


Counter-actualizing Gentrification:

A study of problems and
practices of displacement
in Arnhem, Vienna and Istanbul



Freek de Haan

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A study of problems and practices of
displacement in Arnhem, Vienna and Istanbul

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Acknowledgments

“Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd. Here we have made use of everything that came within range, what was closest as well as farthest away.”

Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, ‘A Thousand Plateaus’

Here it is, the monster devouring ‘everything that came within range’. But, ‘I was several’, with those closest as well as far away...

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Freek de Haan

Chapter 1

Introduction: Problematics of gentrification, axiomatics of actualization

1.1 Gentrification in Europe: A symptomatology

What is gentrification? And how is it a problem? As a primer, let us treat it as a kind of clinical condition, but with the same patience, curiosity and lack of moral prejudice a good doctor would have, faced with some new disease. Let us call it ‘Ruth Glass syndrome’, after the social clinician who first diagnosed and isolated it in Central London in 1964, as ‘an invasion of the middle classes into working class quarters, changing their social character’. But before diving into this history, let that name, RG-syndrome, give us pause to take in some of its symptoms, without rushing into etiology or treatment options, without immediately stating its causes and without ringing the alarm (Yuppie monoculture! Capitalism! Neoliberalism!). In other words, let us first practice some ‘symptomatology’ and look at three clinical cases around Europe that seem to show some economic, social and political signs of Ruth Glass syndrome.

Our first case, Klarendal, Arnhem, The Netherlands (Image 1.1), demonstrates some ambiguous symptoms in the sphere of real estate development. In tandem with the rest of the city, prices for homes have been rising steadily in the working class neighborhood since the turn of the century. And its general image as a place to be avoided has drastically turned. Not surprisingly, this change has spiked the interest of real estate brokers, developers and home buyers. A company like Clockwork Inc.,¹ for instance, has built a new block of 1930s-style terraced houses, on a plot that used to support homes for seniors. Besides counting on making a profit in the area, using the latest techniques of cost reduction and yields calculation, the internationally operating real estate developer was hoping the project would bring it a foothold in the Arnhem market. But there are also more locally oriented developers active in Arnhem, such as real estate entrepreneur Richman. Going more on his guts than by precise cost-benefit accounting, the property merchant looks not for empty(able) plots but for potential monuments. Recently, Klarendal caught his sharp eye for hidden treasure. Among other properties, he has renovated with great attention to detail a row of early twentieth century houses that otherwise would have been ripe for demolition (Image 1.2). A few doors down, yet another entirely different real estate actor is a group of households that have banded together to redevelop a block of dilapidated ‘fixer-uppers’ (*klusshuizen*). With the intention to live in the buildings themselves, the collective has invested not only their savings and mortgages but also

¹Names of individuals have been *anonymized* as much as possible in this thesis for privacy reasons and to avoid personal information that is not scientifically relevant anyway. Some organizations, such as ‘Clockwork Inc.’, have been *pseudonymized* for the same reasons, but also for readability and literary effect. More important than their corporate or institutional identity is the type of phenomenon they exemplify, which their pseudonyms serve to express (in Chapter 5).

their own sweat and tears. In sum, the range of investors has become quite diverse in Klarendal, which was not always the case. Before, it was primarily the local social housing corporation, People's Housing, that did all the property development in Klarendal. The latter, however, still very much present in the neighborhood, is no longer the same kind of social entrepreneur either. Although it has remained wisely conservative in its financial accounting (unlike some of its peers which crashed after 2008), it has invested heavily in the neighborhood in recent years in an attempt to improve the area's bad image. Above and beyond regular upkeep, renovation and sustainability investments in its affordable social housing (supported by the level of technical equipment found at Clockwork Inc.), it has tried to improve the entire territory by 'neighborhood development' (*wijkontwikkeling*). The centerpiece in this effort has been the establishment of the 'Fashion Quarter' in Klarendal. Some 75 commercial properties, which were either vacant or turned into homes, were redeveloped into boutique shops and workplaces, mainly involved in fashion design and production. Moreover, to landmark the change of image, People's Housing installed 'Station Klarendal' at its main junction (Image 1.3). The old post office, located elsewhere across the city, was moved piece by piece and reconstructed at its new location to serve as a classy grand cafe and house new fashion businesses. Long-time residents of Klarendal are conflicted about the changes. Their place of residence no longer gives them a stigma, but they also find the new fashion boutiques and restaurants out of touch with their taste and their wallets.

Thus Klarendal certainly shows signs of gentrification and (mostly indirect) displacement of its original economic and cultural practices, but also a large variety of investments and the dominance of a housing association that keeps living there affordable for the great majority of poorer households. In short, the variation of real estate practices in the area makes it hard to definitively assess whether RG-syndrome is really present.

About ten years later than Klarendal, from around 2013 onwards, our second case, Rudolfshheim-Fünfhaus, Vienna (Image 1.4), has also been experiencing a renewed interest from outside. The former 'stepchild' has released itself of old stigmas of crime and prostitution and is now heralded as the new Berlinesque place to be, 'arm aber sexy' as the saying goes. With the arrival of a more affluent or at least more 'sexy' crowd of artists and creative entrepreneurs, new questions arise about the district's ideal 'social mix'. Local politicians, policy makers, social housing associations and real estate businesses each in their own way visualize, value, plan for or ignore the changing demographics that come with the area's 'gentle urban renewal' (*sanfte Stadterneuerung*). Whereas the social-democrats ruling the District Council interpret the changing social mix in comforting cosmopolitan mantras of togetherness, the populist, right-wing opposition takes sides with the old, native Austrian working class, resisting any social change. And whereas social housing providers avoid, at least publicly, issues of diversity, for-profit real estate developers try to capitalize on the area's cultural variety by marketing to 'diversity seekers'. Meanwhile, at street level, social interactions among residents old and new take on a variety of forms. Most of the time the same spirit of tolerance as espoused by aforementioned office holders rules public spaces. But beneath the cosmopolitan surface social tensions are



Images 1.1-1.3. Above, a satellite view of Klarendal, located in the North of Arnhem (population during period under study, i.e. roughly 2000-2020: ± 7.000 , city-wide: ± 150.000). On its southern side the district is bordered by train tracks, which lead to Arnhem central station, located to the west. Klarendal's western border with the district of St. Marten is marked by the Hommelseweg, which, together with the road along the train tracks, Sonsbeeksingel, and the neighborhood's mainstreet Klarendalseweg, houses most of its commercial life, including the new Fashion Quarter. Also located in the North West, on the Hommelseweg, is the social hub and playground 'Leuke Linde' (Lovely Lime Tree). In the lower left corner, a small part is visible of the Nederrijn river (famous from the Battle of Arnhem) (source: Google Maps, accessed 05-10-2020, marking added). Below, on the left, a row of houses at the Western end of Leuke Linde, redeveloped by listed properties entrepreneur Richman (source: own photo). On the right, the Fashion Quarter's central junction (Sonsbeeksingel-Klarendalseweg). In front, one of its many clothing shops and, in the back, the old, relocated post office building, Station Klarendal, which now houses a grand cafe and some fashion entrepreneurs (source: Tripadvisor.nl, accessed 05-10-2020).

also brewing along class and ethnic lines. Small but cumulative moments of social displacement are expressed primarily in conflicting appropriations and experiences of public space: noisy cars, dogs unleashed, kids playing loudly, youngsters loitering about. By Viennese tradition, people tend to handle their irritations by avoidance and quick appeal to authorities. This in turn produces a rather overregulated public space, with a lot of designated areas, fences and signs explaining rules of social conduct (Image 1.5). However, there are also more ambiguous places to be found in the neighborhood, where such appropriations, including state regulation, seem out of place or gain little traction. The Schwendermarkt (Image 1.6), for instance, has been the occasion for many place-making claims, but has retained a status of an open space, a kind of commons that welcomes the forging of surprising, class bridging social ties or 'social mixing' by being resistant to both commercial 'upgrading' and state regulation instituting an indifferent and fragile liberal tolerance.

In short, in a different sphere of practice than in the above description of Klarendal, that is, in the sphere of socializing in public, we see that Rudolfshiem-Fünfhaus certainly displays some signs of 'social' displacement, but the picture is not as black and white as an 'invasion of the middle classes' would suggest. There are also places that manage to remain 'common' in character and open to unexpected events of 'social mixing'. Again, the presence of RG-syndrome is unsure.

Our third and last clinical case, Beyoğlu, Istanbul (Image 1.7), seems to show the most severe symptoms and this has not passed by its concerned residents. While the historical district of Beyoğlu and the neighborhood of Cihangir in particular have been experiencing classic symptoms of Ruth Glass syndrome since the late 1980s, the condition has clearly mutated into something else since the 2000s, something more acute. Politically speaking, Turkey has experienced a rather dramatic change of the guard in recent decades, with the conservative AK party of former Istanbul mayor and now president Erdoğan sidelining a seventy-year-old hegemony of founding father Kemal Atatürk's republican heirs. Maintaining close ties to certain business elites, especially in construction, the new political regime has, since the turn of the century, had a significant impact on spatial planning practices. Urban planning has become focused around large-scale strategic projects of 'urban transformation' (*kentsel dönüşüm*). Deploying a host of new AKP initiated legislation, special projects are pushed through by rather arbitrary legal exemptions, bypassing, for instance, local authorities, participation requirements or conservation principles. While especially important for historic Beyoğlu, such principles are repeatedly shunned by the new public-private partners of construction, through any (semi)legal means necessary. For instance, a huge waterfront development called Galataport, which will include a mix of new mass tourism, shopping and luxury living functions, is exempted from Beyoğlu's integral Conservation Plan by a combination of privatization and coastal planning laws. As Ankara reasserts its powers by such exemptions, discontented citizens living in the surrounding area see their concerns violently marginalized. However, legal limits are also tested within conservation legislation. For example, under the rather paradoxical banner of 'conservation by renewal' (*yenileyerek koruma*), a few blocks of the working class neighborhood of Tarlabası are being entirely reconstructed into luxury housing and touristic amenities, demolishing all



Images 1.4–1.6. A satellite view of Vienna’s 15th district, Rudolfshheim–Fünfhaus, located in the western part of the city, just outside the Gürtel (belt road) (population: ±70.000, city-wide: ±1.700.000). The area is clearly split into a northern and a southern section by the train yard behind the Westbahnhof (attached to the belt road) (source: Google Maps, accessed 05–10–2020, marking added). In the lower left corner, just outside the district border is the 18th century Schönbrunn Palace, the main summer residence of the former Habsburg royals. Below, on the left, Image 1.5 is a photo of a sign at one of the district’s parks explaining rules of social conduct in German, Turkish and Croatian. It is sponsored by the Vienna Integration Fund, long tasked with the integration of immigrants (source: own photo). On the right, Image 1.6 shows some of the stalls at the otherwise inconspicuous Schwendermarkt (source: Wikipedia.org). It is situated in the middle of the district, not far below the train tracks visible in Image 1.4. More than the surrounding parks and market squares, the ambivalent public area has been the occasion for many place-making claims, leading to surprising moments of actual ‘social mixing’.

but the old Ottoman-era facades (or transforming even these into what critics call a ‘simulacrum’ thereof) (Image 1.8). In practice, the old residents, especially tenants and those without proper proof of ownership, have little say in their displacement supposedly in the name of heritage conservation. Political participation, required by law, is reduced to information provision. However, not all civil participation and action is quashed and not all rule of law is done for. The Turkish state bureaucracy, its legal apparatus especially, are still a factor to be reckoned with, and still acts as a brake on hasty development when citizens (know how to) appeal to it. Moreover, the new majoritarianism of the AKP seems to also have provoked a reconfiguration of civil society (including many of the previous elites employed by the Kemalist bureaucracy). In recent years local neighborhood associations have increasingly allied and organized through urban platforms. The most dramatic showdown of this alliance against the antagonizing government was the protest and two-week occupation of Beyoğlu’s Gezi Park and Taksim Square in late spring of 2013. When the state announced it would demolish the Republican-era park and replace it with a replica of the Ottoman barracks that were there 70 years before, the people of Istanbul rose up. To stop it from being privatized and only serving commercial ends, they reclaimed it as a commons. After the Gezi commune’s violent evacuation, its often refreshingly carnivalesque ‘Gezi spirit’ did not die. Besides being channeled into dozens of urban forums around Istanbul and even other cities (Image 1.9), it has politicized a whole new generation of Turks.

Clearly, Beyoğlu shows some quite obvious signs of RG-syndrome, much of it enforced through political and judicial means. The government shows little intention to be inclusive to concerns of the area’s incumbent residents, whether it is about a brutal eviction or privatization and commercialization of historic public spaces. But, as a reaction, citizens also counter-litigate and protest this political displacement in new and other ways, thereby mitigating and delaying some of the worst symptoms.

As already becomes clear from this brief overview of cases, gentrification appears to manifest itself in wildly variegated forms in very different settings. First, on a most superficial level, there is the huge difference in population metrics when comparing these cases. The respective populations of Arnhem, Vienna and Istanbul are each a tenfold of the next. Also, the three clinical histories are not in sync historically, with every case separated by about a decade from the previous in terms of when the condition set in. Second, on a deeper, contextual level, differences in terms of history, culture, politics and modernization trajectories become even more pronounced, perhaps to a point of incomparability. For instance, whereas Vienna and Istanbul were the political centers of enormous competing empires that collapsed in WWI, Arnhem, while famous for being the site of a decisive battle in WWII, could never claim such a status and remains a rather ordinary city. Another notable difference, but then between the two Northern European cities and the Southern metropolis of Istanbul, is their supposed level of ‘development’ in terms of market institutions, secularization and democracy. But the variety is not necessarily topographical. Indeed, thirdly, the above overview also presents us with a significant multiplicity of practices of gentrification, among economic actors in Arnhem (profit-oriented, aesthetic, utilitarian, social developers), social relations in Vienna (demographic,



Images 1.7-1.9. A satellite view of the district of Beyoğlu, Istanbul (population: $\pm 250,000$, city-wide: $\pm 15,000,000$) (source: Google Maps, accessed 05-10-2020, markings added). Some important sites of 'urban transformation' are clearly visible, such as the green Gezi Park and adjacent Taksim Square in the northeast, and the new tourism hub Galataport, under construction in the gray area on the southeastern coastline. The bridges below lead to the historical peninsula, hosting the famous Topkapı Palace and Hagia Sophia Mosque. While our research first focused foremost on the neighborhood of Cihangir (population: $\pm 3,600$, official borders marked in green on the map), its economic functions and politics proved inextricably entangled with its immediate surroundings. For instance, to its northwest, the flagship 'conservation by renewal' plans for Tarlabası (of which a computer rendition is visible in Image 1.8, source: Beyoğlu Conservation Plan, 2011) give an impression of the sanitized, quasi-conserved space that the government has in mind for the whole historical district. In May 2013, it was similar plans for Gezi Park that ignited its anarchic occupation and the ensuing countrywide protests against the AKP's oppressive urban policies. After the initial Gezi movement, it broke out into dozens of open forums spread across Istanbul. Beyoğlu continued its political conversations at Cihangir Park, shown on the right, in Image 1.9 (source: Başka Haber, 25-06-2013). Most forums remained active until the municipal elections of 2014 again reclaimed people's political energies.

conflictual, evasive, ‘commoning’) and political processes in Istanbul (majoritarian, bureaucratic, insurrectionary, deliberative).

Now, throughout all this geographical, historical and practical variety, signs of the original RG-syndrome can certainly still be diagnosed. And Glass, despite thinking it was unique to the British capital, without a doubt expressed a strong intuition of its many economic, social and political dimensions even from the confines of the London situation during the 1950s. However, as the condition of gentrification has spread throughout the global urban hierarchy and adapted its form to a highly diverse range of local and historical contexts, thereby contaminating just about every social, commercial and political practice, it may today have evolved too far outside of those confines, such that a revisiting of the initial symptomatology is warranted. This is of course not the first time this has been noted and the history of gentrification research and debates reads like a coming to terms with this spatial, historical and cultural multiplicity, both as practiced and as observed. Famous and canonized are the frictions among the contradictory diagnoses by Ruth Glass’ more radical Marxist heirs and other, less capital determinist urban clinicians. Today, there is much room for scientific pluralism in gentrification discourse, yet favored paradigms and their fast explanations still strongly contaminate and dominate its symptomatology. Despite many attempts, this tension has never been resolved. We now have a rich theoretical tool box available to explain every economic, political and cultural part of the phenomenon, yet in the background incommensurable essentialisms persist. And so we think we know how gentrification emerges (its essential ‘causes’) and what it can do (its most serious ‘consequences’), but on closer inspection, as will be argued in more academic detail in the following chapters, we only have an epistemologically fragmented understanding of a supposedly ontologically (‘essentially’) singular phenomenon. What we need instead is an epistemologically more singular approach to what is today, and perhaps always was, an ontologically multiple event.

At this point, therefore, the time has come to slow down, take stock, relax our habitual interpretations of RG-syndrome and reflect on our basic social diagnostic machinery. Only then, as will be argued in this thesis, can we allow ourselves to regroup its symptoms in new, more adequate forms and also to more fundamentally reject, adjust and reaffirm its genealogy, etiology and political-ethical treatment options. All in a way that better suits the current problematic. What is still lacking is the kind of non-essentialist and, for lack of a better word at this point, holistic approach that ties together the problem of gentrification without condensing it to one aspect or part of it, such as ground rent levels, class distinctions or spatial governance regimes. What is needed is an approach to the problem that manages to instead tie it down to a multiplicity of cultural, economic and political *practices*, while not losing sight of its special coherence. Typically disregarded and trivialized through the use of more abstract, speedier explanations, practices describe *how* we actually *do* gentrification, how it actualizes itself as a problem in the form of a confluence of concrete (in)capacities of real estate economization, social interaction, neighborhood politics and so on. In other words, we need an approach that allows us to defer the question of *the* cause of *the* consequences of gentrification and instead ask how it emerges as a problem and a practice in places as different as Klarendal,

Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus or Beyoğlu. Only then can we revisit all its implied ethical questions of social diversity, economic justice and democracy in a way that does not rely on fast but rather inarticulate and performatively exhausted notions of the evils of elite monoculture, capitalism and neoliberalism.

With these objectives in mind, and as implicated by the title ‘Counter-actualizing gentrification’, this thesis can be said to explore and affirm two kinds of truth. The first truth is a *problematic* one, concerning the many-sided phenomenon of gentrification exemplified by the three cases above. The second, is an *axiomatic* truth, which relates to the espoused research strategy of ‘counter-actualization’, our preferred new diagnostic machinery needed to comprehensively navigate the multiplicity of theories and practices of gentrification. Briefly put, the method works in a direction *counter* to the way our world is posed to *actualize* itself, moving from the above topographical maps and other surface metrics (prices, demographics, electoral patterns) to the narratives and practices that underlie, oppose and escape them. In this introduction both problematic and axiomatic claims to truth are introduced and brought together, briefly at first (1.2.1-1.2.6), leading up to a set of leading research questions (1.2.7), and then more elaborately in subsequent sections (1.3 and 1.4). After this subject-related and more philosophical groundwork, an elaborate methodological section will introduce the logistics and research design of the European project that this thesis was a part of (1.5.2); my own activities within and beyond the project (1.5.2) and about the complications of doing comparative research within the context of the ‘axiomatics of problematics’ introduced in earlier sections (1.5.3). The chapter closes with an outline of the rest of the thesis (1.6).

1.2 Gentrification counter-actualized: Two truths, two research questions

1.2.1 A problematic truth: Theories, empirics and ethics of gentrification

To repeat, this thesis explores and affirms two kinds of truth, one problematic and one axiomatic. The first truth concerns the *problem* of gentrification. The truth or falsity of a problem definition, of its well-posedness rather than of its solution, is a matter of how it forces us to think beyond a complacent common sense (Deleuze, 1994). A first glance at a common sense definition of gentrification will show that this is not an easy kind of truth to pose well. Take the current Oxford Dictionary definition, which is much more encompassing and general than Ruth Glass’ ‘invading of working class quarters by middle classes’: “the process of changing an area, a person, etc. so that they are suitable for, or can mix with, people of a higher social class than before”. Obviously, and in contrast to Glass’ ‘invasion’-based definition, this one is bereft of any problematic element, not in the last place of the violence and displacement that are often implied in the ‘making suitable’ of an area for higher class land users. Thus posed, we may question how well it invites us to think or feel or ask questions about the process. It would certainly be an understatement to say the definition does not represent the true social, economic and political weight and complexity of the problem of gentrification, which, as already suggested, has over the years shown to have the power to bring together a multitude of issues defining

our time. Indeed, in its presence, many theoretical, empirical and ethico-political debates on urban space are brought into their starkest relief. As a broad name for the dynamic expression of inequality in the modern capitalist city, gentrification could surely be said to be among the most pressing urban challenges today.

These aspects are what makes the problem of gentrification interesting as a research topic but also quite challenging. First, on the *theoretical* side of the subject, it has seen just about any available scientific paradigm pass its door. While at its core, at least historically speaking, it has been a Marxist problematic (eg. Glass, 1964, Smith, 1979a, Lees et al., 2010), gentrification has been subjected throughout the years to a rather incommensurable bunch of approaches, from neoclassical economics (eg. Schill and Nathan, 1983, Skaburskis, 2010) to cultural geography (eg. Mills, 1988, Bourassa, 1993, Ley, 1994, Caulfield, 1989) to feminist theory (eg. Rose, 1984, Bondi, 1994) to Bourdieuvian or Polanyian sociology (eg. Jager, 1986, Butler and Robson, 2001, Bernt, 2012) to Gramscian/post-Marxist discourse analyses (eg. Loopmans, 2008, Davidson, 2009) to Foucauldian governmentality approaches (eg. Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008, Sequera and Janoschka, 2015). Second, *empirically* gentrification challenges our discriminatory powers, in terms of both space (where is it?) and time (when is it?). The spatial question has generated reports of gentrification all over the world ('gentrification generalized', Smith, 2002, Atkinson and Bridge, 2005, Lees et al., 2016), but has also raised issues about its general applicability as a concept and possible status as a vehicle for Anglo-Saxon epistemic hegemony (Maloutas, 2011, Lees et al., 2015). From a postcolonial perspective (as will be explained in more detail below), it may leave too little room for more local interpretations of spatial changes. Likewise, the temporal question has led to many studies of global and local origins and stages of gentrification, but has also raised issues over its historical uniqueness, contingency or necessity. Third, on the *ethical* side of gentrification, we find just as many views on how the issue may be problematized, politicized and handled economically. While academic voices outright cheering for gentrification are rare (eg. Byrne, 2002), there are strong alternative discourses of 'revitalization' and 'urban renaissance' that tend to obscure the displacive effects of gentrification (Lees, 2008). However, in more or less deliberate ways, many have (roughly) split the general for-or-against issue into discussions of social mix and diversity (eg. Bridge et al., 2012), economic inequalities (eg. Smith, 1996, Slater, 2017) and democratic process (eg. Uitermark 2009, Hyra, 2015). This specification significantly complexifies the ethical question of gentrification, yet not doing so would also certainly sell it short. In sum, gentrification has already thoroughly tested our theoretical, empirical and political powers and stretched them to their limits. Thus, notwithstanding its almost equal power to appeal to our most complacent faculties of recognition, the problem-event of gentrification *forces us to think*, thereby revealing some of its 'truth' as a problem (cf. Deleuze, 1994). The first objective of this thesis then, is further developing and bringing out this truth of the problem. This is done by the empirical investigation of the three European neighborhoods that have been subject to gentrification.

1.2.2 An axiomatic truth: The ‘speculative turn’ and the social sciences

The second truth that occupies this thesis is of a very different kind, even though in practice both are inextricably related. This truth concerns the *axiom of actualization*. As an axiomatic truth, rather than a learned, problematic truth like the one introduced above (more about this difference below), it hinges on a basic metaphysical decision. But as will become clear throughout this thesis, it is an ontological prescription with far-reaching epistemological and methodological implications, which is the reason why it is chosen. The axiom is extracted from current metaphysical debates that emerged around the ‘speculative turn’ (Bryant et al., 2011), so called because they include new perspectives that contend to speculate beyond the ‘correlation’ of being and thought that has been so firmly instituted since the Kantian revolution (including in the social sciences). In a very particular way, the axiom combines several positions prevailing in the ontological discussion. The concerning standpoints broadly find reality primarily in either numbers and mathematics; interpretations, subjects and discourses; or practices, affects and singularities (networks, assemblages etc.). For decades if not centuries, the second, quintessentially Modern standpoint has been the dominant philosophical position (even if not in popular and ordinary ‘naively realist’ discourse). By epistemological reasoning, it emphasizes the primary constitution of *our* reality, the only one accessible to humans, by way of interpretive categories (subjective, social or systematic). This however, as both the other standpoints bring under attack in their own way, distinguishes the human (interpreter) too strictly from the non-human (interpreted), *either* because we have devised the mathematical tools to transcend human finitude (eg. Meillassoux, 2008), *or* because we never have been metaphysically exceptional as humans (eg. Latour, 1993). As such, we find two seemingly mutually exclusive escape attempts from the Kantian epistemological prison, both already suggested by its designer: the mathematical and dynamical sublime (cf. Deleuze, 1984).² In this thesis, as will be further elaborated in Section 1.4 of this chapter, a risky attempt is made to respect the *posthuman* exceptionality of the mathematical from the *non-human* standpoint of ontological unexceptionality, while avoiding a naïve, pre-critical realism. The main intellectual source for achieving this is the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who, especially in collaboration with psycho-analyst Felix Guattari, has outlined a ‘transcendental empiricism’ that gives *ontological priority* to empirical singularities, affects and practices while being able to reserve a special place for both interpretive (sign) structures, as the main

² In Deleuze’s reading of Kant, which takes special interest in the Third Critique, the aesthetic and the sublime gain a generative rather than deviant status. By confronting our interpretive faculties (of reason, understanding, imagination, sensibility) with something that exceeds their powers of presentation, sublime aesthetic experiences force them into discord, thereby opening thought up to difference beyond itself. The sublime comes in two forms that constitute the limits of representational thought, “the mathematical Sublime of the immense and the dynamic Sublime of power (the former brings reason into play from the standpoint of the faculty of knowledge, the latter from the standpoint of the faculty of desire)” (Deleuze, 1984: 52). Badiou and other like minded rationalists could be said to run with the former, finding a truth and subjectivity in mathematics which transcend the realm of representational knowledge (Badiou, 2006: 5-6, Crockett, 2013). Deleuze and his followers primarily pursue the Spinoza–Nietzsche path of more-than-human power and desire.

preoccupation of post-Kantian critical philosophies, *and* for mathematical, scientific and economic axiomatics, as the objects of posthuman speculations. What they also suggest, and what forms one of the basic axioms of this thesis, is that these affects, signs and axiomatics and the societal assemblages in which they are produced, can be related in order of succession. That is, historically, but also in the present, these different ontological components stand in a (onto)genetic relationship, whereby singularities and affects, making up practices, generate or *actualize* themselves through interpretative signs and mathematical operations.³

Many of the precursory and new perspectives considered part of the philosophical ‘speculative turn’, especially those prioritizing ‘more-than-human’ entities, affects and practices, have quickly found their way into anthropological, sociological and, perhaps most of all, geographical discussions. With words often tracing back to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, like ‘actor-network’, ‘affect’, ‘assemblage’ or simply ‘practice’, many so-called relational approaches have expressed the ambition to come to terms with the ‘non-representational’, something long proscribed by their Kantian epistemological roots. Not surprisingly, it has not been easy to reconcile these new approaches with more traditional paradigms of social theory and method. Within critical geography, for instance, the discussions around the use of ‘assemblage’ (following McFarlane, 2009, 2011) bring this out quite sharply. While some take up the new relational mantle with deep ontological commitment, rejecting all preconceived transcendental categories and contexts of urban inquiry, such as those of spatial scale (Fariás, 2011, see also Fariás, 2009), others deny ‘assemblage’ any ontological purchase at all, confining its value to the methodological (Brenner et al., 2011). A core point of contention between these two positions, is about the ‘naive objectivism’ of which both sides accuse each other. Brenner et al. (2011: 233), self-proclaimed part of the critical tradition in philosophy (ie. Kant, Hegel, Marx, Adorno etc., Brenner, 2009), point at how basic political economic structures mediate our understanding of society and are in fact necessary to distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant. Ignoring such mediation and thinking facts speak for themselves then amounts to naive objectivism and an ultimately ideological affirmation of the status quo. Fariás (2011), coming from the perspective of Deleuzian and actor-network theory (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, DeLanda, 2006, Latour, 2005a), wonders whether his opponents are actually critical enough. Are they not naively objectifying an all too coherent capitalist edifice of ‘underpinning’ logics, strategies and contradictions that as such mediates any and all inquiry (but to which they have privileged access)? A truly critical inquiry would be ready to ‘problematize’ all of reality and not decide which objects, relations or interests are more relevant to study than others (Fariás, 2011).

This thesis, however, will neither ‘naively objectify’ whatever conditions are

³ Used throughout this thesis, the word ‘actualization’ designates the creative achievement of a potential. Following Bergson and Deleuze (1990b, 1994), this is primarily to distinguish it from the so-called ‘realization’ of a ‘possibility’. A possibility, like a kind of ideal blueprint, *resembles* the real and only differs from it in that it lacks reality. The actual(ized), in contrast, is a *creative* product of (‘virtual’) relations that do not resemble and are just as real as what they bring forth. Think of how real relations between genes, womb and mother bring forth (actualize) a foetus that was nowhere to be found as a blueprint or pre-existing possibility. (See below Sections 1.2.3 and 2.2)

supposed to prestructure our being and thinking (capitalist political economy, neoliberal ideology etc.) nor ‘naively’ abolish the transcendental method. By systematically bringing together the speculative *axiomatics* of actualization and the *problematics* of gentrification – a concept historically defined by political economy – an attempt is made here to revisit the basic categories of critical geography from the perspective of new relational theories. As such, problematics and axiomatics combine into a consistent social scientific epistemology and methodology, to be further explained in Sections 1.4 and 1.5, that could be characterized as a transcendental empiricism, a science of problems.

1.2.3 *Transcendental empiricism: A first itinerary*

Let us have a first look at what such a science might impel us to do, in order to then arrive at some main research questions. This will take some preparation, since, in a science of problems and practices, posing the right (truthful) questions is at least as important as finding truthful answers. Looking at gentrification, we could say that before it is distinctly *interpreted* or precisely *measured* it constitutes a complex multiplicity of *practices* condensing around a singular critical transition, a tendency, an event. As such, it forms an ontologically ‘objective’ problem to be solved through such practices. Callon (2009), speaking of global warming rather than gentrification, compares the problem or ‘issue’ in such an objective yet undetermined (or ‘totipotent’) state to a biological stem cell that has not yet differentiated into a specialized one. Thus global warming constitutes a ‘stem issue’ first, before it is *economized*, *politicized* and *scientized* in specific practices, for example in the form of a carbon market. In a very similar way as Callon, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) have likened the state of such an ‘objective’ problem to that of an egg: a problem of which the mature animal born from it is but one possible ‘solution’ or actualization. What both Callon and Deleuze and Guattari aim at with these analogies is to conceive of problems as real and immanent to material processes and practices rather than mere projections of ideal or social transcendental subjects or structures (for example, Spector and Kitsuse, 1977). Their transcendental empiricism attempts to trace the world in its problematic, embryonic genesis, rather than deduce a general representation from its supposedly mature form, which then retroactively passes for its ideal condition of possibility (for example, ‘human subject’ from white middle aged men or ‘society’ from modern national institutions). The world thus inquired becomes inherently problematic, even constituted by material-semiotic problems, with the apparently distinct entities populating our actual reality (for example, ‘mature’ animals, subjects, societies, markets) serving only as their temporary and incomplete ‘solutions’. This implies that problems may be changed but never subsumed by their solutions and thus could be said to always outlive the latter (hence their status as a virtual ‘tendency’ rather than an actual object). In our case we could say, even though the tendencies of social, economic and political displacement that constitute the problem of gentrification find their combined resolution in any actual state of a certain territory, those tendencies are never cancelled out by this actualization and keep haunting it. That is, the problem persists. How can we gain a first understanding of such a ghostly stem problem?

With genetic conditions related to their actualizations as problems to solutions, any actual space of gentrification could be considered conditioned by a real-life problem or ‘stem issue’ of gentrification. Inquiring into such conditions, rather like obtaining stem cells from highly specialized ones (Callon, 2009), would demand the extraction of some kind of multidimensional section of the ‘stem’ problem of gentrification from actually enacted, narrated and measured spaces. Inevitably, our habitual use of language tends to fall short in this operation. However, in elaborating what has later been dubbed ‘assemblage theory’, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) give us a recipe for attempting it nonetheless. As far as natural language goes then, a problem or multiplicity might best be described or sectioned by an ‘indefinite article + proper name + infinitive verb’:⁴ Producing rather nonsensical expressions ‘freed from all formal significances and personal subjectifications’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 263), this formula explores the limits of a language otherwise primed for generalization and the cancellation of multiplicity (cf. Deleuze, 1990a). What if we perform this operation on problems of gentrification? Something in the way of, for example, ‘a Notting Hill / Tarlabası / Hoogvliet to gentrify’ could then capture those problem-events of gentrification in their most desubjectified + singular + affective state. In an intuited state, that is, still as far away removed (as language allows) from generalities of political ideology, culture and capital. In a way defaulting our preconceptions of ‘gentrification generalized’ (as mentioned in Section 1.2.1), it may thus translate into a first itinerary for the development of less reductive accounts of gentrification: (1) forget overarching cultures, political scales and economic systems (*desubjectify*),⁵ (2) follow a neighbourhood by its proper name (*singularize*) and (3) immerse yourself into its immense bundle of social, economic and political practices (*be affected*).

1.2.4 Reflex: Abstract etics, concrete emics

Before explaining this initial roadmap further, we have to address an important distinction that is only implied in these three steps. This is the reflexive distinction between the *etic* and *emic*, which in its original ethnological usage, captures the difference between accounts of the world expressed in conceptual schemes regarded as meaningful by the scientific community and those of the natives being studied (Lett, 1990: 130–131). Although originating from a rather universalist structuralism (*phonetic-phonemic*), the distinction has, under the influence of postcolonial thought, come to designate a much more symmetrical hermeneutics. Thus scientific etic categories are no longer considered more objective than emic ones in any metaphysical sense.

⁴ Deleuze and Guattari apply the formula to psychoanalysis (‘a Little Hans to become horse’) and evolutionary biology (‘a Wasp to meet Orchid’); two disciplines they perceive as mired in essentialist generalities. Perhaps in the same way, we might capture Callon’s unresolved stem issue as ‘an Earth’s climate to change’.

⁵ To avoid confusion, the injunction to ‘desubjectify’ here means bracketing the subjects (rather than objects) in a linguistic sense, be they ‘agents’ or ‘structures’. In gentrification research, this would mean sovereign housing consumers but also capital, class and political structures. To desubjectify therefore does not imply a move from agency to (objective) structure in an ontological sense.

However, in order not to lapse into uncritical surrender and relativism toward the emic (which actually bases its cultural symmetry on an Archimedean viewpoint similar to that of the etic positivist, cf. Latour, 2004a), we have to reconceive of their relation in pragmatic terms. This way, another mode of translation between the emic and etic becomes conceivable, beyond unilateral capture (be it universalist or relativist). When conceived not as an informational transfer between different interpretations but a superposition of *practices*, translation between emic and etic comes to mean the ‘production of difference out of incommensurability rather than an equivalence out of difference’ (Morris in Chakrabarty, 2000: 263n57, see also Section 1.5.3.3). Now if we want to have emic practices make a maximum difference to our etic investigations (*be affected*), that is, capture a maximum of *concrete* empirical details without losing consistency and significance, we need to decide on a maximally *abstract* conceptual tool box for our research practice.⁶

1.2.5 *Etics: Two key sets of concepts*

Returning to our itinerary then, when the first step (*desubjectify*) says ‘forget overarching cultures, political scales and economic systems’, this means, first of all, bracketing any habitual *etic* categories of sociological and geographical explanation. It inserts a momentary retreat from the ‘politics of explanation’ (Latour, 1988b) with its template structures of responsibility, its *causes célèbres* and its meta-reflexive games of accusation. This is more or less what Farías (2011) suggests we should do when we go out and study the urban. While the third step will allow many such categories back in under new transcendental conditions, if only to question and debate them, this first step is a necessary run up to step two (*singularize*), which implies nothing less than an intuitionist surrender to the emic. It means a ‘following of an actor’, as actor-network theorists would say (Latour, 2005a, Farías, 2011), one that goes by a singular *emic* proper name. Bracketing our theoretical common sense then, we singularize our empirical cases. In this thesis, three urban neighborhoods where we sensed something interesting was transpiring: ‘a Klarendal / Rudolfshiem-Fünfhaus / Beyoğlu’. However, in the third step (*be affected*), two sets of the most abstract kind of *etic* categories are introduced to guide the (transcendental) empirical investigation of whatever these singularities may have to undergo:⁷

⁶ Here, the abstract and the concrete should not be seen as logical or dialectical opposites (cf. Deleuze, 1978). In the Deleuzian ontology proposed, practices are *concrete* (‘grown together’), in that they constitute our immediate lifeworld, but by that same feat also *abstract* (‘drawn away’), in the sense that their relevant, grown together qualities (tendencies, critical intensities, rhythms, capacities) are rather withdrawn from our *discrete* (‘separating’) and, perhaps, *extractive* codifications of them. The important point here is that the maximally abstract set of etic concepts, distilling on a *methodical, practice* level the critical diagrammatic differences between flows, practices, interpretations and metrics (Chapter 2), allows us to connect and resonate at that level with the maximum of emic concreteness, but with a minimal imposition of etic discretions.

⁷ Mentioned here and there in relation to Deleuze and Guattari but not explained up to this point, a ‘singularity’ might be circumscribed as flow of potentials or an assemblage of tendencies that sits between stability and instability (or as suggested in Chapters 2–4, it is ‘metastable’, cf. Deleuze, 1990a: 103). As such, it generates *affects* that can make a living with it (economize, define its values)

- The *first* set of etic categories corresponds to the aforementioned ‘multidimensional section’ of the stem issue of gentrification. In any event of gentrification – for now taking the rather badly posed dictionary definition at face value – singularities are *naturalized/socialized* (becoming ‘areas’, ‘persons’),⁸ have their affects *economized* (‘made suitable’) and – lacking in the aforementioned definition – become *politicized* as concerns rise (subjectification). In other words, as a *singularity* generating *affects* and *concerns*, any material-semiotic problem of gentrification will be actualized by *emic* practices of *socialization*, *economization* and *politicization* (cf. Callon, 2009).⁹ These include emic practices of stoop sitting, arguing, making a living, rebuilding a house or protesting in the streets. But also of financial speculation, electoral politics or even (non-etic) scientific studies involved in the process (ie. models of land markets used to justify policy). As hidden, black-boxed, passive or sporadic they may be, neither one is more or less of a practice than any other.

The empirical chapters of this thesis each study exactly this multiplicity of practices on their own terms. Chapter 4 juxtaposes the gentrifying neighborhoods of Klarendal, Arnhem and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, Vienna, to explore a continuum of practices of *socialization*. Chapter 5 then takes a deep-dive into Klarendal and compares practices of real estate *economization* related to that neighborhood alone. Finally, Chapter 6 compares the practices by which gentrification has been *politicized* around Cihangir, Istanbul, and, again, Klarendal. Thus, each chapter studies the ‘co-actualization’ of

and *concerns* that anticipate its reassembly (politicize, define its publics).

⁸ Socialization here means something very different from its classical sociological meaning of the internalization of the norms of society by an individual through upbringing and education. Quite the opposite, it is the performance of the social through representations like ‘individual’ and ‘society’. Without academic or folk practices of socialization, there is no society nor ‘social facts’ (cf. Latour, 2005a: 257). In this regard, it is closely related to practices of ‘naturalization’, ie. performing nature, which does not pre-exist as such, as ‘natural fact’, mainly but not only through scientific practices. Through social science especially, the social, usually the realm of contingency and moral choice, can be ‘naturalized’ using special classification systems and mathematics (to such an extent that contingent moral categories and their relations are presented as absolute necessities). But in more everyday discourse on morality and identity as well, and also influenced by science, socialization and naturalization are often hard to distinguish (‘(un)natural’ becomes another word for ‘(not) right’ and ‘(not) me’). In short, what naturalization and socialization, as defined here, have in common, is that they try to approach and cultivate singularities or identify and stabilize them through aesthetics, classification and, sometimes, measurement. Although the focus in this thesis is on socialization and only that term will be used, it should be noted that practices of naturalization (of the social) are also implied.

⁹ For now, this can only be described in very abstract and general terms, but these will become more concrete throughout the empirical chapters and in the conclusion. As suggested in note 7, *singularities* (singular events or places), conceived as metastable assemblages of potentials (Chapter 4), bring forth *affects* or practices that (desire to) connect to, care for and make a living through them (ie. repeat, evolve, proliferate) (see Chapter 5). These, however, also tend to generate *concerns*, over territory/property and prestige/stigma, especially among individuated beings such as us humans (ie. sexual/dying beings, see Chapter 5). These concerns, as a kind of anxiety over things broken (cf. Heidegger, 2010, Latour, 2005b, 2007), are politicized by affected publics; collective subjects that say ‘no’; anticipatory assemblages that plan for alternatives; and sociotechnical apparatuses of governmentality (Chapter 6).




Image 1.10. An abstract diagram of (counter-)actualization. Schematized here, the concept of (counter-)actualization distinguishes practices, interpretations and metrics and relates them in terms of necessary conditioning. Moving up and from left to right, some interpretations emerge from practices and some of those interpretations are subsequently quantified as metrics. The epistemic strategy of counter-actualization moves down from metrics to interpretations to practices for the purpose of critical interpretation and reconfiguration of practice. This diagram will be absolutely central to the rest of this thesis and will return in many forms. In Chapters 3-7 it will be applied to and made more concrete in terms of practices of socialization, economization and politicization specifically.

a whole multiplicity of social, economic or political practices by comparing either across two neighborhoods or within one.

- However, to follow and systematically describe this process of actualization, a *second* set of etic concepts is required. This is the already mentioned distinction of *practices*, *interpretations* and *metrics*. Most human socializing, economizing and politicizing today involve signifying and calculating practices, that is, qualifying interpretations¹⁰ and quantifying metrics.¹¹ As

¹⁰ Throughout this thesis the notion of ‘interpretations’ is defined very broadly, as acts of meaning-making that constitute subjects and their objects. In this way it follows modern hermeneutic philosophy (Heidegger, 2010, Gadamer, 1989) in its critique of positivism and expansion of the definition beyond the context of the deciphering of biblical or historical texts. However, it also does not restrict interpretation to the human (let alone exalt it as the ‘essence of man’) (cf. Luhmann, 2012, Bryant, 2011, see also Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3).

¹¹ Notice that both sets of concepts are genealogically entangled (see Chapter 2). While practices of naturalization/socialization have their base in flows and tendencies of attraction, transition and metastability (ie. singularities, see Chapter 4), modern human socialization implies *practices* of cohabitation, *interpretations* of group identity and *metrics* of some such identities by statistical institutions. Likewise, practices of economization have bacterial origins (ie. originate from ecologies of pre-individual sets of affects, see Chapter 5), but human economization also implies concerns over, or ‘interests’ of, prestige, territory, property and money. Practices of politicization, lastly, have sexual and predatory roots (ie. emerge from a concern for the future in between birth and death, see Chapter 6), but modern human politicization actualizes concerns through narratives of victimhood, injustice, decline and progress; and through electoral metrics of parties and policies representing those ideological interpretations. In all three kinds of practices, the introduction and then feedback effects of mathematics (first money, then voting and science, cf. Sohn-Rethel, 1978, Graeber, 2011) has forced radical sociotechnological changes, such that the above origins become hard to distinguish and unearth. To achieve the latter, nonetheless, a practice of counter-actualization works to move not just beyond positivist equations of math and reality but also beyond interpretivist restrictions.

will be further substantiated in this chapter and the next two, interpretations and metrics cannot be existentially reduced to practices but practices can certainly be regarded as their ontological conditions of possibility. Moreover, the same can be said about the relation between metrics and interpretations: the latter condition but do not determine the former. Thus a threefold model of necessary conditioning, or in genetic rather than logical terms, a model of *actualization* presents itself, where practices may give rise to interpretations, which in turn may generate metrics. However, as will be further elaborated in Section 1.4, this serialized set of ontological concepts describing processes of actualization also points to a pertinent epistemological strategy of *counter-actualization*. As the term suggests, this means studying social, economic and political phenomena by starting with *metrics* (facts, prices, votes) to see what *interpretations* inform them (indicators, theories, values, ideologies) and which alternative interpretations they exclude – a fairly familiar critical move. This is then followed, however, by a second analytical move, that relates both quantified and alternative interpretations to the *practices* that generate them – thereby also bringing into view those practices that are represented by neither (*How* are residents counted, (self)identified and mixed? *How* is real estate exploited, valued and cared for? *How* are issues of gentrification voted on, protested, or (de)marginalized?). So apart from providing analytical traction and systematics in research practice, counter-actualization can also open windows on adjacent possibilities, untapped capacities and otherwise unforeseen risks.

The three empirical chapters each demonstrate in different ways how the counter-actualization scheme can help navigate and relate both urban/gentrification theory and empirical fieldwork. Thus Chapter 4, after a distinct treatment of theories of social mixing, follows a strict path of counter-actualization, moving from the emic metrics (statistics in use) around Klarendal and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus toward daily, street-level interactions and ending up at events and practices that manage to elude foregoing theories of socialization and mixing. Along the way, different theoretical notions of (the failure of) social mixing are applied and evaluated. In Chapter 5, counter-actualization is first applied to economic *theory* (as a means of ‘desubjectifying’ it), moving from theories of rent (gaps) to class analyses to a theory of practices of economization. Subsequently, an *empirical* route of counter-actualization is mapped out across a series of practices with a varying focus on rents and profit, prestige and symbolic violence, or creative production and socio-ecological welfare. As mentioned, this analysis stays largely *within* Klarendal. Lastly, Chapter 6 presents again another take on counter-actualization, where the theoretical and the empirical are enfolded step by step in confrontation with standard theories of political science and geography. Working through class-based theories of politics *as applied to* Turkish urban transformation and governmentality approaches *as applied to* Dutch gentrification efforts (ie. interpretation vs. metrics led notions of politics), the chapter embeds both within a theoretical-empirical range of practices that politicize the issue in different but, as such, contiguous ways.

However, the above two sets of etic concepts combine (practices + actualization) into an ontological framework (Image 1.10) and epistemic strategy that provide *analytical* guidelines to our empirical study. One important implication of this combination is that the distinctness of the categories of natural/social, economic and political increases with actualization and decreases with counter-actualization, also in relation to each other. While they are axiomatically distinguished on a metric level (eg. you cannot buy votes or truth), they start interpenetrating on an interpretive level (eg. economic policy or economic science) and become superpositioned in practice (eg. community art, social entrepreneurship or participatory budgeting) (more on this in Chapter 7). This is another reason that one's inquiry should best start from metrics (or at least interpretations). In sum, despite the basic differentiation of socialization (singularity), economization (affect) and politicization (concern) rooted in the universal problem of territorial assemblage, this is not as clear a distinction in practice as our modern axioms of daily exchange often seem to suggest.

Before we can translate these analytical cues into an encompassing set of research questions, we have to look at one more, just as important capacity of our itinerary and conceptual apparatus. This concerns the way in which it allows us to 'be affected' not just in an analytical sense but also in an *ethico-political* way. Within a properly relational conception of knowledge practices, we should argue, there can be no retreat in either universalist objectivism, where the etic is simply right and the emic is wrong, both factually and morally, nor in relativist subjectivism, where etic and emic each stay safely within their respective semantic lanes. Any kind of scientific practice stands in some kind of pragmatic, performative and therefore ethical relation to the problem it studies. The manner in which it does, however, may vary significantly according to its particular *ethos*, its normative stance and style, and how it cares for its concepts (such as 'gentrification') as they are set out into the world.

1.2.6 An ethology of gentrification

In the words of philosopher and historian of scientific practice, Isabelle Stengers (1997, 2005a, 2011a) every scientific endeavor exists as, and relates to, a whole *ecology of practices*. In the social sciences, this *oikos* could be said to include etic practices, in our case gentrification research, and emic practices, those we study in relation to a particular neighborhood in transition. Our scientific *ethos* then denotes how we enact this relationship in practice. Echoing Deleuze (1988a), Stengers calls this relation of *oikos* and *ethos* a matter of *ethology*. In much the same way as the animal studies, for which we usually reserve that name, like to study creatures in their own ecological and phenomenological habitat instead of isolating them in zoological laboratories, reflexive as is about its own material-semiotic presence as a practice, just so an ethological treatment of *human* relations would make us more aware of what happens when a certain *ethos* (of 'critique' for example) is divorced from its *oikos* (of university life for example) and may start overpowering others. Strengthened by its universalist and structuralist etics, the ethos of gentrification research has historically been dominated by rather belligerent affects, even when out of place. Here an anecdote comes to mind of Clark (2005), about gentrification war veteran Neil Smith visiting

Malmö and asking for a tour along its local ‘battlefields’. While at the time leaving him at a loss to explain Malmö had none that would fit such a dramatic description, he is quick to add that the foreseeable future will probably bring ‘the war’ to Sweden as well. Aside from whether he is right, it illustrates well how ‘gentrification’ spreads as a ‘battle cry’ and contagiously configures us into war-mode (who wants to be naive?), transforming both scientific debates (eg. Slater, 2006, Smith, 2008b) *and* city neighborhoods into combat zones ridden with antagonism. Now this might well be in order for some ecologies of practice, but not for others, and this is why we need to cultivate a more variable ethos.

Fortunately, as Stengers (2011a) argues with great nuance, warring modes of practice do not exhaust our ethological options. Specific to the social sciences (in contrast to mathematics, philosophy and experimental science), she proposes an alternative ethos, one of *diplomacy*. In this new mode of social science, to be contrasted with that of the expert or critic, a ‘diplomat researcher’ should situate herself “at the intersection of two regimes of obligation: the obligation to acknowledge that the dreams of those she studies, their fears, their doubts, and their hopes, pass through her, and the obligation to ‘report’ what she has learned from them to others, to transform it into an ingredient in the construction of knowledge” (Stengers 2011a: 377). Thus, never purely nomadic, positioned outside and against the world, she cannot start from scratch, but always commences from the middle of things (cf. Deleuze, 1988a): avoiding ‘gentrification’ altogether, both in its emic and etic forms, is not one of her options. This way the new researcher also adheres to what Stengers has dubbed the ‘Leibnizian constraint’ (Stengers 1997: 15), which says that, like a diplomat, as Leibniz was in his days,¹² we scientists should take heed of insistent constraints and not have as our ideal the reversal of established sentiments for the sake of it (thinking *against*), but to work *with* them in the service of bringing about a *new* common notion of, for instance, gentrification (opposition only reinforces current regimes of representation, cf. Deleuze 1994). Think of, for instance, genuinely attempting to engage, without surrender, with the Slow Movement’s visions on food and housing, instead of quickly judging it as really only gentrification. This diplomatic composition of a new agreement should be conceived of as an inherently *risky* process of translating *oppositions* of interest into pragmatic *contrasts*, a process which always involves the potential for *betrayal* (in both directions of the intersection), as the diplomat is never wholly one with whoever she represents (unlike a political representative), but neither can she be a neutral intermediary or arbiter (a universalist technocrat). Nonetheless,

¹² There is a whole history yet to be written of this contrast between war-like and diplomatic modes of knowledge production (the point to which must be, of course, not to universally condemn either one) (cf. Jansen, 2013). What comes to mind in this regard is a contrast between seventeenth century contemporaries Spinoza and Leibniz: the former a typical Enlightenment hero, heretically speaking rational truth to biblical power, while the latter being the intellectually promiscuous courtier and diplomat, scorned by many (eg. Bertrand Russell) for his philosophically ‘inappropriate’ aberrations into obscure notions like the *vinculum substantiale*, which he ‘opportunistically’ invented to reconcile his own monadology with the catholic doctrine of transubstantiation (Look and Rutherford, 2007: iviii). It is from this counter-history that we might extract a kind of ‘conceptual persona’ of the diplomat (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1994) that helps us reposition ourselves anew among the war-ridden practices of geography and ‘gentrification’.

even if the diplomat runs the risk of becoming a traitor, she still might succeed in bringing about positive change where the more faithful and war-passionate, yet out-of-steam critic fails (cf. Latour 2004b: 284).

When added to our two sets of etic abstractions, these ethological reflections can recharge our analytical toolbox with ethical import and nuance, suggesting new takes on old ethical questions of urban justice and gentrification. Rather than identify emic practices as *either* good *or* evil, gentrifying *or* non-gentrifying, capitalist *or* progressive, neoliberal *or* democratic, based on etic preconceptions of social, economic and political structure, this thesis aims to explore their sad *and* joyful capacities within a more open, diplomatic and therefore perhaps more risky ethos (ie. possibly satisfying no one). In this regard, as further developed in Chapter 3, the term ‘gentrification’ becomes more than a scientific fact or battle cry of opposition and may also generate more open questions and pragmatic contrasts (see also the ‘generic definition’ of gentrification in Section 1.3 of this introductory chapter). The empirical chapters (4-6) seek to demonstrate that this approach to practices of gentrification has serious implications for old ethical questions of social *diversity*, economic (*in*) *equality* and *democratic* politics. And as such it is also a hopeful attempt to show that relational approaches to gentrification need not be lacking in ‘political punch’ due to their supposed relativism, as suggested by Lees (2018), even as ‘punching’ might perhaps not be the best metaphor to use anyhow.¹³

1.2.7 Research questions

Having a basic picture of the problem of gentrification and the requirements of its study, we are now in a position to formulate the two main questions that have guided this thesis: one analytical, descriptive and explanatory (A) and one ethical and normative (B). The main explanatory research question can be simply stated as:

A) *How does gentrification emerge as a problem and practice?*

When read in the more technical terms included in the title of this study and which will be further clarified in the following, we could also restate this question as: *What becomes of gentrification when counter-actualized?* However, as we dive into, counter-actualize and explain the problem and its practices, we also immediately immerse ourselves into an ethically charged reality. Which forces us to answer the main normative question:

B) *What ethics of gentrification may follow from this explanation?*

In order to empirically answer these rather abstract questions we have to subject them to the two sets of etic concepts elaborated above and their ethical supplements:

¹³ And perhaps in addition to this, to show how speculative philosophies underlying the new relational theories cannot be gratuitously dismissed wholesale as reactionary, as done by Mason (2019).

practices, interpretations and metrics of socialization (diversity), economization (equality) and politicization (democracy). In addition, we tie them to the cases by which they are answered. Thus we get three sub-themes (1-3) that each generate a new empirical sub-question (a) and ethical sub-question (b). The first sub-theme, treated in Chapter 4, regards demography and ‘social mix’. It asks the questions:

- 1a) *How are neighborhood residents counted, (self)identified and mixed through practices of socialization in gentrifying Klarendal, Arnhem and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, Vienna?*
- 1b) *What does this say about capacities for affirming diversity?*

The second sub-theme, taken up in Chapter 5, is about real estate economics and asks:

- 2a) *How is real estate exploited, valued and cared for through practices of economization in gentrifying Klarendal, Arnhem?*
- 2b) *What does this say about capacities for delivering equality?*

The third sub-theme, treated in Chapter 6, concerns government planning and politics. It poses the questions:

- 3a) *How are issues of gentrification planned for, voted on or protested through practices of politicization in Klarendal, Arnhem and Beyoğlu, Istanbul?*
- 3b) *What does this say about capacities for fostering democracy?*

In order to further develop and prepare the answers to these questions the rest of this introductory chapter will first practice some initial problematics. This means Section 1.3 will take a stab at defining the concept of gentrification in the face of the complex theoretical, empirical (spatial, temporal) and ethical challenges mentioned above. Section 1.4 will then practice a more general ‘axiomatics of problematics’, deciding on some philosophical commitments that empower us to conceptualize and gain knowledge of the ‘general complexity’ of human social life without ‘restricting’ it in the image of mathematics, as is usually done in the so-called complexity sciences. On these ontological and epistemological premises, Section 1.5 explains the methodological choices made in this thesis and the research project in which it participated. Lastly, Section 1.6 will give a general chapter by chapter outline of the thesis.

1.3 Problematics of gentrification: What is... or who, where, when and how is gentrification?

1.3.1 What was it again? Setting the stage for a dramatization

Much like pornography, to take a notorious example (*Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184, 1964), people find it hard to define gentrification, but seem to ‘know it when they see it’. Indeed, the act of defining something by answering the question ‘what is...?’, is not as simple as it appears to be. In any case, whether defining gold, a tiger or

gentrification, assumptions are made about structure, be it atomic, genetic or social structure. Even simply pointing at a landscape – or more likely, a hipster barbershop or luxury loft – and yelling ‘gentrification’ proposes a structural sameness it shares with other spaces. The act of definition then, can be regarded first of all as “a statement expressing the essential nature of something” (Lees et al., 2010: 5). In this section, it is argued, first, that the ‘essential nature’ of gentrification lies not so much with the class or ‘gentry’ part of the word, but with the anexact yet ethically charged event of displacement that it implies, the ‘genesis’ part of ‘*gen*-trification’, if you will. To get to a definition that properly catches the latter aspect we roughly follow the philosophical strategy intimated by Deleuze (1994, 2004) as a method of ‘dramatization’.¹⁴ Beyond and instead of asking the essentialist question ‘what is gentrification?’, we ask the dramatizing or ‘counter-actualizing’ questions of ‘how much, who, where, when and how is gentrification (taking place)?’ As will become clear, it is only when we arrive at the how of gentrification that a properly relational and practice theoretical definition of the event of gentrification (ie. displacement) can be given.

At the start of this introductory chapter, we took for granted the current Oxford Dictionary definition of gentrification: “the process of changing an area, a person, etc. so that they are suitable for, or can mix with, people of a higher social class than before”.¹⁵ The first element to notice in this definition is the object of gentrification, the thing undergoing the change: ‘an area’ ‘a person’ ‘etc’. This already allows for a lot of indexical leeway: anything can be gentrified. And indeed, as it appears today, gentrification has gone just about cosmic, homogenizing our minds (Schulman, 2012), our planet (Lees et al., 2016) and everything in between. However, a second definitional element concerns those people for whom the object is made suitable (or so they might mix with it). This is where a more specific bit of substance enters the definition: people of a higher social *class* (which the same dictionary defines as “one of the groups of people in a society that are thought of as being at the same social or economic level”). This is the point where that aforementioned essence and shared structure (of ‘social or economic level’) is traditionally placed. And as such, it already invokes a certain traditional kind of problem definition and sociological explanations specialized in matters of class.

The 2019 dictionary definition of gentrification is a lot more general than at its original conception. When Marxist sociologist Ruth Glass coined the term in 1964 (or earlier), it had a much more restricted meaning, both historically and geographically. The *when* and *where* of gentrification were still present in its more casual definition.

¹⁴ Among others, Deleuze (2004) gives the example of the question of justice. ‘What is the Just?’ might be a less relevant question to understand the *problem* of justice than asking ‘Where and when is there justice?’. Whereas the first type of question usually leads to formal philosophical exercises (eg. Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ argument), the question of how much justice do we find exercised where, when, by whom and in what manner, directs our attention to the actual creation of rights through casuistic jurisprudence, a practice Deleuze considers profoundly philosophical as it creates its own concepts singular case by singular case (for instance around the notion of privacy, in the famous case of Terri Schiavo, see Protevi, 2009).

¹⁵ Oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com (accessed 02-09-2019)

Observing an at the time rapidly changing inner city of London, she writes:

“One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes – upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages – two rooms up and two down – have been taken over, when their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent period – which were used as lodging houses or were otherwise in multiple occupation – have been upgraded once again. [...] Once this process of ‘gentrification’ starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the social character of the district is changed. [...] And this is an inevitable development, in view of the demographic, economic and political pressures to which London, and especially Central London, has been subjected” (Glass, 1964: xviii–xix)

The *who* of gentrification was still intricately tied up with a particular *when* and *where*. The protagonist of the ‘gentry-fication’ process was a quite specific group of new ‘urban gentry’ modeled after the British rural gentry of earlier centuries, placed somewhere in between the landed gentry and the peasants. Immersed in her historical context, Glass loaded the term with a good dose of sarcasm, mocking the new urban middle class secret longing for the more authentic, rural kind of life of the original gentry (Hamnett, 2003, Lees et al., 2008). However, five decades of academic debates and empirical studies later, these specific *when* and *where* of gentrification have been gradually abstracted out of its definition to encompass all its specifications (‘x gentrification’, ‘y-ification’) and particular instances, as evidenced by the current dictionary entry. A similar, but more scholarly definition comes from pioneer gentrification geographer Clark (2005), who aims to distill it down to its core ‘order and simplicity’ so it may include all the academic footnotes to Glass’ initial proclamation. This involves an eviction of many elements erstwhile considered necessary: ‘inner city’, because rural and suburban gentrification (eg. Phillips, 2002), ‘residential’ because commercial gentrification (eg. Zukin et al., 2009) and ‘rehabilitation’ because new-build gentrification (eg. Davidson and Lees, 2005). What he finally leaves us with is a definition of gentrification almost as ‘elastic’ as the dictionary’s, yet slightly more geographically ‘targeted’:

“Gentrification is a process involving a change in the population of land-users such that the new users are of a higher socio-economic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital.” (Clark, 2005: 263)

Rather than anything possibly being the target of gentrification (‘persons’ ‘etc’), Clark’s definition is about land and the built environment, an abstract *where*. And just like in the dictionary’s version, the minimal temporal element to be found (the *when*) is a very abstract notion of ‘process’ and ‘change’. Yet, ultimately, “[i]t does not matter where, and it does not matter when” (ibid.). In addition, the *who* of gentrification, Glass’ gentry and working class occupiers, has been generalized to ‘new’ and ‘previous land-users’ respectively, with the former being ‘of a higher socio-economic status’. As such the definition can also include a phenomenon like ‘super-gentrification’, where middle class occupiers are replaced by upper class movers (Lees, 2003, Butler and Lees, 2006). Furthermore, it makes room for an

invasion of relatively wealthy non-residential land-users such as tourists. Lastly, note also the inclusion of a 'reinvestment in fixed capital', which can be read as a nod to the two central paradigms of gentrification scholarship, one political economic, emphasizing the *production* of gentrification by 'reinvestment in fixed capital' and the other cultural sociological, emphasizing the *consumption* of gentrification by the 'new land-users' (more on this in Chapters 3 and 5).

While certainly a laudable achievement, there are at least three important problems with Clark's oft-cited definition (eg. Lees et al., 2008). *Firstly*, we should ask whether this definition really is general enough. For instance, as the existence of 'marginal gentrifiers' (Rose, 1984, 1996) proves, it is not always clear whether affluence or class in the one-dimensional economic sense has to be an essential ingredient of gentrification. Clark seems to gesture at this issue by putting 'socio-' before and 'status' rather than class after 'economic'. Another oft-tried manner of accommodating this, is by defining class as not just about economic status but also as predicated on 'cultural capital'. But these adjustments reduce its conceptual distinctiveness considerably, which points to the *second* problem of Clark's definition. It is often said that class is really more of a social *relation* rather than the attribute of an individual, group or population and it matters a great deal how one conceives of such a relation. Neil Smith (1979a), while at times not exactly hesitant to tie the category of capital to a specific group of real estate 'capitalists' (landlords, developers, bankers, estate agents etc., eg. Smith, 1979b), makes a major point of redefining gentrification not as a 'back to the city movement of people but of capital'. Thus gentrification is defined primarily by the quantitative relation (the *how much*) between fixed capitals and ground rents, which in turn determines the relations between land-users by sorting these out geographically. However, the *third* and most significant objection to Clark's and Smith's definitions of gentrification, is the omission or only implied effect of what is roundly recognized to be the ethical-political heart of the matter, including by the latter two scholars. This element, which featured prominently in Glass' aforementioned definition, is the relation of *displacement*.

Whether defined as a socio-demographic change, perhaps spurred by consumer preferences, or fixed capital reinvestment resulting from an intra-class competition for rents, or both, if there is no displacement involved one might as well describe the process by supposed synonyms like upgrading, revitalization, renewal, or redevelopment. And as it appears, the word gentrification all too easily allows for such equations, as evidenced by the cheerful use of the term by some academics (eg. Byrne, 2002) and spatial planners (see Doucet et al., 2011). However, if we intend to retain the ethical edge that gentrification has over its more glossy euphemisms, we should put displacement center stage in its definition (Marcuse, 1985, Slater, 2006: 748) and not rely on uncertain connotations or implied effects. An additional advantage of such a definition would be that the *political* nature of the process and not only its socio-demographic and economic aspects would come out more explicitly. While perhaps for some gentrification scholars of the (neo/post)Marxist persuasion it goes without saying that demographics and economics and everything else is 'political through and through', leaving it only implied would also eventually neglect the specificity of practices of politicization, that is, how they are implicated on their

own terms relatively independent of practices of socialization and economization. Starting from a definition that puts displacement center stage, as does this thesis, political practices as such get more specific attention (in Chapter 6). However, besides bringing out the political dimension more explicitly, making displacement a pivotal part of the definition also directs our attention to implied notions of space, place and their genesis in time, much more so than general references to ‘changes’ of classes of ‘land-users’ or ‘capital reinvestment’. That is, displacement makes gentrification a relational event enacted in practice, a new actualization of space in time. Which shifts our attention toward the *where* and *when* of gentrification (if only to end up at the question of *how*).

1.3.2 *Where and when is gentrification?*

Let us have a look then, at the implied space(s) and time(s) of gentrification. First, the *space* of gentrification and displacement becomes rooted in relational practice. As further clarified in Chapter 3, and as many others have noticed before (eg. Phillips, 2004, Davidson, 2009), research on gentrification has traditionally been less occupied with its *place* than with its *space* (eg. the location of a place of residence relative to the city center). That is, it has been preoccupied with relocations of people, capital and voters in rather homogenized Cartesian-type spaces, instead of the phenomenologically lived dimensions of (dis)place(ment). Gentrification, however, may also happen only or primarily in the latter spatial dimension, for instance when people can stay put in their rent controlled houses but see their neighborhood transform into a place they no longer recognize as their home (a phenomenon Marcuse described in an early and influential account as ‘displacement pressures’, 1985: 207–208). For this reason some gentrification scholars, following Lefebvre (1991) and Soja (1996) have suggested relating these different spaces in dialectical fashion (eg. Phillips, 2004). In this thesis however, as further explained in Chapter 3, both *places* and *spaces* instead emerge as expressive *traces* of relational practices of socio-cognitive distinction and measurement (which as such contingently code and steer those practices in time). And as we will see, these categories are not just applicable to academic or etic practices of space but also to those emic practices enacted within and around the neighborhood. Institutional practices, often directly related to academic methods and discourses, tend to employ spatial metrics (prices, demographics) in their relation to the gentrifying neighborhood, whereas residents and visitors tend to restrict their engagements with it through conceptions of place and simply live it and trace it out by their daily and not-so-daily practices. Moreover, if we want to avoid too sweeping proclamations of a global ‘gentrification generalized’ (Smith, 2002, Atkinson and Bridge, 2005) and aim to genuinely assess the ‘geography of gentrification’ (Lees, 2000, 2012), that is, its variegated diffusion and performativity as an economic, cultural or policy practice, we have to be careful not to sneak back in some frictionless Cartesian-type container space pre-distributing the local and the global. Any ‘traveling’ that gentrification does, is through performative practices, be it a discursive space enacted by flashy media images or an absolute space expressed by metrics of location, value and planning. In sum, the geography of gentrification is generated by relational practices rather than some teleological realization of a

capitalist subsumption already formally established globally.

Similarly, the *time* of gentrification can be conceived in either chronometric time, phenomenological time (Jaques, 1982) or durational time (Deleuze, 1990b). Again, this goes for academic etic practices as well as situated emic practices. In Chapter 5 we will see a chronometric ‘spatialized’ time of gentrification expressed in the differential rent curves of economic geography, but also in emic monitors and calculative models of (future) house prices. These calculative practices mostly write a rather constricted history of progress, in which a rise of house prices or average incomes indicate a neighborhood’s ‘upgrading’. Urban ecological histories, including Marxist, extend back further, pointing also at the preceding downgrading of a neighborhood’s housing, explaining it as a matter of (quasi)natural succession or deliberate disinvestment. Here, particular ‘stages’ of investment (eg. ‘abandonment’, ‘sweat equity’, ‘super-gentrification’) and types of gentrifiers (eg. ‘pioneers’, ‘risk averse’, ‘financifiers’) also enter the narrative (eg. Smith, 1979b, Clay, 1979, Lees, 2003). Some have subsequently couched these stages in the historical context of several ‘waves’ of gentrification that have developed in tandem with the larger capitalist political economy, by now counting up to five: sporadic and state supported (–1973); expanded and *laissez-faire* (–1987); state-led and globalizing (–2000); intensified and financialized (–2008); and, currently, finance-led gentrification (Hackworth and Smith, 2001, Lees et al., 2008, Aalbers, 2018). Ultimately, however, Marxist dialectics takes this history even further, placing any particular reinvestment within the uneven development of the capitalist system as a whole. As such, the history of gentrification becomes one of capital movements that even span across centuries. Indeed, as part of the quest to demarcate the phenomenon, Clark (2005, see also Smith, 1996: 32–33) notes that the rather brutal reconstructions of nineteenth century Paris by Baron Haussman could be seen as a form of gentrification (or *embourgeoisement*). Smith also notes how around the same period Friedrich Engels describes a similar dynamic in Manchester by the term ‘Haussman’. He even sees gentrification-like processes in 18th century France (Smith, 1996: 34). These examples, however, are considered too sporadic to deserve the name. For Smith (1996: 33) or Lees et al. (2008: 5) ‘gentrification proper’ only starts with the postwar ‘back to the city’ movement of capital, into a never as large stock of disinvested real estate. Gentrification is thus a phenomenon defined by a ‘mature’ capitalist land market.

Still, as will be discussed in Chapter 5 as well, gentrification is more than capitalism, even today.¹⁶ Yet to recognize it as such we have to genealogically disentangle imperial-territorial and capitalist modes of practice. When done properly, we may recognize with Osman (2016, reading Jacks, 2008) that gentrification-like processes can be found all the way from ancient Greece to Renaissance Italy. In Chapter 5, evolutionary traces of these pre-capitalist imperial ‘gentrifiers’ are found in certain practices of reuse and restoration. Yet these are not the kinds of gentrification oriented at gaps

¹⁶ In a very literal sense, gentrification was even seen to take place in the decidedly non-capitalist context of the Soviet Union (Andrusz, 1984: 203–204, 218, see also Morton, 1984). This attests even more to the need for a definition based on displacement rather than capital reinvestment or the affluence of users (narrowly defined).

between differential rents but rather gaps of reputation and prestige attached to particular buildings or neighborhoods. These suggest a phenomenological or ‘material hermeneutic’ kind of time where a place undergoes a more sudden ‘Gestalt switch’. The time of gentrification can thus take on a more contingently dialectic character that can be smaller in scope or simply other than the rather ahistorical teleology of global capitalist take-over and proletarian resistance. Indeed, in this regard postcolonial theorist Chakrabarty (2000) has introduced an important temporal distinction parallel to that of space and place, between a developmentalist ‘History 1’, including the uneven development of gentrification theory (based on notions of formal/real subsumption and abstract labor), and the subaltern ‘History 2s’ that interrupt and provincialize this Eurocentric time. Whereas (emic and etic) History 1 constructs time in axioms and metrics of equivalence (enlightenment, prosperity, emancipation), History 2s contradict its dominance by alternative interpretations of subaltern identities, alternative property forms and marginalized political positions. However, both chronometric and phenomenological times should be tied back to the practices that produce them (or not) within any singular event of gentrification if we want to explain the latter without recourse to (etic) reductionisms. For this purpose we have to conclude that History 1 is *not abstract enough* to encompass the whole genealogy that is recapitulated in any such event today. Paradoxically then, to bring out this singularity and its non-Modern History 2s, we need our present processes and practices of human socialization, economization and politicization to reach back deep into the precapitalist and even prehuman past.¹⁷

1.3.3 Or rather, how is gentrification (to become)?

Bringing space-History 1 and place-History 2s back to their Earthly practices, changes the time and space of gentrification as they blur into an affective spacetime punctured by singular events. Gentrification becomes such an event, an immanent tendency of displacement that is actualized in practice *as* the many times and spaces of eviction, nostalgia and ‘preservation ethic’ (cf. Brown-Saracino, 2004). The problem comes to denote a kind of metastable state of a neighborhood, balancing at the edge of a critical transition (a kind of multidimensional and non-voluntarist version of the famous ‘tipping model’ of segregation by Schelling, 1978). As such a complex state, which Jane Jacobs used to ascribe to the city as such (1961: 428–448, see also Chapter 3 and 4), gentrification is finally defined by its *how*, by a displacive condensation of all kinds of practices of socialization, economization and politicization. However, this

¹⁷Following heterodox evolutionary theory (Gould, 2002, Margulis and Sagan, 2000) and assemblage theory (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 1987, DeLanda, 1997, 2009), abstract geological, evolutionary and formal machinations (described in Chapter 2 as ‘abstract machines’, a term coined by Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) could be said to write a kind of *posthuman genealogy* of urban time and space (cf. DeLanda, 1997). The abstraction involved here, of which we can say we do not have enough, is not so much the *discrete* and *general* kind we know from (set) theory, mathematical modeling, and also more mundane ‘real abstractions’ of labor and money (defining ‘History 1’). Rather, we need more of the *concrete* and *singular* kind of abstraction we know from ‘tacit’ skills and ‘ready-to-hand’ tools (ie. evolving practice) (see note 6 and below Section 2.3). Both can draw away from our common interpretive categories, but the latter we tend to neglect in science.

also includes our academic practices (of definition) and this needs to be addressed before settling on a definitive definition. Just as an engagement with place or subaltern histories requires a more ‘symmetric’ hermeneutic attitude towards the relation between emic and etic (in defiance of space and History 1), a descent into the *how* of gentrification, the spacetime of practice, suggests we reflect on the ethological capacities of our concepts. In other words, *how* do we define? How do we *want* our definition to travel? Do we want our definition to prime us for war or diplomacy? Do we want an immutable universal metric or structure, or an immobile, place-specific interpretation? Or do we want instead a concept of gentrification that is sufficiently mutable to allow for maximum analytical detail, but also has the diplomatic capacity to mobilize interpretations into new directions, to ask risky questions that put entrenched positions at stake? It is the latter sort that Clark (2015) seems to suggest when he calls for a ‘generic’ definition of gentrification and it is the kind that we use here.¹⁸ The following definition is one that helps generate questions that trace out, dramatize and counteractualize any spatiotemporal event that demands attention, respectively asking questions of how much, who, where, when, and ultimately, how is gentrification? A pragmatic conceptual instrument not designed to give or even point at a solution. Rather it should be a generative force, generating questions, better posed questions. As such it only attains meaning and significance when we as critical observers bring it with us when we plunge ourselves into the practices that make and change a place.

1.3.4 Gentrification = displacement = ‘gen-trification’

Finally coming to a definition, we can say gentrification denotes a *spatiotemporal event of displacement, where some social, political or economic practices overpower others*. In many but not necessarily all cases, this is a chaotic and complex process that defies simple explanation. As further argued in Chapter 3, this obstinacy is not just a product of our faulty, messy or incompatible concepts of gentrification, but is caused by gentrification being by itself, ontologically, a chaotic multiplicity of tendencies, capacities and actions of displacement. However, if the original meaning of ‘gentrification’ might overly narrow our attention to movements of gentries and their capitals instead of on the displacive relation that ultimately lends the event its ethical

¹⁸ Clark (2015: 449) approvingly cites Stengers (2011c: 19, 40), when she writes: “The generic notion does not authorize any definition. It suggests a way of addressing a situation whose eventual success will be the relevance of the questions to which it gives rise. [...] [a concept] that requires the highest power of invention: not to privilege any particular mode of knowledge.” It must be noted, however, that elsewhere Clark does not seem to be entirely faithful to this open kind of genericity. In Hedin et al. (2012: 449) he and his colleagues define gentrification in strictly political economic terms as “a generic form of accumulation by dispossession”, that is, a local expression of uneven development (with reference to Harvey, 2005 and Smith, 2008a). Again, if genericity is a style of abstraction, then parallel to aforementioned distinction of discreet/concrete and general/singular abstraction, the generic can be either of a logico-mathematical kind (writing ‘History 1’, associated with rationalism and Marxist political economy) or of a practice-theoretical kind found with Stengers, Deleuze and Whitehead. In this chapter, both genericities are deployed, even though the latter is given ontological priority.

gravitas, another etymology is possible. And so is another symptomatology.¹⁹ We need not be entirely faithful to Glass' initial intentions and their cultural context. Perhaps then, as suggested in the beginning of this chapter, we need to regroup symptoms and isolate gentrification differently, such that we "make different constellations appear, different degrees of freedom imaginable" (Kaiser, 2017: 189). Most probably not implied by Glass was the sense of 'generation' of *gen*-trification. In its original meaning, the gentry would be those of noble birth or *genesis*.²⁰ Gentrification then, in this sense, brings into the world *something new*. Often called 'regeneration', it is quite wrongly suggested to reactivate some noble and true essence laying dormant under the blithe and deprivation. However, for good or bad, gentrification is the generation of novelty, which can be hard to recognize by conservative regeneration enthusiasts as well as by critics for whom gentrification is *in essence* only a representation of a much older, rather ahistorically conceptualized economic system (see Chapter 5). It can be hard then to actually see the novelties and differences produced in the process. But a difference is made, and this always suggests an overpowering of some social, economic or political practices by other such practices, else things would just stay the way they are. As such, the definition of the power asymmetry, in terms of relata (eg. social categories, classes, political subjects), lies primarily with the process, the practice, the *relation* of displacement (or in terms of our earlier, rudimentary itinerary: *desubjectify*). This means there are no substantial necessary or sufficient ingredients for gentrification in terms of such relata. Rather than deny this radical contingency of the problem of gentrification, in favor of essence, order and simplicity (as in Beaugard, 1986, Clark, 2005, Lees et al., 2008, 2010), we should, as Chapter 3 argues, affirm its chaotic complexity and try to get to the truth of the problem of gentrification (*be affected*). However, for a problematics of gentrification to become properly methodological, we have to decide on some axiomatic matters of, at least at first sight, a very different 'generic' kind.

¹⁹ As already implicit in the first paragraphs of this introduction, what is suggested from a clinical point of view (as distinguished from a critical one premised on judgement and a search for conditions of possibility), is to first develop a different symptomatology of the problem of gentrification, before rushing to its etiology and therapeutic treatment (cf. Deleuze, 1983, 1991, 1997). This can mean isolating symptoms differently and also renaming this new coincidence of symptoms ('syndrome') by shifting its etymology as required. An important element in this active process of 'differential diagnostics', in which new figures emerge, false clusters of symptoms are disentangled and problems become posed differently (Kaiser, 2017: 189), is to have the clinical case participate in its own careful diagnosis (transcending the status of passive victim or 'patient'). On the difference between clinical and critical, see also Chapter 5.

²⁰ The only instance I have found where this is hinted at, is in a 1984 article in the pro-gentrification magazine *The Brownstoner* (reprinted in Lees et al., 2008: 8). The Brownstone Revival Committee ('brownstone' being a type of New York rowhouse that was subject to many early renovation efforts), defends its practices claiming "Gentrification is not 'genocide' but 'genesis'". In this typical 'good or evil' moralism surrounding gentrification, which can and should be avoided, 'genesis' either gets an undue positive meaning or becomes a mere dishonest mystification.

1.4 Axiomatics of problematics: Ontology and epistemology

1.4.1 Entertaining complexity: restricted, general or abstract

At the philosophical base of this thesis lies an intuition, and it is a very counter-intuitive one when pursued all the way. It is the ‘counter-intuition’ that chaos and complexity come before order and simplicity. Sure enough today’s common sense tells us otherwise, deeply influenced as it still is by the successes of classical science and the Enlightenment philosophies that emerged together with it. For our habitual way of thinking, the universe, the world, life and society are, at base, simple. If things seem complex, so it goes, we just do not understand yet how they can be reduced to a more simple, more real reality. Of course, this rather atomist and mechanical attitude has long been accompanied and challenged by more organic modes of thought. These have given us all kinds of theories of emergence and complexity in which every simple system is seen as influenced if not determined by a complex whole of which it is part. However, this has not changed the basic premise of progressive complexity, where simple parts form more complex wholes or systems. Even the supposedly anti-reductionist ‘complexity sciences’ rarely question it. Despite all the innovative, transdisciplinary models they bring forth, they still give us only a ‘restricted’ form of complexity that is rather positivist in its epistemological outlook (as opposed to a science of ‘general complexity’, Morin, 2007, Byrne and Callaghan, 2014). This is not to say that this restricted complexity, within science most strongly associated with the Santa Fe Institute (eg. West, 2017), can become quite complicated. So much so that even its human creators can have a hard time understanding it. In this sense, today’s mathematical products can be quite sublime in the Kantian sense, whether in the form of chaotic attractors, transfinite sets or algorithms trading with high-frequency. However, this kind of complexity should be considered the product of a more general, or rather, more *abstract* complexity.²¹

Ontological complexity has traditionally been dealt with by mereological means, whether it takes the form of a distinction of micro and macro, local and global, element and system or particular instance and general structure. Rather than keeping with one kind of elementary particles or individuals forming one kind of universe, society or other totality (and whether or not the latter may be ‘more than the sum of its parts’ and exerts causality downward), complexity usually amounts to cutting up the micro-macro link into manageable layers and scales. Rather than one ‘emergence’ of a macro whole greater than its micro parts, this event happens many times over, forming a progressively complexifying hierarchy of wholes. The resulting chains of (social) beings invariably respect scientific boundaries and canon, allowing every discipline a fresh start to build up its own complexity on its own scale. Thus we see systematic, structuralist and cybernetic hierarchies constructed of, for instance, static structures – clock works – control mechanisms – open systems – lower organisms – animal – man – socio-cultural systems – symbolic systems (Von Bertalanffy, 1969) or physical – biological – psychological – linguistic – social structures (Piaget, 1971). Or, within the social realm, of subjects – encounters –

²¹ See note 6, 17 and Section 2.3 for more about the concept of abstraction assumed here.

networks – organizations – institutions (DeLanda, 2006). However, when it comes to epistemological questions about how we come to a position of knowing such a hierarchy, looking ‘down’ from what is invariably considered the most complex top layer, most of these approaches stay silent. *Mereology*, after all, is a kind of knowledge, which begs the question of how it is obtained. Truly engaging with what Edgar Morin (2007, 2008) calls ‘general complexity’ means taking this epistemological challenge seriously and integrating it into our account of the world. But this is no easy task, as it immediately veers us into semantic constructivist territory and all its attendant paradoxes (eg. how to gain knowledge of the experiential or social whole of which one is part and transcendently conditions one’s experience and discourse?). The most common answer to such paradoxes, including Morin’s, has been a *dialogic* or dialectic one, familiar from Kant to Marx to Derrida or Luhmann, going back and forth between parts and wholes, and exploring any antinomies, contradictions and paradoxes between them. Thus a recognition arises of a basic disorder and chaos, at least as a necessary dialogical correlate of any apparent order and simplicity. The question remains, however, of how much we can say these dialectical categories are in touch with a reality beyond our human logical (de)constructions. Ultimately, ‘chaos’ remains just that, an ideal or semantic category.

What general complexity demands, and what even Morin ultimately shies away from, is that we truly integrate epistemology into our ontological distinctions. Considering in this regard the possible epistemological relations between the different sciences, there are at least four options, the last of which is the preferred one. The first two can be dealt with briefly, the third deserves to be addressed in a separate paragraph. The *first* one, which we saw as an outcome of restricted complexity science, is that the sciences simply leave each other alone in splendid naivete, each granting the others their own ontological stratum. The *second* makes only one science the basic one. Whether acknowledged or not, this always has transcendental implications. One such fundamentalist move would naturalize science as, for instance, the product of simple behavioral mechanism, evolutionary psychology or economics. Yet, consistently followed through, this is a rather rare move today, if only because it undermines any substantial truth claim of the kind usually espoused by the positivist sciences (ie. as anything other than an outcome of blind reaction, evolutionary struggle or self-interest). Perhaps more familiar has been the social constructivist move, which reduces science to an arbitrary cultural projection. Still, in its extreme form, this move has also been quite rare in serious academic debate and mostly erected as a strawman. Nonetheless, when addressing epistemological questions, ‘strong program’ sociologists of scientific knowledge and actor–network theorists have certainly skirted this position on occasion (eg. Bloor, 1976, 1999, Latour, 1988b).

1.4.2 Transcendental realism?

A perhaps less defeatist *third* option is represented by ‘transcendental realism’ (also known as critical realism, Archer et al., 1998), which instead of asking the idealist question of what our individual or cultural *mind* must be like to be able to interpret raw experience, asks the primary question of what *reality* must be like for us to obtain

any knowledge of it and for scientific practice to make sense at all. While science may be a social and ‘transitive’ (ie. non ahistorical) undertaking, as a practice it becomes unintelligible if the ‘intransitive’ world it studies does not have a certain structure. Critical realism claims we can obtain scientific knowledge of that mind-independent structure, including the natural and social mechanisms that underlie but need not correspond to our empirical experience of their effects. In the natural sciences, laboratory experiments literally dis-cover such mechanisms by creating closed systems that allow their isolation from any other interfering mechanisms. While in principle no different, in practice the social sciences have a hard time establishing such conditions (as society is an ‘open system’, ie. of general complexity) and have therefore had less success uncovering any mechanisms. However, while it is certainly true that reality must express difference in order for science to make sense, there is no inherent reason to assume this structure corresponds to the way the sciences are ordered historically. By having our ontology rely on the rather classical scientific capacities for mechanical isolation we are led back to a ‘restricted complexity’ where reality is neatly stratified in accordance with scientific common sense (on the argument that it ‘just cannot be an accident’ that the sciences have developed the way they have, Bhaskar, 2011: 20). Indeed, because transcendental realism asks of objects what they must be like in order to be possible objects of science, it remains tied to a representational and therefore, despite its explicit reservations, rather anthropocentric model of knowledge production (Srnicek, 2007). Intransitive mechanisms, as the residually atomist ‘real essences’ of objects, are still re-presented in the image of transitive scientific common sense (and, thus conceived, bear little to no repercussions for scientific practice). In short, within critical realism, the world is still taken to be built up from simple mechanisms and it is only our imperfect practices that just cannot extract them in their real, essential state, purified from all complex interactions. But what if we were to say the complex interaction in between the mechanisms is more elementary than the artificially cut out mechanisms themselves?

1.4.3 *A posthuman transcendental empiricism*

There is a fourth option of relating the sciences and fully integrating epistemological reflexivity into our notion of complexity. This position, as already mentioned in the previous paragraph, is one of *posthuman transcendental empiricism*. It distinguishes itself first of all by bracketing any fundamental ontological distinction between the non-human and human or between nature and society, hence *posthuman*. By transcendental deficit, too restricted forms of complexity (eg. West, 2017, Morin, 2008, Archer et al., 1998) invariably leave the nature-society distinction intact. Somehow, the cutting of the micro and macro always ends up distinguishing individual human subjects from a (neuro)biological substrate (even approaches adamant to avoid any nature-society divide, such as DeLanda, 2006, 2011), which immediately invites back in all of the epistemological conundrums and methodological struggles that have so divided the natural sciences and humanities. As we have learned from actor-network theory’s relentless refusal to accord the distinction any ontological value (eg. Latour, 2005a), not bifurcating nature and society has huge implications for the status of

science. On the one hand, science loses a lot of its exceptionality. While science may be exceptional in its capacity for creating closed systems, in agreement with the critical realists, it loses its privileged access to an intransitive Nature 'out there'. Moreover, even within the realm of modern human practices, science is never entirely closed off from the world outside its laboratories (Latour, 1988a). And conversely, within the 'open system' of society a lot of economic and political laboratories, closed systems and restricted complexities are erected that are usually not recognized as such (eg. financial instruments, polling stations, see Chapters 5 and 6). On the other hand, one gains in appreciation of all the energy spent and all the skills and equipment needed to establish such laboratories. Truths, prices and election results do not come for free, by some sudden Eureka-moment of correspondence between subject and object or metric and referent. Science does not simply pull away a cover of complexity to reveal a simple reality. It rather creates a 'restricted' order not preexisting as such, *from within and out of* a more 'general' complexity, chaos and disorder, and always at the cost of more disorder (as any other 'dissipative system' necessarily does, cf. Prigogine and Stengers, 1984).

However, ours is also a *transcendental* position in the sense that it does intend to account for the conditions of its own possibility as a knowledge *practice*. There can be no falling back on a naive realism after removing the old onto-epistemological cleavages. But neither can a new transcendental ontology and epistemology be the product of mere rational introspection, anthropological generalization or textual deconstruction. So this requires an *empirical* inquiry into the *real* conditions of our *more-than-human* existence (also as a science) rather than the *ideal* conditions of our *human* knowledge. However, to avoid our empirical inquiries ending up elevating the same human essentialisms as our conditions of being and thinking, we have to consider those conditions as not resembling what they condition (as would a 'subject' or 'society'). That is, we have to affirm with Deleuze (1994) the ontological primacy of *difference*. The only immutable 'unground' of existence is the eternal return of the different, of the eternal difference of past, present and future. By this principle, any identity or interiority we experience in the world, any distinction, diversity or stratification of mechanisms, particles, species, minds or systems, all have to be understood as the product of difference in itself and on itself. That is, a product of differential relations that exist prior and external to their terms, and that are *generative* of those terms. Thus extensive thunderstorms and cloud formations are the product of intensive differences (gradients) of pressure, temperature and air flow, and mature animals are differentiated through intense biochemical processes of epigenesis, catalyzed and coordinated by networks of genes (DeLanda, 2009: 115-116). Likewise, human objects and identities are the product of non-resembling *practices*, to be conceived as bundles of differential relations, intensities. As real conditions, these relational bundles are not 'larger' than what they condition, they are not more extensive 'mechanisms' or general 'essences' that transcend the empirical but rather the *abstract* dynamism of singular tendencies and capacities immanent to whatever interpretive object they bring forth (further explained in Chapter 2, these differential elements will be designated as the 'virtual' birthground of any actual entity, following Deleuze, 1994). Thus the objects of our knowledge are constituted by complex differential relations or processes (the 'interactions in between'), such

as serialized *intensities* of temperature or solidity, *capacities* of smell or dexterity or *skills* of empirical distinction and logical deduction. And these intensive differences and practices have a genealogy of their own, *one that extends far beyond 'human history'*. Therefore, any basic epistemic strategy this thesis might employ has to be able to consciously integrate and differentially recapitulate this genealogy in an effective method of inquiry.

1.4.4 Abstract complexity in practice: Deciding on a generic truth procedure

The above transcendental requirements imply, first of all, that we rigorously self-apply the presented ontology. This *thesis*, including this section, is a linguistic product, an *interpretation*, anti-thesis as well as syn-thesis. But as such it also embodies and pursues its own subliminal affective and axiomatic truths. On an affective or *practice* level, we could say the 'complexity first' counter-intuition might serve as a force of perplexion, the eternal dark precursor impelling the thinking and writing of this thesis and the empirical inquiry it reports on. Left on its own, however, this philosophical affect is hard to sustain against the pull of common sense and its internal contradictions and paradoxes. Therefore, we also need to *decide* in all transparency on some ontological axioms that allow us to harness, catalyze and care for that driving force of our counter-intuition and forge it into an efficacious instrument of methodical research. In short, we need some *generic* axioms to decide on a *truth procedure* that instructs us on how to move beyond interpretation. To see how, we may resort to the most 'restricted' position in current metaphysical debates. Alain Badiou, as perhaps the biggest influence on the rationalist side of the aforementioned speculative turn (at least on Meillassoux, 2008), and famous for his equation of 'ontology = mathematics' (Badiou, 2006), has dedicated himself to rigorously carry out the sublime implications of current mathematics for our conceptions of truth (mainly set theory).²²

²² Briefly stated, Badiou (2006) finds in the axioms of modern set theory a way to think 'being qua being' (see also Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4). He bases his ontology not on difference (eg. Heidegger's ontic/ontological or Deleuze's multiple/one) but on the multiple as such, lacking any, even differential unity. He suggests set theory helps us *think* (but not substantially know) about this multiplicity by rational means. This is because math, by axiomatic decision, is indifferent to the substantial 'intensional' content of its sets and operations and only cares about their 'extensional', performative consistency. Thus there is no need or place in his ontology for a consistent, finite set that includes all others (eg. 'Substance' or a set that includes all sets that do not include themselves). Nonetheless, there is the *implication* of the unrepresentable existence of an *inconsistent, infinite* and *empty* 'set of all sets' from which any consistent set is drawn. However, as the existential equivalent of a set, any regular *situation*, which Badiou in very quantitative terms conceives of as a 'count-as-one' (eg. a territory's population), *presents* itself against this *inconsistent multiplicity* and is usually *represented* as a *state*. The latter designates how a situation's elements are related and thus functions to maintain its consistency (eg. the subdivision of a population by class or ethnicity). However, on rare occasions, the inconsistent multiple manages to intrude on situations and rupture their consistent state. While *void* and substantially foundationless, such disruptive *events* put forth a new *truth*. However, for this novelty to endure in a new situation, an individual or collective *decision* has to be made to name and pursue it vigorously. *Subjectivity*, also a rare thing for Badiou, arises from that decision (see below).

As opposed to traditional correspondence and coherence notions of truth, where truth denotes either a relation between an interpretation and the interpreted or, in more pragmatic terms, a felicitous assemblage of discursive and non-discursive practices and problems, Badiou forcefully argues for a 'generic' notion of truth (Hallward, 2003: 153-154). While we have to insist here on a co-actualization of all three truths in any scientific endeavor (see below), it is the latter that is least familiar and so warrants some explanation first. Generic truths, which for Badiou assert themselves in politics, art and love as much as in science and philosophy, are in their core a matter of subjective *decision* rather than objective knowledge (cf. Luhmann, 1997, on 'codes' by which societal subsystems produce themselves). Ultimately, the kind of truth that breaks with the (scientific) status quo cannot find solid ground in that (scientific) common sense. Generic truth, in other words, always exceeds and ruptures any 'objective' knowledge and interpretation. In this sense, it is inherently 'subjective' in that it is more a matter of *decision* and *fidelity* (a 'being true to' a chance event) than it is of signification. But fidelity here is not a matter of blind or arbitrary faith, nor a personal or private devotion. It is an abandonment of self by the active surrender to an impersonal vector of truth (Hallward, 2003: 129). It is thus a public kind of fidelity, not an individual one, of an 'I', but the construction of a collective subject to truth, a 'we' (which is for this reason the preferred pronoun used in this thesis) (ibid.: 123). It is the public affirmation of a *universal* truth, a newly invented Sameness offered to everyone. At the same time, however, this universal Sameness is *singular* in its origin, it presents itself within a particular situation as an inconsistency, unlinked from any culture or structure (in this regard Badiou chimes uncannily well with Deleuze, supposedly his foremost opponent, see Hallward, 2003: 175, 178-180). Generic truth then, in Badiou's sense, denotes the rare, singular birth (*ex nihilo*) of a universal Sameness, which is then pursued by decision and kept alive on fidelity in the face of endless trials. As such, a truth is an active and adventurous "wandering of the Same" (Badiou in Hallward, 2003: xxix).

In our case it is the singular event of the encounter of the Speculative Turn and Gentrification which has gradually, by trial and error and with diligent fidelity, produced a universal prism or diffraction device (see Chapter 3) that has the capacity to counter-actualize and reconfigure the spatial, temporal and ecological relations of scientific, economic and political becoming. In this sense, should we decide it, this encounter could qualify as our Badiouian event (and perhaps let it wander outside the confines of this thesis). However, as such the event is at once scientific and philosophical, which is not an option within Badiou's philosophy, where both are of course axiomatically separated. Much more akin to Deleuze we take the axiomatic kind of truth to be immanent to a problematics (cf. DW Smith, 2004), but also ontologically autonomous. Parallel to, but beyond the Kantian relation of the *theoretical* (categorical) and *empirical*, we employ the discrete universality of the *axiomatic* in order to become maximally affected by the concrete singularity of the *problematic* (desubjectified + singular + affective state), thus enabling an intuitive encounter with the inconsistencies of our situation or 'general complexity' without again collapsing it into the 'restricted' mold of mathematics and set theory.

1.4.5 Two ontological axioms: Eternal difference, transcendental actualization

Which Sameness should we decide to be faithful to then? The two axioms necessary to decide on our complexity–first intuition have in fact already been suggested, yet only implicitly. The first axiom is the one mentioned before in relation to the generic notion of time in Deleuze. This is the *axiom of the eternal return of the different*. It decides that the only sameness there is, is the immutable difference of past, present and future. The second axiom, the *axiom of transcendental actualization*, decides on the *order* in which transcendental conditions arise out of this pure difference. That is, it decides on the immobility of an ordinal topology by which order emerges out of this difference.²³ While certainly empirically plausible, considering universal evolution (eg. DeLanda, 1997, DeLanda, 2009), human history (social, cognitive and mathematical, eg. Sohn-Rethel, 1978, Lakoff and Núñez, 2000), child development (eg. Piaget, 1971) and human practice in the modern present (see also Chapters 2, 3 and 5), it is ultimately by decision that numbers and mathematics can be said to be actualized out of interpretations, rather than vice versa, and that therefore the latter constitute a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the former.²⁴ It will always be possible to argue from a neoplatonic or neopythagorean position (‘the math was always already there in nature’) that this is in fact a bad decision.²⁵ Likewise, it is ultimately an affirmative decision that interpretations and mathemizations are actualized out of the differential capacities for doing so. And again, it is also by decision that practices are taken as necessary but not sufficient conditions for any kind of interpretation, or in other words, that differential relations and practices exist that are not accompanied, internalized or represented by interpretations. However, also in this case, it is always possible, from the standpoint of an interpretive constructivism (be it subjective, social or systematic), to argue that this is an impossible decision to make. But if one does make the decision, on very plausible and pragmatic yet never entirely

²³ In combination, the two axioms can be said to decide on the basic definition of a problem–event as *immutable* in its differentiation and *immobile* in its accidental topology. See Chapter 2 on differentiation and topology and Chapter 3 on the various ontological combinations of mutability and mobility, or ‘affectedness’ and ‘affectiveness’.

²⁴ Both axioms might combine in the less precise one adhered to by Deleuze, as Smith and Protevi (2018) write: “Deleuze always held the critical axiom that the ground cannot resemble that which it grounds; he constantly critiques the ‘tracing’ operation by which identities in real experience are said to be conditioned by identities in the transcendental.”

²⁵ In this regard, it should be noted that these are rather strangely anti-Badiouian axioms. While the first axiom does decide on a basic Sameness, this is none other than the immutability of Difference (which for Badiou is ultimately only intelligible as discrete, extensional difference). By the content of this axiom the thesis allies much more with Deleuze than Badiou. The second axiom, furthermore, allows for truths of pragmatic, interpretive and generic truths to co-exist, or rather co-actualize (see below). It does not claim generic truths to be the *only* real kind of truth. It does, however, state that the pragmatic or problematic kind of truths, such as the one proposed in the previous section, are more basic than interpretive truths, which in turn are a necessary but not sufficient condition for axiomatic and mathematical truths. This means there can be no axiomatic truths that are not the (underdetermined) product of intuitions, discursive practices and mathematical practices (eg. set theoretical). This seems to present a divergence from Deleuze (1994) as well, as extension and ‘differenciation’ are no longer metaphysical primitives or part of an eternal ‘double articulation’, but become performative effects of practices of (more-than-human) interpreting and counting respectively.

solid grounds, and then rigorously pursues it with fidelity, the epistemological and methodological repercussions are significant.²⁶

1.4.6 Epistemic strategy: Counter-actualization

Let us look at the epistemological task at hand first. On the one hand, the above axiomatic decisions instructs us to investigate the differential relations and processes that constitute the genealogy and ontogenesis of our objects of study. In the (post)human sciences this demands an epistemology that puts *practice* first. Many approaches to social research have in recent decades moved in this direction, be they of (neo)Marxist, Heideggerian or Latourian inspiration (Nicolini, 2012). On the other hand, the axioms also strongly suggest (pragmatically, not by logical necessity) how relational and practice approaches to research should proceed. If we decide reality actualizes itself in the order from generalized to restricted complexity, or rather from practices to interpretations to metrics, it makes sense to start from the latter in any research that aims to explore any problem as comprehensively as possible (and to actually ‘rupture’ objectivity in the Badiouian sense).²⁷ What we need to develop therefore is a strategy of *counter-actualization*, which prescribes that we work in the opposite direction of actualization, as if from solution to problem. This is opportune because the factual order provides us with the most analytical traction (which represents a perennial methodological problem of relational approaches: where does the network/assemblage begin? Where to start?). From that position, all metrics (even all mathematics, cf. Lakoff and Núñez, 2000) can be translated into the interpretations that give rise to them (but do not determine their truth).

At this point, we are finally in a position to see how all the above intuitions, their axiomatization and the epistemic strategy that follows translate into the schematic form presented before in Image 1.10. Below, Image 1.11 reiterates and summarizes at once the relations of necessary and sufficient conditioning between the ontological elements of practices, interpretations and metrics (including their underlying axioms). It becomes immediately clear that actualization moves upward in the diagram while counter-actualization works in the downward direction. Moreover, it becomes obvious that within this transcendental structure, the pragmatic (4) and interpretive (2) conditions on which science and mathematics rely (but also economics and electoral politics) (1) do not at any moment exhaust our reality, but always co-actualize with other possible interpretations (3) and untapped pragmatic capacities (6). This alone is reason enough for a transcendental empirical science to pursue a strategy of counter-actualization which systematically problematizes

²⁶ If this begs the question of how this decision actually works: Reflexively we could say it is the combined product of a public *fidelity* to the universal sublimity of mathematics (following Badiou, Meillassoux and others) and a *pragmatism* about the decision’s dynamic and affective effects (following Deleuze, Stengers and others).

²⁷ One could, alternatively, decide to just dive in and intuitively follow practices/actants ‘ANT-style’, although this approach is probably more amenable to that kind of ‘naive objectivism’ that Brenner et al. (2011) warn Farias (2011) about: the slipping in of ideologically problematic *etic* categories.




Image 1.11. The epistemic procedure of counter-actualization cuts across the three levels of the actualization diagram in six steps. It starts from (emic) axioms and metrics (1) to then work down to the interpretations of which the axioms and metrics are a formalization and quantification (2) but also looks sideways at interpretations that are not quantified (3). Moving further down the diagram, counter-actualization relates the quantified interpretations to axiomatic, quantifying practices (4) and relates alternative interpretations to the practices of qualification that produce them (5). From there it is possible to trace the contours of practices that are neither qualified nor quantified and remain underrepresented (6).

and pluralizes reality by mapping and exploring these alternative interpretations and marginalized practices. As a most generic truth procedure then, one cuts across the three levels of the diagram starting from (emic) axioms and metrics (1), working down to the interpretations of which the axioms and metrics are a formalization and quantification (2) but also moving sideways to look at alternative, non-quantified interpretations (3). Should metrics somehow not be present or relevant in the situation under study, one would start instead from dominant interpretations or by distinguishing dominant from alternative. Then, moving further down the diagram, one relates the former interpretations to the practices that translate interpretations into axioms and metrics (axiomatic, quantifying practices) (4) and relates the latter, alternative interpretations to the practices of qualification that produce them (5). From there it is possible to trace the contours of practices that are neither qualified nor quantified and as such remain non-represented (6). In the following chapters these six elements are given further social, economic and political content, but for now it is important to see the generic procedure for what it is.

1.5 Methodological decision-making: A European research project in practice

Having thus established the generic epistemic strategy, methodological procedures suggest themselves quite naturally. In a way, the speculative ontology developed in this thesis could in itself already be perceived as a method in itself. Not so much a ‘grand theory’, restricted as those have always been to either mathematical ‘theories of everything’ or classical sociological metanarratives, (counter)actualization theory could perhaps be seen as a ‘grand method’ (cf. James, 2006), much in the way that actor-network theory is really more a method than a theory (Latour, 2005a: 142). Other than a grand generalizing formula or projection, a *theorein*, the theory and method presented here may be even ‘grander’ in some respects. Not grand in its

generality, it may be 'grand' in its posthuman abstraction. But, for that same reason, also more myopic, more demanding and modest in its practice and empirical claims. And in this pragmatic sense, it should also be a sufficiently 'small method' (reliably portable yet validly malleable). In other words, the diagram of Image 1.11 should be made into a compact device to take into the field and guide its exploration (ie. a sufficiently heuristic fieldwork protocol', see Section 1.5.1.3).

However, before getting into the actual logistics of this translation of epistemic strategy into a fieldwork tool, a few general words are needed about the mixed methods approach taken in this thesis on gentrification. In staying true to our axiomatic diagram a methodology cannot be anything but pluralistic, yet rigorous. By and large, it translates rather straightforwardly into a thoroughly tried and tested set of methods:

- To take *metrics* seriously, if only to problematize them later, one has to collect, analyse and decide on their internal consistency. In this thesis, all metrics are from secondary documentation, treated as *emic* data and have not been subjected to any substantial additional statistical or otherwise mathematical calculations (which would not be excluded in principle by counter-actualization and in fact was a part of our larger research project, see below for more details). Social, economic and political metrics are found everywhere: demographics are discovered in policy documents, government websites or real estate brochures (Chapter 4). Property prices and calculations are encountered in public databases, on appraisal forms and in verbalized rules of thumb (Chapter 5). Political metrics are discovered in polls, neighborhood meetings, but also in scientific policy evaluations (Chapter 6).
- In turn, measured and non-measured *interpretations* suggest methods of *hermeneutics and discourse analyses* to understand the experiences of actors involved (in the sense of *Verstehen*) and to place discursive statements in context. In this thesis, this means analyzing all kinds of social, economic and political expressions. Most central to understanding experiences of gentrification is interviewing the people involved in the process. Here, interviews are conducted with, among others: residents, social workers, housing associations, real estate developers, brokers, entrepreneurs, planners and politicians (with every actor speaking about all related subjects, these are concentrated but still scattered over the various chapters). Also important, however, is the analysis of mediated discourse: history books, neighborhood planning documents, local newspapers, video recordings of events, yearly reports of real estate developers, spatial plans of megaprojects or protest signs.
- Lastly, to see how metrics and interpretations are embedded in what kind of *practices*, and to explore whatever capacities and tendencies are not properly captured by those interpretations, *field observation* and *ethnography* are the obvious methods of choice. In this thesis, this means observing and sometimes participating in practices of socialization, economization and politicization. The goal is to not just get a lived understanding of the practices but also get a feel for their potentials. Therefore, special attention goes out to the relational

capacities and affects of material-semiotic practices. Here, in relation to the subject of gentrification, observations have been done around homes, public squares and parks, shops, workplaces, offices, construction sites and meeting rooms.

Of course, in research practice, progressing through the days, months and years, these sources and methods overlap and mix significantly. An interview with an entrepreneur may take place and refer to all kinds of practices and objects within her workshop and, moreover, may involve the mentioning of her rent and product prices. Likewise, planning documents often not just include all kinds of spatial, demographic and economic metrics, they are also themselves objects of practice, carrying certain capacities by virtue of their semiotics (structure, style etc.). Or in a fleeting encounter in front of a tobacco shop, one makes casual chit chat with residents about high property prices and failing neighborhood policy. With this inherent chaos of relational practice in mind (see Chapter 3), proper fieldwork protocols are required to operationalize the strategy of counter-actualization and translate it into a feasible research practice.

1.5.1 Logistics of the 'Gentrification 2.0' research project

Moving away from axiomatics and further into the practicalities of this particular research, some further procedural and methodological decisions are in need of explanation. This section will first explain some institutional background of the larger research project this thesis has been part of. Then an overview will be provided of the basic methodological decisions that were made before and during my participation (from September 2013 onwards).

1.5.1.1 Searching for a 'Gentrification 2.0'?

This thesis has been part of a European JPI-funded research project titled "Practices and policies for neighborhood improvement: towards 'Gentrification 2.0'". The central premise of its proposal was that traditional conceptualizations were unable to come to an agreement about its driving forces and political-policy implications. This often resulted in a paradigmatically, ideologically or geographically motivated focus on only one dimension of gentrification, be it ground rents and property values, gentrifiers and their cultural capital or government policy and planning. Against such one-dimensional conceptualizations, designated as 'Gentrification 1.0', the development of a more holistic, '2.0' version was proposed, which would bridge economic, cultural and political approaches through a *practice*-based understanding of (better) neighborhood development.²⁸ Moreover, through the notion of *assemblage*,

²⁸ Early in the project we learned the '2.0' moniker was rather off-putting to many gentrification scholars, if not antagonizing, as it seemed to suggest that either gentrification itself (ie. displacement) just needed to be done better, be 'upgraded', or that our '1.0' colleagues were all hopelessly outdated (as if such a simple software-derived notion of progress would apply to social

which also has a strong orientation toward practices, the *relational* approach of Gentrification 2.0 would also secure a better understanding of the mediating role of local context in gentrification processes often assumed to be uniform the world over. Accordingly, research questions in the proposal were formulated to cover all the factors that would be the centerpiece of ‘1.0’ approaches, that is, real estate economics, demographic changes and regimes of planning and governance. To illustrate, a selection:

- How has the nature and significance of property investments/use changed in gentrifying neighbourhoods in the last two decades [...]? How is this currently manifested in our case area regions [...]?
- What kind of socio-demographic trends and developments (shifts in age, social and ethnic mix, migration flows) are broadly impacting on inner-city neighbourhood development... [and are] manifested in our case areas?
- How have changing regimes impacted upon gentrification processes in our case areas? Has a stronger market orientation induced fragmented urban policies, with benefits centred on up- per/middle income groups? To what extent is there still (policy) scope for broader social and spatial ambitions?
- [H]ow are neighbourhoods, following the popularization of [...] [the] ‘creative class’, conceived as innovative, culturally rich as economic engines, and how do they build new forms of image and appeal?

1.5.1.2 Joint Programming for Urban Europe

Under these initial premises the ambitious project did not just promise to be more multidimensional in its scope but also comparative in its geography. As it was part of the Joint Programming Initiative Urban Europe (est. 2010), its explicit objective was to create comparative knowledge and cross-Europe institutional ties. And so, the project set out to study four neighborhoods undergoing gentrification in various stages: Klarendal, Arnhem (NL), Beyoğlu/Cihangir, Istanbul (TR), Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, the 15th district of Vienna (AT), Zurich West (CH). The reason for picking these cases was partly pragmatic, following JPI requirements and the institutional ties already present, but also theoretical, as the specific neighborhoods were intuited to be different from the ‘usual suspects’ (eg. Arnhem instead of Amsterdam). Because of internal issues plaguing our Swiss partner, private company Raumdaten GmbH, they were unable to deliver anything on their case. Soon after the project started it was discontinued and it is therefore no part of our research, including this thesis. Empirical work on the other three cases was primarily executed by each respective team: Klarendal by Radboud University (RU), including Arnoud Lagendijk, Huib Ernste, Rianne van Melik, Huub Ploegmakers and me; Beyoğlu/Cihangir by the Middle East Technical University in Ankara (METU), including Serap Kayasü, Emine Yetişkul, Şule Demirel and Merve Gürsoy; and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus by the University of Vienna (UNIVIE), in the persons of Heinz Fassmann, Yvonne Franz, Michael Friesenecker, Isis

science). So while the name served its purpose in obtaining research funds, we came to appreciate the name ‘Beyond Gentrification’ more. This also became the name used for the project website Beyondgentrification.com.

Boot and Dario Unterdorfer. All teams were also occasionally assisted by students (in Nijmegen most notably Konstantinos Gourzis, Stefan Venema and Rowan Voermans). Because I was the only full PhD researcher on the project and therefore had the time and resources to do it, I was the only one who was able to do any research across locations. So apart from the project meetings we had as a consortium in each of the cities under study I could also visit them on other occasions to do some research of my own (more on this below).

1.5.1.3 Research design: From theme protocols to fieldwork protocols to assemblage

The general research process was designed as follows (see Image 1.12 below). Based on the research proposal and consortium meetings, four themes were chosen and elaborated that would cover the problem of gentrification in its full dimensions. While this thesis presents three sub-themes within the overarching theme of gentrification (practices socialization, economization and politicization), the project started out with four: socio-demographics (coded DEMO), property (PROP), planning (PLAN) and commerce (ECON). The last of these was eventually dropped as a part of this thesis, for reasons of time, but also because it would not contribute anything fundamental to the subject of practices of economization as treated in Chapter 5 (the actualization scheme would be much the same, roughly: making-valuing-pricing). This is not to say that it is not a very important dimension of gentrification, which




Image 1.12. A schematic depiction of the research design. ‘Actants’ or objects of study, such as real estate prices (metrics), strategic planning documents (interpretations) or social interactions in public space (practices) and ‘themes’ of demographics, planning, local economy and property combine into ‘theme protocols’ formulating theme specific empirical questions. The theme protocols subsequently inform a choice of thematically/theoretically relevant field actors to contact, visit and investigate. Together with this selection of actors, the theme protocols inform (and remain a backdrop for) actor-specific ‘fieldwork protocols’. These provide concrete discourse analytic, interview and ethnographic questions. As a last, culminating step, themes and actors cross-tabulate into an ‘assemblage’ spreadsheet, which summarizes theoretical, empirical and methodological questions and choices.

more directly covers changes in the nature of work, gender and cultural consumption. These aspects are therefore treated only indirectly in this thesis. However, the four themes were translated into *theme protocols*, which combined a first theme-specific literature review and suggestions for methods (eg. document analysis, interviewing, observation) and specific field actors and sources for studying the theme. Each team took the lead on one or two themes (the Austrian team on DEMO, the Turkish on PLAN and the Dutch on PROP and ECON). The respective theme protocols were then peer reviewed and co-edited in an online word processor. The general assemblage approach sketched out in the original research proposal was still very open to specification. As I was lucky enough to pitch my particular interpretation of that theory to the teams at an early stage, our research project became a first systematic comparative experiment in counter-actualization. This meant that each team wrote the theme protocols with the six-fold distinction of practices, interpretations and metrics of Image 1.11 already in mind.

The theme protocols were subsequently translated into actor-centered *fieldwork protocols*, which gave more specific methodological instructions, such as interview questions and observational suggestions. During fieldwork, in public spaces, people's homes or at workplaces, the protocols were literally taken along to work as checklists/surveys to ensure all relevant themes and questions were covered. The protocols were also structured based on the diagram of Image 1.10 and the four themes, making for a concise list of empirical topics. Thus, the (counter)actualization theory worked to navigate at once the theoretical (and ethical) debates on gentrification and its subthemes *and* the empirical ground work in each of our case neighborhoods. Based on the theme protocols, ten different fieldwork protocols were set up for ten different actors: academics, community organizations, entrepreneurs, housing associations, investors, media, municipalities, political parties, real estate agents and residents. Naturally these did not completely correspond to the four themes. For instance, although a real estate investor might have more to say about property related matters, they also have relevant views on planning, demographics or commerce. Therefore, any actor-specific protocol would include questions covering several themes.

As a last, culminating step, both theme and fieldwork protocols would be summarized in an 'assemblage protocol'. This large spreadsheet would state for every combination of theme, intersecting themes, actant and actor the relevant theoretical issues, empirical questions and methodological choices (ie. data sources, analysis). It also suggested a systematic deduction of a range of codes by which data could be analyzed. With an eye on relevant theoretical discussions, combinations of theme, actant and actor resulted in 67 codes (which also ended up in the fieldwork protocols). For example, [DPRES] would represent [D]emographics, [P]ractices, [RES]idents (example question: 'Where do residents meet (use/accommodation of public space; use of [semi]private space, eg pubs, shops,...)?'); or [PIBUC] would stand for [P]roperty, [I]nterpretation, [BU]yers, [C]ommercial (ie. entrepreneurs) (example question: 'How is the budget constraint 'calculated' (i.e. the price range of suitable/affordable properties)?'). Ultimately, this system of codes proved too arduous and deductive *for me* and my pursuits in this thesis. Nonetheless, the spreadsheet provided me with a useful initial overview of the complex link between theory

and empirical instructions and, as such, the confidence that a sufficiently holistic covering of gentrification issues was achieved. But in practice, the initial function of the assemblage spreadsheet was restricted to providing overview. For me, as I became intimately familiar with the (theme specific) gentrification literature, it became less and less necessary to consult it.

1.5.1.4 Access to the field, data collection and analysis

One important objective and requirement of the Urban Europe initiative (at least for leading project partner Radboud University) was to embed the project with local non-academic partners. As an advisory board, they provided interim corroboration of results and helped ensure good valorization. But it was also very useful for reasons of access. In the Dutch case, our societal partners were the main housing corporation (Volkshuisvesting Arnhem) and social work organization (Stichting Rijnstad) active in Klarendal and the City of Arnhem (Gemeente Arnhem). In Vienna there were strong ties to the Urban Renewal Office of the 15th district and in Istanbul with the Cihangir Neighborhood Association. In Arnhem, social workers were crucial in getting into contact with and gaining the attention and trust of some prominent residents and entrepreneurs. Much of the introduction into the vernacular history and everyday issues of Klarendal also came from talking to them. For Chapter 5, on the real estate market of Klarendal, having the housing association on board was absolutely essential. It gave us an entry into the many departments of the largest property owner and (re) developer in the district. Likewise, the City's representative on our advisory board was essential for getting to speak to many other municipal workers and politicians (the main interview input for Chapter 6). However, most interviewees among residents and entrepreneurs were contacted and recruited by simply stopping them on the street, addressing them at neighborhood gatherings, ringing their door (eg. if they lived in the buildings under study in Chapter 5), or by walking into their shop or workplace. Often this started a snowballing from one respondent to the next based on interesting topics and references during interviews and observations (theoretical sampling). Most developers, consultants and academics, operating at a distance from the neighborhood, were contacted through email or telephone to schedule interview appointments (most of which face-to-face).

Data collection proceeded by document collection, interviewing and participatory and non-participatory observation (see Appendix I and II for an overview of all the interviews and documents referenced in the text). Most recent documents were found online or acquired through email (demographics, neighborhood newspapers, project plans, municipal budgets, company reports etc.), but many, mostly older paperwork, such as political coalition accords or planning documents from before 2000, also had to be retrieved from physical archives, such as public libraries, municipal archives, housing corporation cabinets or personal collections of residents. All physical documents were scanned and stored at a cloud service. My own analyses mostly relied on physical photocopies and prints. For the Viennese and Istanbul cases, I depended mostly on project partners and other local contacts to provide me with the appropriate documents (photographs, online articles, spatial plans etc.). Interviewing

and ethnographic work in Arnhem was mostly conducted by me (65 interviews) and my direct project colleagues (13), sometimes together. But some interviews were also done by students doing an internship within our project and writing their master thesis on gentrification in Klarendal (Konstantinos Gourzis (2) and Stefan Venema (7)). The Vienna and Istanbul teams also relied on students for some of the interview and observation data (including written reports and photographs). Observations in Arnhem by me and my Nijmegen colleagues were recorded by physical notes and hundreds of photographs. After sit-down interviews, voice recordings would often stay on during (rather indexically phrased) explanations of work practices. When permitted, some group gatherings, such as Neighborhood Council meetings, were also recorded. In between notes, photographs and sound recordings, a thick enough ethnographic account of practices was ensured.

It should be noted that, because of pragmatic constraints and differences of theoretical preference and methodological procedure among the participating partners, the resulting interview data differed somewhat in extension and quality (Section 1.5.3 on comparative urbanism we come back to some of these issues). For instance, the Turkish team was not able to audio record and therefore transcribe their interviews. Here we had to rely on written notes (although I have complemented their data with my own where possible). Also, the Austrian interviews were generally more faithful to the format and transcriptions significantly shorter in length. However, taking these differences into account, each team managed to generate a substantial amount of useful interview data (see Table 1.1 for an overview). For the Dutch case 89 interviews were conducted, most of which were recorded by dictaphone and stored at our shared cloud server. Four interviews (Interview no. 039, 040 and two not referenced in this text) were not or only partly recorded due to technical or personal issues. All interviews that were recorded were transcribed word for word. For this thesis, I read all interviews again (not all at one time), and only coded inductively, by hand, on paper, (parts of) those 69 interviews that I deemed relevant for the developing arguments in the respective chapters. As part of the hermeneutic cycle, repeatedly moving from data to theory and back (more on which below), interviews were coded and returned to repeatedly when needed (see Appendix I for an overview of all the interviews referenced in the text by number, eg. 'Interview no. 052'). The analysis was a meeting of deductive but relatively *open* thematic coding (DEMO, ECON, PROP, PLAN) and *descriptive* (etic) and *in vivo* (emic) coding which then produced a further *axial* coding (cf. Strauss, 1987) that refined themes and their overlap (as a more inductive approach than the above mentioned 67 specified codes). Overall, however, this was a fairly loose and turbulent learning process and not a neat progression from open to axial to selective (see below). However, our project partners each did 126 and 75 interviews in Vienna and Istanbul respectively. As for the analysis of the Austrian and Turkish data I have relied significantly on my colleagues to provide empirical support for our claims in the interviews and documents and to find good illustrative quotes for the text. Moreover, they were crucial in corroborating my own analyses of the two cases throughout the years.

	Arnhem (Ch. 4-6)	Vienna (Ch. 4)	Istanbul (Ch. 6)
Team	RU	UNIVIE	METU
Interviews	89	126	75
Per actor:²⁹			
Academics	9	3	5
Community org.	13 (+2) ³⁰	6	7
Entrepreneurs	14	16	10
Housing ass.	6 (+2)	6	N/A ³¹
Investors	4	10	4
Media/journalists ³²	1	1	5
Municipalities	9	8	2
Political parties	4	7	2
Real estate ag.	6	3	12
Residents	19	66	28
Use of protocol	Checklist/topic list	Strict survey	Strict survey
Recorded	Yes	Yes	Some (6), but mostly no (only notes made in fw-protocol)
Transcribed	Yes	Yes	Mostly no, some yes (3), some written by email (6)

Table 1.1. Comparative overview of collection and processing of interview data across research sites.

²⁹ Of course many people interviewed could be classified as more than one type of actor (eg. an entrepreneur also living in the neighborhood). In this counting, each interviewee is cast into one category.

³⁰ Our contacts working for societal partners Rijnstad, a community organization, and Volkshuisvesting, a housing association, were both interviewed three times (therefore '+2').

³¹ There are no social housing associations in Istanbul, so logically this actor category is not applicable there.

³² The analysis of media perspectives in Arnhem and Vienna was largely restricted to a discourse analysis of newspaper and magazine articles. The one interview in Klarendal was with the head editor of the neighborhood newspaper (who was also acting chair of the Neighborhood Council, the local political platform). In Turkey, people in media played an important role in shaping political opinion and organizing in and around Cihangir/Beyoğlu (where they also often lived themselves). This was reason to interview more of this category.

1.5.1.5 *Some reflections on my own usage of the data*

The fieldwork done in all three cities produced an enormous amount of data, not all of which is *explicitly* used in this thesis. While holistically speaking, all interview and ethnographic data have been taken into consideration, of course not all interviews are quoted, observations described or photographs shown. This is also a product of *learning* what is really relevant to our cases. Along the way, this learning included significant extensions and reformulations of research questions, scientifically relevant objects of study and field actors to sample. This is much in accordance with the kind of ‘science of problems’ described in Section 1.2.3, for which the primary objective is to attain, through *in vivo* experimentation, a rigorous idea of a *distribution* of ‘solutions’ that define a complex problem (ie. singularities, affects, concerns), rather than to capture one stable conjunction of causes and effects (necessarily under laboratory-like conditions) (cf. DeLanda, 2005, Callon, 2009). As such, learning takes and defines its own time (by an exact points of saturation, about which more below). As a consequence, the time planned within the project for fieldwork, roughly from October 2014 until April 2016, did not entirely chime with my own iterative processes of discovery and corroboration. Much of the data collected during the period that was prescribed by the project did not answer questions that arose later in the process. Indeed, much of what happened after the deductive phase of determining fieldwork and assemblage protocols can, at least for the writing of this thesis, best be described as a hermeneutic cycle, or perhaps even better, ‘hermeneutic turbulence’.

The representation of the scientific process and the role of method depends largely on the views of the epistemologist or methodologist. When applying the foregoing ideas of counter-actualization to the research process, we can again contrast three such views, a mix of which were inscribed into the Gentrification 2.0 project. As a first view of science, positivist philosophy sees (the ideal) scientific method as a kind of recipe for truth-finding. The research process moves through a linear series of steps (conceiving questions, deducting hypotheses, empirical testing, analyzing results and (re)formulating theoretical models) to arrive at a truth, be it by verification or falsification. When a kind of equilibrium between theory and reality is reached in the medium of truth, the messiness and mistakes on the way to achieving that ‘correspondence’ are no longer relevant. In gentrification scholarship, this tight, positivist kind of research design is not all that common, even among quantitative studies (eg. Helms, 2003). The most prominent empirical tests of rent gap theory (eg. Clark, 1988) are very reflective on how data are obtained and how difficult that can be (see also Chapter 5). Still, at least in the background, the traditional, positivist ideal of scientific rigor remains strong in gentrification studies and social science generally. Partly due to this still demanding model of science, carried forward both by peer review and bureaucratic imperatives of funding institutions, the deductive, protocolled phase of our own project was the part that most approached this ideal type, at least procedurally. In the research proposal and final reporting this part could give an impression of an orderly process of asking questions, collecting data and finding answers. In a way, basing (part of) our protocols on the axiomatic decision of distinguishing practices, interpretations and metrics, and relating them through counter-actualization (as in Image 1.11), did also comply with the hypothetico-

deductive philosophy ideal. But there were never any quantitative hypotheses posed or tested. Any secondary quantitative data used was to loosely indicate trends and to counter-actualize (deconstruct into interpretations and practices).

A second view on science inscribed in our research project was of a more interpretive kind. Instead of a linear algorithm of truth production, this outspokenly human science has to go through several hermeneutic cycles to unearth its deeper structures of meaning and class. Truth becomes a matter of positional interpretation, whether evaluation-free, in the Weberian sense, or expressly critical and political, as in the Marxist tradition ('the point is not to interpret but to change'). Within gentrification scholarship, the latter tradition of demystifying class structures with an emancipatory intent is the dominant mode of interpretation. In practice, this usually entails catching signs of gentrification (ie. displacement) in qualitative data. Interpretation then moves back and forth between architectural features, commercial activities, social interactions and neighborhood politics and structural theories of a Bourdieuvian, Lefebvrian or postcolonial cut. However, as this dialectic, cyclical kind of research process is inherently harder to proceduralize and exactly plan for, as it is never entirely clear beforehand when interpretive representation (ie. ideal typological or diagnostic saturation) will be achieved. And so was the case within our project, which also ambitiously announced an in-depth understanding of the local contexts of our cases through 'thick descriptions'. However, any *iterative* movement between theory (ie. theme/fieldwork protocols) and data analysis remained only an implicit objective that was not formally planned for. As mentioned, this proved insufficient *for me*, as my questions, hypotheses, theoretical views and interests changed as fieldwork proceeded (more often than formal project planning allowed for). In other words, much of the hermeneutic work came after the protocolled part of the research was finalized. Still, because of the open manner in which the (counter-actualizing) fieldwork protocols were set up, our investigations were far from algorithmic.

Not fully satisfied with the products of positivist and interpretive methods, a third and last view on science, based in practice theory, emphasizes how both do not fully engage with and trivialize the material heterogeneity and messiness of scientific practice and how it is always superpositioned or 'partially connected' with the world it studies. Now it might appear, certainly from the more radical interpretivist point of view, that the methodological choices presented above are the rather arbitrary result of paradigmatic positions or otherwise ideal, economic or political interests of researchers and (funding) institutions. However, this rendition of science as an ultimately arbitrary play of cultural signs or social power tends to exclude or take for granted any way to discern the genuinely productive and enlightening performativity of hypothetico-deductive protocols and hermeneutic reflections as they are *practiced* by science in 'methodological assemblages' that reach beyond (emic) fact production and critical institutions (cf. Law, 2004). Moreover, just as much as the positivist view, the interpretivist would be uninterested in the (just as productive) *messiness* of real, more-than-human scientific practice. If, as found by ethnographic studies (ibid.), even laboratorial science is already quite messy in the process of achieving 'correspondence' between theory and nature, despite the neat positivist image it portrays to the public and to itself (Latour, 1987), then a social science

which takes seriously its own (auto)ethnographic insights must certainly be just as messy. Embracing the mess we are in (ie. general complexity) and approaching it as an opportunity implies we recognize the hermeneutic turbulence of practice that subsists before and after correspondence, in spite of our indispensable yet inadequate protocols and dialectic reflections. As will be further detailed in Chapter 3, we need to develop an understanding of the turbulent (etic) research process as an often chaotic interference of and resonance with the (emic) practices under study. Whereas laboratory-like, *in vitro* social science working by controlled (quasi)experiments and coding schemes can and should (performatively, ethically) close itself off by protocols of truth procedure or hermeneutic distinction and opposition, the *in vivo* experiment that is posthuman ethnography cannot and should not pretend to do so. But this would also require a different concept of truth. Rather than a matter of *correspondence*, be it as positive truth (equilibrium) or dialectic understanding (cyclical), truth would designate a more complex, messy and turbulent relation of felicitous *coherence* within an ecology of practices that share in a problem. As suggested in Section 1.2.6, sharing a problem in constructive, diplomatic and joyful ways implies etic and emic practices start to interfere in turbulent ways, hopefully generating new and exciting concepts that may betray stabilized but out-of-place positivist and critical habits (eg. ‘the gap multiple’ in Chapter 5, or ‘urban mesopolitics’ in Chapter 6). In unsuspected ways, practices encountered come to cohere and resonate with theory and vice versa. But before that happens, this messy process also generates a huge amount of ‘data’, that is, fragments of emic reality that, together with a mass of substantial etic theories, are the building blocks of new conceptual contrasts.

In my own experience of the research project and process, it was also one of general turbulence. The explosion of (multi-theme, multi-site) data was accompanied by a cascade of hermeneutic cycles. With every practice encountered (eg. interaction in public space, property appraisal, participatory budgeting) a whole new gentrification-adjacent discussion and substantially specific literature was brought into the analysis, meaning more work and taking more time, which was mostly lacking for other project colleagues. Much like a runaway cascade of Hopf bifurcations it became hard to contain the chaos and maintain consistency. Nonetheless, despite it taking a lot of time and effort, eventually a kind of pragmatic *saturation* set in quite naturally. In methodological terms, this was not so much a saturation in terms of statistical representativeness (as in quantitative analysis) or classificatory coverage (as in qualitative analysis), but a saturation in terms of hitting limits of conceptual dimensionality and detail that seemed immanent to the problem at hand. Both the initial cascade of (sub)problems and its eventual saturation and restriction I experienced as an emergent effect of applying, with rather exhausting fidelity, the counter-actualization diagram, rather than as a product of my own arbitrary decision, which would probably have come sooner. Likewise, the need to introduce new terms, such as ‘volcanic singularity’ (Chapter 4), ‘economic dyscalculia/dyslexia’ (Chapter 5) or ‘practices of (in)civility’ (Chapter 6), presented itself quite automatically, when an extension, revision, further differentiation or connection of existing conceptual contrasts between practices was called for (on a problematic, non-representational, topological level).

1.5.2 My own activities: A Freek de Haan to deploy

Whether instigated by lack, turbulent process or simply my own interest, a significant part of the empirical work for this thesis was done outside or on top of the formal requirements of the larger project. As explained above, my main job within the project was doing the bulk of the empirical work in the Netherlands, since I had the time and resources for it. However, for the same reason I could also go beyond what was initially planned for. And so, with the intention of giving my research a bit more ethnographic depth and footing, I supplemented my interviewing and observation work with some longer stays at all three research sites.

I spent half a year living in Klarendal, from January until July 2015. While I sometimes had my doubts whether the six months gave me much extra insight into the case, it did provide me with a good feel for the, so I found out, rather uneventful daily life in the ‘notorious’ neighborhood. Furthermore, as I stayed in one of the social housing complexes of the main housing corporation (together with a group of college students), it gave me an impression of how they worked and related to their tenants. More important, however, was the access that the stay provided, simply by being there during that period, but also because it gave me a certain credibility and trust with residents and other involved actors. Overall, residents, entrepreneurs and civil servants had already seen many students of Klarendal come and go over the years, from high school to university level. As the lack of return on time invested talking to the scholarly tourists became clear to many of them, they became more reluctant to be interviewed and access could be difficult. Aside from my writing for the neighborhood newspaper (see Appendix IV), being able to regularly show my face in public places and telling people I lived in Klarendal helped make the ethnographic ‘gift exchange’.

In Vienna and Istanbul, all the research by protocol was done by colleagues there. Nonetheless I also wanted to go there myself and get a proper feeling for the neighborhoods we were studying and about which I was supposed to write. Otherwise, my own impressions of the places would be limited to the excursions we did during project meetings (once in Istanbul, twice in Vienna). While the latter were very informative and gave everyone the chance to meet and engage with local actors (social workers, neighborhood associations etc.), a sense of everyday life was hard to obtain. Therefore I lived for about a month in both cities, specifically in Beyoğlu/Cihangir (September 2015) and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus (November 2015). The general objective, feasible within the timeframe, was to get a good, holistic feel for both places and their history. This meant absorbing the atmosphere and the lived spatial reality of the place, by looking at real estate prices, chatting with residents, joining a protest and so on. Most importantly, the research visits provided me with first hand experience of the places and structures that feature prominently in the empirical chapters (4 and 6), such as Reindorfgasse, the parks of the 15th district (eg. Dadlerpark) and Schwendermarkt in Vienna, or Tarlabası, Galataport, Cihangir Park and Taksim Square in Istanbul.

However, for reasons mentioned in the previous section, my own data collection also stretched out beyond the period prescribed for it by the international project. Therefore I also had to gather a lot of data on the Turkish and Austrian cases after that period. This concerned the gathering of relevant documents and, for the Turkish case, conducting a few extra interviews. These were mainly with planners and academics, to make sense of the (Turkish) documents and the planning practices in which they were embedded.

1.5.3 Comparativism in theory and practice

What I learned above all, moving in between the three cities and neighborhoods, is that any comparison between them would either have to resort to very general categories, or resign itself to particularity. Or, as a third option, rethink what comparative urban geography means. Luckily, much work has been done recently in this direction. Therefore, to conclude this methodological part and this introductory chapter, a few words on doing comparative research are in order. Geographical notions of comparing cities have recently undergone some radical transformations under the influence of postcolonial and relational theories. While postcolonial ideas have shaken up the way we look at the geography of theory production, including on gentrification (eg. Lees, 2000, 2012, 2018), relational and practice theories have changed the way we look at cities or gentrifying neighborhoods as geographical units of analysis (cases) and their causal explanation. To understand the comparative approach taken here, both postcolonial and relational reflections have to be briefly addressed and brought to bear on one another. After this discussion of comparative theory and methodology, the rest of the section will review, from my perspective, some of the practical challenges we faced in our own project of comparative urbanism.

1.5.3.1 Comparative tradition and postcolonial critique

That cities or neighborhoods are called ‘cases’ suggests that they are *particular* instances of something more *general* and this has indeed been the traditional approach to comparative urban research. In a *positivist* mode of analysis, the city, neighborhood or some other locality becomes a particular instance (eg. land value) that can be compared to other such instances in order to establish or falsify the existence of general regularities among determining variables (eg. proximity to the urban center, commuting costs). An explanation is reached when these regularities are mathematically described (by spatial ‘laws’). Thus made predictable, certain values of variables are said to *cause* the spatial unit to display its particular value. Likewise, in a more *critical* (structuralist/realist) explanation, the particular city or (gentrifying) neighborhood is considered *part* of a more *general* social structure (ie. capitalist political economy). In critical geography this relation is often translated into the more recognizably (geo)spatial terms of the local and global and, bound up with this, center and periphery. Comparison then means looking at how much particular (gentrifying) places express the general structure (their ‘uneven development’). However, because of the rather disappointing abstractness of these

universalist comparative gestures, many have abandoned comparing greatly varying cases at all (ie. Eastern and Western, before 1990, or later, Northern and Southern cities) and introduced all kinds of ‘variation-finding’ submodels (eg. ‘varieties’ or ‘geographies’ of ‘variegated’ capitalism, neoliberalism and gentrification, eg. Lees, 2000, Van Gent, 2013).³³ In critical geography this specification has often translated into refined differences of scale in between the local and global (national, urban). Still, in most ‘encompassing’ gestures of comparison, the universal, ‘underlying’ structures of political economy are never far away and keep haunting the otherwise genuine attempts to honor diversity through more ‘individualizing’ comparisons.

Not surprisingly, the seemingly inevitable dominance of these implicated modes of encompassing and individualizing comparison has led to much discussion on uneven academic production and ‘theory cultures’ (eg. McFarlane, 2010), including in gentrification studies (eg. Lees et al., 2015, Maloutas, 2011). As argued in Chapter 3 as well, the latter have indeed, from a postcolonial perspective, been dominated by a rather Anglocentric master narrative of global gentrification, a quasi-universalist “monocausal explanatory model based on market mechanisms and neoliberal policies” (ibid.: 34). The legislation of scholarly value by Anglo-American ‘theory culture’ has of course been strongly reinforced by the increasing dominance of English as the academic *lingua franca* and through a particular set of discursive channels (journals, councils, conferences) employing gatekeepers (referees, publishers) with their own discursive preferences (Minca, 2003, Aalbers, 2004, Paasi, 2005). It is in such an ecology of practices that applications and specifications of terms like ‘gentrification’ or ‘neoliberal urbanism’, born and bred among those same hegemonic practices, are allowed to travel fast (even so in the form of critique). It goes without saying, then, that geographers intent on doing comparative research (and pushed to publish ‘internationally’)³⁴ find such practices and their requirements to be the source of a lot of friction in their ‘local’ interpretive work. In order to connect with the discursive practices of their peers they are required to express themselves in terms not necessarily of their own choosing, forced to employ only ‘half-way de-contextualizable’ terms such as gentrification (Maloutas, 2011). And so, as the diffusion of a place-specific concept has been rather unilaterally accelerated and allowed to generalize itself to encompass the ‘global’, comparative studies further

³³ In their reviews of comparative urban research, Ward (2010) and Robinson (2011a), both referring to Tilly (1984), distinguish four strategies of comparison: universal, encompassing, variation-finding and individualizing. Whereas universal and encompassing comparativisms look for causal constants and systemic processes generalized among cases, individualizing approaches idiosyncratically detail the histories of single cases, brought into comparative relief through other case studies and general theory. The variation-finding approach situates itself in between the above, taking on two forms closely situated to encompassing and individualizing. There is, on the one hand, the still causally universalist variation-finding, which tends to focus on ‘most similar’ cases (because of easy variation control, but not necessarily) and aims to devise ‘linked submodels’. On the other, there is the less understood, causally pluralist approach to variation-finding, which departs from the observation of similar outcomes among ‘most different’ cases. We employ the latter comparative logic (more on which below).

³⁴ Of course people from outside of the English-speaking practice could choose not to publish internationally, but this would only reinforce the Anglo-American hegemony and be detrimental to any fair comparison among equals (cf. Aalbers 2004: 320).

'down the global urban hierarchy' (so implied by that concept) are condemned to determine only 'local' species, deviating more or less from the Anglo-American phylum. But gentrification, as a mutating bundle of practices, does not travel in such an arborescent fashion. Now it must be said that many efforts have been made to move beyond this epistemic overextension (Lees, 2000, 2012, 2018, Harris, 2008, Lees et al., 2015, 2016), yet on a *practice* level, the fundamental legislative ethos has not changed much (see Chapter 3). The result is a persistent mismatch between the relatively centralized distribution of epistemic, comparative practices, aligned with political economic power, and the chaotic, rhizomatic and often slow diffusion of actual (emic) social, economic and political practices (notwithstanding the very real but overestimated centralizing performativity of some 'actually existing' comparisons). To better address this mismatch, comparative urbanism needs to proceed in a more radically relational direction.

1.5.3.2 Radicalizing the relational comparative approach

Escaping epistemic, comparative colonialism requires a serious rethinking of our object or 'unit' of analysis and its implied ontology. Instead of endlessly alternating and debating between, on the one hand, the *metrics*-derived world of land usage models and uneven development, reducing places to trivial intermediaries of global forces, and, on the other, the *interpretation*-based scalings and ideographies that dialectically compensate the former's reductionism (proclaiming all places as 'ordinary' and distinctive as the next, Robinson, 2006), we should restate the problem of spatial comparison in radically *relational* terms (cf. Ward, 2010). Specifically, through the concepts of *fractionality*, *performativity* and *topology* (see also Chapter 3).

First, *fractionality* undermines the mereological thinking that underlies this wrongheaded dialectic of encompassing and individualizing comparisons. Instead of thinking about places in terms of relations of *interiority*, *being* (more or less) part of a larger whole, they should be viewed as *becoming* individuated by differential relations of *exteriority* (cf. DeLanda, 2009). Places and their relations are thus fractional and dynamic, they consist of fractional, deferential processes that never add up to *one* whole but are also more than just a collection of *many* parts (much like a fractional line never amounts to a full surface but cannot be reduced to a set of points either). For us then, the 'case' to be studied is not a pre-existing territorial *unit* individuated through *etic* interpretations and metrics (ie. 'methodological territorialism'), but a territorializing *relation* (becoming, process). Outside of any etic container space, it designates an *emic* assemblage of *practices* that *does* the territorializing through its own enrolled interpretations and metrics (including emic comparisons). As a process of (counter)actualization, in other words, the case is fully *performative* and produces in practice its own flows of territorial interpretations ('global', 'Southern', 'Turkish', 'Klarendal' etc.) and selective metrics thereof (GPS coordinates, city rankings etc.).

As such, however, this ontologically fractal and performative multiplicity of practices can only become our 'unit' of analysis if we no longer conceive of it as a *topographical* object, through political territories or other etic projections of

global/center, local/periphery or North/South. Instead, we should approach it as a differential and *topological* singularity from which many performative topographies can and do emerge. ‘Thinking cities through elsewhere’ then becomes a matter of studying how they ‘already inhabit one another’ topologically speaking (cf. Robinson, 2011a, 2016). And this includes connections between cities through *emic* comparative topographies in circulation (or ‘actually existing comparative urbanisms’, McFarlane and Robinson, 2012). These will also feature in Chapter 6 in the form of ‘global city’ rankings in Istanbul planning and national policy evaluations in Arnhem. However, from this point of view, our comparative, variation–finding efforts become primarily interested in the continuous differential variety of practices (of socialization, economization and politicization) that actualize this topological space than in the discontinuous diversity among already territorialized parts and wholes that are actually the retroprojective product thereof. In methodological practice, the objective of comparative studies is then the collaborative exploration of the convergences and divergences of (‘Dutch’, ‘Austrian’ and ‘Turkish’ genealogies of) practices, in terms of their current actualizations but also their potential capacities. However, as explained in Section 1.4.6 (and Chapter 3), this topology of shared tendencies and capacities and their rhizomatic genealogies (they are not neatly individuated ‘cases’ like animal organisms or species, see Chapter 5, Part 1), should be approached analytically through counter–actualization. Or, in a comparative spirit, ‘co–counter–actualization’.

1.5.3.3 *Comparative urbanism as a relational practice: Co–counter–actualization*

As a relational practice, comparative urbanism becomes ‘genetic’ qua ontological framework and ‘generative’ in its epistemic production (cf. Robinson, 2016). If comparison is to become something other than the enactment of either a legislative ‘view from nowhere’, bringing truth to the slumbering and the oppressed, or a supposedly more humble ‘view from everywhere’, making inventories of local diversity, then it must designate some active, creative *resonance* between practices. A relational practice that manages to bring out the *genetic* singularity of assemblages and, by doing so, *generates* new and better concepts and practices of socialization, economization and politicization. However, as explained above (Section 1.4.6), the most tractable way to get at a comparison of virtual practices and singularities is through a deliberate *counter–actualization*. When we want to do more than participate in metric comparisons (ie. producing our own in a positivist mode) or deconstruct and critique them, we have our practice of comparison begin from the *emic* demarcations of our respective research sites (topographic, demographic, administrative) in order to each counter–actualize them toward the relational topology by which these sites already ‘inhabit each other’ (ie. the problem of gentrification). As such, this practice can be said to form a comparative assemblage of ‘co–counter–actualizations’. At once, it explores the shared *genetic* conditions of topographically separated gentrification processes (the problem of gentrification in all its social, economic and political dimensions), and in doing so *generates* new concepts and ethical coordinates of historical difference and spatial justice. In other words, this co–counter–actualization is supposed to be performative in a particular way. While in principle any actualization of parts and wholes and their (possibly quantitative) comparison (re)distributes our

capacities for engaging with the case (ie. counter-actualizes itself) and as such can be said to be performative in its own way, making this redistribution a deliberate and reflexive objective of our research practice is another matter. Comparison cannot just be about interpreting ('revealing') power structures, outside or inside academic practice, but also has to enact a more equal redistribution of (intellectual) powers, including capacities to distinguish powers of domination. But foremost, it should be about learning and sharing the ability to bring out singularity and produce new, generative conceptual contrasts of social, economic and political practices.

This goes for etic-emic relations (as discussed in Sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.6) but also for what we might call etic-etic relations, that is, relationships among researchers and their collectives. As suggested above, also in relation to gentrification studies, academic production has been highly uneven. Within academia at large, this issue has been addressed in (postcolonialist) terms of the 'politics of translation'. Translation and cultural exchange, postcolonial theorists have argued (Spivak, 1992, Bhabha, 1994, Chakrabarty, 2000: 17-18, 263n57), is never a simple transfer of meaning or information from one language or culture to another, but is always contaminated by historically and geographically uneven relations of power, including in scientific communication. From a universalist perspective, translation is a matter of having an expression mirror another in a different language and have this relation of identity grounded in (the perception of) one and the same reality. For a perfect science, or according to the logical positivist ideal type, translation would no longer require any effort, as it would restrict communication to one unequivocal language of logic and mathematics, verifiable or falsifiable by indisputably given data. If needed, the translation of different natural languages used by scientists can resort to this universal, neutral language unproblematically anchored in reality. If it cannot, it is not meaningful in a context of scientific justification (and therefore ultimately meaningless in general). Despite a long tradition of critiquing it, the ideal type still dominates our scientific institutions and practices in stronger or weaker forms. In human geography, also of the critical variant, the weaker form is still present in the demanding presence not so much of logic, mathematical theories and leveled contexts of justification, but of the English language, certain social and political economic theories and in the procedures of reviewing and funding institutions. On an everyday practice level, translation is thus still mostly depoliticized. In contrast to the universalist perspective, the more critical, relativist, multicultural and (de)constructivist perspectives would say translation between subjects, cultures and languages is ultimately impossible, as meaning-making only operates through perpetual deferring and dissipation (of conclusive identity). Scientific language, if there is such a singular thing (considering 'paradigms', 'epistemic communities' etc.), can only be one language among many. A common language making all others obsolete is impossible and any attempt to achieve it, ethically questionable. Thus critical of the dominance and positivist logic of commanding discourses, this perspective tends to produce a commendable hermeneutic deference for the different, the subaltern and the queer. Still, how to truly do so in *scientific* practice remains a challenge.

As an alternative to these opposed notions of (scientific) translation and, by extension, comparative geography, a relational practice approach avoids the whole

idea of translation as either a frictionless or an impossible *information* exchange and redefines it as a material-semiotic event of *transformation*. Besides taking in the postcolonial idea of a more symmetric translation by a “practice producing difference out of incommensurability (rather equivalence out of difference)” (Chakrabarty, 2000: 263n57), this definition of translation would further extend the implied transformational process to also include material and non-human components (making it ‘supersymmetric’, cf. Latour, 2005a: 106–108). What does this mean for practices of comparative geography? First of all, a more symmetric knowledge production, starting a genuine “dialogue between different urban sites” (McFarlane and Robinson, 2012: 769), demands a diversification of academic connections and intensive collaboration and teamwork (McFarlane, 2010: 736). However, such a multi-site ‘dialogue’ cannot (just) mean literally conferencing to exchange information, but involves the whole material-semiotic assemblage of scientific practice. Translation (ie. transformation) takes place not in between distinct cultural wholes (‘countries’, ‘epistemic communities’, ‘universities’), but in open assemblages of practices that also include material, non-human relations. In scientific research projects, this includes the uneven availability and workings of transport and communication technology, bodily capacities, labor time (secured through money) and so on.

1.5.3.3.1 Establishing metric and axiomatic interoperability

In this regard, a properly reflexive practice approach to collaborative translation makes urban comparison, understood as co-counter-actualization, a complex and demanding affair, accounting for all three ‘levels’ of assemblage. Even on the level of *metrics and axioms*, supposedly the realm of unambiguous information exchange (and the more ‘universal’ or ‘encompassing’ comparative gesture), it requires that we explicitly recognize and not brush away the significant interpretive difficulties and practical efforts involved in achieving technical and semantic interoperability across our national and urban databases and systems. Technically, metrics must be equally available, reliable and uniform in order to be comparable. Semantically, they must be based on what computer scientists call an ‘ontology’ (not to be confused with academic metaphysics). The latter involves standardizing objects and deciding on axioms for logically relating these objects (and, of course, basic axioms of set theory). Even when multi-sited research does not undertake any direct quantitative comparison (and if it is committed to co-counter-actualization), achieving interoperability would still involve deciding on some ontological objects and axioms (eg. distinguishing practices, interpretations and metrics and having them condition each other) and devise shared fieldwork protocols. The challenge is not to cover up the messiness of this process with scientific idealizations and be transparent toward peers and publics about the decisions and work involved.

1.5.3.3.2 Unlearning interpretive habits together

On an *interpretive* level, where we not only make positive decisions on objects of measurement, but also deconstruct, criticize and look for local alternatives excluded

by those objects and their relations (as a more ‘individualizing’ comparative exercise), the sharing and common interpretation of in-depth qualitative data becomes a challenge. Here, we want to learn of each others local meanings of gentrification (eg. the Turkish ‘urban transformation’ and the Dutch ‘neighborhood development’, see Chapter 6). Making sense of interview reports and other documents, often written in foreign languages, requires us to tirelessly (re)interrogate informants and colleagues located elsewhere. However, within the dialogue between urban sites, this is also where a lot of unsettling, destabilizing and ‘unlearning’ of universalist habits has to take place (cf. McFarlane, 2010). Our respective bases of operation are located in places that tend to prefigure our concepts of ‘gentrification’ and its many adjacents (neoliberalism, capitalism, governance, participation etc.). More abstract axioms such as those proposed above, can of course assist in this unlearning, by returning us to more generalized and emic axiomatics of exchange (truth, money, power), but also by demanding we tie such concepts to the etic and emic practices by which they are variously enacted and circulate. Thus performing as a kind of generic resonance chamber, the axiomatic actualization diagram at once minimized our etic differences while maximizing our openness to emic difference, having our cases bring out each other’s singularity (affected and concerned, we may add). Thus, the critical move of unlearning can be followed up by an affirmative, generative move, avoiding the slipping back into old habits without much transformation achieved.

1.5.3.3.3 Practicing multi-sited ethnography

Which brings us to the end point of co-counter-actualization, the level of emic *practices* and their ethnographic comparison. Here, some lived experience and more-than-linguistic understanding has to be gained of each other’s urban ‘elsewheres’ by physically visiting them and observing the practices that define their social, economic and political capacities. ‘Multi-sited ethnography’ provides an appropriate methodology for this, as it “moves [us] out from the single sites and local situations of conventional ethnographic research designs to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-space” (Marcus, 1995: 96). Whereas single-site ethnography has traditionally aimed for ‘thick descriptions’ of individual cases, often within an encompassing colonial context of the ‘capitalist political economy’ or ‘world system’ (accompanied by the epistemic and ethical imperative to side with the subaltern and a translation framed in ‘us-them’ terms, *ibid.*: 100–101), multi-sited ethnography tries to come to terms with the demands of fractionality (more than ‘world system’, less than self-contained ‘cultures’), performativity (of the ‘global’ or ‘capitalism’) and topology (‘diffuse time-space’) as put forward by the aforementioned radically relational comparative approach.³⁵

³⁵In the words of Marcus: “The object of study [eg. gentrification] is mobile and multiply situated, so any ethnography of such an object will have a comparative dimension that is integral to it, in the form of juxtapositions of phenomena that conventionally have appeared to be (or conceptually have been kept) ‘worlds apart’. Comparison reenters the very act of ethnographic specification by a research design of juxtapositions in which the global is collapsed into and made an integral part of [ie. performed by] parallel, related local situations rather than something monolithic or external to them. This move toward comparison embedded in the multi-sited ethnography stimulates

This also has practical implications. As their object of study (eg. gentrification) becomes scattered and mobile (by financialization, policy mobility or cultural memes), ethnographers should follow. By experiencing, observing and pursuing social, economic and political capacities across sites and histories one gets a vivid understanding of the assemblage of (gentrification) practices by which places ‘inhabit one another’. This does not necessarily imply a dissipation of descriptive ‘thickness’, as it would be mistaken to have that quality depend too much on the traditional ethnographic virtue of ‘being there’. Presupposing a particular notion of space and place, this trope of ‘being *there*’ all too often promotes a rather misplaced (and anthropocentric) ontological primacy of ‘bodily co-present’, ‘ground-level’ and ‘everyday’ social interactions. In a modern world of transnational bureaucratic networks, mass migration and online public arenas ‘*being there*’, that is, intensive and sustained involvement with an event or practice, has come to be seen as equally important for the ethnographic understanding, and its emphasis has shifted accordingly (cf. Craith and Hill, 2015). Moreover, ‘thickness’ also loses some of its representationalism by being measured not just by the naturalism of ethnographic descriptions (bringing out a case’s singularity), but also by the pragmatic power to generate new concepts. In sum, multi-sited ethnography asks of us to follow our object around and find thickness in its dynamics as much as its accorded place. While not discounting the value of lived experience of static places, ethnography is no longer confined to the topographical site and also studies more ‘distant’ attachments and mobile carriers of culture (which is no less labor intensive).

In conclusion, the reflexive and transformative assemblage of urban comparison brings out the singular genesis of its cases *and* generates new common concepts by a deliberate co-counter-actualization. This requires an alignment among collaborators by practicing interoperability, critical unlearning and multi-sited ethnography. Ideally, this is a symbiotic process by increasing the discriminatory powers of all involved (without necessarily erasing their differences). But of course, this ideal set of practices can only be enacted imperfectly. Therefore, the last section will measure our own European project of comparative urbanism against this ideal type and address some difficulties that arose along the way.

1.5.3.4 ‘Gentrification 2.0’ as a comparative practice of co-counter-actualization

To close this section on our research design and process, I want to reflect on the comparative assemblage and its three levels as it has actualized itself during our own cross-European urban ‘dialogue’. Although not a part of this thesis, some direct comparisons at the *metric* level were produced within our project. It took quite some work to make the secondary datasets on demography, economy, property and planning coming from different research sites interoperable and commensurable for

accounts of cultures composed in a landscape for which there is as yet no developed theoretical conception or descriptive model” (1995: 102) Might we theorize or describe this ‘accounting of cultures composed in a landscape’ as the ‘fractional performance within a topology’? A multi-sited ethnography of gentrification then accounts for how juxtaposed (fractional) events of gentrification supposedly ‘worlds apart’ are really (topologically) entangled in the same multiplicity of practices.

our website's GIS feature (Beyondgentrification.com shows maps on all four themes for all three cases). However, for my own purposes, metrics were also an important vantage point for any attempt at co-counter-actualization. In that effort, it became clear that their availability was highly uneven among research sites, especially between Arnhem on the one hand and Vienna and Istanbul on the other. In the Dutch setting, there were extensive metrics on all themes of interest that, moreover, demonstrated their performativity in social, economic and political practice. In contrast, in Vienna we encountered a significant reluctance to use social statistics (see Chapter 4) and in Istanbul, as far as there was the capacity to obtain them at all, they served a rather ritualistic role within bureaucratic practices (see Chapter 6). As such, these differences were also highly relevant at the underlying level of interpretations and practices. Beyond the engagement with metrics as such, there was also the challenge of establishing ('semantic') interoperability among sites and institutions was achieved primarily through the axiomatic ('ontological') distinction and relation of research objects (themes and actants), which then translated into ('technically interoperable') fieldwork protocols. The latter were expressly designed to be open to any specific interests of project partners. But, especially important for my purposes, the protocols provided a shared operational vantage point and generic procedure enabling co-counter-actualization.

At an *interpretive* level, our project was from the start consciously non-Anglosaxon in terms of its participants and its empirical focus. Still, our institutions and cases can be characterized as fairly close to the global 'centers' of academia and political economic power. And in a most literal sense, it was a Eurocentric project. However, this does not mean it had to be so in spirit. Most importantly, the selection of cases was a very deliberate attempt to avoid the 'usual suspects' of gentrification. It aimed for 'variation-finding' among 'most different' cases (cf. Robinson, 2011a: 12). Universalist causal explanations of gentrification were to be countered not by devising causal 'submodels' ('x gentrification', 'y-ification') but by narrating how 'plural causalities' (ie. sets of practices) lead to similar outcomes (ie. gentrification) (ibid.). Thus, each in their own way, the three chosen empirical sites have the power to destabilize hegemonic narratives of global gentrification: Arnhem is a small and 'ordinary' city, ranking low in the global urban hierarchy; Vienna, at least until recently, is an almost anachronistic bastion of social-democratic housing policy; Istanbul can in many ways be considered to belong to the 'global South'. Indeed, in this regard our comparative dialogue surely initiated a lot of 'unlearning' in between our positionalities. For instance, and speaking for myself, it took me a while to understand the still significant role of bureaucracy and legal proceedings in Turkish 'neoliberal' urban politics. Reasoning from a Northern European understanding of that word, it was hard to see and hear anything other than 'crony capitalism' from the stories coming out of Istanbul. In the end, the label of 'neoliberalism' only threw me off track in trying to understand the singularity of my Turkish case.

Within our own open methodological assemblage and ecology of practice, these positionalities were also tied up with differences in scientific ethos. In a comparative, multi-sited, multi-partner research project such as ours, etic-emic and etic-etic relations are unavoidably intimately implicated. And this may require some

diplomacy. As science–society relations and habits heavily influence the ethos any project partner brings into the consortium, this can sometimes complicate matters of methodology, despite all protocols and efforts at open dialogue. For instance, in *my* experience, the Viennese team practiced a somewhat more *positivist* ethos than mine. Very conscientious about the planning and procedures for collecting and analyzing data (consistently referred to as ‘evidence’), they were more concerned than I was with quantitative representation (eg. number of residents to interview) and with the number of interviews to conduct (which were indeed more true to protocol and more numerous). The Dutch team, certainly me, was somewhat less concerned about strict time planning (as is also the luxury of a PhD student), which as predicted by the Austrians led to an explosion of data which became hard to process in its totality. This then required a more (theoretically/deductively) selective handling of the data. For me, this was not much of a problem, as I had the time to move through several hermeneutic cycles (of both data collection and analysis), supported by the navigational specificity of the counter–actualization scheme. In relation to the Turkish team, again in *my* experience, it also came to the project with its own ethos, but not as much a positivist ethos as a *critical* one. In line with its own earlier publications and the general norm of Turkish research into urban transformation, it was set on interpreting and exclaiming whatever was happening in Beyoğlu as the effect of neoliberal urbanism. While not entirely wrong, in both empirical and political terms, this felt to me like jumping to conclusions that require little empirical support or specification. Hence, using my own initial ignorance, I have tried to get my colleagues to explain to me the taken–for–granted details that make Turkish planning and politics so singular and not just another dangerous expression of neoliberal urbanism. In short, to use Stengers’ (2005b, 2011a) words, my hermeneutic cycling was situated in between practices and ethoi operating in more of an ‘expert’ and ‘war’ mode and this required some diplomacy and idiocy on my part.

Finally, at the level of studying *practices*, our multi–sited ethnographic activities took the form of brief collective research visits; our respective on–site observations; and my own longer individual research visits across sites. The collective research visits were attached to our organizational consortium meetings and included tours through our case areas and meetings with important field actors. While their brevity did not allow for experiencing much of everyday reality of our neighborhoods, they were very useful in their own way. For instance, a collective visit to the Cihangir Neighborhood Association gave us a chance to talk to a whole panel of active members (Interview no. 067). Complementing each other, both on the side of researchers and interviewees, a lot of ground was covered in a relatively short time. However, the bulk of observations were of course done in separation, with every team observing and reporting about their respective sites. In the context of this thesis, Chapter 4, which is about everyday neighborhood interactions and ‘social tectonics’ between classes and ethnic groups, relies on this work by the Viennese team. Chapter 6, which treats Istanbul spatial politics, involves practices with more spatial (ie. Ankara) and historical (ie. Gezi protests) ‘distance’ to everyday street–level reality and therefore relied less on observations in the neighborhood itself and more on my colleagues’ first–hand experience of Turkish planning practices. My own ethnographic activities in Klarendal I have already described in Section 1.5.2. Also mentioned are my own

research visits to Istanbul and Vienna. My own privilege, of being situated close to the 'center', also within the project itself, should be recognized here. I could thankfully profit from the labor time freed up by the skills (linguistic, justificational etc.) and institutional prestige of the project initiators and my PhD supervisors (and their freedom and patience!). In truth, I was the only one who really had the time for the intense and sustained ethnographic study that our axioms and protocols of (co-) counter-actualization were demanding. Unfortunately, this has become the norm in modern academia (to which I will return in my epilogue on 'fast' and 'slow science' in Chapter 7). Consequently, it often felt imposing to again ask for more time, time to dive back into the data, to go over the basics, to rethink our questions. Overall, despite our intense project meetings, the patient help of my colleagues and my own travels, I still feel my analysis could have been thicker with more time (and prescience of its necessity). Part of this was because of my overall learning process: developing my theory and following up on all that it entailed, discovering what to look for on site (often too late), learning about academic economics and politics. But perhaps this feeling of inadequacy comes from a lingering attachment to an unattainable ethnographic ideal of 'being there'. In sum, constructing new, transnational ecologies of scientific practices requires not just efficacious axiomatics and postcolonial unlearning, but also a good dose of diplomacy, deliberate idiocy and acceptance of inevitable loose ends.

1.6 Thesis outline

The next two Chapters will further elaborate on the theoretical foundations of this thesis and its two stated objectives. First, Chapter 2 will present the here posited actualization theory as a pragmatic but affirmative answer to the philosophical debates surrounding the speculative turn. Against this background, Chapter 3 takes a deeper dive into academic debates on gentrification. It suggests that a practice-based actualization theory is better suited than other paradigms of gentrification scholarship to tackle its inherent ontological multiplicity. The following three chapters attempt to demonstrate this empirically by respectively focusing on social, economic and political practices of gentrification. Chapter 4 interrogates the notion of 'social mixing', and studies its many metric, interpretive and practical modalities in Klarendal, Arnhem and Rudolfshaus-Fünfhaus, Vienna. Chapter 5, after revisiting economic geography and evolution in light of actualization theory, investigates a string of practices of real estate economization that together define the housing market of Klarendal. In the third and last empirical chapter, Chapter 6, the political dimensions of gentrification are addressed in a comparative study of Klarendal and Beyoğlu, Istanbul. Chapter 7 recapitulates the results of the preceding chapters but also attempts, as much as our theoretical framework allows, a synthesis that transcends the separated domains of practice. Additionally, it offers some reflections on causality and academic positionality in relation to gentrification studies. Lastly, some general policy recommendations are presented.

Chapter 2

Social science beyond the correlation? Some speculative propositions after DeLanda, Latour and Meillassoux

2.1 Introduction: Social science turning speculative?

After the Linguistic Turn, the Affective Turn and undoubtedly many others, yet another intellectual shift has asserted itself in the humanities over the last decade or so. This time it has been a Speculative Turn (Bryant et al., 2011). Its main thrust consists in reclaiming metaphysical speculation from the ban put on it after the great ‘Critical Turn’, the Kantian revolution that prohibited all thinking beyond human finitude. How should social scientists, for whom this anthropological revolution is so constitutive of their discipline, respond to the new challenge? Should they simply dismiss it as a degenerative re-turn to pre-critical or even pre-scientific thought, or should they welcome it as a proposition for rethinking some of their fundamental questions? This chapter explores what taking up this speculative challenge might amount to and translates some prominent positions surrounding the new turn into one, admittedly weirdly coherent social theory. As such, it presents the philosophical groundwork for the ontological, epistemological and methodological choices presented in the previous chapter.

So, what exactly is this speculative turn? The metaphysical problem to which it responds is an old and familiar one and reads as follows. When philosophy and science analytically ‘bifurcate’ nature (Whitehead, 1964, Latour, 1993) and the two resulting halves, thinking and being, or nature and society, are ‘correlated’ by transcendental necessity (Meillassoux, 2008), they become trapped epistemologically. That is, when we humans see only projections of our own innate or social natures every time we look at what seems to surround us, we are imprisoned by our own subjective or structural ‘conditions of possible experience’. Nothing essentially new is allowed to appear before us – other than, maybe, by sheer accident – because all phenomena and our interpretations of them are always already determined by our ideas, genes, brains or discourses. Moreover, logical contradictions abound as there is no way of knowing whether the thus posited structures of experience are truly known. This all too familiar problem of all post-Kantian critical theories, of being trapped in this correlation, has led French philosopher and speculative turn forerunner Quentin Meillassoux to fittingly place them under the header of ‘correlationism’. Since Kant, this correlationism’s critical dead end has become commonplace, signifying our fundamental human finitude, and for some the source of our spiritual freedom (Žižek, 2004: 41-44, 2013). However, following the works of, amongst others, Manuel DeLanda, Bruno Latour and Meillassoux (Bryant et al., 2011), this position has become increasingly under attack by renewed speculations about what might lie before or beyond the transcendental correlation between thinking and being, mind and body, human and non-human. Enter the speculative turn.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the greatest inspirations for this transition (and also for this thesis) has been the work of Gilles Deleuze. Like so many thinkers of his generation, he radicalizes the Kantian Critical Turn in the direction of a kind of globalized contingency. But whereas, for instance, Derrida remains very much preoccupied with the impossibility of all pre- and post-Kantian metaphysics, Deleuze takes some significant steps toward a more positive ontological program beyond deconstruction (Protevi, 2001). Under the banner of a ‘transcendental empiricism’ he sets out not to discover the *ideal* conditions of (*im*)possibility of thought and being, but to develop an empiricism of the *real* conditions of their *genesis*. This brings him to study a staggering variety of subjects with a hefty family of concepts while keeping an eye on their singular modes of existence. Another important source for the new speculative undertakings not yet mentioned here, has been Alfred North Whitehead, whose seemingly outlandish panpsychism poignantly touches upon the delicate matter of what (a) society actually is – an issue that also occupied the forgotten sociologist and fellow Leibnizian Gabriel Tarde some years earlier. Apart from Deleuze, this lineage of thought has been taken up especially by ‘speculative sociologist’ Latour (Debaise, 2008), who, like Whitehead, disputes the so-called bifurcation of non-human nature and human society so constitutive of Modernity.

For Whitehead, speculative thought is “the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted” (Whitehead, 1978: 3). What follows in this chapter are some propositions in that direction, their ‘systemic’ character mainly coming from the metaphysical framework of Deleuze (which is indeed, very much contrary to the superficial image of him as a postmodernist, a classical system of nature, Lærke, 2005). However, beyond positing these propositions in the usual sense of discursive statements to be judged as true or false, they should also be thought of as endowed with an ‘extra-propositional’ relevance (DeLanda, 2005), capable of acting as a lure for ‘imaginative feelings’, and “pave the way along which the world advances into novelty” (Whitehead, 1978: 187). Thought and theory after the speculative turn should not only be considered a renewed attempt at reaching out to a reality after human finitude. It is not just, in Stengers reading of Whitehead, a matter of “giving a plausible account of what exists but [also] about approaching each [human or non-human] society with the question of what it might be capable of, and this capacity designates not its judgments but the interstices to which it provides shelter” (Stengers, 2011c: 509).

Following this distinction of speculative tasks, this chapter will first propose some ways of conceiving realities beyond the correlation to then suggest some methods of how to approach them. In the first section the speculative realism of DeLanda and its problematic treatment of modal philosophy will be discussed. This will set the stage for the next section (re)formulating a truly ‘flat ontology’ with the help of Latour’s ANT. The third section will then take Latour’s chaotic cosmos as a point of departure for composing a post-correlationist vision of social reality, thereby making use of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘abstract machines’. At the end of the section, Meillassoux’s speculative materialism will be interpreted as describing one of these machines. The last section, again relying heavily on Deleuze, but also DeLanda and

Stengers, briefly reconnects with epistemological and methodological choices made in the previous chapter, only now in the language specific to the discussed speculative philosophies.

2.2 *Tendencies—capacities—possibilities—properties*

First we want to lay bare some inconsistencies and frictions in the work of Manuel DeLanda on mathematics and modal logic. These will prove fertile soil for a more elaborate ontology that is more consistent with some valuable achievements of the ‘idealist’ human sciences that we cannot just debunk away as DeLanda tends to do. As he explains, the extensive properties (mass, volume, length etc.) and phenomenological diversity of entities are not given by transcendent(al) essences but generated by intensive differences (DeLanda, 2009). So, for example, actual cloud formations are produced by gradients of temperature, pressure and speed in the air, while animals are the product of biochemical differences within embryogenetic processes. To further clarify, DeLanda ventures into the subject of geometry.³⁶ One can distinguish between metric and non-metric geometries in terms of their symmetry or invariance under groups of transformations. Accordingly, topological, differential, projective and metric spaces differ in their clarity and distinctness, respectively going from only ordinally structured to being measured up by exact cardinal quantity. Now, for DeLanda, the key to getting rid of essentialism lies in Deleuze’s conception of this mathematical or *logical* relationship between different geometries as being primarily of a *genetic* nature.³⁷ Thus, the intensive processes generating actual clouds and animals may be conceived as differential spaces, inhabited by topological singularities,³⁸ giving birth to extensive qualities by progressively differentiating themselves. This way, as the physicists say, we go through a cascade of symmetry-breaking events, from indistinct to distinct. More precisely, *topological* events extend themselves into and structure an intensive field of *differential* relations, which cancel and average out to individuate actual states of affairs with a *metrically* precise size and scale.

However, as announced, DeLanda’s account of the genetically related geometries shows some inconsistencies with his other theories, especially his classification of modal categories so often rehearsed throughout his later writings (ie. DeLanda, 2005,

³⁶ DeLanda’s lucid treatment of the geometries and their structural relationship (as first put forward by Felix Klein) makes something explicit that remains mostly implicit in the work of Deleuze. However, especially with the help of DeLanda’s exposition, this relationship becomes clearly distinguishable in eg. Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘Treatise on Nomadology’, a chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987: 351–423) that will also be of great importance for the rest of this chapter as it also treats the notion of ‘abstract machines’.

³⁷ Reflexively we could say the geometric transformations are differential *capacities* of the practice of geometry, while the mathematical structures resulting on paper are *possible* representations thereof. (Cf. Piaget, 1971, and his analysis of mathematics in terms of ‘reflective abstraction’)

³⁸ Within dynamical systems theory these singularities are represented as ‘attractors’ and ‘bifurcations’ (DeLanda, 2005) or stable states and critical transitions (Scheffer, 2009) (see also Chapter 4).

2006, 2009, 2011). As the reader may have noticed in the last sentence of the previous paragraph, there is no mention of the *projective* in DeLanda's ontological cascade of symmetry-breaking. Why this is so, has a lot to do with his declaration of war on essentialism. As DeLanda frequently explains, when distinguishing properties, tendencies, capacities and possibilities, the first three have an 'objective' status, while possibilities are accorded only a 'mind-dependent' status (2009: 128). As he notes, the subjective imagination of 'alternative scenarios', ie. possibilities or 'possible worlds', necessarily introduces an essentialism of some kind (2005: 36). This is because possible worlds, in order to have any meaningful structure, need to be individuated through the use of natural kinds that remain essentially the same throughout different particular worlds. As such, possibilities are not a very good place to start conceptualizing immanence, because, being only ideal, (retro)projective fictions derived from a fully formed actuality, they can never constitute the real, genetic condition of anything. Thus, the conditions (of possibility) are only represented in the projective image of the conditioned and the possible merely *resembles* the real, lacking only 'reality' itself. As a consequence, 'being' becomes a predicate that only some transcendent instance like a Leibnizean God or subject can provide for choosing one possibility to be best or true. Accordingly, the nature of the *process* of a possibility's rather miraculous coming into being (or not) is obscured, with no sensible genetic relation between the possible and the real. Therefore, to counter this essentialist idea of the real and the possible, DeLanda follows Deleuze by introducing the distinction between the *actual* and the *virtual*, whereby the former corresponds to extensive *properties* and the latter to *tendencies* and *capacities* not yet actualized. Thus, there are long term *tendencies* and *capacities* of systems ('virtual singularities' and 'intensive affects' in Deleuze & Guattari) that may become actualized as emergent *properties*. Yet again, just like the projective seems missing in DeLanda's three layered ontology (topological virtual, differential intensive, metric extensive), there seems to be no serious room here for *possibilities*.

An important consequence of this neglect of projective possibilities is that the nature of properties is misunderstood.³⁹ This is because if we follow the genetic trajectory of symmetry-breaking as described above, possibilities come *before* properties. That is, tendencies give rise to capacities which (should) first become identifiable possibilities before they may be measured in terms of extensive properties. One of DeLanda's favorite examples for elaborating his distinction of modalities makes his mistake very clear. A kitchen knife, he tells us, has properties that are *always* actual, like its sharpness, which is defined as the angle of its blade's triangular shape (2011: 3-4). Yet, the knife also has virtual tendencies and capacities (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 406, on a sword's 'singularities' and 'affective qualities'). For instance, it displays the tendencies to melt at very high temperatures or to break when flexed too much, while it carries the capacities to cut a tomato, to kill or to nail a note onto a doorpost.

³⁹ Probably for much the same reasons as DeLanda (distancing himself from Aristotelian essentialism, Hegelian dialectics, Freudian Oedipalization and so on), Deleuze does not seem to occupy himself too much with the projective realm either, focusing on a much worse neglected domain of 'difference in itself' and its affective intensities. Nevertheless, he does so profoundly in his work on Leibniz (1993) and on science (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994). Section 2.4.3 of this chapter will return to this issue.

While it is hard to argue about these tendencies and capacities, it is difficult to accept that the so-called property of sharpness is not first and foremost a capacity. Slicing a tomato properly is very difficult with a blunt knife, although it may work just fine in the act of killing. The (possibility of the) property of sharpness, in other words, is very much contingent on the capacity to cut. ‘Sharpness’ is a derivative of the situationally defined capacity to cut and not the other way around. The precise, metric angle of the blade’s edge is not a property particularly relevant in the act of cooking. In the kitchen, the only thing that counts is the knife’s capacity to efficiently cut tomatoes or, in an altogether different assemblage, to kill. Indeed, probably the only place where the metric properties of the knife are significant is in their manufacturer’s office. And before they get there, there’s the ‘subjective’ envisioning of the possibility of making a knife that is perfectly sharp, or efficiently produced. It follows that an unused blade in a drawer is not sharp. If sharpness is defined as a blade’s precise metric angle, then it only *becomes* sharp when its capacity to be measured is actualized in an event of measurement in the producer’s workplace. If, instead, sharpness is practically defined as a capacity to cut (ie. becoming-sharp-in-relation-to-a-tomato), its extensive identity is less important.

As weird as this reversal of primary (extended) and secondary (subjective) qualities may appear to us, especially in such a physical context, it is definitely implied by geometric structuralism: first come perspectives on a projective plane (‘how space appears to X’) and only later, by parallel projection (introducing a decentering axiom of parallels), come the Cartesian coordinates (‘space as it really is’). However, one of the more severe consequences of making capacities dependent on (individual entities with) extensive properties (DeLanda, 2005: 72, 2011: 4), like making the knife’s ability to cut depend on precise metric properties, is a presupposition of individuation, that is, having ‘always actual’ properties supporting the virtual rather than arising from it. This effectively violates DeLanda’s own tenet of ‘relations of exteriority’ (2006) that states that differential and affective relations, ie. tendencies and capacities, are defined neither by the properties of their terms nor by those of the whole they bring forth. Which automatically brings us to another serious consequence of DeLanda’s ‘objective’, ‘always actual’ properties. However DeLanda may be speaking in terms of a historically contingent emergence of wholes from their parts, his ontology clearly presupposes their actuality, at least of the parts. Everywhere in his ‘bottom-up’ rendition of reality already extensive *parts* come first, whereas *their* relations, ie. *their* tendencies and capacities to form emergent wholes, come second (DeLanda, 2006, 2011).⁴⁰ It comes as no surprise then, that DeLanda’s scaled account of the universe neatly follows the disciplinary, or may we say, essentialist distinction between the

⁴⁰ A similar critique of Ian Hacking (one of DeLanda’s inspirations) and other students of science like Latour comes from feminist physicist Karen Barad (2007), who forcefully argues against thinking of reality as always already consisting of discrete objects that subsequently interact. As will be further elaborated in the next chapter, Barad, by interpreting Niels Bohr and his notion of quantum indeterminacy through a posthumanist ontology (rather than the usual epistemological interpretations of quantum uncertainty), theorizes a world in which material-discursive relations of ‘intra-action’ do not follow determinate *relata*, but the other way around (eg. taking the practical entanglement of scientist and object of study as ontologically prior to the epistemic cut that subsequently separates them).

(analytically and metrically inclined) physical, chemical, biological, psychological and social sciences (2013: 72). Yet, geometrically, scale is a property of space that should feature quite late in DeLanda's proposed chain of symmetry-breaking. It has no relevance whatsoever in topology or differential geometry, which attests to the case that his point of departure in thinking about emergence is flawed here, as he assumes beforehand the actuality of a universe always already built up extensively part by whole, scale by scale, discipline by discipline.

Where DeLanda goes wrong then, is in his conception of properties as 'objective' and 'mind-independent'. The problem here lies not with recognizing the 'mind-dependent' nature of possibilities, it is about *not* conceiving properties as such.⁴¹ It is very hard to see how DeLanda's somewhat scientifically employed distinction between the objective and subjective rhymes with his geometrical exposition. Nevertheless, however inconsistent DeLanda's modal system may be, with some adjustments, aligning it with his mathematical ideas, there may be extracted from his distinction an elegantly parsimonious model of emergence that sits more comfortably with both Deleuze & Guattari's writings and his own earlier work on so-called 'abstract machines' and with the conception of a 'flat ontology' that we find in Latour's ANT.

2.3 *Temporal order out of flat chaos*

Beyond the categories of common sense (Deleuze, 1990a, 1994) and beyond its bifurcations of nature, we end up with (only) the beginning of a rather nonsensically symmetric 'flat ontology': "a *kakosmos*, that is, in polite Greek, a horrible and disgusting mess! [But] a cosmos nonetheless..." (Latour, 2010a: 481). Students of ANT are already quite familiar with this chaosmos. Where from the seventies onward so-called Science and Technology Studies and their 'strong program' had already been making some pretty controversial claims as to the epistemic symmetry of scientific rationality and more 'primitive' practices, ANT has further radicalized this symmetry in recent decades, stretching it far beyond the human realm to arrive at an idea of what may be designated as 'supersymmetry' (Sismondo, 2009: 87).⁴² To be done with the great divide between Society and Nature that has legitimized the Western proclamation of Modernity (Latour, 1993), ANT has through meticulous empirical study brought into view the 'supersymmetrically' distributed work it takes to uphold such a divisive representation of the world in the first place. In his Tardean-inspired 'speculative sociology' (Debaise, 2008) Latour refuses to restrict the social to humans, designating as social all modes by which heterogeneous collectives of human and non-human 'actants' associate by acting as each other's mediators in

⁴¹ One might argue that properties are 'mind-independent' in the sense that they are sociologically self-organized, that is, as 'real abstractions' transcending individual meanings, but that is another argument altogether. (See also the end of the next section on Meillassoux.)

⁴² Although there might be interesting connections to be further looked into (a world without gravity?), this notion of supersymmetry should not be confused with the much more specifically defined concept in physics (see Kane, 2000)

chains of translations. In Latour's sociology then, we find a good starting point for an immanent and speculative science. Before science models its law-abiding Universe, other possible human perspectives and even non-human *capacities* and *tendencies* have been cancelled out. Keeping with such a Universe, one inevitably turns a blind eye to such modalities of existence. Thus echoing William James, there always subsists a plasmatic 'pluriverse' of potentials before the distributed composition of such a scientific construction may commence at all (Latour, 2004a).

How then to assemble a 'universe' from this still rather negatively defined pluriverse? How to break the obtained supersymmetry while keeping our ontology flat, that is, without renewed recourse to transcendent creators, and without presupposing an always already actual 'universe'? In Latour and the wider actor-network literature we find a lot of ideas of how this is done in practice, ideas very much congruent with the geometry and modal theory presented above.⁴³ In ANT we can find a critique of Euclidean space, notions of topology, of differential transformations, 'monadological' formations of scalar perspectives and a lot of metrology. Yet what is missing in ANT, probably intendedly so, is an explicit ontological framework that rigorously links up these different concepts while retaining their heterogeneity. Therefore, where Latour seems to be somewhat suspended between an outright 'actualism' (Harman, 2009: 127-129) and tentatively recognizing the potency of the virtual-actual schema (Latour, 2005: 59),⁴⁴ his theories could well be infused with some more rigour by connecting them with DeLanda's ontological framework. So, returning again to the latter's geometrical example, noticing how symmetry is broken through groups of transformations, we may imagine these mathematical entities as (only) one expression of what DeLanda in his interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari's transcendental empiricism conceives as a 'machinic phylum' of 'abstract machines' (DeLanda, 1991).⁴⁵ Related to each other genetically like the 'phylum' of geometries, these nested operators, every one of them *abstract in relation to the next*,⁴⁶ perform

⁴³ Consider for instance the almost uncannily congruent distinction of network, fluid, fire and Euclidean spaces in Law and Mol (2001). What is missing in their account, however, is the ontogenetic relationship between these spaces, which again attests to ANT's problematic actualism. In the next chapter and throughout the empirical chapters this link will be further developed and substantiated.

⁴⁴ See also his notion of 'plasma' as the 'real milieu' not yet formatted, the unknown 'in between' 'full of potentials lying in wait' (Latour, 2005a: 244-246).

⁴⁵ That is, mathematical structures (such as Bourbaki's) also arise from a transformative and affective practice of subjecting written down numbers, equations or figures to mathematical operators (see DeLanda, 2012: 236). The (algebraic) topo-logical representations we encounter in our textbooks should therefore not be considered as the virtual singularities themselves, which can only be rigorously approximated (and not only through mathematics). In this sense, the theory proposed here is fully reflexive and deferential in a Derridean sense, yet it is so in all modes of existence and not just within the realm of signification.

⁴⁶ Read: 'drawn away' for the next. When a fact is constructed, other interpretations recede into the background; when an (individual) interpretation is expressed the (distributed) practice producing it becomes a blind spot (see also Chapter 3 on 'intra-action' preceding observation and interpretation). Insofar as abstraction usually (in epistemologically based accounts) refers to how theoretical, mathematical or artistic constructs have a sublime, 'drawn away' character in relation to our common interpretive categories, it hereby acquires a new ontologically oriented meaning.

the task of progressively composing an increasingly distinct order, one after the other, forming a cascade of events 'breaking' symmetry.

Before describing these machines in more detail, three important things have to be kept in mind in defining them to keep us from again turning them into transcendent essences. First, as antidotes against misplaced concreteness, their abstractness is not to be understood as being discreet and general (like topology is for a mathematical structuralist, Piaget, 1971).⁴⁷ As a real condition of existence, rather than an ideal condition of possibility, the abstract machines do not resemble and essentialize what (novelties) they bring forth. Topologies, as the real condition of differential spaces do not formally resemble the latter (and so forth). Second, and in relation to this, they operate irrespective of their components of assembly being human or non-human. DeLanda would say they are themselves 'mechanism independent' and as such 'divergently actualized' in wildly different concrete assemblages. Thus, for instance, an abstract machine of evolution (or 'probe head', DeLanda, 1997: 139) may be expressing itself not just in life's speciation, but also in the diffusion of cultural practices (often referred to as 'memes', Sperber, 1996). Or, to take another example, an abstract machine of cognition may be considered not as 'in the head' (like Chomsky's robot or some other internal module), but as operative across people and their tools (Hutchins, 1995).⁴⁸ As such, thirdly, the abstract machines have to be conceptualized as events simultaneously *distributed* over and *distributive* of assemblages. They are neither 'micro-reductionist' mechanisms (trivial machines) nor 'macro-reductionist' (deep) structures. Conceived geometrically, in three dimensions, they are rather surface events, not operating from a higher, transcendent dimension, but always on a lower, fractal dimension, like an immanent 'fractal line' filling a surface.⁴⁹

However, note also that this conception also deviates from both DeLanda and Deleuze. The former restricts abstract machines to the virtual as dualistically distinguished from the actual. From a differential point of view, however, we cannot but conceive this dichotomy as a continuum, one to be structurally *represented* here as four distinct and nested abstract machines. This also departs from Deleuze's strict dualism between the pairs virtual-actual and possible-real as presented in Deleuze, 1993: 104. There he connects both movements of actualizing and realizing orthogonally rather than seeing them as forming a continuum (of 'existentifying').

⁴⁷ It should be noted that the understanding of topology referenced here, which makes a conscious 'leap away from quantifiable structure' (ie. an abstraction), would probably no longer be recognizable to most mathematicians (see Phillips, 2013: 135).

⁴⁸ The structuralist and systems theoretical great chains of being (mineral-animal-man) are of a *general* rather than an *abstract* nature. That is, misplacing concreteness (or rather *discreteness*, following Deleuze, 1978, see note 6 of Chapter 1) they merely represent actual objects in their finalized form. The point made here is that a 'man' may 'become-mineral', when, for example, trying to escape from a burning building or jamming a highway (Ball, 2004), or that 'minerals' may 'become-man' when, for instance, brought into a laboratory setting (cf. Latour, 1999a, Ch.5).

⁴⁹ Or a surface filling a volume, see Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 488 and DeLanda, 2005: 149n71.

2.4 *The machinic phylum*

2.4.1 *Tendencies of flow (singularity)*

Having established their peculiar immanence in more general terms, we can speculate on that elegant, encompassing model of emergence promised before by considering the abstract machines as a phylum immanent to all kinds of ontogenetic processes. In this chapter they will be described only briefly in order to be able to present them all together, for now giving only a few examples of which only some have emerged from the research on gentrification presented in this thesis. The first and most elementary is an *abstract machine of folding* which embodies the topological feature of a catastrophic inflection within an unstable particle-flow (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, Deleuze, 1993).⁵⁰ In its most abstract form this can only be *represented* (spatially, mereologically) as folds within folds, tendencies ‘all the way down’ (which does not mean it cannot be approximated by abstracting *away* from such representations in practice, ie. by counter-actualization). In any process of actualization, an initially symmetrical plane of immanence is folded through topological accidents, a basic play of ‘speeds and slownesses’ (Deleuze, 1988a). Translated to dynamical systems theory, ‘lags’ in spacetime (*hystereses*) (among proliferating assemblages of tendencies) bring forth sets of different stable states (maxima and minima) and points of critical transition to alternative states (cf. Scheffer, 2009).⁵¹ Studies of ecological systems approximate such critical foldings by a kind of counter-actualization: they construct an *n*-dimensional manifold – what’s in a name? – in which all combinations of metric properties are assigned coordinates, each representing a possible state for the system to be in. Then they trace out the empirical trajectories of the system within that space and derive from them the differential relations which define certain system tendencies (of stability and transition).

Here one can think of the anexact yet rigorously approximable tendencies of a chemical substance to turn into a solid state, or a lake ecosystem to morph into a turbid state (Scheffer, 2009). Or, as will be further substantiated in Chapter 3 and 4, we can think of the event of gentrification as a multidimensional version of ‘tipping point’ models of segregation and white flight (cf. Schelling, 1978). While these models are usually predicated on rather simplistic assumptions of methodological individualism and consumer sovereignty, they may nonetheless synthesize some intuitions about the topologically simple core of an otherwise dimensionally complex event (ie. an intensive superposition of social, economic and political practices).⁵²

⁵⁰We need to be careful here not to confuse this folding with the production of scale, which is only an extensive *projection* of part-whole hierarchies onto topological timespace contractions. This happens, for example, in DeLanda, 1997: 60, 2006). Latour avoids this theoretical ‘jump’ by simply speaking in terms of stronger and weaker actor-networks.

⁵¹More precisely, we are not exactly speaking of the possible stable ‘states’, but the virtual singularities that asymptotically direct both ontic (ie. the assemblage studied) and scientific-epistemic multiplicities (ie. state spaces of possibilities) (cf. DeLanda, 2005).

⁵²It should be noted that tendencies are not *simple* parts of more *complex* wholes. Any such simplicity, described by ‘laws of nature’ for instance, can only be the product of ‘generally

Conceived as such, the problem–event of gentrification, expressing itself most intensely somewhere between two states of segregation (‘decaying’ and ‘upgraded’), may shed light on the question, to be explored in Chapter 4, of what we mean when we speak of ‘place’ in relational terms. What ‘makes’ a truly ‘mixed’ neighborhood – an eminently topological notion – could be reconceived in terms of ‘metastability’: in between stability (segregated stable states) and instability (inevitable critical transition) there may be sweet spots where urban life becomes most connective, interesting and virtuous (as suggested by often misunderstood urbanists such as Jane Jacobs and Richard Sennett). These sweet spots or ‘singularities’, as they are called in Chapter 4, are not straightforwardly bound by time and space and can be of any scale or duration (phenomenologically speaking). In Klarendal, Arnhem, for instance, it is a very singular theatre event that manages to mix neighbors through community art and as such write new history. In Rudolfsheim–Fünfhaus, Vienna, it is a particular public market square that as an obstinate ‘commons’ quilts its inhabitants through their differences.

2.4.2 *Capacities of practice (affect)*

Next, ordinal series of tendencies (ie. conduction–convection–turbulence) may start to resonate, ramify and proliferate through their differences (DeLanda, 2005: 83), effectively engendering a second *abstract machine of affectivity*. Orders of tendencies start to affect each other, mobilize and mutate each other, interlocking to form ever evolving entrainments, bacteria, ecologies and practices.³³ Stable states and critical transitions form catalytic cycles, intensive relations of synchrony and heterochrony, which start to incrementally ‘search’ and develop new connections, associations and affective capacities. Here one can think, in its simplest form, of the spontaneous syncing of pendulum clocks (Strogatz, 2004). Or, a lot more complex, of populations of animals (for example, foxes and hares or wasps and orchids) evolving through their resonating differentiations. In this evolutionary sense, affectivity should designate the base tendency of, resembling what evolutionary biologist Gould (2002) has termed, ‘plurifaction’: literally a ‘more-making’ not primarily of evolutionary individuals (but also including them), but the unfaithful diffusion of ‘dividual’ differential relations situated *between* heterogeneous species of animals, languages or technologies (eg. the *relations* between cows and humans, the *capacities* in between humans and knives). Affectivity thus describes a nonlinearly ordered dissipation more than a process of adaptation. The latter only becomes a performative force when there is an observer or bookkeeper *interested* in stabilizing, individualizing, ranking and selecting such

complex’ scientific assemblages that isolate and name tendencies as such. Their topological simplicity says nothing about causal simplicity. That is, one tendency (ie. of gentrification) can be the overdetermined product of an immensely complex assemblage of tendencies (of practice, interpretation and measurement).

³³ Now it must be noted that the definition of this dynamic operator should not depend on evolutionary individuality (which is the province of the next abstract machine). So even though the phenomena we are interested in as social scientists all involve such individuality (as defined below in terms of ‘autopoiesis’), it does not mean that we cannot study the workings of this abstract machine beyond, or ‘before’ individuality (by, again, abstracting away from individuality by counter-actualization).

species for its own plurifaction (see the abstract machines of meaning-making and bookkeeping below). In general, affectivity expresses itself in complex human assemblages in the ‘memetic’ domain of creative routines of skilled, bodily practices and of stylized craftsmanship, communal care and diplomatic dialogue (cf. Sennett, 2009, 2012). Thus, in Chapter 4, habitus-amplifying routines of distinction but also creative, habit-breaking practices define (in)capacities for ‘social mixing’ in Arnhem and Vienna. But in Chapter 5 especially, this evolutionary domain will be central to the analysis of real estate investors. To highlight the practice side of economic life, these will be treated not as neatly individualized ‘actors’ but as bundles of practices, or ‘agencements’ (cf. Callon, 2007, Çalışkan and Callon, 2009, 2010). Local real estate agencements, including developers big and small, realtors, housing associations and fix-up collectives, each perform the property market of Arnhem in different but overlapping ways, emphasizing either profit, aesthetics, utility or care.

2.4.3 Possibilities of interpretation (concern)

The realm of affectivity is also immediately a realm of ethics. Affects of ‘making a living’ (ie. plurifaction) embody joy but also sadness, anxiety and *concerns*. And concerns are the germ of negation, conflict, communication and domination. This requires the positing of a third abstract machine. Unfortunately, Deleuze, DeLanda and anti-correlationists in general often tend to downplay its ontological autonomy and importance, presenting it primarily as politically and intellectually reactive. However, since it is of great relevance for *social* theory and science, it should be treated here somewhat more extensively than the foregoing, to see how it nonetheless may be affirmatively *refitted* into a post-correlationist ontology. Whereas differential processes of affectivity traverse and explore tendencies by means of local information only (by ‘blind’ variation), as they course through organisms, ecologies and dialects, a third *abstract machine of autopoiesis* (cf. Maturana and Varela, 1989, DeLanda, 1997: 63–64, Luhmann, 2012), emerges from that myopic evolution to envelop a more global projective plane.⁵⁴ From a *differential* point of view (Deleuze 1994, 1993), this is the point when capacities sufficiently converge and condense compossible tendencies, such that a point of view or Leibinizian ‘monad’ is individuated. This center may project and so represent ‘clearly and distinctly’ a whole body of ‘obscure and confused’ ‘nomadic’ capacities. However, although from a differential-relational perspective this emergent monadic whole ‘is always smaller than its parts’ (cf. Latour et al., 2012), it nevertheless calls into being a whole new phenomenological, dialectic and informational dynamic. One which contrary to the Latourian doctrine (Latour, 2005a: 163n209) is ontologically irreducible to its differential (‘transformational’) and pragmatic conditions (cf. Fariás, 2013: 29–30).⁵⁵

⁵⁴ ‘Auto-poiesis’ literally means self-production. See explanation below.

⁵⁵ However, it is important to not, as Fariás tends to, interpret the actor-network world of relational assemblages as one of concrete material or even mechanistic objects waiting to be made sense of by ideal, quasi-causal or virtual structures (attractors) of communication (cf. Žižek’s interpretation of Deleuze in *Organs Without Bodies*, 2004). The point made here is that ANT’s ‘materiality’ properly conceived is fully constituted of virtual relations, never directly

In the history of western philosophy, this irreducible dimension of meaning-making has most familiarly been investigated by post-Kantian phenomenologies (taking the latter term only in that very broad and plural sense). For Kant, meaning or rather knowledge is the product of a rational-empirical synthesis of conceptual forms and sensations within the individual, basically empty transcendental subject. In Hegel this meaning-making self is historicized and becomes dialectic and sociological. With Husserl, apparently in sharp contrast, it is subjected to the most rigorous reduction to be revealed as a consciousness that is essentially intentional in nature: it is always about phenomena. With Heidegger (2010), this transcendental 'cogito' gets a more existential and hermeneutic quality, oriented at the immersion of subjectivity in everyday, non-scientific practice. What is still a rather detached intentionality (meaning-making) in Husserl becomes an anxious or authentic relationship of care and concern (the projected 'being-there', or 'Dasein'), which is conditioned, moreover, by its own lived temporality and mortality (or 'being-towards-death'). In Chapter 6, the Heideggerian notion of concern (*Fursorge*), indicating the relation of human *Dasein* to excluded others (ibid.: 118), will come back in the no less lived but less anthropocentric notion of 'matters of concern', as professed by Latour (2005b, 2007) in the context of a posthuman politics (more about which below). Looking at evolutionary history, there is indeed no reason to restrict the dialectical capacities of concern and temporal experience to the human in the way phenomenological and existential philosophies have traditionally done. While it is, by its own logic, impossible to locate in historical time its exact moment of emergence (cf. Žižek, 2013, see below on 'blind spots'), autopoiesis can be said to establish itself when autocatalytic cycles (chemical reactions, metabolism) close in on themselves and start conserving that closure through the reproduction of their own constitutive relations (Maturana and Varela, 1989).⁵⁶ As Žižek (2013: 158) notes, this is the moment of the emergence of Life, when in Hegelian terms "the external limitation (of an entity by its environs) turns into self-limitation". However, an important distinction from the perspective of evolutionary theory and, surprisingly, Heideggerian philosophy (Heidegger, 2010, Arendt, 1998), is the emergence of birth and mortality as we know it. That is, of the sexual production and programmed death of evolutionary *individuals* (Margulis, 1997, Margulis and Sagan, 2000, 2003). As they continually engage in 'horizontal', symbiotic exchanges of genes and other functional components, the immortal beings we call bacteria are more like open assemblages of affects (ie. practices) than closed-off individuals (ie. interpretations of selfhood). The evolutionary introduction of (almost) exclusively 'vertical' reproduction and the inevitability of death by the evolution of meiotic sex (at first by a kind of abortive self-predation, Margulis, 1998: 89, 103, see Chapter 5), introduces a new sexual and predatory affectivity that produces all kinds of more-than-human forms of selfhood and matters of concern.

representable in actuality. Conceiving it otherwise, just mounting the virtual on top of the actual, even if 'fully symmetrical' and co-determined, amounts to misplacing concreteness, or rather, actuality.

⁵⁶As cognitive creatures ourselves, we tend to see essence and individuality everywhere, blinding ourselves to more 'horizontal', rhizomatic and supposedly 'blind' processes designated by the abstract machine of affectivity. Here, the challenge is not to anachronistically retroproject our own individuality onto our deep past in order to be able to rediscover the pre-individual and agential distribution in the here and now.

A significant reinforcement of this autopoiesis is the appearance of neurological capacities, making possible the massive and rapid generation of (self/other) distinctions. At the cortical level, this semiosis takes the shape of an unrelenting stream of neuronal firings and rewirings. What results is a dichotomous ‘plasticity’ that constantly oscillates between making forms and almost immediately annihilating them (again, first formalised in Hegel, Malabou, 2008). Events of serial affirmation and negation produce the capacity to navigate differences and, eventually, project possibilities and agency. The ‘ontological explosions’ that make a projective, mental ‘transdifferentiation’ possible at the level of neurogenetic differentiation (ie. in practice), give rise to an idea of stable, individual selfhood, however rudimentary (even though this will always remain an absolute ‘blank space’ to the cognitive assemblage itself, *ibid.*: 72, cf. Barad, 2007). From another angle, as shown by DeLanda (2011), the simulation of ‘neural nets’ may serve to synthesize some rigorous intuitions on how this neurologically distributed production of self might happen. Being endowed with so-called ‘hidden layers’ between their sensory input and motor output components, these ‘artificial’ multilayered neural assemblages are dispositioned to store within their hidden layers, not individuated memories (like a computer does), but the *capacity* to generate activation patterns and memories, thus forming a repository of ‘distributed representations’. Training neural nets this way, by a repetitive confrontation with a partly unique population of stimuli (for example, human faces), a capacity to recognize and generalize slowly condenses in the form of extracted ‘prototypes’, which may be considered an internalization of an external topology of affects as environmental opportunities and risks (DeLanda, 2011: 194). This idea also lends itself quite naturally to a ‘fleshy’ interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic of alienation (Hegel, 1977): in order to distinguish from itself and anticipate its movements a predatory animal needs to internalize (simulate) and so in a sense identify with the prey and vice versa (Negarestani, 2009), thus forcing the emergence of dialectical relations of interiority (subject) from differential relations of exteriority (habit) (Deleuze, 1994, DeLanda, 2005).

We can see this (abstract) phylogenetic achievement recapitulated in ontogenetic processes in the here and now, also in those generating meaning and subjectivity.⁵⁷ While many ways have been developed in transcendental philosophy and interpretive sociology for handling possibilities and their internal dynamics of identity, opposition, contradiction and paradox, Luhmann seems to be the one framing this issue most abstractly (although Hegel, 1977: 104–105, is certainly a forerunner).⁵⁸ Abstract enough,

⁵⁷ There is nothing wrong in principle with a notion of recapitulation, that is, an isomorphism between ontogeny and phylogeny. The problem with the classic theories of recapitulation (Haeckel) was that they were not sufficiently abstract, still tied to generalities derived from actual results and their similarities: a human fetus does not resemble an adult fish and a child growing up does not go through a stage corresponding to a fully developed ‘primitive’ culture (Gould, 1977).

⁵⁸ Although we have to disagree with Luhmann’s correlationist argument about how his observing systems are most probably restricted to the human world (Luhmann, 2012: 170), we should not go as far as to generalize it in ‘panpsychist’ fashion. As follows from the phylum of abstract machines presented above, there can be no extrapolation of phenomenology or observation theory to all beings, as in Harman, 2011 or Bryant, 2011 respectively. That would only serve to once again obscure the morphogenetic processes that are prior to the formation of an observation and

that is, to function as a compact description of a universal phenomenological machine of possibilities, one that might be divergently actualized in say a Levi-Straussian structure or Žižekian subject (see for example Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000).⁵⁹ Borrowing our language from Luhmann's systems theory then, we could say that with every ontogenesis of a singular thought, communication or observation, there is a 'loosely' consistent aggregate of mediators being funneled into more 'tightly coupled', discontinuous 'forms' (Luhmann, 2012). Fundamental to this achievement, as suggested above, is that the operative capacity for representation, the complexity-reducing formation of the form, becomes a 'blind spot', a dim hidden layer. What is gained, however, is the opening up of a subjective horizon of distinctly individuated options for meaning-making, that is, a presumed to be totalizable combinatorial space of possibilities.⁶⁰ Only within such a phenomenological world, necessarily given structure with the use of essences, can 'decisions' be made manifest; decisions that can only appear as such by the forgetting of the capacities, endowed with their own sense, which are needed to make them possible. Autopoietic meaning-making is thus the continual presentation ('realization') of one possibility among a totality of possibilities *as such*, as the immediately self-reflexive construction of decisions and the subjects 'behind' them (for example, I, other, God, nature, society etc.).⁶¹ Every referential indication presupposes and more or less explicitly *refers to itself* as part of a distinction contingently selected from a wider world of possibilities (Luhmann, 2012). And this includes, in the current philosophical context, the option of observing this 'first-order' bifurcation by epistemologically introducing a 'second-order' correlation. Nonetheless, however convincingly some statements express otherwise, one is, when making meaning, by necessity confined to the realm of the possible. In other words, constitutive of the process of signification is that there is never within it a confrontation with a truly solid Real that would cancel out any possibility of things being otherwise and thus prohibit any further meaning-making.

Examples of autopoietic meaning-making within a human context are not hard to find, this being the most familiar terrain for interpretive sociologies. One could think of single statements and decisions or whole narratives and ideologies. In the context of gentrification we find these in the form of positive stories on urban renaissance or dystopian interpretations of the process. In Chapter 4, habitual social distinctions

whose structures can never be reduced to it. As DeLanda (2012) shows by genetically prioritizing significance over signification and connectionist over symbolic artificial intelligence, observation and representation through tight either/or-forms come fairly late in universal evolution.

⁵⁹ And compare, for instance, Luhmann's generic idea of a 'blind spot' constitutive of every meaningful distinction, with Žižek's much rehearsed "stain at the heart of psychic life" as its "condition of impossibility" (Butler et al., 2000: 117-118).

⁶⁰ A so-called 'state space', a standard reference of DeLanda when talking about possibilities, would be a scientific formalization of such a phenomenological horizon. As briefly mentioned in Section 2.4.1, counter-actualizing such a space means constructing, through repeated experiments, a differential surface *immanent* to that state space, thus drawing out a processual vector space constituting a continuous 'geometry of sufficient reason' (Deleuze, 1994: 201) able to bridge the discontinuously individuated possibilities without the need for adding a *transcendent* dimension (God, Nature) having to decide on the matter.

⁶¹ Cf. Luhmann, 2005, on how a legitimate (plane of) organization is recursively constructed by making decisions on decision-making and decision-makers.

of class, ethnicity and culture also fall in this category. In economic practices, as described in Chapter 5, meaning is made in the language of scarcity and value: legal and extra-legal property claims, aesthetic icons and territorial stigmas. But in political practices especially, treated in Chapter 6, concerns, hopes and anxieties around gentrification are articulated, clash and struggle amongst each other to be included in discussions, plans, laws and governmental regimes. In Istanbul, for instance, efforts at 'urban transformation' in the historic Beyoğlu area, initiated by AKP officials and their business allies since the turn of the century, pitch against each other interpretations of which past is to be 'conserved' in the renewal. Against the AKP's Neo-Ottoman and neoliberal vision for Beyoğlu, centered on luxury living, tourism and shopping functions, local and national opposition groups with a mostly Republican, secular and left-liberal outlook, passionately organize, litigate and protest against the gentrification plans. During the summer of 2013, this ideological antagonism came to its most spectacular head around the planned redevelopment of Gezi Park. In stark contrast, Arnhem has seen a push toward consensual 'integral area-based policy'. As electoral politics at the city level are not so much polarized but persistently fragmented and inconclusive, interpretations of what should be done with neighborhoods perceived as problematic take the procedural ('depoliticized') form of financially circumscribed 'change missions' only substantiated by maximally devolved 'area-based' decision-making. The resultant new localism, practiced in Neighborhood Councils and participatory budgeting, combines a 'warm' communitarianism with a 'cold' neoliberalism, thereby channeling concerns of gentrification only by specific political affects.

Unfortunately, the (very real) incommensurability between the transformational and the informational, the differential and the dialectic, has somewhat polarized recent debates in the humanities, with, roughly, ANT and assemblage theory on one side, depriving meaning of its ontological relevance and independence, and with Post- or Neo-Marxist discourse analyses and Luhmannian systems theory on the other, blocking access to what lies outside of human meaning. We can, however, get around these difficulties by connecting their respective ontologies genetically, thereby in the process redoubling their incommensurability in terms of not two, but four modalities of existence.⁶² Which brings us to a fourth abstract operator, concerning processes

⁶²At this point we should briefly distinguish the phylum of machines from a fourfold superficially similar, proposed by Nicolai Hartmann, a metaphysical classic and inspiration to systems theory (eg. Bertalanffy, 1969) that has received some renewed attention of late (eg. Peterson and Poli, 2016). Sidestepping the Kantian epistemological problematic from a distinctive realist perspective, Hartmann (1953) distinguishes four ontological 'levels of reality' (inanimate, animate, psychic and spiritual) and four 'laws of stratification' (of recurrence, modification, novelty and 'distance of strata', 1953: 47-48, 75-76). What is certainly interesting from our point of view, is that the laws do not simply correspond with the levels, but relate and operate across them (there is a kind of 'mechanism independence' at play there). However, besides the fact that these sets of levels and laws do not chime well with the four operators presented here, they crucially lack a historical or genetic relationship. As Peterson also notes (as being "not unproblematic", 2016: 122n16), Hartmann did not bother much with a genetic explanation of his laws of stratification (even though he did not rule it out either, 1953: 110). Moreover, he could not conceive of their productive or evolutionary genesis in terms other than the realization of possibilities (where higher forms are already 'contained' or 'involved' in lower forms, *ibid.*), as opposed to the actualization of virtual relations. In any case, this absence does give credence to Žižek's (2013: 905, 909) dismissal of

restricted to assemblages involving the activity of human bodies and brains, yet simultaneously embodying what is for a lot of us the least human(e), most alienating aspect of our world.

2.4.4 *Metric properties (math changes everything)*

Surveying current speculative thought, there seem to be two main routes of escape from the interpretive correlation, both usually considered incompatible. As mentioned in the previous chapter (see note 2), these lines of flight from the Kantian prison can be said to correspond to the two types of 'sublime' experiences that its designer distinguished: dynamic and mathematical (cf. Deleuze, 1984: 52). Either one criticizes it from without, as found in Whitehead, Deleuze, DeLanda and Latour or from within, as in Meillassoux (and certain aspects of) Žižek, Badiou and Luhmann. Thus 'posthuman' speculation beyond the human-world correlate involves either an inquiry into 'pre-human' tendencies and capacities (DeLanda, 2013) or 'transhuman' mathematizable properties (ie. primary qualities) (Meillassoux, 2008). Considered empirically, both strategies can be said to be inherent to language. As fuzzy and fully historical meshworks of dialects and grapholects, languages embody all three abstract machines presented above. DeLanda (1997, 2009), following Harris (1991), describes them in terms of three nested 'combinatorial constraints' acting on populations of linguistic replicators: first, populations of signifiers organize into more or less likely contractions; second, they differentiate, evolve and reduce into classes; third, as classes they are related in propositional forms as arguments and operators (ie. tendencies, capacities, possibilities). Interestingly, if the last constraint is loosened, this model becomes a pretty good description of that 'affective language' we call music, while its extreme tightening, making the resultant symbols operate (relate, function) without a specification of arguments (objects, variables) and thus without any likelihood constraints, gives us the strictly meaningless 'science languages' of mathematics and set theory. Emerging from *within* the correlationist 'prison' of language then, there may be ways of 'decoding' it, leaving only 'empty' axioms, yet bootstrapping a veritable *abstract machine of quantification* transcending the world of meaning-making, thus disclosing a whole new realm of facts, facticities and factials.⁶³

Social theoretical descriptions of this axiomatic sidestepping of the correlation are not hard to find. In Marxist social theory, for instance, there is the concept of

Hartmann and by proxy Meillassoux as 'naive realists' about their stratified ontologies. Indeed, the ontogenetic relation of the four machines presented here is crucial for safeguarding their transcendental (empirical) character.

⁶³Meillassoux distinguishes between the Heideggerian 'facticity' of the correlation itself ("the non-factual essence of fact as such") and 'factuality' to describe this facticity's 'speculative essence' which follows from its non-iterable character, the impossibility of applying facticity to itself, signifying the necessity of contingency (and contingency alone). 'Factials' for Meillassoux then describe the axiomatic conditions of factuality, including non-contradiction and other mathematical 'figures' (2008: 79-80). (Note here the similarity with Luhmann's (1997: 364) description of societal 'codes' as non-applicable to themselves, eg. the truth of the distinction between true and untrue being undecidable.)

'real abstraction'.⁶⁴ With the advent of money and only later science, humans have constructed symbolically generalized, quantitatively determined structures like markets or Euclidean spaces, in which objects move (ideally) without changing and from which humans themselves, as meaning-making subjects, are quite absent – and constitutively so (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, Žižek, 2008a: 11). It is these kinds of real abstractions that Deleuze and Guattari also seem to be hinting at when they define capitalism and the modern State as based on a host of 'axiomatics' of social control.⁶⁵ For them, capitalism effectuates an immanentization of a functionalist State, one ruled less by normative codes than by the deployment of an efficient set of axioms quantitatively determining and extracting surplus from ever more deterritorialized social forces (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 251-253, 1987: 453-473). Of course this narrative resonates and sometimes communicates directly with Foucault's far more detailed genealogy of the modern state and its disciplinary and biopolitical governmentality (Foucault, 1977, 1991, 2007, 2010a, Deleuze, 1988b). In the following chapters, governmental 'real abstractions' of singularities/identities, affects/values and concerns/ideology feature in the form of demographics, money, votes and other policy evaluation procedures. They bootstrap, assemble in sets and reify markets, societies and democracies. As math thus affects all spheres of life, it partly redefines our transcendental self-interpretation as well. Our subjectivity is emptied in Kantian fashion and becomes a 'view from nowhere'. Simultaneously, we also become quantified objects at the intersection of datasets ('structures'), objects whose freedom of movement ('agency') becomes a matter of rational adaptation. At a practice level, 'subjectivity', that is, knowledge production, is concentrated in centers of calculation such as statistics departments, market monitors and electoral procedures. For us 'objects', our social, economic and political subjectivity is mostly reduced to filling out forms (surveys of incomes, ethnicities, housing needs and desires, party preferences, livability scores etc.).

Reconnecting with the speculative realism debates, another strong and somewhat more surprising theoretical link can be made here with Luhmann's sociological account of modern communication, as structured by generalized 'codes' (confusingly, very similar to Deleuze and Guattari's decoded 'axioms'). Modern social differentiation, he tells us, has led a select number of functional subsystems – economy, politics, science, media, art, family etcetera – to become operationally closed and autonomous in respect to each other (Luhmann, 1997: 372). Thus, in principle, a rich person cannot buy political power or a government official cannot simply confiscate property for one's own. Crucial in this regard is the binary codification of symbolically generalized media: money (coded as paid/not-paid), power (government/opposition), truth (true/untrue) etcetera. Like Deleuze and Guattari's axioms these codes have a certain set-theoretical character, where what constitutes a set in itself remains undefined (cf. Badiou, 2006). As from a discursive point of view 'empty' sets with no meaningful

⁶⁴ See Toscano (2011) explicitly connecting Meillassoux's speculative project with this notion of real abstraction and to the, from a Marxist point of view, perverse phenomenon of financial speculation.

⁶⁵ Here also, Toscano (2008) makes the link between the Marxian concept and Deleuze and Guattari's.

‘outside’ (like ‘empty signifiers’, Laclau, 1996) they prescriptively ‘redouble’ the phenomenological world as *facticities* ascribing everything its universal scarcity, truth, power, sexuality and so forth through the application of the axiomatic binary code (paid/not-paid, true/untrue, beautiful/ugly etcetera). Thus, sociologically departing from their conception as purely mathematical axioms – Meillassoux would say from ‘ontological’ to ‘ontical’ (2008: 127–128, cf. Badiou, 2006: 52) – they present themselves within a situation of meaning-making as rather tautological structures in need of some detautologizing content. Hence for their axiomatic operation to succeed they demand legitimate criteria provided by discursive programs (pricing strategies, laws, theories, ideologies and so on). It is only through these that the binary codes can reintroduce what they initially exclude (the ‘excluded third’) and thus be allowed to interpenetrate (Luhmann, 1997: 367). Nevertheless, as we also see in Badiou, the axiomatized truths of love, beauty, science or power are something very different from the programs, meanings and knowledges from which they arise. From the mathematical point of view they do not just lack an outside, but *imply* an absolute one. Like Badiou inspired by post-Cantorian number theory, Meillassoux paints us a picture of that ‘great outdoors’ beyond the correlation. In his ‘*facial*’ terms of primary qualities as absolute possibilities⁶⁶ and necessary contingency following from absolute non-totalizability,⁶⁷ he shows us how making the switch to a strictly axiomatic ontology endows the real with some very peculiar and, one must admit, fairly ‘inhuman’ and literally meaningless properties (cf. Brassier, 2007). Even so, we could say it yields a very convincing conception of reality enacted from the ‘*facial*’ offset of the numerical (rather than the differential or dialectical), possibly helping us to better grasp the rather erratic nature of numbers so ubiquitous in our modern lives. As an extreme example, think of computerized financial speculation and its rather senseless acausal dynamics. Looking at them we learn in practice that when symbolic generalizations are quantified (nature/society, market, democracy), they lose, in principle, their ontological totalizability and become absolutely contingent rather than grounded by a ‘premodern’ sufficient reason (God, sovereign, subject) (which does not *imply* it being destabilized). A less extreme and less directly visible but absolutely ubiquitous expression of this lack of totalizability, despite the appearance of order by shared network protocols, powerful search engines and

⁶⁶ Meillassoux reiterates the Cartesian distinction between subjective secondary qualities and objective primary qualities, where the latter are restricted to what is based on the Cantorian ‘non-All’. Constitutive of an absolutely detotalized and de-subjected mathematics, the latter describes then the ‘structure of the possible as such’, not designating what is necessarily true (by the principle of sufficient reason), but what is mathematically conceivable and therefore ‘absolutely possible’ (Meillassoux, 2008, 124–127).

⁶⁷ The impossibility of a totalization of ‘being-qua-being’, derived from Cantor’s proof of the impossibility of a quantity of all quantities, brings Meillassoux (2008: 103–104) to reject the principle of sufficient reason and probabilistic reasoning, as they both presuppose a determined totality (of possibilities) enabling their calculation. The rather bizarre result is an acausal, hyper-chaotic universe in which everything, including the laws of nature, can change at anytime without any reason (which does not imply they will) (cf. the Badiouian event as absolutely contingent). Moreover, of course, it means a *facial* absence of any religious piety or metaphysics (cf. Luhmann, 1997, 364–365n308); only an arbitrary language like mathematics lacking any likelihood constraints (ie. probability) proves able to adequately describe such an absolutely contingent universe (see Hallward, 2011).

Quantification			metric properties
Autopoiesis		interpretive possibilities	measured possibilities
Affectivity	capacities of practice	capacities for interpretation	capacities for quantification
Folding	tendencies of transition		tendencies of stability

Image 2.1. An extended version of the actualization diagram presented in Chapter 1, summarizing the four abstract machines and the tendencies, capacities, possibilities and properties they actualize. Post-Kantian epistemology ('correlationism') has long confined social theory (if not scientific practice) in between the thickened borders. The Speculative Turn has opened the door to the ontological recognition and study of other modalities of existence. While the lowest level of tendencies could also be split into tendencies of practice, interpretation and metrics, it is more important here to emphasize how the right side of the diagram is oriented toward states of stability and the left toward thresholds of transition. Which does not imply that change does not happen when moving to the right. On the contrary, attempts to stabilize, anticipate and govern through practices, interpretations and metrics always summon their own performative undoing by inciting critique, experiment and chance events (ie. counter-actualization).

extreme platform monopolies, is the relentless proliferation and ramification of databases (as technological enactments of Badiouian 'multiples', cf. Mackenzie, 2012). The point here is that metrics increasingly lead a machinic life of their own and to properly understand it, its irreducible ontological status has to be recognized.

Taking these abstract machines together (Image 2.1), how could they be usefully deployed in concrete (transcendental) empirical research? Implicitly, they already feature in many practice theoretical accounts of urban life. Think of the following example taken from *Paris Invisible*, a visual actor-network analysis of the French capital by Latour and Hermant (2006: plan 11): the *geometrically* delimited and mapped spaces of Paris make up a key institutional repository, which is the product of an organization's (*Service Parcellaire*) intent on *identifying* streets and squares, deploying *practices* and techniques (for example, a theodolite) for making something out of just vaguely defined *flows* of urban transformations.⁶⁸ Similarly, but more explicitly, the following chapters will approach events of gentrification ('flows') by moving from social, economic and political metrics to interpretations to practices. Thus the abstract machines and their specific modalities translate into concrete flows of practices, interpretations and metrics. The term abstract machines, although philosophically foundational, is thereby only implied and will no longer be utilized.

⁶⁸As already stated earlier but more generally, this systematic ontological fourfold is missing or only figuring implicitly in Latour's own texts.

2.5 Conclusion: A speculative philosophy of social science?

Having now elucidated the post-correlationist speculations underlying this thesis we are in a position to briefly return to the epistemological and methodological principles of the previous chapter and couch them in the philosophical language which have inspired their conceptualization in the first place. The first concerns the notion of *counter-actualization*, the second is about *co-actualization*.

The critical rationale behind *counter-actualization* can be found in the work of Deleuze and Stengers. True immanence withholds us any first transcendental principles to depart from in our study of empirical phenomena. In the words of Deleuze: “One never commences; one never has a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters in the middle; one takes up or lays down rhythms.” (Deleuze, 1988a: 123) Unlike DeLanda then, who presupposes their existence, we cannot start from actual parts and wholes and simply construct a universe ‘bottom-up’. We are always already in the messy and continuously varying middle of things. Where to start in practice then? As Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 161) famously advise, one should just ‘lodge oneself on a stratum’ to then, from there, carefully ‘experiment with the opportunities’ and ‘lines of flight’ it offers. In other words, from a pragmatic point of view one connects with the most distinctly actualized components an assemblage has to offer and carefully counter-actualizes it from within – more prudently perhaps than any critical demystification, poststructural deconstruction or other ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ (Felski, 2012). Instead, as suggested in the previous chapter, counter-actualization may be best defined as a matter of ‘dramatization’ (Deleuze, 2004, Stengers, 2008a): not immediately asking and answering the definitional ‘What is..?’⁶⁹ but to address every situation as an undecided event that demands its own questions (of how much, where, when and how?).

Against the power of generality, which tends to place itself outside of its ecology of practices, counter-actualization is thus an exercise in what Stengers would call ‘critical ethology’. In contrast to the habit of critical debunking, her “immanent critique must present itself as an ingredient of the assemblage, not as critically examining/dismembering the assemblage itself” (Stengers, 2008a: 44). Counter-actualization is a participation, establishing resonance. Much like Derrida’s ‘self-deconstructing’ texts, an assemblage already incessantly counter-actualizes or ‘deterritorializes’ itself. Therefore, one only has to become affected and raise concern for the assemblage in order to learn from it. Instead of setting out to critically debunk in the name of society from outside of society, a *deliberate* counter-actualization ‘fabricates a line of flight’ by experimenting with differential ‘refrains’ already in progress. It means slowing them down, hesitating and learning instead of jumping to abstract conclusions. It means carefully developing a pragmatic feel for a situation of concern and for the both toxic and nourishing affects it holds and may still undergo. To be able to discriminate relevant empirical contrasts within a very singular assemblage, one has to engage and resonate with its ethological milieu and make an affective

⁶⁹ In ‘critical’ rhetoric: ‘of what general social form or process is this a particular expression?’, ‘what is really behind all this?’

connection first (one exterior to and preceding its terms).⁷⁰

Similarly, for Deleuze (1988: 125-126), critical ethology defines bodies, animals and humans by the ecological affects they are capable of (ie. ways to affect and be affected), instead of studying essential characteristics or metric properties of things. Through prudent experimentation it studies the compositions of relations or capacities between different bodies, minds and practices.⁷¹ Thus he defines the outlines of a ‘nomad science’ as opposed to a ‘Royal Science’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 369-371). While the latter only searches for laws and extracts constants from variables situated in a striated Euclidean-type space, the former, operating with a smooth and tactile geometry, places these variables in a state of continuous variation to try and seize their singularities instead of formulating their general form.⁷² In other words, except for doing only measurements and interpretations, science may include empirical speculations in the posthumanist form of experimental practices (not necessarily in the ‘controlled’ sense) and an anexact yet rigorous intuition of flows (cf. DeLanda, 1992). Aside from interpretive and quantitative methods, this implies a larger role to play in the social sciences by the more ‘ethologically’ inclined methods of ethnography, ethnomethodology and participatory ‘observation’ (on condition they familiarize themselves with the study of autonomous, non-discursive affects, cf. Massumi, 1995).

The second epistemic and methodological rationale that can be extracted from the work of Deleuze and others is *co-actualization*. For Deleuze, Spinoza’s axiomatics in Ethics can have an ethological effect. That is, there is a possible double reading of the early Modern philosopher: a systematic one, in pursuit of the general idea, and an affective one, “without an idea of the whole, where one is carried along or set down, put in motion or at rest, shaken or calmed according to the velocity of this [one] part” (Deleuze, 1988a: 129). Hence we notice an isomorphic and symbiotic becoming of thought and being in reading Spinoza: according to its own ontology, comprising velocities, affects and abstractions, the Ethics itself, together with its reader, is a complex of ethological relations as well as a system of abstractions. Likewise and more generally, we could say the sciences, as epistemic assemblages, and their objects of study, as ontic assemblages, do not entertain either positive relations of correspondence or negative relations of interiority, but rather of coherent isomorphism. As the divergently actualized products of one and the same universally singular phylum of morphogenetic machines, they may be conceived as entangled

⁷⁰ In Stengers’ own words, when ‘reclaiming’ an ecology of practices, one “always begins with an empirical starting point, with a situation we have to claim, against all those generalities that demand that we eliminate it away” (Stengers, 2008a: 57).

⁷¹ Deleuze’s idea of ethology has been taken up especially by Isabelle Stengers, who speaks of writing an ‘ethology of capitalism’ (in Pignarre and Stengers, 2011) and of engaging ‘ecologies of practices’ (Stengers, 2005a). Compare also Latour (2004a) and his plea for a political ecology inquiring into ethological ‘matters of concern’ rather than ‘matters of fact’ (and their ‘critique’).

⁷² With DeLanda (2005: 221-223) this thesis prefers this idea of a minor, or ‘intensive’ science, avoiding a too strict division of labor between science and philosophy (and art) as Deleuze & Guattari propose in *What is Philosophy?*, not in the least because restricting the movement of counter-actualization to philosophy would be detrimental to a reflexive social science.

in a process of co-actualization (cf. DeLanda, 2005).⁷³ That is, in a co-evolutionary process in which a heterogeneous assemblage of research skills, instruments, causal models, material phenomena and so forth may be said to progressively differentiate and discern what is ('mind-independently') relevant and irrelevant within its ecology of practices.

In order to engage with the four abstract dynamics as a social scientist one has to come down to their respective levels. Thus, if we want to be or experience and understand artistic practices, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 1994) tell us, we have to 'become animal'. Likewise, Latour (2005a) advises us to become 'myopic ants' in order to trace actor-networks. This does not mean we have to dress up like animals or ants. One does not attempt to resemble animality (correspondence) but, through disjunctive synthesis, to become isomorphic with it. It means we have to affect and be affected 'differentially', that is, carefully experiment and intervene to come to some skillful handling of our research object's capacities, find out, as the famous Deleuzian phrase goes, 'what a body can do' (Deleuze, 1988a). Thus, a myopic nomad science implies serious ethnographic legwork (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 371). Yet the same principle of isomorphism or co-actualization goes for engaging with the world of real abstractions and primary qualities. Critically debunking these facts and factials so central to our modern daily lives as just constructions of meaning (facticities) does not take their peculiar performativity seriously enough. Perhaps against our critical inclinations, engaging with metrics and models also means taking them at face value and helping them improve.

To conclude, we should be aware that the theory presented here makes for a pretty schizoid assemblage.⁷⁴ However, keeping in mind the overarching theory of (counter-)actualization, they are related, not just in logically exclusionary but also in morphogenetic terms, one giving birth to the next – and all of them just as immanent to reality as the other. Even so, the ontological speculations proposed here are perhaps still of a rudimentary kind. For instance, the proposed set of four modalities may have to be extended by a fifth abstract machine, although this is still a very speculative matter (in the regular sense of the word).⁷⁵ The continuum of abstract machines

⁷³ Deleuze (1988b) speaks of a 'non-relation' between 'visibilities' and 'sayabilities', as both actualizations (integrations) of differential relations (affects) of power.

⁷⁴ And they truly are incommensurable from a *dialectical* perspective. See, for instance, DeLanda's (2005: 72) description of the relation between singularities and affects as one of mere 'complementarity', or see Luhmann (2012: 98–100) speaking of a 'caesura' between the theories of 'structural drift' and autopoietic observation. And as we have already seen, a similar theoretical threshold is breached when switching from the discursive to the axiomatic (see Badiou, 2006: 52). However, in the words of Deleuze, while "negation is *opposed* to affirmation", "affirmation *differs* from negation" (1983: 168). Thus, from a *differential* perspective the above epistemic incommensurabilities could be 'ontologized', so that their difference is a matter of 'mutually exclusive apparatuses' (Barad, 2007), that is, of 'actants' involved: practices ('mutable mobiles'), interpretations ('mutable immobiles') or metrics ('immutable mobiles'; cf. Law and Mol, 2001). This will be further explored and substantiated in the next chapter in terms of capacities to affect and be affected.

⁷⁵ In particular Deleuze (1992) describing a power diagram successive to Foucault's panopticism, has incited a host of literature on this topic. See for instance Galloway (2004).

might also be progressively refined, as parallel to the differentiation of geometries (introducing affine geometry or others). However, keeping the here presented toolbox of abstract machines as parsimonious as it is may have some significant advantages. Assemblages studied by the social sciences are particularly complex and it is my conviction that this complexity can only be tamed somewhat by staying with the four intuitively appealing and theoretically well-tried modes of existence: flows of tendencies, practice of capacities, interpreted possibilities and metric properties. Including these in one coherent (post-?)social theory, thus fashioning a 'system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted', accompanied by a deep, ethological concern for ecologies of practices, could constitute a working theory true to the event called the speculative turn. The following chapters, engaging with the problem of gentrification, may be considered the theory's first trial.

Chapter 3

Of centerpieces, elephants and monsters: Reassembling the ‘Copenhagen interpretation of gentrification’ through relational and practice theories

3.1 Introduction: Affirming the chaos of gentrification through relational and practice theories

Throughout the long-standing debates on gentrification it has been pointed out that it runs the risk of becoming a chaotic concept (ia. D Rose, 1984, Beauregard, 1986, Clark, 2005). As Phillips (2002) notes, this imminent chaos has motivated many interventions of both the legislative and interpretive kinds, with the former proposing a particular essence of the phenomenon based on a ‘centerpiece’ theory and the latter allowing for many incommensurable perspectives on the ‘elephant’ of gentrification to complement one another (Clark, 1992a). Today, the tension between both kinds of approaches, captured well by the so-called ‘Copenhagen interpretation of gentrification’ (Clark, 1994), is still very much with us, even though concerns about interpretive relativity have mostly shifted from postmodernist to postcolonial (eg. Lees et al., 2015). However, in response to this enduring tension, this chapter will propose a rather different, more affirmative take on the chaotic nature of gentrification. The event, we will see, is not just epistemologically plural, but a veritable ontological ‘monster’ (cf. Law, 1991). Acknowledging and working with this monstrous reality instead of explaining away or denying it, is what this chapter will suggest as a necessary next step. As the title suggests, we will call upon recent ‘relational theories’ for this, by which we mean those theories predicated on ‘relations of exteriority’ (reducible to neither part nor whole, eg. DeLanda, 2009) as opposed to ‘internal relations’ (ie. in terms of parts, wholes, scales, contradictions and dialectics (of capitalism), eg. Harvey, 1996).⁷⁶ What is thus proposed is a more radical relationism that departs from both legislative approaches, in which one all-internalizing capitalist, postmodern and/or neoliberal nexus produces gentrification, and interpretivist approaches, where gentrification is part of (internal to) many disparate, possibly complementary perspectives. Crucial in this regard, as the title also implies, is to keep things down to earth by a focus on *practices*. Gentrification is thus reconceptualized as an ontologically chaotic and often ethically ambiguous tendency of a heterogeneous assemblage of academic, social, productive, consumptive, governmental and oppositional practices. This lays the groundwork for a more open and less despairing perspective on gentrification and suggests new avenues for research on the topic.

The chapter is structured as follows. The next two sections will first revisit the kind of multidimensional problem gentrification is, the way the debate has developed in response to it and how this has resulted in an appeasing ‘Copenhagen interpretation of gentrification’ (Clark, 1994) that sits uneasily between causal and geographical universalism and relativism. The following Section 3.4 will reinterpret this

⁷⁶ See also the recent debate on assemblage theory in *City* (2011, volume 15, issue 2 and 3-4).

epistemic truce in terms of a recent ontological revision of the original Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics (Barad, 2007). In Section 3.5 the resulting idea of an ontological (rather than epistemological) multiplicity of gentrification is translated into a new theory of its social, economic and political actualization. Before concluding, Section 3.6 will elaborate a research strategy of 'counter-actualization' fitting the new ontology and, for programmatic purposes, tentatively apply this heuristic procedure on three major themes of gentrification: social mix, rent gaps and neoliberal urbanism. The last section will recapitulate and conclude the arguments made in the chapter.

3.2 The kind of problem gentrification is

In what follows it is proposed to define gentrification broadly as a multidimensional event of displacement. Take away the core aspect of displacement and the concept loses all ethical import. Its power over upgrading, revitalization or similar euphemisms lies exactly there. That being said, empirically and even morally, displacement is anything but a straightforward phenomenon, ranging from complete, direct and physically violent dislocation to partial, indirect and phenomenological exclusion (Slater, 2009, Davidson, 2009, Lees et al., 2015: 447). However, as such a wide-ranging phenomenon, not even affluence or class, in the one-dimensional economic sense, constitutes a necessary ingredient. Therefore, instead of trying to settle the matter of defining gentrification by proposing yet another set of essential ingredients, it might be more useful to first think of the kind of multidimensional problem spaces we are talking about when considering such an event of displacement. Across the board (eg. Smith, 1982, Hamnett, 2003, Freeman and Braconi, 2004), research on gentrification has been occupied primarily with the relocation of people and capital in a rather homogenized, Cartesian-type 'firstspace', to the detriment of the phenomenologically lived dimensions of (dis)place(ment) (cf. Phillips, 2004, Davidson, 2009). It is the reason for Davidson's call to try and capture displacement and by extension gentrification in their 'full, appropriate dimensions', which for him, as for Phillips, means placing abstract and measured space in a dialectical relation to place as both conceived and lived (in line with Lefebvre, 1991). Still, as invaluable as this critique is, the rather loose and blurry dialectic scheme of interpretation proposed instead (cf. Merrifield, 2006 or DeFilippis, 2004 on Lefebvre's triad) has a tendency of abstracting a little too much from the concreteness of gentrification practices (not unlike Smith's (1982, 2008) initial grand dialectic of uneven development). Therefore, we have to take the discussion a step further and transform these phenomenological and dialectical categories into a relational ontology defined by multiplicities of practices. This will further our studies of displacement and gentrification in its manifold practical dimensions and will help refine the ethical coordinates for dealing with it.

As noted long ago by Jane Jacobs, rather than a simple 'two-variable' problem (eg. of supply and demand of urban space), the city is better thought of as a living problem of 'organized complexity' (1961: 428-448). And so could be the event of gentrification (cf. Van Weesep, 1994: 80-81). As with biological phenomena, nonlinear and multi-agent models can help us confront this kind of problem. For instance, tipping point

models of segregation (Schelling, 1978, Ball, 2004), even though they may be too simple a description of any real event of displacement, can still effectively bring our attention to the dimensionally complex yet topologically simple *event* gentrification is (cf. DeLanda, 2005: 10–15). However, for this we have to take the spatial events these tipping models describe not as mere relocations by social preference but as critical tendencies in a non-Cartesian, multi- or n-dimensional topology constituted by all kinds of social, political and economic practices.⁷ Why precisely such a reframing is useful and how it works out will be the subject of what follows, but for now, these preliminary remarks point to a redefinition of gentrification, not just or primarily as absolute relocation or relative displacement, but as an event where certain spatial practices (tend to) overpower others. As such, gentrification becomes a tendency of displacement we might not be able to exactly pinpoint (by the term ‘gentrification’) or measure, but can nevertheless rigorously assess, evaluate and experiment with (through ‘gentrification’). However, to clarify how this approach constitutes an improvement, a more precise recap of how gentrification’s multidimensionality has been dealt with up to now is needed first.

3.3 *Complementary gentrifications?*

The history of debates on gentrification has been told many times and takes on an almost canonized form (eg. Lees et al., 2008, 2010). There is little point in again recounting the complete story here, but we can quickly fly through some of its essential turns in order to elucidate the debate’s current state. Roughly then, it was from the late seventies that a debate emerged between Marxist, (consumer) cultural and neoclassical explanations of gentrification. While the neoclassical economists soon lost interest in what they considered an insignificant process (both theoretically and empirically), the debate between critical theories of gentrification took off dramatically, with causal explanations variously emphasizing ia. economy or culture, structure or agency and production or consumption of gentrified spaces. Without a completely satisfactory explanation coming from any one of the positions alone, many attempts at accommodating and integrating the different perspectives followed. In this vein it was Hamnett (1991, although see Caulfield, 1989: 618) who introduced the old Indian tale about a group of blind men feeling around an elephant but finding themselves in disagreement about what it is, as every one of them takes only part of it into account. Integrative efforts like Hamnett’s, attempting to make the blind men communicate, mostly brought in new centerpieces through the backdoor

⁷As will become apparent in Section 3.5, this definition is inspired by assemblage theory especially (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, DeLanda, 2005, 2009), which rethinks *actual* social assemblages positioned in Cartesian and projective space, as immanent to a *virtual* multiplicity described by an n-dimensional Riemannian type space (a conceptual resource which, not incidentally, the dominant approach to gentrification considers entirely insignificant to social science, see Smith, 2008a: 99). While the former types of space are framed by metrics and interpretations, the latter is defined fully yet locally (ie. differentially) by the tendencies and capacities that make up practices. In terms of gentrification, practices thus constitute a problem space that ontologically precedes and produces displacive distinctions of parts (properties, people, classes, cultures), wholes (market, neighborhood, society) and their possible measurement (in terms of money transactions and demographics).

(like ‘the production of gentrifiers’ as the underlying essence of both production and consumption perspectives). The so postmodern decade that followed, much dissatisfied with the modernist ‘legislative’ epistemic that was inherent to both the polarized and integrationist arguments made earlier, opened the door to a more ‘interpretivist’ understanding of gentrification (Phillips, 2002). Most notably, Lees (1996, but see also Mills, 1993) took stock of the many academic and non-academic meanings ascribed to gentrification, treating both fairly symmetrically.

Somewhere in between the legislative and the interpretive, Clark (1994) argues for a ‘Copenhagen interpretation of gentrification’, referring to the widely adopted interpretation of quantum physics. Devised by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg in the 1920’s, the interpretation was an attempt to tackle the tenacious issue of wave-particle duality that back then divided many physicists. It is Bohr’s notion of ‘complementarity’, which is considered one of the central elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, that Clark (1992a, 1994) proposes to be particularly helpful in advancing the deadlocked gentrification discourse. This is because, according to Clark, it expresses how explanations of gentrification and their different ‘standpoints of description’ may be mutually exclusive due to the incommensurability of the abstractions on which they are founded, but that this does not preclude the possibility of more than one of them may having some correspondence to reality or ‘truth value’. And so, even if there is no ‘foolproof holistic theory’ in sight and we are still just “blind men groping around and feeling different parts of the gentrification elephant” (Clark, 1992a: 358), that does not mean our more or less disparate (thick) descriptions of the phenomenon, when concisely communicated and listened to without too much ‘reflexive categorization’ (ibid.), can each have some value by illuminating part of its totality.

Clark’s tension reducing propositions have most certainly contributed to the further exploration and analysis of the multidimensional problem of gentrification, albeit (inevitably) in a rather arbitrary fashion. While in the early years issues of incommensurability mostly pertained Marxist rent gap, neoclassical and post-industrial theories (Redfern, 1997, although see Clark, 1994: 1034), other more or less incongruent perspectives have accrued over the years, from Bourdieuvian (Bridge, 2001a, 2001b) to governmentality (Uitermark et al., 2007) to technology oriented approaches (Redfern, 2003). Nonetheless, but especially with respect to the earlier duals, several dialectical strategies have been proposed for ‘integrating the incommensurable’ (Phillips, 2002). Lees, for instance, although not finding complementarity a very ‘profound solution’, recommends ‘informing one set of ideas with another’ so as to dissolve tensions into a ‘higher mode of representation’ (1994: 140, Phillips, 2004: 26n3). Doubling down on the dialectic approach to complementarity, Phillips (2002, 2004) takes recourse to a triadic analytic that portends not to sublimate (in ‘higher representation’) but perpetually overcome difference. Following Lefebvre (1991) and Soja (1996), he thus distinguishes between material economic ‘firstspaces’, symbolic cultural ‘secondspaces’ and practically lived ‘thirdspaces’ in order to indicate an undue fixation in gentrification research on accurately measurable firstspace and a relative neglect of ‘other geographies’ of gentrification. However, the problem with these dialectic complementarities is that they confine us ontologically

to a representational economy centered on human experience. As such, it is made epistemologically impossible to assign any ontological priority to lived practices *vis-a-vis* abstract conceptions (which is nevertheless done implicitly in all kinds of condemnation of fetishism). But more importantly, as evidenced by the categorical mismatch in Phillips (2004) and Davidson (2009: 229) concerning ‘representations of space’ (but more generally as well, eg. Merrifield, 2006: 109–110 and Crang, 2001: 201 on ‘spatial practices’), this phenomenology simply lacks concrete enough analytic criteria (cf. DeFilippis, 2004: 26). In Phillips, for instance, despite claiming they are ‘distinctively different’ (2002: 289), it is very hard to distinguish, for instance, secondspace ‘structures of feeling’ from thirdspace ‘cultural textures’ of gentrification (‘embodiments of how people make sense of the world’) (see especially Phillips, 2004, section II-2). These issues signal the need for a more rigorous approach to dealing with complementarity.

In the meantime however, on a slightly different track, another consequence of the ‘postmodern’ Copenhagen interpretation has been that “the questions have changed: more and more researchers have turned away from questions of *causality* – which lead almost invariably to contests between competing explanations – to examine *consequences*” (Lees et al. 2008: 190). With causal discussions left undecided and a purportedly alarming diffusion of gentrification strategies around the world (Smith, 2002, Atkinson and Bridge, 2005), a politically pragmatic realism has set in the form of a ‘geography of gentrifications’ (Lees, 2000, Lees et al., 2008, 2015). Wisely circumventing persisting causal dissensus in the spirit of the Copenhagen interpretation, Lees et al. (2008: xxii) state that “most gentrification researchers now accept that production and consumption, supply and demand, economic and cultural, and structure and agency explanations are all a part of ‘the elephant of gentrification’”, leaving further research with the task of recording its geographically diffused manifestations, as if to urgently assign oneself to diagnose the symptoms of a rapidly spreading disease while in the meantime assuming there is a common sense of what everyone is talking about (‘few would disagree...’, Lees et al., 2015: 449). Not unlike the earlier interpretive responses to causal ‘legislation’, this has led to Southern critiques (eg. Maloutas, 2011, Ghertner, 2015). The latter refuse to submit to the ‘encompassing’ gestures of Northern theory (Robinson, 2011a), with its ‘purposeful simplicities’ of “the general factors that constitute the engine behind the process”, or of gentrification as an “uneven outwards and downwards [...] expression of neoliberal urbanism” (Lees et al., 2008: 189).

In sum, as they attempt to navigate the Scylla of legislative absolutism and the Charybdis of interpretive relativism, both causally oriented and geographically comparative approaches to gentrification are still represented well by the Copenhagen interpretation. With an optical metaphor we could say they alternate between epistemes of reflection and refraction. In their most generalizing reflective mode, particular gentrified spaces are simply taken to *mirror* global trends of capitalism, neoliberalism and consumerism (eg. Smith, 2008a: 199–200, Lees, 1994: 148). However, more commonly today, gentrification is also diversified causally (eg. state-led), typologically (‘x-ification’) and geographically (scale, North/South). Particular cities, neighborhoods or discourses thus come to be prisms *refracting*

each in their own specific or ‘ordinary’ way the now more or less obscured universal rays of gentrification. Still, however far one takes this strategy, the core analytical and moral contradiction (capitalism/neighborhood) is only apparently absolved into a more and more complicated (typo)logical or spatial (scalar) structure, resurfacing intact whenever epistemic ‘legislation’ or political expediency is called for. By this rather opportunistic but eventually self-defeating oscillation between reflection and refraction, every (non-revolutionary) practice, technology or ideology is bound to be theoretically trivialized in spite of all the claims to contingency and variegation. As an alternative, therefore, the next section will further develop (and make less metaphorical) this troubled optics of gentrification. As suggested by Karen Barad’s recent revision of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, an additional ‘diffractive’ mode of inquiry can shine a light on the chaotic relations of exteriority from which gentrification events, including their internalizing observations, emerge.




Image 3.1. The famous ‘double slit’ setup (source: Barad, 2007: 82).

3.4 The Copenhagen interpretation revisited: Turning elephants into monsters

‘The Copenhagen interpretation’ often suggests much more consensus than its contributors actually shared. Most crucially, Bohr’s notion of complementarity and Heisenberg’s famous ‘uncertainty principle’, as initially formulated and as such widely adopted, were actually quite incompatible (Barad, 2007: 115). As Barad explains (2007: 302), the notion of complementarity, or what she calls Bohr’s ‘indeterminacy principle’, is of an *ontic-semantic* concern, whereas Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is merely an *epistemic* consideration. That is, the latter addresses only the problem of simultaneously *knowing* complementary subatomic events (like the position and momentum of an electron), while leaving intact the old metaphysics that presupposes the pre-existence and individuality of such objects before measurement. Unfortunately, despite Heisenberg having succumbed to Bohr’s position in a postscript to his famous paper on uncertainty (Barad, 2007: 115–116), the die was cast and the epistemic interpretation became the hegemonic one (probably because

it was a little less hard to swallow within a physics environment still thoroughly classical in outlook). This left complementarity as not much more than a problem of intersubjective communication (and ‘incommensurable abstractions’).⁷⁸

However, as an ontological rather than an epistemological matter, the physical reality of complementarity becomes much more important. And this, one encounters not just in any situation. To produce the famous duality of waves and particles, circumstances have to be created in which matter, generally thought to be made up of particles, starts exhibiting wavelike behavior, that is, an interference pattern. This is exactly what is achieved in the famous double-slit experiment in which two openings in a barrier act as a *diffraction* grating for light or matter passing through just before landing on a screen positioned behind it (see Image 3.1). This setup, which started out as a mere *Gedankenexperiment* and has only recently been amenable to actual empirical testing, has taken several forms. These range from the standard arrangement to one with a so-called ‘which-path detector’ (which gives information on which of the two slits a particle passes through, thus destroying its wave pattern) to one with a retroactive ‘quantum eraser’ of which-path information (testing whether the wave pattern is ‘restored’ after erasing information on which of the two slits a particle passes through).

Without being able to get into the details of these experiments here (but see Barad, 2007: ch.7), there are three things that come out of them that are very enlightening in relation to the nature of complementarity. The first outcome mentioned earlier, coming from the standard double-slit experiment, is that the detection of particles *physically* annuls their wavelike behavior (rather than merely disturbing the measurement of their pre-existing wavelike properties). The second interesting result, from which-path experiments specifically, is that the complementarity of determining particle and wavelike behavior is *continuous* and of a *virtual* nature. This means that one can to a *degree* define both properties simultaneously, but not both *sharply* at once (Barad, 2007: 304). Moreover, this continuous trade-off is virtual in the sense that the wavelike behavior is destroyed by the mere capacity for (paths of) particles to be defined (ie. distinguishability), whether or not a measurement is *actually* made (Zou et al. in Barad, 2007: 305). Thus it is more or less indeterminate *capacities* that are entangled and ‘intra-acting’ rather than sharply individualized (interacting) objects like ‘particles’.⁷⁹ The third relevant result, issuing from the so-called quantum eraser experiment, is that this ontological inseparability does not merely undermine our classical notions of space (of spatial separability), but of *time* as well. By demonstrating how erasing information on the path taken by a particle *after* it has passed through the grating still results in an interference pattern (which

⁷⁸ As clearly stated, for instance, by physicist and historian of science Gerald Holton, whom Clark (1994: 1036) approvingly quotes: “Objectivity [and complementarity], according to the Copenhagen school, is therefore... not an ‘ontological attribute’ – that is, not a description of the property of being – but becomes a problem of communication.”

⁷⁹ In ‘interaction’ the pre-existence and individuality of *relata* is presupposed. ‘Intra-action’ designates the genetic relation or vector that precedes the *relata*. As what assemblage theorists call a ‘relation of exteriority’, it neither pre-exists in some part nor is interior to some whole.

one would only expect from a wave), the experiment shows how both space and time are intra-actively produced as an integral aspect of the experimental event rather than merely serving as an unaffected external parameter. In sum, complementarity thus designates an *enactment* of virtual yet very real capacities for producing matter in space and time. It is not just about an *analytical* incompatibility of two abstractions (like ‘wave’ and ‘particle’), but about the *physical* impossibility of ‘synthetically’ enacting both (sharply) simultaneously, as one becomes *ontically* indeterminate when we merely enact the capacity to determine the other.

Ironically then, the implications of quantum physics and Bohr’s notion of complementarity have been interpreted in (at least) two mutually exclusive ways. When complementarity is just an epistemic matter, only signifying a “relation between mutually exclusive descriptions [of the same object] predicated upon theoretically incommensurable abstractions” (Clark, 1994: 1036), then Bohr’s phrasing of complementarity in terms of the ‘instruments and apparatus employed’ indeed no longer demands to be taken literally because our concepts are ‘the most important of our instruments’ (Richards in Clark, 1992a: 361, see also Lees, 1994: 139). The ‘conditions of observation’ are then no longer the material-semiotic practices by which our interpretations are enacted (‘instruments and apparatuses’), but only concern the most general structures of our social theories (ie. structure and agency). When we interpret complementarity in ontological terms, however, it is exactly the detailed arrangement of those apparatuses we need to focus on, rather than our own disparate subjectivities. And if we do so, the line between object and subject is not just redrawn “from between our instruments and ‘that being observed’, to between ourselves and the world, including our instruments” (Clark, 1994: 1035), but becomes contingent altogether (upon physical or material-semiotic arrangements).

Admittedly, this latter point was not brought forth altogether clearly by Bohr as well, which left all the more room for the more epistemically minded interpretations of his work. Bohr’s ontological intimations stopped short when it came to the scientific observer herself, as a human being. Barad has also observed this and ties this remnant of humanism (which presupposes the ontic individuality of the human observer despite Bohr’s own indeterminacy principle) to him being concerned mainly with the epistemics of his own practice of physics and not so much with the wider ontological implications of his findings. In response to this significant omission on Bohr’s part, this is where feminist and posthumanist Barad picks up complementarity and radicalizes it to also include humans and their political and economic practices. For her, this means that there is no inherent divide between a transcendental subject and its object, but only a contingent material-semiotic (re) enactment of observational ‘cuts’, separating cause and effect; marking body from marked body. Thus the enactment of a ‘subject’ (an ‘apparatus of measurement’) can be, for example, at the end of a blind man’s stick, when held firmly in order to feel around a room (as the ‘object of measurement’), or it can be his hand, when held loosely in order to examine the features of the stick itself (which are of course two mutually exclusive, that is, complementary cuts) (Bohr in Barad, 2007: 154).

Having thus ‘ontologized’ complementarity, Barad restates her point clearly: “...in experiments with matter (and energy): when electrons (or light) are measured using one kind of apparatus, they are waves; if they are measured in a complementary way, they are particles. Notice that what we’re talking about here is not simply some object *reacting* differently to different probings but *being* differently. What is at issue is the very nature of nature.” (Barad, 2012: 6) Moving beyond quantum physics (and beyond mere analogy),⁸⁰ this conclusion very much recalls recent actor–network theories on ‘ontological multiplicity’ (eg. Mol, 2002, Law, 2008) and ‘multinaturalism’ (Latour, 2004a). Much like Barad’s subatomic events becoming either wave or particle in the physics lab, Mol, for instance, finds ‘the’ disease of atherosclerosis enacted quite differently in the various diagnostic and treatment practices around the hospital. The disease, she paradoxically concludes from this, *is* more than one (as in universalism or transcendental idealism/realism), yet less than many (as in relativism). More abstractly perhaps, the same can be said of climate change, which in its accorded scale already looks a lot more like gentrification than a particle or disease. Referring to the same old Indian parable, but reviewing it through the ontological lens of actor–network theory, Esbjörn–Hargens speaks of climate change as a ‘multiple object’ and of the ‘blind men’ trying to understand it as *enacting* “a slightly different elephant depending on the methods they use” (Esbjörn–Hargens, 2010: 155). Counterintuitively then, there is no singular, pre-existing object that is the elephant (not even to ‘the elephant itself’, for the simple reason that the latter presupposes its individuality). Nor, for that matter, are there individual subjects (blind men) perceiving it. What unfolds is only a contingent superposition of capacities (practices) for enacting different observational cuts. Neither *one*, ‘multi-sided’ object, nor a mere collection of *many* (subjective, cultural, discursive) viewpoints, the elephant becomes multiple in itself: distributed over a heterogeneous assemblage of human and non-human bodies it becomes a sociological hybrid, a real monster (cf. Law, 1991).

3.5 *The genesis and ‘travels’ of gentrification: practices, interpretations, metrics*

How to diffract rather than reflect or refract gentrification events and get to the bottom of their practical constitution? To better deal with their monstrous multidimensionality, we need to understand how both their constituent practices *and* their (academic) interpretations circulate. As Phillips (2010: 548) has noted, the ‘circulatory sociologies of translation’ of actor–network theory could prove very useful

⁸⁰ Some concerns might be raised here about the applicability of lessons learned from the subatomic Planck scale to that of human social existence. As Barad explains, the epistemological and ontological issues considered (in this section) are not circumscribed by the size of Planck’s constant but can have wider application, provided one avoids gratuitous analogies that split the world in two and make one half simply mirror the other (2007: 70, 416n55, 457n41). The world is not metaphysically split into a microscopic quantum and a macroscopic classical/human half; the former rather supersedes the latter (Barad, 2007: 276–279). The quantum action defining the very small Planck scale, where interference and diffraction become an undeniable feature of reality rather than an expression of our epistemic shortcomings (as classical science has it), reveals something about ‘the very nature of nature’ that is as valid for large objects as any other, i.e. nature as without a fixed essence, as a process of intra-active becoming of space, time and matter (subject-object and scalar distinctions included, 2007: 108–110, 422n15).

here, bringing the “rather abstract and programmatic discussions of an interpretive approach ‘down to earth’ by linking them to [...] how interpretations/knowledges are actually constructed.” For me, this implies embedding epistemological networks of traveling concepts (like ‘gentrification’) into the wider ecology of (gentrification) practices they portend to correspond to. Therefore, this section will first develop a more universal distinction of traveling actants, spanning academic and non-academic networks, in order to then return to the epistemological issues of causality, typology and (postcolonial) geography.

Actor-network theory has proposed many concepts for handling traveling ‘actants’ (ie. material-semiotic practices) and the different spatiotemporal realities they enact. Here we will adopt and adapt through assemblage theory a particularly helpful conceptual framework that ontologically classifies empirical actants in terms of their capacities to affect (mobilize) and be affected (mutate). Three ‘down to earth’ types of actant result from this that can be said to intra-actively compose the problem-events of gentrification: practices, interpretations and metrics (see Image 3.2).

As a first category of actants, Latour (1987) has shown in many ways how a Modern, Cartesian-type space is enacted by technoscientific ‘immutable mobiles’. Thus, 16th century Portuguese imperialism was founded on calculative practices involving a metrically precise and materially mobile system of coordinates. Likewise, and more controversially, Newton’s laws of nature needed transport in the form of ships, letters and calibrated laboratory conditions to also be valid beyond England (Law and Mol, 2001: 611–612). Metric spacetimes are not ‘out there’ but have to be constructed to exist and persist, always in symmetric cooperation with non-human actors as well, be they theodolites, cosmogenic isotopes, survey forms, voting booths or ledgers. By embodying mathematically immutable realities (‘matters of fact’), these actants have enormous mobilizing power, not only in technoscientific, but political and economic practices as well. Around gentrification we can think of *metrics* as demographics, offering us truths on changing neighborhood populations (and gentrification); polls, elections and other power evaluations, quantitatively deciding on matters utterly divisive; or, most familiar to us all in daily life, economic transactions, prices and prosthetic sums, measuring exchange values of everything from dilapidated houses to ‘third wave’ hipster coffees.

Elaborating on Latour’s concept by recombining its terms, Law and Mol (2001) further introduce so-called mutable mobiles and mutable immobiles, which both generate their own kinds of ‘fluid’ and ‘fire’ spaces respectively.⁸¹ Hence there is the *mutable mobile*, like the Zimbabwe bush pump or the diagnosis of anaemia, which travels continuously through a network of practices, mutating fluidly and incrementally (both itself and its environment simultaneously). In relation to gentrification we can think here of slowly changing *practices* and know-how of social distinction, familiarity and mixing through statistics, media discourse and association

⁸¹ A fourth possible category, ‘immutable immobiles’, we leave aside here (but see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1). Suffice to say it denotes the problem-event (of gentrification) itself, which urges to be mutated and mobilized, ie. actualized by practices, interpretations and metrics.

in the streets, cafes, parks, playgrounds, schools, community gardens and so on; or think of political practices of voting, writing policy documents, making court cases, orchestrating demonstrations, acquiring charisma and informal strategizing; or, in terms of economization, practices of comparative appraisal, accounting, bidding, speculation, labor division, functional and aesthetic appraisal and, of course, building, making and designing products.

In contrast to the slowly evolutionary mutable mobiles the *mutable immobile* mutates much faster relatively speaking, in a discontinuous fashion, like the vexed signifier of the absence or presence of ‘alcohol’ in the treatment of liver disease (Law and Singleton, 2005, Law, 2004) or, more relevant here, the contentious distinction of new, proper or ‘best’ use’ of a building through rezoning and gentrification (cf. Guggenheim, 2010). As a radically temporalized ‘fire object’, the mutable mobile ‘flickers’ from one semiotic Gestalt or discursive form to another, at the (phenomenological) price of continuously producing ‘immobile’ star-like centers (‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ structures and positions, or ‘sites’, cf. Lees, 1996). Or in perhaps more familiar terms, series of meaning making distinctions (‘cuts’) of part/whole, past/future and ego/alter mark out a ‘field’ of possible objects and positions (Luhmann, 1995a, Bourdieu, 1984, cf. Law, 2004: 83–85). In gentrification research this pertains to narrative forms or *interpretations* of social identity of gender, race, ethnicity and place; to political ideologies, parties, programmes and policies, be they revanchist, emancipatory, conservative, liberal or neoliberal, promoting segregation or integration; and to economic values of property, use, function, aesthetics and authenticity of real estate, retail and people (class). Moreover, the sign of ‘gentrification’, both as an academic and non-academic indication, is itself such a fire object, popping up in this publication,

		SPACE-	
		affective / mobile	not affective / immobile
-TIME	affected / mutable	practices (spacetime)	interpretations (temporalizing space)
	not affected / immutable	metrics (spatializing time)⁸²	problem-event

Image 3.2. An ontological classification of empirical actants in terms of their capacities to affect (mobilize) others and be affected (mutate) by other relations. Each kind of relation also enacts a different kind of spatiotemporal reality.

⁸² In line with Schatzki’s (2010: 79–87) ontological ‘flattening’ of Harvey’s original conception (1996), material-semiotic practices of interpretation and measurement can be understood here as different attempts at ‘spacetime compression’. However, crucially distinct from both Harvey and Schatzki, is that these operations are conceived less anthropocentric and that ‘objective spacetime’ is rendered fully performative rather than always actual and overarching (ie. based on ‘relations of exteriority’ rather than ‘internal relations’).

then in *The Guardian*, then a Rotterdam white paper and then a graffiti on the streets of Istanbul (while in the meantime, fortunately, no one subject, epistemic community or Ruth Glass exactly owns it and legislates its meaning). In short, the proposed ontology comprises three different actants which embody the material-semiotic answers to the concrete questions that define the structure of the problem-event: How, what and how much? (cf. Deleuze, 2004) Still, however useful these distinctions by actor-network theorists may already prove to be in describing the manifold production of space more comprehensively yet less abstractly than political economic (Smith, 2008a) or phenomenological (Lefebvre, 1991) categories allow for, its three types of actant still relate in rather analytical and somewhat arbitrary ways. Moreover, the ‘traveling’ of ‘mobile’ actants of actor-network theory can still be conceived to happen in some global overarching space, be it absolute or relativistic. What is therefore crucially needed for a truly immanent (‘flat’) and relational rendition of the production of space and to properly engage gentrification as a ‘synthetic’ process, is to relate these actants historically and genetically as does assemblage theory. For proto-actor-network theorists Deleuze and Guattari (Latour, 1999b), differential (‘fluid’), projective (‘fire’) and metric spaces are related in terms of their degrees of invariance or symmetry under transformations (ie. capacities to affect and be affected). A process of symmetry-breaking (cf. Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) then describes the genesis or *actualization* of spaces from virtual and fluid to actual and static (DeLanda, 2009). In other words, types of actants can be prioritized ontogenetically, so that metric asymmetries *emerge* from interpretative asymmetries, and interpretations from practical asymmetries. This makes simple sense: in order to measure anything, interpretive choices have to be made first, but this in turn requires actualizing the particular capacity to do so. Conversely, however, there are many interpretations that are not being measured, and there are practices not or barely translated into interpretations. Prioritized ontogenetically then (but also historically or ‘phylogenetically’, cf. DeLanda, 1997), Image 3.2, distinguishing actants analytically, is reassembled into the diagram of Image 3.3, relating them synthetically. As variously exemplified and brought to life in the next section, this scheme of ontogenetic actualization will prove a useful heuristic tool (of ‘counter-actualization’) for simultaneously navigating both empirical problems of gentrification and the theoretical discourse surrounding it.




Image 3.3. General diagram of the (counter-)actualization of intra-active practices.

However, bringing this actor-network and assemblage ontology to bear on the epistemological issues surrounding gentrification, we find that the geographies of both the problem itself and of the traveling concept relate to each other in such a way that our epistemic practices become a performative part of the problem (understood in a value-neutral sense). Although some have noted how ‘gentrification’ has become a widely traveling concept (eg. Lees, 2003, 2012, Butler, 2007), this observation and its ethical implications have yet to be properly processed (Lees, 2018). Much has been made of whether the concept does or does not travel well across the Atlantic (eg. Musterd and Van Weesep, 1991, Lees, 1994b) or to non-Anglo-Saxon contexts (eg. Maloutas, 2011, Lees et al., 2015). In recent times, positions range from exclaiming a global ‘gentrification generalized’ (Smith, 2002, Atkinson and Bridge, 2005) to proposing a more variegated ‘planetary gentrification’ (Harris, 2008, Lees et al., 2016) to the more radically post-colonialist stance, criticizing what it considers overextensions of a parochial concept (Ghertner, 2015). Again, only this time geographically, in the form of different ‘comparative urbanisms’, we see more or less legislative or interpretive positions put forward in “between what is true of all cities and what is true of one city at a given point in time” (Nijman in Lees et al., 2015: 9-10, Lees, 2018: 55).

As such, the debate on gentrification shows itself at the forefront of a larger discourse on developmentalism, (post)colonial comparativism and parochial theorizing (eg. Chakrabarty, 2000, McFarlane and Robinson, 2012). Still, as discussed before, gentrification studies have not only been dominated by Cartesian-type ‘firstspaces’ (Phillips, 2004, Davidson, 2009), but even so by what Chakrabarty calls ‘History 1’. That is, the theories of uneven development underlying much gentrification research (Smith, 1982, 2008a, Lees et al., 2015, 2016) retain many questionably developmentalist elements (Chakrabarty, 2000: 12, 261n37) evidenced more or less explicitly by the constant and often too easy exclamations of universal takeover by capitalism, neoliberalism and indeed gentrification (‘increasingly...’, ‘planetary’). Translating this discourse into the circulating actants presented above might help provincialize it somewhat. That is, if metrics of truth, power and money enact a promise of equivalence (regardless of their ideological content and specific pragmatic effects), theirs is an objectivist, secular and developmentalist History 1 of enlightenment, emancipation and prosperity. On the interpretive level, however, there is always room for ‘history 2s’ to develop; alternative and subaltern narratives in contradiction with and possibly critical of the actual, incomplete instantiations of these universals (often, of course, suggestive of other, more truthful, just and fair metrics). However, to problematize thoroughly our History 1 and not just debunk it as culturally arbitrary (as it is simply ‘indispensable yet inadequate’, Chakrabarty, 2000), we should not only situate it among its subaltern others, but tie *both* types of narratives to the empirical practices from which they emerge, be they topographically interpreted as ‘in’ the North or South.

At this point, any comparative capacity becomes topologically rather than topographically entangled first (cf. Robinson, 2011a: 16). As Robinson suggests, also with reference to Deleuze and Guattari (1994), this might demand the ‘most abstract concepts’, which we interpret as enacting a topological kind of abstraction (from interpretation) in the direction of a rhizomatic pragmatics (cf. Deleuze and Guattari,

1987: 7) rather than a Cartesian-type abstraction toward equivalence (and History 1). The purpose of which would be to maximally stretch the tension between ontological abstraction (as in Images 3.2 and 3.3) and detailed observation, to the point where both rejoin in (and are explained by) concrete differences and genealogies of practice. Rather than having to choose for a universalist (critique of capitalism-type) or relativist (ordinary cities-type) comparative gesture, or one in between, based on linked or ‘variegated’ submodels of capitalism or gentrification (cf. Robinson, 2011a: 12), we could make our object of comparison those circulating actants through which neighborhoods, cities or countries ‘already inhabit one another’ (Robinson, 2011a: 7) and by which they are only subsequently individuated. Immersed in such comparative work, questions of conceptual overstretching (‘is it or is it not?’) and typological diversification (‘x gentrification’, ‘y-ification’) (Maloutas, 2011) become less an issue of correspondence (whether epistemic or political) and more of pragmatics and ethics. In our own modest connection with the ‘ecology of gentrification practices’ we become obliged to take care of our ‘traveling concepts’ (cf. Stengers, 2008a: 50) and ask ourselves questions like: ‘Is it, in this case, helpful to present gentrification as a hard fact, or a battle cry, or a problematizing proposition?’ ‘What sort of comparative gesture is (ontologically) welcome here?’

In line with these comparative pragmatics, as Robinson also suggests, “alternative rubrics of rigour and causality need to be explored” (2011b: 136). Parallel then, to the aforementioned gestures, three positions can be ascertained regarding causality. The first, empiricist position, like neoclassical (land) economics, conceives causality in the form of mathematically formalized constant conjunctions of quantitative variables. Critical (realist) approaches, in contrast, interpret such superstructural interactions as mere symptoms of deeper historical and (infra)structural causes. Of course much of the impetus of the causal debate on gentrification was exactly the latter type intervention, specifically in relation to urban ecological and neoclassical naturalizations of neighborhood cycles and filtering processes (eg. Smith, 1982). Nevertheless, within the relational ontology proposed here, such ontological stratifications are the product of a very specific kind of epistemic assemblage making contingent observational ‘cuts’, like production/consumption, post-industrialism/gentrifier or neoliberalism/policy. Inevitable as making such choices may be, seeing causality through the lens of relations of exteriority, intra-action and performative practice, guards us against essentializing or reifying the parts, wholes and scales these choices produce. Therefore, in a third position, *causation* would be reconceived as a process of actualization embodied by a series of practical, interpretive and metric actants. This radically performative event is then always accompanied by processes of *effectuation* or ‘counter-actualization’ in the sense that it generates new, more or less benign capacities for practicing, interpreting and measuring things differently. When we focus our efforts mostly on the former, as is arguably the case in gentrification studies (cf. Redfern, 2003, Maloutas, 2011), we tend to take actual reality as inevitable and retrospectively design rather teleological explanations in its image (structural determinants, functions of systemic survival). However, if we attend more to the process of effectuation, leading in the direction of the virtual, we may discover a zone of indetermination where many capacities for change await exploration. As Gibson-Graham has noted, such a complex notion of causality, based

on a “nonresemblance between the virtual and the actual”, could make for a much more “rigorous anti-essentialism to the understanding of causation, working against the nearly ubiquitous impulse to reduce complex [path-dependent and nonlinear] processes of eventuation to the operation of one or several determinants [so that instead] it does not collapse what it aggregates into fewer categories, but spreads everything out to the limits of our tolerance for dimensionality and detail” (2006: xxx-xxxi, 202n34).

It should be clear by now that it is this tolerance for detailed dimensionality we should develop in our engagements with events of gentrification, so as to define their dimensions not abstractly (as Cartesian, transcendental) but with reference to concrete differentiations and ways of changing (virtual capacities), which are in principle infinite in number (n -dimensional), but in practice always bounded by immanent relations of relevance (DeLanda, 2005: 11-13). Thus, for instance, a human-bike-assemblage might have infinite ways of changing dependent on the connections it makes with its environment (including heart attack or breaking in half), yet around ten dimensions (steering, balancing, suspension etc.) might be relevant in habitual practice. However, somewhere in between these daily dimensions and an absolute loss of consistency (eg. heart attack), there lies a zone of indetermination to be explored through problematization, experimentation, invention and learning (eg. sports). The same goes for practices constituting gentrification events and it is their multiple dimensions that will be tentatively worked out in the next section through a first exercise in counter-actualization.

3.6 Gentrification counter-actualized

The current section will set forth a research strategy on the basis of the above theory of actualization. It will be demonstrated how the distinction between metrics, interpretations and practices allows one to navigate both empirical phenomena and theories surrounding three prominent gentrification themes: social mix, property market practices and neoliberal governance.⁸³ But first a few words are needed on the epistemic strategy involved: counter-actualization. As students of the Moderns and their peculiar modes of existence and veridiction, we are advised to ‘invert their inversions’ where their calculations wrongly take ontological precedence over all other attachments (Latour, 2013: 435). However, if actualization finds its most immutable resolution in metric determinations, it appears only natural for a geography investigating problem-events to commence its inquiry there. In a world of multiplicity, relationality and process, ‘matters of fact’ offer the necessary epistemic demarcation and foothold into an assemblage of interest, if only to critically problematize them.⁸⁴ Thus counter-actualization works from metrics to

⁸³ Other possible and important themes around gentrification are ia. commerce and entrepreneurship (eg. Zukin et al., 2009) or ecological relations (eg. Dooling, 2009).

⁸⁴ This advice we can take from assemblage theory: “This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce

interpretations to practices, taking something of a problematizing detour in order to be able to ward off fast conclusions (on gentrification's presence, absence or type).

As a first step then, one starts out with a reflective mode of inquiry. In the case of gentrification processes, *at least* three modern 'modes of veridiction' (Latour, 2013) are obviously important: economization, politics and (scientific) reference. In daily life we axiomatically distinguish these practices with the use of generalized media: by axiom money does not buy you power or truth and vice versa (cf. Luhmann, 1997). However, in order to be able to make the differences they make ('reflect'), these semantically empty (or qualitatively indivisible) media of equivalence require further *quantification*, which can be more or less easily achieved and institutionalized.⁸⁵ Prices and investments are thus metrics taken as reflective of some general need (born from either necessity or luxury); polls and evaluations measure (how much decisions reflect) the general will of the people; models and statistics quantify (observations of) nature and society. By these numeral actants of modern (self-)governmentality, constituting the gentrifying neighborhood's firstspace or History 1, the place is in essence a changing population, economy and electorate (eg. Ley, 1994).

However, these matters of fact can and should be bracketed, not because they are all lies or subjective, but because they have performative powers that deserve serious scrutiny. Therefore a second, refractive step of counter-actualization ties metrics to their prior interpretive choices and to other possible (non-quantified, alternative) choices. This entails an analytic move quite familiar to critical geography, "from *pure* abstraction - the logic of identity - to the full complexity of the contradictions of the real", that is, from mathematics to structural, dialectic and triadic analysis (Lefebvre, 2004: 12-13). It is a move that produces stories and analyses of general contradiction and dominance, of bourgeoisie over proletariat and peasants, of capital over labor and land, of the economic over the political and social, of the post-industrial class over the industrial, of masculine over feminine, of conservative over progressive, of ego over alter (or 'Other'). Moreover, such contradiction also entails a first blurring and interpenetration of communicative systems and fields (cf. Luhmann, 1997). Thus market logics penetrate the political system and state bureaucracy intrudes upon social life (Habermas, 1987, Ley, 1980: 242).

So far, so familiar. Yet to further counter-actualize, these interpretive dialectics are, thirdly, tied to (diffracted into) the multiplicity of intra-active practices from which they emerge. This perhaps 'post-critical' gesture, more prudent but possibly more penetrating than the more familiar debunking and suspicious modes of critique (cf. Felski, 2012), compels us to keep things 'down to earth' (Phillips, 2010, as cited before). Thus, a chaotic ecology of practices forces itself upon us, comprising capacities geared toward quantification and calculation; practices of intersubjective distinction; and capacities underrepresented and underutilized (Image 3.3, bottom

flow conjunctions here and there [and] try out continuums of intensities segment by segment." (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 161)

⁸⁵ One could maybe add other modern axioms of learning (in school), care, lawfulness, love (or 'fame') and beauty (of art) (cf. Luhmann, 1997). Evidently, these are less obviously quantifiable (but see Badiou, 2006).

row). In the following subsections, according to the aforementioned themes, we will make some first strides into this multidimensional ‘ecology of gentrification’ by way of counter-actualizing its practices of socialization, politicization and economization.

3.6.1 Practices of socialization: Failing to mix?

There are no truths about society and its gentrifying demographics without some very specific professional or folk practices of socialization being in place (cf. Latour, 2005a: 257). Nothing is social or natural (non-social) in and of itself, but has to be made so through all kinds of sociological skills and techniques. With relations of practice preceding the identity of their relata (see note 79), socialization here is not primarily the internalization of society by an individual through normative interaction, but the intra-active enactment of the social through *ia*. representations (‘cuts’) like ‘society’ and ‘individual’ (cf. Barad, 2007). Hence, according to the different actants they enrol, we can discern a continuous diagram of practices of socialization:

		Social-demographic numbers, tables and graphs	↑ (Counter) actualization ↓
	Non-quantified, everyday representations of identities, groups and their relations	Social indicators, classifications and theories on their relations	
Common cultivation of singularly joyous and sad encounters, lines of flight (from identity)	Habits, affects, discourse and expressive media of solidarity, recognition, distinction, resentment and indifference	Academic and statistical research methods, numerical skills and institutions	
Continuum of intra-active practices of socialization: singularities – identification and representation – counting and statistics			

Image 3.4. (Counter-)actualization of practices of socialization.

In the right column of the figure in Image 3.4, we find those academic, statistical and professional practices that (re)produce all kinds of metrics, which often legitimize policies of desegregation, social mix and gentrification. In opposition to these metrics we find, in the middle column, practices of socialization which are only a matter of interpretation. These are the daily habitus interactions (often contentious or ‘tectonic’, Butler and Robson, 2003, Jackson and Butler, 2015, Davidson, 2010) and local narratives about a neighbourhood’s history and population (‘there goes the hood’, ‘those new people’) which for critics often prove the failure of demographically motivated mixing policies (Bridge et al., 2012, 2014). However, still other practices of social composition, those in the outer left column, barely if ever translate into clear social and moral representations and may as such present (joyful, sad or anomic) lines of flight from such tight distinctions, as when a community event or public place blurs the line between gentrified and gentrifiers or breaks old habits.

There is then, good reason to assume there is more to a neighborhood’s ‘geology of morals’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) than habitus tectonics. If we want to expand our current thinking and research on practices of diversity, exclusion and social mixing, one place to start could be the Bourdieuvian concept of habitus. As Sloterdijk

(2012) reminds us, classical understandings of the habitus by Aristotle or Aquinas (consciously ignored by Bourdieu) conceive it as irreducible to ‘the class within us’ (ie. an arbitrary expression of a deeper social structure) and have it comprise ‘the virtuous within us’ as well. Avoiding the Bourdieuvian conflation of social dominance (*pouvoir*) and practical achievement (*puissance*), and the implied reduction of a neighborhood to a zero-sum social field, it would be interesting to see what ‘volcanic’ encounters and events escape its tectonics by summoning the virtuous within us. A social heterotopia, where difference is articulated beyond the habitual, need not be some exotic counter-site (Foucault, 1986) or postmodern ‘thirdspace’ (Soja, 1996, Phillips, 2004), but neither should we expect too much from the comfortably segregated and tolerantly cosmopolitan ‘third places’ (Oldenburg, 1999) and their low-key ‘public familiarity’ (Blokland and Nast, 2014). When asked about their daily grievances, residents of multi-class and multi-ethnic neighborhoods have a strong tendency to speak in ‘powerful negative generalizations’ (‘those kind of people’), while positive experiences, far from installing a cosmopolitan ‘generalized respect for difference’, tend to be singularized as about *this* or *that* encounter, place, or person (Valentine, 2008: 332–333). As research looking for averages and routines tends to focus on the former, it almost automatically misses out on the latter, while it is exactly those events, places and spaces that by virtue of their singularity exceed those generalizations and thus offer lines of flight from identity cleavages.

Not just any art event, street festival, market square, playground or cafe, it is these volcanic ‘singularities’ that manage to stand out from other ‘third’ spaces by their capacity, not of magically harmonizing or wiping out structural divisions, but of connecting social practices and identities *through* their differences. Storming with joyful as well as sad affects, they are the stuff of (singularized) neighborhood history. In practice, although without guarantees, such singular events can be cultivated through, for instance, skillful community art (eg. mixed theater) or cultural ‘border objects’ (eg. nostalgic *and* vintage theater decor). In any case, whether consciously encouraged or serendipitous, their power for maintaining social heterogeneity in the face of improbability (think Schelling, 1978, cf. Bruns-Berentelg, 2012: 88) lies in supplying the ‘vertical tension’ people need to challenge their habits and become the best versions of themselves, if only momentarily (Sloterdijk, 2012). In practice then, real social mixture, or better, superposition, is not necessarily about a tension between segregation and a cosmopolitan respect for diversity, but between a state of multi- or monoculturalist indifference and an affirmative differentiation of neighborhood life, which takes considerable collective attention, effort and creativity.

3.6.2 Practices of economization: Calculating rent gaps?

In the same sense that there is no society without socialization, neither are there markets of real estate without practices of real estate economization and marketization (cf. Latour and Callon, 2011, Çalışkan and Callon, 2009, 2010). Land and buildings interrelated in real estate markets are not economic by themselves, but are performed that way through certain calculative devices and scripts. In a gentrifying neighborhood, like in case of a housing bubble (S. Smith et al., 2006), one can expect

different calculative practices at work than in others. According to the dominance of certain material devices or senses, such practices can range (as in Munro and Smith, 2008, SJ Smith, 2011) from the very technological and formal (cf. Christophers, 2014) to the behavioral-cultural (cf. Bridge, 2001a, 2001b) to the affective (cf. Caulfield, 1989, Rothenberg, 1995) (Image 3.5).⁸⁶ If we as critics of gentrification ‘wish neoclassical theories of urban land markets to become not true’ (Lees et al., 2008: 48–49, Slater, 2017), it would surely be good to get a better grip on the manifold practices of economization by which they become (less) true. If rent gaps can seem tautological – gentrification occurs (not) when the gap is (not) sufficiently wide (Redfern, 1997: 1284) – it is because they are entirely performative in nature. As a product of ia. practices of estimating costs and benefits, visualizing ‘the market’, securing attachment of buyers and setting prices (cf. Çalışkan and Callon, 2010), potential and then actualized ground rents, and the parcel, neighborhood and metropolitan scalar distinctions they imply, are never simply ‘out there’ but have to be performed through particular combinations of calculative, discursive and affective methods (comparative, narrative, aesthetic and technical). So rather than again painstakingly trying to empirically detect them ourselves (eg. Clark, 1988) we could study how rent gaps are practiced. Moreover, beyond rather naturalizing, actor-centered distinctions of commodified ‘market’ and decommodified ‘state’, we can then examine a whole, intra-active range of calculative capacities (including appraisal skills, property market databases, point systems, mission statements etc.) performing investments that can be self-interested or socially committed, competitive or oligopolistic, specialized or standardized etcetera. Considering the often complex urban history and heterogeneous housing stock of gentrification-prone neighborhoods it is most likely that many such different practices contribute to any one particular event of gentrification.

		(Prosthetic) prices, valuation models, point systems, metric properties	↑ (Counter) actualization ↓
	Non-quantified values of housing and location, extra-legal property claims	Property/welfare rights, values quantified	
(Common) desires and capacities of dwelling and construction	Passionate interests, material hermeneutics, media of housing discourse	Calculative practices of finance, production (costs) and appraisal	
Continuum of intra-active practices of real estate economics (cf. SJ Smith, 2011): affective – behavioral-cultural rationality – hedonic/ comparative pricing			

Image 3.5. (Counter-)actualization of practices of real estate economization.

It is highly questionable whether it is helpful to dialectically subsume all of these practices under one concept of (the uneven development of and resistance to) capitalism (cf. Latour and Callon, 2011, DeLanda, 1997). Therefore, to resist

⁸⁶ ‘Affective’ should be understood here not only as pertaining to (erotic, festive) interhuman feelings or emotions (cf. Caulfield, 1989, Rothenberg, 1995), but also in a transhuman, Spinozian sense, including relations with non-humans (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 256–257). Most importantly here, this implies desires of dwelling and construction skills in relation to non-human home and housing materials.

the epistemic pull of capital so strong in gentrification discourse and to better appreciate the process' economic heterogeneity, we might want to expand our 'ethical coordinates' around the issue (cf. Gibson-Graham, 2006: 88, Hodkinson, 2012). Ideologically, the axis of housing (de)commodification is limited by universal state provision on one end and free market reign on the other. Historically, neither extreme has turned out especially satisfactory or entirely just (Hodkinson, 2010). The often presented stark choice between disinvestment and gentrification may be false (Lees et al., 2008: 264), but in practice, not making it can be difficult. In cities where needs, use values, desires and capacities vary widely and evolve constantly, even among that (increasingly) heterogeneous group called the poor or precariat (cf. D Rose, 1984), economic collectives are confronted with the wicked problem of striking a marginal balance between disinvestment, reinvestment and 'overinvestment' (risking gentrification). To understand the capacities for constructing such a dynamic, qualitatively heterogeneous equilibrium, it is imperative we learn of the many calculative, discursive and affective investment practices that (together) affirm or destroy it.

Hence, orthogonally deepening or diffracting the axis of (de)commodification, we encounter another tension between calculative and standardizing enclosures on the one hand and commonist, autonomist or anarchist arrangements on the other (cf. Hodkinson, 2010, 2012). More or less outside the disciplinary clench and resource dependency of both state and market, many economic lines of flight subsist, cautiously pushing various dimensions of economic practice toward the outer left column of Image 3.5. Here we can think of the usual, but still under researched (intra-active trade-offs between) practices of communal sweat equity (self-build properties), community land trusts (land owned by community association, house by the resident) housing cooperatives (collective ownership, resident as shareholder) and mutual housing associations (DeFilippis, 2004, Rydin, 2013). Furthermore, moving away from housing's 'History 1', in which total commodification is high and resistance seems all but futile, there is much to learn from studying and comparing actually existing bastions and pockets of alterity, both Northern and Southern. Think of the sophisticated social and ecological investment practices and associated techniques of area-based asset management, product customization and normative organization of Dutch housing associations, most of which (particularly outside of high pressured Amsterdam) still manage to provide good, affordable and diverse housing with little or even despite state intervention (Priemus, 2013). As Blessing (2012) analyses these 'third' sector organizations, they can, depending on details of practice, evolve into either 'monstrous hybrids' (resulting in transgression, crisis and uncontrolled gentrification) or 'magical hybrids' (ie. autonomous commons). Looking to Southern collectives, in contrast, there is much to learn for Northern, 'internally colonized' consumers and clients of housing (cf. Habermas, 1987: 350-351). For example, about how exactly, by what technical and cultural practices, Argentinian 'grassroots perform simultaneously the roles of realtors, land buyers, developers and builders' (Lees et al. 2016: 225, see also Rodríguez and Di Virgilio, 2016). Literally, much more translation of practices is desirable here. However, even beyond these educational exchanges, which still largely fall within the calculative sphere, there may be many other subaltern, discalculative elements (cf. Law and Callon, 2005)

that could introduce alternative ethics into our dominant urban economics, like Islamic Waqf land arrangements (Khalfan and Ogura, 2012) or otherwise religious or monumental commons (Bertier et al., 2014). In short, in the face of gentrification, economic autonomy can come from many sources (not necessarily antithetical to ‘the’ process), and we need a more refined framework to distinguish, experiment with and evaluate them in situ.

3.6.3 Practices of politicization: Neoliberal urbanism?

Practices of socialization and economization tend to ‘overflow’ and generate concerns (cf. Callon, 1998a), which subsequently translate into conflicts, deliberations and plans through practices of politicization. However, as neither located in one particular place, like a parliament or some one-fold ‘frontier’ (Smith, 1986: 34, Betancur, 2002), nor ‘everywhere’ (ie. down to the most mundane neighborhood interactions, eg. Davidson, 2010, Paton, 2009), the political can also be redescribed as a multiplicity of practices enrolling a range of different actants. In their ‘search of a public’ (cf. Dewey, 1954) concerns around gentrification thus travel and mutate (‘career’) along a continuum of capacities for politicization, rather than fit into a ready-made political sphere to be dealt with (cf. Latour, 2007: 815). From actor-network theory’s ‘matters of concern’ and Deweyan publics to Machiavellian power play and governmentality (see Table 5), different gentrifications hold and may require different styles of politics, none of which are in themselves ‘depoliticized’ or neoliberal in the usual, supposedly straightforward sense.

		Electoral, financial and scientific evaluations of power	↑ (Counter) actualization ↓
	Political ideologies and movements (demonstrations, organizations etc.)	Political parties, programs, plans, regulations, laws, offices, territories	
Emerging, buzzing yet underrepresented concerns	Organizational power play, networking skills, charisma	Technologies (and affects) of ‘governing at a distance’	
Continuum of intra-active political practices (cf. Latour, 2007): matters of concern - public problems - Machiavellian - deliberative - governmentality			

Image 3.6. (Counter-)actualization of practices of politicization.

Thus gentrification, not necessarily by that name, can be politicized in totally established practices of democracy (N Rose, 1999), as in San Francisco elections (Lees et al., 2008: 262-263) or, as was the case in Rotterdam in November 2016, a city-wide referendum (Doucet et al., 2016). In other times and places, when voting does not allow for the issue to be dealt with, many gentrification cases are taken to court or to the streets, as in Istanbul for instance (Yetiskul et al., 2016). These are all political practices enrolling totally different sets of organizing skills, equipment and procedures, producing a wide range of ‘frontiers’ and concerned groups. Most often than not, it is only certain particular concerns of displacement rather than the issue of gentrification as a whole (if we could even speak of such a thing) that are on the agenda. For example, the referendum in Rotterdam was to decide on the ratification

of an entire and rather technical white paper ('Housing Vision 2030') rather than that one particular part about the demolition of thousands of social housing units (hence a disappointing, below validity turnout). Furthermore, unexpected and ambivalent political identities and alliances can emerge around the issue (cf. Caulfield, 1989: 627), as when older, native working class residents, who lived through an overwhelming influx of foreign immigrants before, might politically support some gentrification efforts as they welcome any newcomers with whom they share their ethnicity (cf. Ernst and Doucet, 2014). Moreover, political efforts both for or against gentrification are often coming from very particular, not necessarily working class (allied) groups (Ley, 1994). They could be well-off and not exactly 'vanguard' residents fighting large-scale commercial and touristic redevelopment (Erman and Coşkun-Yıldar, 2007, Yetiskul et al., 2016) or nomadic, middle class squatters (Pruijt, 2013: 38-39). Moreover, if electoral and overtly expressed affinities can already be quite messy, relations get even further entangled when it comes to those practices of politicization we collectively call planning (cf. Beauregard, 2015). Ranging from the more sociotechnically 'distancing' (cf. Miller and Rose, 1990, Uitermark et al., 2007) to the bluntly authoritarian, and from Southern to Northern, all planning is affectively immersed in fractal, informal and often favoritist networks of officials, professionals and prominent residents (cf. McFarlane and Waibel, 2012). Though in need of constant scrutiny for corruption, any organic and genuinely communicative planning practice, aiming to invest but keep a lid on gentrification, needs to take heed of these circuits and learn to manipulate them. That is, the hard to cultivate practices of 'everyday diplomacy' and charisma and the Machiavellian power games they constitute (Sennett, 2012), are often critical for either enabling or obstructing gentrification events.

And finally, considering the outer left column of Image 3.6, many other emergent and buzzing concerns can remain frustratingly without public address. Counter-intuitively, this need not be a mere matter of neoliberal hegemony, but could also come from a lack of fit of such verbalized concerns with the 'paper world' of bureaucracy, or from their denial by a complacent or embarrassed socialist government ('we do not have any gentrification here'). However, considering this whole range of gentrification politics, research questions can take forms like: How are concerns of gentrification addressed and reassembled, through which political channels (eg. a referendum or informal planning)? And what are the specific practical risks and opportunities of the latter? To challenge our tolerance for detail and avoid reducing the political to a simple frontier with neoliberal urbanism, these analytic and strategic questions can help us politicize gentrification concerns differently.

To summarize and synthesize this section, we now see how entangled with every mode of veridiction (truth, money, power) there is a whole multidimensional continuum of practices to be explored and experimented with. The ontological framework of (counter)actualization helps navigate this messy continuum theoretically, empirically and ethically. However, as already alluded to, while axiomatically these social, economic and political practices may still be separable, they start interacting on the interpretive level, be it in a base-superstructure imaginary (eg. Smith, 2008a) or as a triple interpenetration of societal subsystems (eg. Ley, 1980: 240-242). As bundles of practices however, they further diffract, interfere with and overpower each other and

thus superimpose upon one another concrete problems, risks and opportunities (ie. a constant 'overflow' of singularities, affects and concerns, cf. Callon, 1998a, Hardt and Negri, 2009). Coming together as such, by way of 'ontological multiplication', the image emerges of a gentrifying neighborhood as an ecology of practices in a kind of metastable state of suspense, possibly offering many interesting social, economic and political lines of flight. Thus, gentrification is not and should not simply be the edge of capitalist expansion and reactive resistance. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) show us, there is an excessive difference between 'cutting edges of deterritorialization' (lines of desire, affect, engagement and experiment) and their subsequent reterritorialization through state coding (interpretations) and capitalist axiomatics (metrics). Ecologies of practices are never fully comprehended by clear-cut moral distinctions or technological determinism, but require a vigilant, caring and diplomatic ethics or 'ethology' (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 253-257, Stengers, 2011a). That is, they demand a pragmatic science of indeterminate tendencies ('speeds and slownesses') and capacities ('affects') which would understand insurrection, counter-hegemony and reform as largely a matter of skillful timing (and long-term patience) within a viscous organizational ecology. In a double pronged strategy (cf. Harvey, 2013: 87-88), it could set out to discover where in our urban practices to accelerate and (socio) technically outdo today's big business and government (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, 2015) and where to decelerate our ('slow') food, care, work, education, cities and science beyond fake claims to authenticity (cf. Honoré, 2004, Stengers, 2011b). Thus it would inform a new 'political ecology' beyond gentrification, comprising a rich mix of new or repurposed techniques of socialization, economization and politicization (cf. Latour, 2004a). This constitutes not simply a technocratic fix, but involves in every case of gentrification a complex of 'lay' and 'expert' practices, identities and measurements. Always considering the latter as entangled within a chain of intra-action and responsibility (cf. Barad, 2007), is the only way to keep at bay the risk of (post-)capitalist technocracy (ie. severe technical asymmetries, be they social, economic or political, cf. Latour and Callon, 2011).

3.7 Conclusion: To face the solidified chaos that is gentrification

At the start of this chapter the concept of gentrification defined a problem-event of displacement, where 'certain spatial practices (tend to) overpower others'. Now substantiated, this implies that, instead of just another spatial fix to a systemically predefined economic problem, gentrification signifies an inherently chaotic event, assembling a thousand spatiotemporal fixes in complementary relations of intra-action. On second thought therefore, even Jacobs' description of the city as a problem of 'organized complexity', despite her reservations about 'sentimentalizing nature', still connotes too much of an 'organized whole' in equilibrium (1961: 432-433). Indeed, the 'high-energy', 'unaverage' intensity of today's gentrifying cities is perhaps better understood as a metastable state of 'solidified chaos' (Jacobs, 1961: 436, 442), which by now has taken on new, topological meanings (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, DeLanda, 1997, 2005). However, whereas the old 'Copenhagen interpretation of gentrification' (Clark, 1994) interpreted this chaos as epistemic uncertainty resulting from incommensurabilities of analytic abstractions, the

new, Bohrian-Baradian interpretation presented here affirms it as a fundamental, synthetic feature of reality (of which any observer of gentrification takes part). In the latter view, gentrification becomes a multidimensional monster: more than one (multi-sided) elephant, yet less than a collection of fragmented phenomena (cf. Mol, 2002: 55). It follows that, in order to tame this paradoxical creature, we have to trace and follow how it actualizes itself as a problem in practice, which reflexively includes the construction of social, economic and political imaginaries and measurements of gentrification itself (possibly but not necessarily going by that name). It has been suggested that the actor-network and assemblage inspired categories of ‘traveling’ metrics, interpretations and practices together provide the conceptual apparatus abstract enough to empirically acknowledge the dominance of certain spaces and histories in these actualizations while avoiding overly functionalist and parochial theorizing. Thus the *ontological* flattening of our gentrifying planet does not in any way elide questions of power, as critical political economists repeatedly keep asserting (eg. Smith, 2008a: 253-255, Lees et al., 2015: 9), but rather refuses to reduce power and difference to social dominance (cf. Gibson-Graham, 2006). And neither does it imply a loss of ‘political punch’. Indeed, when it comes to the problems of gentrifying neighborhoods and unjust cities, approaches predicated on relations of exteriority can open up new ways to break free from the often paralyzing contradictions of diversity, equality and democracy (Fainstein, 2016) by (re)inventing practices of singularization, autonomous commoning and politicizing marginalized concerns (cf. Hardt and Negri, 2009: 319-320). The concept of gentrification can thus become the ethically charged optic tool through which to not only reflect the brute facts of displacement or ring the planetary alarm and call to arms, but also an instrument of diffraction geared to explore new, more just assemblages.

Chapter 4

Social tectonics and volcanic singularities: A relational approach to social mixing in two gentrifying neighborhoods

4.1 Introduction: Social mix, gentrification and public familiarity

Much of the long-standing discourse on the social mix(ing) of urban neighborhoods has been initiated by theories and studies arguing the detrimental effects of a spatial concentration of disadvantage (for a historical overview see Sarkissian, 1976, Sarkissian et al., 1990, Bridge et al., 2012). So-called ‘neighborhood effects’ and homogenous social networks are thought to hold people back in their life pursuits (eg. Galster, 2007, 2012). Based on these ideas, many policies of mixed communities have been enacted. Middle class in-movers are thought to bring in the ‘bridging’ kind of social capital to counter concentrated disadvantage and foster societal integration (eg. Putman, 2000). Many other researchers, however, have been critical about these policies, saying social mixing does not bring about the change promised (Lees, 2008, Bridge et al., 2012). At street level, in everyday interactions between mixed groups and their cultural habits, dynamics of ‘disaffiliation’ (Atkinson, 2006, Watt, 2009), ‘othering’ (Valli, 2015) and ‘social tectonics’ are found to rule the scene (Robson and Butler, 2001, Butler and Robson, 2001, 2003, Slater, 2005). Social mixing, these critics say, turns out nothing but a ‘gentrification by stealth’, a neoliberal smokescreen even (Bridge et al., 2012, Lees et al. 2016). Some others still (Blokland and Nast, 2014, Blokland and Schultze, 2017), say both positive and critical views on social mixing may entertain overly ambitious ideals of integration or even, in the case of the critics, a romanticized picture of (non-mixed) deprived neighborhoods. Instead, we have to recognize the presence of a kind of ‘public familiarity’, designating an everyday ‘comfort zone’ of weak interaction that produces a more low-key but still significant sense of belonging.

This chapter aims to add a new perspective on social mixing to this already rich range of views. One somewhat in line with earlier provocative suggestions by Mumford (1938) or Sennett (1970) on the virtues of social disharmony that come with social mixing (see Sarkissian, 1976, Sarkissian et al., 1990). However, while acknowledging the pitfalls of both policy and critical perspectives and how they share rather unrealistic underlying ideals of integration and social mobility, this chapter also challenges the fixation on the sphere of everyday interaction and comfort as the necessary site of social mixing or its failure. Instead, it asks whether there are moments of affirmative social mixing that amount to neither harmony nor comfortable indifference. What about the not-so-daily, habit(us) breaking events that might have little ‘structural’ socio-economic impact but nevertheless manage to effectively mix people beyond their comfort zone? In order to explore this question, case studies are presented of Klarendal, Arnhem and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, Vienna. Both these neighborhoods are interesting precisely for the *absence* there, of the sort of ‘brutal tectonics’ of violent dispossession (Lees, 2012: 167) which is, for good but rather restrictive reasons, the

focus of most gentrification research today. Paraphrasing Gibson-Graham (2006), the here presented cases rather *allow* us to practice some patience against the tyranny of the emergency called ‘planetary gentrification’ (Lees et al., 2016) and thus explore some new and perhaps more diplomatic concepts of socializing (as promised in Chapter 1 and 3).

According to the above considerations, the following section (4.2) will first look for theoretical resources that can help us move beyond conventional ideas of social mixing and indifference. To take into the field the resulting relational approach toward practices of socialization, the third section (4.3) will present an apposite methodology. Through the method of counter-actualization set out in the previous chapters the aforementioned perspectives of policy, critique and comfort will be explored empirically in order to try and transcend these. Therefore, Sections 4.4 and 4.5, presenting our case studies of Klarendal and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, will tell two resonating stories of social mix policy, tectonics and habit-breaking events. In the last section the chapter will conclude with some points for further discussion and research.

Part 1

4.2 Ontology: Social tectonics and volcanic singularities

There is a particular ontology informing both policy and critical accounts of society’s composition (‘mix’) and balance. In order to understand why this ontology obstructs our understanding of the kind events and practices this chapter seeks to explore we first need to elaborate on its fundamentals. On the one hand, this conventional ontology of the social (mix) constitutes a macro perspective, historically enabled by the introduction of statistics, which says a country, city or neighborhood is composed of a population of individual people occupying a particular structural position within that social, economic and cultural space. On the other, there is a kind of ground or micro level where these individuals are thought to interact, encounter and possibly mix (as a verb) with one another in daily life (eg. Valentine, 2008, Dirksmeier and Helbrecht, 2015). In policy perspectives this mixing is not much problematized, as proximity or contact is (wishfully) thought to automatically breed neighborly familiarity and interactions with a positive impact on macro structures (ie. social capital, role models, economic spillover and so on). In contrast, critical theories of gentrification find interactions between neighbors to be much more contentious and selective because of the macro social structure underlying and constraining them. Probably the most prominent theory at work here is that of Pierre Bourdieu (eg. Davidson, 2012, Robson and Butler, 2001, Butler and Robson, 2001, 2003, Butler, 2008, Watt, 2009, Valli, 2015), by which the neighborhood is imagined to be a macro social ‘field’ where residents play out their specific ‘habitus’ in order to accumulate economic, cultural and symbolic capital (see eg. Bourdieu, 1985). Thus the neighborhood’s everyday phenomenological game, of perceiving and being perceived, of classifying and being classified, constitutes the ground level for a more expansive and quite conservative competition for power. Absent revolutionary action, the

situation is perpetuated, with residents' everyday habits and doings consolidating and mirroring the larger class structure within and beyond the neighborhood. Critical studies explain gentrification in these terms, showing how the introduction into the neighborhood of people occupying a higher economic and cultural position, whether achieved through market dynamics or mixing policy, brings about clashes, disaffiliation or indifference at the level of interacting habituses. Robson and Butler, for instance, speak of a failing integration in Brixton, London, and explain it with their now popular metaphor of 'social tectonics':

"The model of social cohesion in Brixton [...] might be characterized as 'tectonic'. That is to say, broadly, that relations between different social and ethnic groups in the area are of a parallel rather than integrative nature; people keep, by and large, to themselves. [...] It is this apparent paradox of informal, voluntary segregation and the embrace of multiculturalism as an ideal of city living which give social relations in Brixton their 'tectonic' aspect. Social groups or 'plates' overlap or run parallel to one another without much in the way of integrated experience in the area's social and cultural institutions. This does not make for an especially cosy social settlement, and many residents, middle class and otherwise, speak of palpable tensions..." (Robson and Butler, 2001: 77-78)

Thus micro interaction is imagined as the 'tectonic' meeting point of opposed macro structural groups or classes (the tectonic 'plates'). Notwithstanding the attractiveness of this metaphor, many recent so-called relational approaches have fundamentally questioned the ontology of the social that underlies it. The following subsections present three of such approaches, taking inspiration from physics, geology and evolution theory, to challenge our thinking about the social and the practice of social mixing. Bringing these together, it is argued, may open up a new perspective on our inherited notions of social mixing (4.2.1), social tectonics (4.2.2), gentrification habitus (4.2.3) and practices of socialization more generally.

4.2.1 (post-)Actor Network Theory: Ontological multiplicity and social intra-action

A first useful approach to the relational comes from feminist science studies and post-ANT work on ontological multiplicity. From double-slit experiments concerning the infamous wave/particle paradox, physicist and feminist Karen Barad (2007) extracts some conceptual distinctions that are insightful here. The first distinction is between 'mixtures' and 'superpositions', which ensues from the quantum mechanics of light, where depending on the experimental setup light can be enacted as either particle or wave. *Enacted*, because there is no unambiguous, individual entity 'out there' that is subsequently *represented* as either one or the other. The physical event that is being studied does not pre-exist our multiple perspectives on it (as epistemological relativism would have it), but is in itself indeterminate, or 'ontologically multiple' (cf. Mol, 2002, Law, 2008, see Chapter 3). The mixture thus designates the enactment of (an ensemble of) particles, while the superposition of waves embodies indeterminacy. For the particles and their mixture to come into being a tight distinction or observational 'cut' is required which cancels out that indeterminacy. In other words, only through contingent experimental operations (a particular superposition of practices) a static representation emerges, between many 'mixing' parts and one 'mixed'

whole (whether that whole includes observing human subjects or not). The second interesting distinction drawn by Barad, is a parallel difference between ‘interaction’ and what she calls ‘intra-action’ (see also in relation to ecological gentrification, Kern, 2015). Whereas interaction, like mixture, presupposes the individuality of the relata (and thus suggests a composite whole as well), intra-action rather designates a ‘pre-individual’ continuum of practical tendencies, intensities and capacities: real virtualities which are neither reducible to many perspectives nor amount to one whole (cf. Mol, 2002). However, relating the two genetically, one could say the mixture-type interaction of the ‘plates’ (positions and classes, as represented in everyday language or statistics), are ontologically expressed (and not just ‘exceeded’) by an intra-active ‘tectonics’: a superposition of pre-personal capacities and practices. In these first, basic ontological terms then, the process and practice of social mixing, making use of all kinds of ‘techniques’ of socialization (eg. street-level phenomenology, newspaper reports, municipal statistics), thus contingently produces the identities of the groups being mixed.

4.2.2 Deleuze and Guattari: Assemblage theory as a ‘geology of morals’

A second strand of relational thought which has also occupied itself with these kinds of intra-active ‘relations of exteriority’ (reducible to neither parts nor whole) is what has come to be known as assemblage theory, originating with Deleuze and Guattari (1987). For its main proponent, Manuel DeLanda, these genetic relations of exteriority have a particularly ‘abstract’ character, one that escapes the confines of static structuralist systems (see Piaget, 1970) in that they are no longer essentialist retroprojections from a fully actualized or ‘mature’ reality (ie. the Aristotelian scale of nature of mineral–animal–man, cf. Gould, 1977). From the point of view of his poststructuralist complexity theory of energetic and catalytic flows, DeLanda (1997: 55) writes, “human culture and society (considered as dynamical systems) are no different from the self-organized processes that inhabit the atmosphere and hydrosphere [or, for that matter] lavas and magmas, which as self-assembled conveyor belts drive plate tectonics and over millennia have created all the geological features that have influenced human history.” Here DeLanda is not saying that human behaviour and history are metaphorically or analogically *like* geological processes. Following Deleuze and Guattari (1987), his claims are more radical, saying that *the same* basic topological stratifications, or ‘abstract machines’, are ‘divergently actualized’ in *both* human and non-human, geological processes – which is *not* to say that they describe human behavior as sufficiently as they do lava streams (as for that one needs to add biological and linguistic codings, DeLanda 1997, 2011). In this light, the idea of a ‘social tectonics’, as put forward in the gentrification literature, becomes less metaphorical, provided we do not misplace concreteness (or actuality) but take the mechanisms at play as topologically abstract or *virtual*. As in the case of geological dynamic systems (DeLanda, 1997, 2009) social tectonics then becomes an ‘anexact yet rigorous’ matter of emergent tendencies or ‘singularities’ of attraction, circulation and transition that define zones of intensity and practices (which only in turn, when represented through distinctive signs, give rise to determined social groups and individuals, ie. ‘plates’). It is only in this particular way that Deleuze and

Guattari's (1987) characterization of assemblage theory as a 'geology of morals' makes sense (DeLanda, 1995). Likewise, it makes more acceptable the non-metaphorical way in which Deleuze speaks of a 'volcanic' space or line of flight that both grounds and exceeds currently actualized moral stratifications (Deleuze, 1994). In short, for the assemblage approach there are intra-active events of sedimentation, folding and stratification, expressed or coded as 'social plates', but these moments of stability 'rest' on an indeterminate volcanic spatium where differences endlessly intensify and plates continuously break down.

4.2.3 Sloterdijk: *Antropotechnics of breaking habit(u)s*

The third and last relational approach considered important here concerns theories of practice. In a recent expose provocatively titled 'You must change your life' German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (2012) explores some of the classics of practice theory (see also Nicolini, 2012). In an original interpretation of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Foucault and Bourdieu he arrives at a 'general antropotechnics' in which psychosomatic practices of discipline and virtuosity are reevaluated ontologically and ethically. However, of Bourdieu, who features so prominently in theories of gentrification and social mixing (Davidson, 2012, Robson and Butler, 2001, Butler and Robson, 2001, 2003, Butler, 2008, Watt, 2009, Valli, 2015), Sloterdijk is especially critical. Although he applauds the sociologist's attention for practice he detects in Bourdieu an undue conflation of practical achievement and social dominance. Indeed, in Bourdieu one finds a rather explicit identification of, for instance, interest and libido (Bourdieu, 1998), or what in French is called *pouvoir* and *puissance*, two words for the same English word 'power' (Massumi, 1987: xvii). However, Sloterdijk's critique centers largely on the Bourdieuvian concept of the habitus, the classical understandings of which, he says, Bourdieu consciously disregards. In these older conceptions by for instance Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, *habitus* or *hexis* is irreducible to the 'class within us' (ie. a culturally arbitrary sign of some deeper social structure). For these, it just as much harbors the potential of the 'virtuous within us', the capacity of "growing further into new, heightened forms" (Sloterdijk, 2012: 184, cf. King, 2000). A positive differentiation, that is, not subject to any limits imposed from outside of that practice, as by some society-wide social field. By making all power internal to a social field, as if it were ultimately subject to a zero-sum competition, the theory runs the risk of becoming impotent critical kitsch, which tends to see arbitrary domination in every form of self-control (cf. Sloterdijk, 2012: 152). To avoid this, Sloterdijk turns to Nietzsche and Foucault, for whom power in practice and 'techniques of the self' feature as not just repressive to an imagined free ability, but are also productive of many practical skills and capacities. Practices need 'vertical tension' to develop, yet this need not imply social dominance (or functional teleology).

What Sloterdijk is after is a kind of tension that immanently arises from a practice, in the same way living species, in the words of genetic biologist Richard Dawkins (1996), are compelled to endlessly climb an ecological 'mount improbable'. Developing a (social) capacity or skill (playing the violin, persuading someone to cooperate, walking or talking after a stroke) means working against probable outcomes and

requires the diligent exploration of immanent stabilities and critical transitions (cf. Sennett, 2009, 2012). In both non-human and human life this makes of ‘survival’ (*Überleben*) a much less reactive and individualistic endeavor within some zero-sum field, but a genuine reach for the improbable (by *anyone* who’s compelled to become his or her own Nietzschean *Über-mensch*). Thus, the idea of an ecology of practices emerges in which habits are continuously ‘broken’ and maintained, often guided and catalyzed but never exhaustively captured by hierarchical imaginaries and identities (like master/pupil or high/low class). Knowing how to discriminate between institutions of repression (*pouvoir*) and ‘less-than-revolutionary’ achievements (*puissance*) makes the difference of knowing when one is dealing with (ecologies of) practices dominated by ‘predatory’ forces of negative, exclusionary competition (and in need of ‘critical’ intervention), or when they are of a more ‘symbiotic’ nature that allows for an affirmative cultivation of improbable moments of intensity and capacitation; for events that do not necessarily amount to structural change (‘social mobility’), but are nonetheless highly relevant and inspirational to neighborhood life.

To summarize, what post-ANT, assemblage and practice theories can provide us with, is a conceptual toolbox for tracing spacetimes as ontologically multiple, tendential (virtual) and pragmatic events. In relation to policy and critical narratives, these approaches taken together can open up a new ontology of socialization. It describes social mixing as an intra-active process, immanently defined by singular practices (attractions, transitions and ‘vertical tensions’ of doings and sayings). Practices of socialization, that is, which only through additional sociological observations (‘cuts’) are performed as an ‘interaction’ or ‘mix’ of economically or culturally positioned ‘individuals’ and ‘groups’. It follows that a relational approach can and should bring to our attention the elusive events and practices that happen below the radar of such (policy or academic) representations. That is, the improbable places and volcanic events that make a significant difference in the unfolding of neighborhood life yet tend to escape identities dictated by daily tectonics and institutional oversight.

4.3 Methodological recapitulation: The study design

“This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there [and] try out continuums of intensities segment by segment.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 161)

To systematically explore and capture the full range of practices and events from statistical to tectonic to volcanic, a methodology has to be designed accordingly. In this chapter we take practices of socialization as our focus, as differentiated from practices of economization (Chapter 5) and politicization (Chapter 6), which will here act only (yet importantly) as contextual influences (their multiple interactions will be addressed more systemically in Chapter 7). To repeat and specify the methodological outline of Chapter 1, the general approach taken here to processes of socialization makes an *ontological* distinction between *practices*, *interpretations* and *metrics*. We

take these as related dynamically in terms of *actualization*, with metrics emerging from interpretations and interpretations from practices. Moreover, we consider these components related in terms of necessary conditioning: no interpretation without practices of interpretation and no metrics without prior interpretive classification. With these ontological distinctions in place, our *epistemological* strategy takes the opposite route of actualization. *Counter-actualization* thus denotes the research strategy of starting out from metrics or ‘matters of fact’ in order to problematize them, that is, tie them to the contingent interpretations and problems of practice they are actualizations of. As a heuristic tool, the counter-actualization scheme presented in the previous chapter (Image 3.4) serves to navigate and connect empirical phenomena and theoretical debates on gentrification and social mix, that is, to tell a story and make an argument.

Specified to the practices of concern in this chapter, this general ontology presents us with a particular multiplicity of interacting and interrelating, or ‘co-actualizing’, practices of socialization, from quantifying to qualifying to singularizing in nature (Image 4.1). Social statistics serve as our narrative entrance point and first foothold into the empirical process under study. They present us with the institutionally prevalent ‘social imaginaries’ (Schinkel, 2013) of social composition, mix and integration. Again, we present these ‘emic’ figures as they perform their factuality in neighborhood practice and governmentality, with the intention neither to (post-) positivistically verify or falsify them nor to critically debunk them as power-laden social illusions. Rather we problematize them in the sense that we tie them back to the practical problems (of socialization) of which they are powerful yet contingent and always imperfect resolutions. Story-wise and argumentatively then, emic metrics provide solid ‘context’. From there, as many critical studies have done before, we investigate street-level interpretations and interactions in order to see how daily phenomenology and routines confirm or deviate from the facts and their interpretation. However, this move will set the stage as well for the exploration of ‘lines of flight’ from these routines.

Metrics		Social-demographic numbers, tables and graphs	↑ (Counter) actualization ↓
Interpretations	Non-quantified, everyday representations of identities, groups and their relations	Social indicators, classifications and theories on their relations	
Practices	Common cultivation of singularly joyous and sad encounters, lines of flight (from identity)	Habits, affects, discourse and expressive media of solidarity, recognition, distinction, resentment and indifference	
Continuum of co-actualizing practices of socialization: singularities – identification and representation – counting and statistics			

Image 4.1. A diagram of the ontological spectrum of practices, interpretations and metrics of socialization. Following the logic of counter-actualization set out in previous chapters, this chapter works from the upper right cell (statistics) to the lower left (singularities).

Moreover, in reaction to calls for more direct comparative research on gentrification and its geography (Lees, 2000, 2012), our research project has been set up as a comparative study from the start (see Section 1.5). However, the ‘comparative gesture’

involved here does not portend to isolate causal factors either through statistics or the selection of most similar cases (Robinson, 2011). Rather, the gesture is one of utilizing isomorphic ontologies and having parallel investigations resonate and learn from one another in order to develop and experiment with new perspectives on gentrification, displacement and possible ‘lines of flight’ from these events. In what follows, this is exemplified by the unexpected resonance that developed between a theater event in Arnhem and a public square in Vienna.

For this specific chapter we made use of three types of data sources. For policy metrics and perspectives we analyzed statistical and planning documents used in practice in both city and district level governance. However, most of our research presented here is based on qualitative, semi-structured interviews with a range of actors from within and around our neighborhoods of study (including political officials, civil servants, community workers and of course residents, accessed through snowballing, street interviews and institutionally).

Part 2

4.4 A Klarendal–Arnhem to socialize

4.4.1 Setting the scene: Strengths and weaknesses of a diverse neighborhood

Klarendal is one of the smaller districts of the mid-sized town of Arnhem. It emerged during the nineteenth century as a working class quarter, housing one of the oldest social housing estates of the Netherlands (1860, Luthers Hofje). Since then it has seen several waves of (re)construction producing all different kinds of working class housing throughout the area. Although plagued by stigmatization as much as any other ‘bad neighborhood’ it has always been known to be relatively cohesive. Spirited moments of manifest social solidarity and control were the successful resistance to rather brutal gentrification plans in the early 1970s and the so-called ‘drug riots’ of 1989, involving vigilante cleansings of drug-related activities. However, it was the new century that brought new, much more subtle gentrification efforts. After a decade of rather aimless muddling, trying to make the neighborhood more livable, an elaborate covenant was drafted in 2001 entitled ‘Klarendal kom op!’ (...come on!). It set a series of new policy goals, drawing support from the municipality, from the social housing corporation owning most of the properties in the area (People’s Housing, see Chapter 5), and most importantly, from the Neighborhood Council, instituted in response to the aforementioned plans back in the 1970s (see Chapter 6). Having deliberated collectively over the neighborhood’s strengths and weaknesses, it became clear to those involved that something had to be done about its main economic axis, which had over the years seen most of its commercial life disappear in favor of the city’s downtown and the supermarkets. But what? With Arnhem housing Artez, the second most prestigious arts and fashion academy in the country (after Amsterdam), and with many of its students already living in Klarendal’s cheap housing, the idea slowly arose to revitalize the local retailscape by establishing a ‘Modekwartier’ (Fashion Quarter) there. It set the stage, from 2004 onwards, for a more comprehensive yet

largely commercial gentrification of the area (see Chapter 5).

Dutch white papers, planning documents and, as we observed in Klarendal, even neighborhood meetings often start with metrics ('getting the facts straight first') (see Image 4.3 below). These are then followed by interpretations of the problems they indicate. The first planning documents relevant to Klarendal's latest developments follow a similar logic. Thus the first 'neighborhood plan' drawn up in 1997, simply titled *Wijkplan Klarendal 1998-2002*, starts with a 'neighborhood profile' which then serves as "an overview of statistical facts and developments that form the base of the [subsequent] neighborhood description", a description of problems which then leads to a prescription of policy measures. In a later, much more comprehensive and consequential white paper of the *Klarendal kom op!* era (2000-2006), entitled *Klarendal: Kleur en Karakter* (2003), a similar structure is adhered to. To (let the city itself) paint a first picture of the area then, here are some facts and their interpretations registered right *before* any gentrification trends, plans or efforts became manifest.

According to the *Kleur en Karakter* paper Klarendal holds a stock of 82,6% rental (most of it 'social' ie. owned by the social housing corporation) and 17,4% owner-occupied housing, numbers which are later interpreted as both a strength ('lots of cheap housing') and a weakness ('homogeneous supply', 'too little owner-occupied'). However, much more attention goes out to ethnicity. In terms of ethnicity, it is (only) reported that 31% of 'non-Dutch ethnicity', with 19,4% as the city average and with "Turkish residents in the majority compared to other allochthonous residents." The categorical asymmetry by not mentioning the Dutch (norm) repeats itself in the interpretation of these facts: "Integration of migrants and the original population has barely taken place. Problems occur in those areas where there is a concentration of migrant families. Expressions of this are [Dutch] people *no longer* feeling at ease on the street, moving out and decreasing tolerance." (p.15, emphasis added) In the absence of gentrification pressures, the theme of integration chiefly pertains to (asymmetrically attributed) problems of non-Dutch culture and, apart from some brief mentioning of high unemployment and dwindling retail, economic issues (let alone class differences), are simply absent in the social imaginary. However, in the same document these figures on the 'current situation' serve as input for a subsequent SWOT-analysis ('strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats'), which also gives a good impression of how the metrics are interpreted. The neighborhood analysis was the product of a sounding board consisting of about 40 people, including mostly residents and some neighborhood professionals.⁸⁷ When it comes to social aspects of the neighborhood (under the heading 'living together in Klarendal') we can find under 'strengths' the qualifications "you can be who you want to be", "multicultural society", "nice atmosphere, conviviality (*gezelligheid*) and solidarity (*saamhorigheid*)", "positive social control", "diversity with ia. artists". Simultaneously, nonetheless, an enumeration of 'weaknesses' indicates the exact opposite as well: "the composition of the neighborhood is homogeneous with a socially weak demographic", "bad

⁸⁷ Although we were not present during this particular meeting, observation of other similar participatory planning sessions has taught us they had a structure similar to the documents, with neighborhood 'factsheets' handed out to provide points for discussion.

integration of groups: old Klarendallers, students, *allochtonen*”, “too little contact between neighbors, both young and old” and “[threat of] racism and a split between migrants and the Dutch” (p.27-28). Although these observations are contradictory and ambiguous (as is noted in the document as well), there is little doubt about the common ideals of integration at play.

When we look at a ‘neighborhood profile’ (Image 4.2) from a more recent and, with the regeneration process well underway, less elaborate neighborhood action plan ‘Wijkactieplan Klarendal 2013-2015’, some crucial indicators come out dramatically different. It seems that the percentage of social housing has decreased severely from more than eighty in 2001 to less than sixty percent in 2012 (59,5% ‘corporation-owned’) and also the share of immigrants (‘non-western allochthones’) has decreased by almost one-third. Surprisingly, there seems to be a small rise in unemployment (benefits).

In the same figure, however, one is invited to go to the source of the metrics (*cijfers*), an official website of the municipality of Arnhem. There we find more comprehensive stats that tell a rather different story. We see here how the decrease of social housing has been mostly relative rather than absolute (Image 4.4), which corroborates much of the aforementioned absence of physical displacement; but also rates of ethnic diversity (Image 4.5), income (Image 4.6) and unemployment (Image 4.7) have indeed remained quite stable. The subtle mismatch between the pictures that arise from the neighborhood plans and from the municipal database betray a desire to indeed have the former convey a sense of action or the need for it. Notwithstanding this, good quality long-term data on income groups or classes are most tellingly absent both in the neighborhoods plans and in the city’s databases, as compared to data on welfare dependency, ethnicity and livability. One could thus argue a kind of ethnically colored ‘urban revanchism’ and a blind eye toward class differences is already embedded in these municipal statistics (cf. Schinkel and Van den Berg, 2011, Uitermark et al., 2017), very much gearing government action toward gentrification and social mixing efforts.

4.4.2 *Status quo: Heterogeneity on the ground*

When we switch from the official metrics to the word on the street, distinctions become more crude but still roughly stay in line with the above: one-third ‘old Klarendallers’, one-third ‘Turks’ and one-third ‘newcomers’ (Interview no. 036). It works as a rather rigid social imaginary, no doubt fortified by the heavy use of statistics in neighborhood policy. As relative outsiders like community workers or the neighborhood pastor acknowledge (Interviews no. 002, 026, 005), it does not allow for much recognition of other important categories Klarendal residents, often living there for longer than a decade, such as ‘students’, ‘artists’ (consistently classified as newcomers), ‘squatters’, ‘marginalized’ and ‘illegals’. Nonetheless, the dominant categories already show complex intersections of class and ethnicity, that is, between Dutch non-gentrifiers, non-Dutch non-gentrifiers and Dutch gentrifiers (and it is quite possible that the above three-category vernacular is

Wijk profiel > Klarendal

Hier vindt u een selectie van cijfers over de wijk. Op www.arnhem.incijfers.nl staan nog veel meer gegevens op wijkniveau.

	wijk Klarendal		Arnhem
	2010	2012	2012
<i>bevolkingssamenstelling</i>			
aantal inwoners	7.235	7.345 ¹	149.821 ¹
aantal huishoudens	4.321	4.422 ¹	76.487 ¹
% niet-westerse allochtonen	25,6	23,6 ¹	18,2 ¹
mutatiegraad	17,2	17,3	14,0
<i>fysieke woonomgeving</i>			
aantal woningen	3.733	3.813	69.900
% corporatiebezit	62,8	59,5	37,3
<i>sociale woonomgeving²</i>			
rapportcijfer woonomgeving	6,9	6,9	7,2
rapportcijfer leefbaarheid eigen buurt	6,7	6,8	7,1
rapportcijfer voorzieningen eigen buurt	6,7	6,8	6,9
% onveilig gevoel in de buurt	32	30	26
% achteruitgang verwacht van de buurt	8	10	19
<i>participatie</i>			
aantal bedrijfsvestigingen	490	610	12.560
aantal arbeidsplaatsen	1.480	1.620	100.490
% werkzoekenden	10,8	8,9	6,8
% bijstandsgerechtigden	8,9	9,3 ¹	5,6 ¹

¹ per 1 januari 2013

² onderzoeken gehouden in najaar 2009 en najaar 2011

Images 4.2-4.3. On the left, a capture of the 'neighborhood profile' (wijkprofiel) as found in the 'Neighborhood action plan Klarendal 2013-2015'. Some translations of the most important terms: A 'selection of numbers about the neighborhood' gives us the 'social composition' (bevolkingssamenstelling), the '(built) living environment' ((fysieke) woonomgeving), homes 'owned by social housing corporation' (corporatiebezit), 'livability' (leefbaarheid), 'seeking employment' (werkzoekenden) and 'entitled to income assistance' (bijstandsgerechtigden). It is not uncommon for these profiles to be handed out as A4 print outs at the start of neighborhood meetings to help prioritize issues and policies. On the right, a photocopy of such a handout used


KLARENDAL - wijkgesprek 7-10-2015

BEVOLKING

	Klarendal	Arnhem
inwoners	7.456	152.288

discussie over grenzen


"de rest heeft de gemeente verzorgd"



Bron: Onderzoek en Statistiek, gemeente Arnhem, zie arnhem.incijfers.nl

during such a meeting (wijkgesprek, 07-10-2015), including a map of Klarendal and some population (bevolking) statistics on age and gender. Although this in itself is a very interesting political practice (some would say 'depoliticizing', cf. Huisman, 2014, see also Chapter 6), we show it here to give an idea of how metrics actually perform and format the neighborhood, that is, how they 'socialize' it practice. As my notes on the handout indicate, the administrative borders on the map already led to a discussion about social identity before any deliberation on political issues could start: there is the 'real' Klarendal and "the rest is made up by the government".

eigendom - Klarendal



Bron: BAG / WOZ gemeente Arnhem


gemiddeld besteedbaar huishoudensinkomen - Klarendal



Bron: Regionaal Inkomensonderzoek: CBS *


Images 4.4-4.7. Top left, Image 4.4, visualizes the development of Klarendal's housing stock 2005-2016, sorted by property (light blue = social housing corporation, yellow = private rental, dark blue = owner-occupied), as presented by municipal website Arnhemincijfers.nl (accessed 13-09-2017). Top right, Image 4.5, gives the change of ethnic composition in Klarendal. 'Dutch' (Nederlanders) compared to 'non-Western allochthonous' (including Turks, Maroccans, Surinamese, Antillians and 'other non-Western'). The latter is a rather politically arbitrary selection, with eg. the Japanese and

Etniciteit in 7 categorieën - Klarendal



Bron: BRP, bewerking O&S

percentage wwv - Klarendal



Bron: Gemeente Arnhem

(formerly colonized) Indonesians being considered Western and the Turkish as non-Western. Bottom left, Image 4.6, gives the dispensable income of Klarendal residents compared to the city average. Quality long-term data on income groups or classes are suspiciously absent in the city's databases compared to data on welfare dependency, ethnicity and livability. (light blue = Arnhem, yellow = Klarendal) Image 4.7, on the bottom right, shows the percentage of welfare recipients compared to city average. (light blue = Arnhem, yellow = Klarendal)

already a way to reduce complexity on the ground). Like many Dutch working-class neighborhoods, Klarendal has lived through two demographic transitions: of labor migrants moving in, in the 1970s (mostly ‘Turks’), and the more recent gentrification. As in the Amsterdam case of Ernst and Doucet (2014), the first of these is sometimes experienced (ie. phenomenologically) as more of a displacement than the second. So some Dutch non-gentrifiers appreciate the demographic change, *despite* the often tectonic if not clashing relationships with the (Dutch) gentrifiers (Ernst and Doucet, 2014: 201). Overall, however, interviewees from both the Dutch and non-Dutch working class category had grown accustomed if not appreciative of each others’ presence in the neighborhood. Cultural clashes with non-Dutch Klarendallers were mostly restricted to interactions with more recent immigrant groups, such as the Somalis or Ethiopians (Interview no. 038).

Thus concerns about gentrification can often be overshadowed by ethnic issues, amplified by a dominant culturalist framing and measurement of citizenship (eg. *autochtonen/allochtonen*). Nonetheless, more so than in the aforementioned study, there surely are many examples to give of daily interactions of the class tectonics type in Klarendal. One working woman of Turkish descent summed up the ambiguous change as going from a neighborhood that was ‘unsafe but cosy’ to one ‘safe but unc cosy’ (*ongezellig*) (Interview no. 039). In a similar vein, another woman (working single mother) spoke of an ‘invisible wall’ along the length of her street, dividing tenants like her and the more recently arrived homeowners (Interview no. 040). On one side of the street, she and her neighbors would text message each other every other day (codeword: ‘stoop’) and gather around one of their front door to socialize (cf. Image 4.8), while homeowners from the other side (were experienced by her to) walk by them contemptuously. Taken more or less literally then, these and other long time residents’ stories indeed express a familiar image of how sometimes “[o]pen doors, street games, and stoop sitting are replaced with iron bars, guard dogs, high wooden fences and a scorn for the streets” (Smith, 1982: 1391). Moreover, beyond the residential sphere, one most prominent point of social contention has been the coming of the aforementioned Modekwartier, which has definitely brought some elements of what Kern (2016) has aptly called ‘temporal displacement’, when neighborhood life changes and drifts into discord with that of original residents. Oldtimers sometimes feel defrauded by the powers that be, wondering why the new fashion and design shops that were supposed to revitalize the area have such odd opening hours as compared to the mom-and-pop stores of old (and, to paraphrase, ‘How the hell do they earn their money? These no-good artsy-fartsies must be subsidized!’; Interviews no. 041, 026). Sometimes, swaths of ‘posh’ people suddenly pop by, when, for instance, the yearly Fashion Night is organized, or a biennale event. Nevertheless, discontents about these events should not be exaggerated, as there is much ambiguity about them and also recognition for the many genuine attempts by the organizing entrepreneurs to actively connect with and involve old time residents in them (Interview no. 009).

Most interactions we have observed in the neighborhood display the kind of public familiarity that Blokland and Nast describe, that is, not the blasé encounters among metropolitan strangers (Simmel, 1971) but those creating local comfort zones through

“the recognizing and being recognized in local spaces, where one meets some people whom one knows and many whom one does not, but with whom one develops some level of acquaintance, however superficial and fluid” (2014: 1155). This we observed for instance at the large neighborhood playground Leuke Linde (‘Lovely Lime Tree’, Image 4.9), often dubbed ‘the heart of Klarendal’ by old-time residents, many of whom volunteer for its maintenance and yearly events. A typical ‘third place’ (Oldenburg, 1999, Blokland and Nast, 2014), it facilitates a comfortable, low-key cosmopolitan yet mostly separate and *ad hoc* gathering of users from the three aforementioned demographics (Interview no. 042). Whatever ‘bridging’ contacts do occur there and at other similar places, is best understood as strongly situation and institution



Images 4.8-4.9. On the left, a typical Klarendal display of stoopsitting, incidentally captured here by Google’s Street View vehicle (source: Google Street View, 05-2014, accessed 05-10-2020, credits to Rianne van Melik for finding this). On the right, a view on the sitting area overseeing playground Leuke Linde (source: own photo, 30-09-2015).

dependent (cf. Nast and Blokland, 2014) rather than person (*habitus*) or neighborhood dependent (ie. as ‘selective (non-)belonging’, Watt, 2009, Pinkster, 2014). Especially the presence of children, be it in the streets, at school or at the playground, is a crucial mediator (or in the words of Grannis, 2009, ‘it’s the kids, stupid!’). Generally speaking, however, everyone usually ‘stays on their own island’ (Interview no. 026).

4.4.3 A Ballroom Theater to cultivate: How a public event changes nothing, yet everything

Up to this point, most of the practices of socialization, be they governmental or everyday, have been noted before in the literature. However, although it does not make for a crystal clear picture, it is important to acknowledge here, the very real presence of ambiguity and ambivalence (cf. Bridge, Butler and Le Galès, 2014). Indeed, it could well be a necessary condition for the development of yet another kind of social practice or event we call singularities. During interviews with residents of Klarendal we were repeatedly referred to this one special event that had no comparison to other events or festivals organized in the neighborhood: ‘Ballroom Theater’. In the following paragraphs, first a synoptic description of the event will be given in order to then, in more detail, draw some practical lessons from it in terms of the capacities, risks and opportunities for social mixing that community art may harbor.

The Ballroom Theater was an initiative by a community artist and cultural entrepreneur living in the neighborhood. She was already appointed by the municipality as a ‘cultural scout’ to look for opportunities to try and involve people in the neighborhood into cultural events that otherwise could not or would not (Interview no. 006). Although at first it took some serious persuasion power, the scout managed to get it funded by the municipality and the social housing corporation. The event comprised a series of vaudeville evening shows, hence the name Ballroom. The theatre was to be very approachable, with an eclectic program. The organizer deliberately tried to mix certain high and lowbrow culture, with for instance having local Turkish wrestlers have a go on stage supported by an opera singer (Image 4.10), and a dog fashion show with Klarendallers catwalking their dog in designer wear made by local fashion students. Crucial was that some prominent older ladies from the neighborhood acted as party hosts and served drinks and food together with a crew of younger girls in petticoats (Images 4.11, 4.13). For them, that was an important recognition of their status as originals of Klarendal (Interviews no. 006, 041). One could say, before any new, habit-breaking relation could be pursued, it accorded them the appropriate symbolic capital in relation to the ‘guests’ of which many were new middle class residents. It gave them the confidence to get out of their comfort zone and into a costume. Also, the unofficial ‘mayor of Klarendal’, a local community leader, acted as the show host, dressed in ringmaster attire (Image 4.11).

However, most interesting about the Ballroom event was that it had a real theatrical life of its own as well. The two years when it was organized, in 2007 and 2009, were both a highlight and tragedy (Interview no. 026).⁸⁸ The first year everything went great and was a story of heroism on stage as well as off stage. The cheap tickets sold out easily and the audience was a good mix of Klarendallers, although some would say the non-Dutch were a bit underrepresented among visitors (De Gelderlander, 18-06-2007). The local press picked up on the exhilaration surrounding the event, with one newspaper describing the “atmosphere” as “exuberant” and “somewhere in between a seedy nightclub, an intimate theater, a large living room and a colorful sports canteen. Everything is mixed up and everyone has a great evening.” (ibid.). The second year, however, went completely sour. Due to a series of misunderstandings among the organizers about the theatre’s aesthetic and social objectives and the handling of the budget, which were surely interpreted as and thus amplified by a good dose of identity clash, the cultural scout decided to quit halfway during the second series of the show. In her words:

“...during the process I noticed that they [the old Dutch Klarendallers] had their own ideas about what the Ballroom theatre should be. They mostly wanted to advance their own part, which was for a large part Dutch folk music. I thought it was more about a mix of people. It’s not about making it your own party but it’s about showcasing the neighborhood in its entire breadth. This is where our opinions diverged and why it exploded after the first three shows.” (Interview no. 006)

⁸⁸The year in between, 2008, only had a one-evening tribute to the theater at the opening event of Station Klarendal (see Chapter 5).



Images 4.10–4.11. Some impressions of the first year of Ballroom (2007) (source: DVD ‘Het Ballroom Theater. Theater voor de Klarendaller.’). On the left, a still from the DVD documenting the event, showing two Turkish wrestlers going at each other accompanied by an opera singer. It was one of the many outlandish combinations of cultural expressions populating the theater stage. On the right, a still from the grand finale. In the front, the master of ceremony in his ringmaster costume and, behind him, some of the crew in petticoats, holding the thank you flowers they just received.

Also due to a lack of organizational skills among the people left behind and the concurrent homogenization of cultural connections, the theatre did indeed lose its mixed character and became a rather monocultural folk music festival, enjoyable only for the Klarendal originals. In the end, the story of Ballroom touches on the question of what makes a place like Klarendal. While it may be unlikely that events like this register in the socio-economic statistics or have a very profound impact on daily routines, they nonetheless prove highly significant to the very singular life of the neighborhood. Much more than your regular hip ‘happenings’ (cf. Kern, 2016), Ballroom constitutes a true volcanic singularity that redistributes habits, if only temporarily, and counters the indifference of social tectonics. It might not change the life of the inhabitants of Klarendal in the structural way policy-makers and their critics would like to see, but as a point of affection and conversation the event eventually binds friends and foes through their ambiguous differences – as is often the case with works of art.

Now at least two lessons can be drawn from this in terms of action and policy. First, the story attests to the (both over and underestimated) power of community art. As Gielen notes community artists can pull “city-dwellers out of their comfort zones” and “make public space anew [...] precisely in the interruption of the daily routine and of the regular social intercourse” by introducing a ‘dismeasure’ or “something singular, with the result that everything that was regarded as normal before suddenly no longer seems to be so evident” (Gielen, 2015: 278). Through art, people are momentarily drawn out of their habitus, learn to deal with diversity in unexpected ways and compose a sense of life in common and togetherness that purports both more and less than the social capital bearing, problem-solving urban village dreamt of by policy. Or in the words of the culture scout who initiated the Ballroom: “Through art you can come into contact in a wholly different way. Community art [*sic*] is not trying to solve problems, but looks at the possibilities and the opportunities of a community. ‘How can you create something beautiful together?’ is a very different question than ‘how do we solve the dogpoo issue?’. If you manage to tap the vitality of neighborhood dwellers that yields an intense experience.” (Reith, 2012: 9, my translation)

Furthermore and as a second general lesson, the theatre of course did not arise entirely spontaneously; a serious amount of aesthetic, social and organizational efforts and skills were required, not to mention considerable institutional support. Around €30.000 was made available by the social housing corporation, a sum which was more than worth it according to its then project manager, as it was ‘peanuts’ compared to its total investments in the neighborhood. However, on the organizational side, several practical variables, opportunities and risks can be ascertained for cultivating a Ballroom Theater. A first dimension of variation is personal, about enlisting the right support by the right people. As the cultural scout explains: “You need key figures in the neighborhood first, from there you can broaden the circle. What you hope for is that people will start talking about it at the cafeteria, the barber and in the supermarket queue” (Reith, 2012: 9, my translation). Thus it takes considerable preparatory socializing, visiting and connecting not just key figures from the local wrestling society, capoeira club or line dancing group, but also in the street and the supermarket queue. With Ballroom, the networking and ‘bridging’ practices started far before the actual shows. However, there are risks involved too, as things can also become too personal. Ballroom’s eventual downfall was most surely fed by some intense gossiping about who offended whom or embezzled what. Secondly, in terms of these crucial social efforts, the fact that the cultural scout was involved both in a professional capacity and as a resident worked brilliantly – at first. When things went wrong and questions of authority, project ownership and responsibility became problematic, this risky mix of the private and public entailed for her some seriously intimidating tensions, as she could not just leave the neighborhood. Nonetheless, professional help proved indispensable, in terms of institutional connectivity and aesthetically. Unfortunately, recognition of this fact did not translate into financial compensation (in hourly pay, the scout recalculated, she earned about €1,25), which of course only adds to the precarity of events like these. In connection with this, thirdly, organizing an improbable event like Ballroom inevitably entails the risky business of working with and affirming differences of skill (levels) while keeping (their translation into) powerful negative stereotypes at bay. This is about administrative and communicative as well as manual and aesthetic skills. Much of the eventual conflicts among organizing parties had to do with insensitivity toward the former. Any suspicion of double standards proved detrimental, as when, for instance, the old Klarendallers observed they were held to more stringent norms of accountability, ‘having to hand over every little receipt, down to the last little penny’ (Interview no. 041). Even after intense interviewing with all parties, there was no untangling all the intrigue and conflict surrounding matters such as these and the ensuing downfall of Ballroom’s second edition. Still, a good part of the organizational problems could be traced back to communicative incompatibilities of the very verbal Klarendallers and the paper world of subsidiaries and neighborhood professionals.

On the aesthetic side, in a fourth dimension of a Ballroom’s enactment, several relevant variations of both skills and materials could be discerned. In developing the Ballroom theme, the cultural entrepreneur skillfully and effectively navigated the various aesthetic faculties of those involved, not just catering their habitual dispositions, or educate them in high art, but provoking new sensibilities, aiming for new heights. Expressing, in her words, “a Moulin Rouge style, it was not supposed

to be pedantic or patronizing, and not just a cozy community art project, but a little rock and roll too” (Interview no. 006). As such, moreover, she was attentive to making it a properly immersive experience of singularity, rather than a distant, highbrow exercise of formal experimentation (cf. Bourdieu, 1984: 34). The event had to be “not too chic; raw, but with attention”. Related to this, the particular materials enrolled by the event comprised another significant parameter. A most striking example were the bright pink (*knalroze*) theatre chairs, which gave the venue, in the words of the cultural scout, a real ‘cult feeling’: “For the hip and young they had a real cult status while for the old Klarendallers it really felt like home” (Interview no. 006) (see Image 4.13). Here we might see materialized, through furniture, what Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987) would call a relation of ‘inclusive disjunction’. Carefully deployed as ‘intercalary synthesizers’ (ibid.), or perhaps ‘fire objects’ (Law and Singleton, 2005: 344), the chairs could act as catalytic and mutually affective boundary objects. Other examples were the location and refreshments. While working on the establishment, which was a former, centrally located supermarket, the group rediscovered many old niceties like copper elements in the facade, which again embodied a happy symbiosis of nostalgia and vintage (Image 4.12). Cooking served a similar function, with accessible but high quality finger food prepared by a volunteering chef, and served of course by the aforementioned hosts. Moreover, with ‘rock and roll rawness’ comes a drink or two. Advised to ‘watch out with Klarendal and alcohol’, a compromise between reality and stigma was found in closing at 11pm. A fifth and last aspect that demands attention here is the fragility and passing character of the improbable event. As for the Klarendallers vying for a second edition in 2009, this may not go down easily with some, especially those who do not necessarily understand art as an expression of novelty. Unlike the yearly festivals, and as the cultural scout knowledgeably anticipated, an artistically ‘bridging’ event like Ballroom tends to creatively exhaust



Images 4.12–4.13. On the left, a photo of the front of the Ballroom Theater during its first year. Visitors are taking some fresh air, as “every saturday people were packed like sardines in there [met de benen buiten]” (Interview no. 003). Visible on the facade are the copper door frames that manifested themselves during preparations. On both sides of the entrance are panels of a man and women in fifties-style clothing. On the right, a photo of the interior of the Ballroom Theatre, including the bar in the shape of an old Dutch barrel organ (‘drankorgel’) adorned with the word ‘Delirious’ (sic), and in the front, the bright pink theatre chairs (source: Ytje.blogspot.com, accessed 05-10-2020). One newspaper described the “atmosphere” as “exuberant” and “somewhere in between a seedy nightclub, an intimate theater, a large living room and a colorful sports canteen. Everything is mixed up and everyone has a great evening.” (De Gelderlander, 18-06-2007)

itself (Interview no. 006). Nonetheless, it should be reminded that precisely because of its singular nature it still endures vividly, through stories and as an inspiration for other initiatives within or without the neighborhood.

In sum, again in the words of the cultural scout, “There are many ways to skin a cat but what we [cultural scouts] have in common is that we take up these community art projects as professionally as possible, with high artistic ambition. That concerns everything from the choice of artists to the location, the materials, the equipment, the promotion and so on. The participants feel they are taken a hundred percent seriously, which allows you to get out the maximum effort possible. Quality then breeds quality, among participants as well as audience.” (Reith, 2012: 9, my translation) However, notwithstanding these parameters of artful community composition, singularities are naturally hard to plan for (as planning might be almost synonymous with applying general knowledge to anticipate action, eg. Friedmann, 1987, see also Chapter 6). Ballroom has not by far been the only subsidized social mix initiative in the neighborhood, so state support is not exactly a sufficient condition (Interview no. 026). However, as the next case shows, it might not even be a necessary condition either, with affirmative mixing events actually arising as a reaction to state planning. In its explosive eventfulness the Ballroom Theatre exemplifies in a condensed form what social mixing can mean beyond what are indeed rather unrealistic images of integration. However, instances of such obvious explosive temporality do not nearly deplete the kind of events this chapter is after. Other singular places and spaces of social mixing actualize over longer durations yet that does not make them less eventful, just even more difficult to recognize as such.

4.5 A 15th District of Vienna to socialize

4.5.1 Setting the scene: Valorizing the ‘ideal mix’

Formerly ‘Red Vienna’ still bolsters a relatively strong welfare state, cherishing a substantial provision of decommodified, social housing (Matznetter, 2002, Kadi, 2015). Within it, Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, commonly known as the 15th district, is a typical Viennese working-class area with a large stock of rent-regulated housing built from the so-called ‘founders period’ (*Gründerzeit*) of the 1850s and onwards. Today, affordable housing options are under pressure across the city, mainly due to increasing demand resulting from population growth and recent changes in public policy (Gutheil-Knopp-Kirchwald & Kadi 2017). Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, the smallest district beyond the busy beltway encircling the inner-city (the *Gürtel*), is no exception, although rental and property prices are still considered affordable. Typical for the often ambivalent stories of regeneration, media reports are shifting on the youngest, poorest, least educated and ethnically most diverse neighbourhood in Austria (Taxacher and Lebhart, 2016: 62). The city’s ‘stepchild’ is said to cast off its former stigmas of high crime and street sex work (criminalized in 2011) and now shows its ‘first signs of gentrification’. Thus in the past few years, it is heralded as the new Berlinesque, ‘arm aber sexy’ place to be (Kurier, 10-10-2014). Most prominently around mainstreet Reindorfasse, urban creatives attracted by such an image have

been opening up galleries and launching start-ups in co-working spaces, blending business with social life in very present public gatherings and festivities. The new ‘diversity seekers’ appreciate not only the social mix and the broad range of ethnic businesses, but also the many ‘hidden treasures’ (*Geheimtipps*) to be discovered in the district, such as (semi-)public courtyards, small parks and scenic streets, with the occasional view over the Habsburg Schönbrunn Palace. In tandem with the neighborhood’s change of image, new public and private investment into the housing stock, local economy and public spaces have been taking place in the form of subsidized and free-market renovations, new-build housing, lifestyle-oriented gastronomy and the redevelopment of parks and squares. Meanwhile these developments, amplified by the media, are getting noticed by long-term residents, who have begun voicing concerns, and by (potential) gentrifiers as well, reflecting on the social consequences of their possible location choices.

When looking for social *metrics* in Viennese practice, one quickly learns that, in contrast to the Dutch case, they are suspiciously underused in spatial policy and politics, or rather, underused out of suspicion (cf. Boersma and Schinkel, 2015). However, before explaining why, it is helpful to look at the only practice we found them used explicitly: the real estate business. For instance, in a 2016 citywide market report by EHL and BUWOG, two large real estate companies, the 15th district is lauded for its ‘diversity in transition’ (‘Vielfalt im Wandel’), propped up with local and comparative statistics, making special mention of the ‘share of non-austrian citizens’ (Images 4.14-4.15). The following 2017 report likewise speaks of a ‘melting pot of cultures’ (‘Schmelztiegel der Kulturen’) and adds some new ‘social conditions’ (*soziale Gegebenheiten*), characterizing along class and cultural lines the district’s (prospective) population as ‘consumption oriented base’, that is, the aspiring materialist but precarious working-class; ‘adaptive-pragmatic’, that is, young, middle class families looking to ‘anchor’ and ‘hedonists’, the ‘poor but hip’ (Image 4.16). Thus ‘diversity in transition’ here means a “revitalization” from “a classic working-class district with a high share of migrants and street prostitution” to one “attractive for families and a young urban audience” (2017: 46). Not surprisingly then, in trying to address households and other investors looking for secure property investments (often for retirement purposes), the glossy documents interpret the metrics as an asset. Indeed, in other market communications like it, we find similar, often rather indistinct appreciations of the demographic mix, like “the future comes with great diversity” (“Die Zukunft präsentiert sich in großer Vielfalt”, Jelitzka & Partner, 2016).

Compared to these metric appreciations of private actors, most of Vienna’s public institutions are for reasons of politics – some would say political correctness – much more reluctant to indulge in demographics. Two simple reasons for this are a general absence of neighborhood level planning documents and the inaccessibility of district scale survey data. Qualitative assessments still prevail within practices of day-to-day social service provision and mediation. Carefully moderating on house rules for common spaces, the non-profit housing associations dominating the market do seek to mix incomes at the building level. While they see social mixing as an important overall planning goal, in practice they restrict it to individual buildings rather than involving the whole neighborhood and its population. Even this mixing, however, is




TALGASSE 5/ EHL IMMOBILIEN

VIELFALT IM WANDEL

RUDOLFSHEIM-FÜNFHAUS ist ein traditioneller Arbeiter-, aber auch Multikulti-Bezirk, der sich in den letzten Jahren stark verändert hat. Rund um die Reindorfgasse gibt es eine Sanierungsoffensive, 24 Baublöcke sollen erneuert werden und bereits jetzt findet man dort eine junge Kreativszene, die leerstehende Geschäftslokale belebt. Neuen Aufschwung erfährt auch der Schwendemarkt, dessen Ende bereits befürchtet wurde. 2015 wurde der traditionsreiche Handelsplatz renoviert und die Hälfte der Marktstände neu vergeben. Aufgrund der moderaten Wohnpreise ziehen auch Familien und ein junges, urbanes Publikum vermehrt in den Bezirk westlich des Wiener Stadtzentrums.

1958 WURDE IN RUDOLFSHEIM-FÜNFHAUS Österreichs größter Veranstaltungskomplex, die Wiener Stadthalle, eröffnet. Seit fast 50 Jahren finden dort Konzerte, Shows und große Sportveranstaltungen, aber auch viele Hauptversammlungen statt.

RUDOLFSHEIM-FÜNFHAUS ZÄHLT 76.320 Bewohner. Der Anteil der nicht-österreichischen Staatsbürger ist mit 38,5% der höchste Anteil in Wien. Einkommensmäßig liegt Fünfhaus mit EUR 16.799,- weit unter dem Wiener Durchschnitt von EUR 21.143,- und ist das niedrigste Einkommen in Wien. Die Wohnungen liegen mit einer Belegung von 2 Personen etwas unter dem Wiener Durchschnitt von 2,04 Personen je Wohnung. > X



Images 4.14-4.15. On the left, a page from the 2016 EHL and BUWOG housing market report on Vienna's 15th district, titled 'Diversity in transition' (Vielfalt im Wandel) (BUWOG/EHL, 2016). On the right, an enlargement of the lower section. Some translations of the most important terms: The above figures present 'demographic facts' about the 'share of non-Austrian citizens' (Anteil Nichtösterreichische Staatsbürger), the 'average income' (Durchschnittseinkommen) and, in the pie chart, the 'age groups' present. Below, we find the number of 'residents 2015', 'homes with main residence', 'persons per household 2015' and the migration balance (Wanderungsbilanz). In the pie chart we find the 'area distribution', including the 'built environment', 'traffic space', 'green areas' and 'water'.

DEMOGRAPHISCHE FAKTEN

ANTEIL NICHT-ÖSTERREICHISCHER
STAATSBÜRGER

Ø WIEN 25,6 %

RUDOLFSHEIM-
FÜNFHAUS 38,5 %

+12,9 %

DURCHSCHNITTSEINKOMMEN *


€ 16.799,-

Ø RUDOLFSHEIM-FÜNFHAUS

€ 21.143,-

Ø WIEN

BEVÖLKERUNG NACH ALTERSGRUPPEN



ALTER	JAHRE
0 - 5	4.483
6 - 14	5.722
15 - 24	10.377
25 - 64	45.649
> 65	10.089

Ø ALTER 38,6 JAHRE

* Quelle: Statistik Austria, Lohnsteuerstatistik 2014
durchschnittlicher Jahresnettoeinkommen in Euro, Stand Dezember 2015

KENNZAHLEN WOHNEN

76.320 WOHNBEVÖLKERUNG 2015

38.569 WOHNUNGEN MIT HAUPTWOHNSITZ

2,0 PERSONEN / HAUSHALT 2015

ZUZÜGE

WEGZÜGE


WANDERUNGSBILANZ

+ 6.763

- 4.544

+ 2.219

FLÄCHENVERTEILUNG



FLÄCHENTYP	PROZENT
BAUFLÄCHE	55,8 %
VERKEHRSFÄCHEN	34,6 %
GRÜNFLÄCHE	8,7 %
GEWÄSSER	1,0 %

not openly discussed and internally precise threshold values remain absent (Interview no. 049) (Image 4.17). In line with the focus on buildings, is a more general preference to take the composition of the physical properties and their affordability as an implicit proxy for social demographics, thus addressing ‘social’ tensions around gentrification rather indirectly or not at all. Thus when issues of gentrification and displacement do enter political discourse, they tend to be addressed, or rather repressed, by reference to the neighborhood’s physical composition and its planning through rent-regulated apartments within the ‘soft urban renewal programme’ (*Sanfte Stadterneuerung*) (as did the district governor recently in the *Der Standard*, 05-11-2014).

Nonetheless, among local political parties, which are elected at the district level and thus involved in policy-making down to the very detail, there has emerged a striking difference in the usage of statistics. While the dominant social democrats (SPÖ) repeat their ‘fact-free’ blanketing mantras (“We are lucky in our diverse district that we do not only have a coexistence, but a very peaceful mixing”, Interview no. 050), it is perhaps not surprisingly the right-wing FPÖ that likes to hammer on (selectively) problematic statistics: “About 34% are non-Austrian citizens and when we obtain to the UN-counting method, about 56% are migrants in the 15th district. [...] According to me, the population composition is the main problem [here]”, as one of its District Council members told us (Interview no. 051). Considering this challenge to a long-standing political status quo, it is interesting that some recent attempts have been



Image 4.16. A mapping of Rudolfshheim-Fünfhaus’ so-called ‘SINUS-milieus’ from the 2017 EHL and BUWOG housing market report (BUWOG/EHL, 2017). The measure of social milieus are a trademarked product of Sinus Sociovision GmbH, an influential market research company. Residents of the 15th district are characterized as ‘consumption oriented base’ (ie. working class), ‘adaptive-pragmatic’ (ie. young, lower middle class) and ‘hedonists’ (ie. precarious creative class).

made by Vienna's statistics department (MA 23: Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Statistik) to make district level statistics more accessible to political discourse (eg. Taxacher and Lebhart, 2016). However, it is yet unclear whether these attempts will get any regular following, which will most likely depend on future political directions taken. In any case, at this point the political Left seems in denial about gentrification, while the Right does not really care and instead focuses on ethnic composition. Overall, in short, while metrics do inform some background notions of mix, they are not used to define any distinct threshold values of 'balance' in the way Dutch policy makers may sometimes do.

4.5.2 *Exclusive conjunction: Everyday cosmopolitan comfort, hidden tectonics*

Meanwhile, around ground-level public spaces, 15th district policy officers fare safely by rather generic qualitative appreciations of diversity. Looking at, for instance, communiques surrounding recent redevelopment plans for Kardinal-Rauscher-Platz, also known as 'Water world' (*Wasserwelt*) because of its (long inoperative) open waterworks installations, policy-makers frames their efforts efforts of improvement as creating accessible spaces of encounter (*Nachbarschaftsort* or *Ort des Miteinanders*), bringing out the 'beneficial potential of diversity' (*Diversitätadvorteile*) characterizing 'socially mixed' Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus. Similar communications circumscribe the plans for Forschneritschpark, which is to become a 'conflict-free' zone 'cohabitating' different groups of 'users'. Typically, conciliatory buzzwords of 'togetherness' (*Miteinander*), 'connection' (*Verbinden*) and social 'creativity' (*Gestalten*) reverberate throughout these documents, signalling a particular desire for peaceful and liberal coexistence, but also a certain cosmopolitan correctness. To a large degree, resident's perceptions seem to chime with this correctness of planners and policy makers. Without the buzzwords, one long-term resident in his early 30s soberly but approvingly characterizes the demographic milieu: "The mix of people in the public space is quite diverse. Very poor people, and also really young families, like a 19-years old girl with two kids. But I also see people reading very heavy books, well-educated people so to say. In terms of ethnic background, everyone is represented, from Turkey, Africa, people of colour, Indians." (Interview no. 051) More generally, our analysis shows both long-term and new incoming residents appreciate the neighborhood's 'interesting mix', more or less in line with the 'official' position on the ideal composition. In a performative sense then, the official, politically correct discourse really does seem to contribute to an overall atmosphere of everyday tolerance. Still, one should not make too much of this. Indeed, as many critical scholars have observed liberal, multicultural tolerance can be rather minimalist (if not oppressive and condescending, Žižek, 2009, Stengers, 2011a). What we mostly found in superdiverse Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus are people out to secure their basic zones of comfort, in a relation of what we might call 'exclusive conjunction', a tolerant but largely static co-existence of separate cultures and age groups. Materializing and thereby reinforcing this conjunction are the functionally pre-designed (fenced off ball games areas, dog zones etc.) and, being located in bureaucratic Vienna, rather overregulated public spaces (Image 4.18). Correspondingly, when asked what they require of the parks, squares, streets and courtyards within the neighborhood, our



Image 4.17. Presentation of the Reindorf redevelopment project by Wohnfonds_wien at the Urban Renewal Office in 2015 (source: Wien.gov.at, accessed 01-06-2019). On the left, buildings for rooftop and courtyard redevelopment are shown. On the right, the redevelopment initiative in the southern part of Rudolfshiem-Fünfhaus is divided into three sections (North, East, South) with Sparkassaplatz, Reindorfgasse and Schwændermarkt as (commercial) points of reference. There is no mention of social mixing objectives. The colored sections on the map do not indicate any metric values.

interviewees prioritized rather elementary conditions of accessibility, spaciousness, cleanliness and safety (and for which the state is mainly held responsible). Direct contact, socializing or bridging ties above and beyond a comfortable segregation and low-key familiarity of each other's presence we observed to be extremely rare in these uneventful 'third places':

However, brewing beneath the soothing blanket of cosmopolitanism and its daily reality of calm indifference there is definitely also discontent and rising tension. Our interview data shows fault lines emerging between the 'old Austrians', the several groups of ethnic newcomers and the lower and new middle-class households. The continuous renewal of the population over the last decades causes reservations among the more long-term residents about a lapse in the quality of social life. Often in rather reactionary terms, they complain about and conflate a sense of ethnic disconnection or seizure and the overcrowding of public spaces: "The people here in the 15th district are mean, aggressive and asocial. I have been living here in my [council housing] flat for 8 years and it continuously becomes worse and worse. More and more foreigners [*Ausländer*] are moving in, the Austrians become less and less." (Interview no. 053) Indeed, most displeasures and frictions that arise are rooted primarily in understandings of appropriating public spaces, diverging along cultural and class lines. Thus there are many noise complaints by older residents

about mostly new middle class dog-owners. The latter group, in turn, can be heard maligning the noisy presence of ‘car-lovers’ (ie. proles) (Interview no. 054). The conflict-free living side-by-side in a densifying urban district is thus experienced to be at risk due to overuse and insensitive behavior: dogs not being in the designated areas, youth unduly occupying and polluting park benches, kids being too loud and so on. While this does lead to the occasional hissing or out loud cussing, the typical Viennese way of dealing with this is a combination of avoidance and appealing to authorities. Avoidance means, for instance, just moving to another, less overused park in another neighborhood (Interview no. 055). Appealing to authorities is another way of not engaging with the source of nuisance and rule-breaking directly, often out of fear of the other. One typical response of authorities has been to install a host of signs explaining rules of conduct in several languages at the entrances of public areas (Image 4.19).



Images 4.18-4.19. On the left, a view on the basketball/football court at Dadlerpark, one of Rudolfshheim-Fünfhaus’ spacious and well-maintained public spaces (source: CourtsOfTheWorld.com, 2015, accessed 05-10-2020). Aside from the court, there are designated and fenced zones for sitting, playing, exercising, skating or dog walking. The physical design aims to peacefully regulate social traffic in the dense and diverse area. On the right, as already presented in the introduction of this thesis, a sign at Vogelweidpark explaining rules of social conduct in German, Turkish and Croatian. Apparently, the physical design is felt to require additional coding (or perhaps also causes that need?). The sign is sponsored by the Vienna Integration Fund, tasked with fostering integration of immigrants in Austria (source: own photo, 31-10-2015).

In short, there are certainly some tectonic frictions emerging at public intersections of class and ethnicity. But these remain relatively mild due to a still prevalent culture of tolerance. Thus social comfort is maintained through some public familiarity, indifference and avoidance tactics. Still, there are those often older residents who cannot go along with the political correctness that supports such a public life. Seeking a discursive armory, they find it, for instance, with the right-wing FPÖ critical of multiculturalism. And this indeed points to some of the limits and perverse effects of liberal tolerance (cf. Epstein, 2017). Take, for instance, Žižek’s more general diagnosis:

“Today’s liberal tolerance towards others, the respect of otherness and openness towards it, is counterpointed by an obsessive fear of harassment. In short, the Other is just fine, but only insofar as his presence is not intrusive, insofar as this Other is not really other. [...] My duty to be tolerant towards the Other effectively means that I should not get too close to him, intrude on his space. In other words, I should respect his intolerance of my over-proximity. What increasingly emerges as the central human right in late-capitalist society is the right not to be harassed, which is a right to remain at a safe distance from others.” (2009: 35)

As this modern ‘right not to be harassed’ also seems to apply to most of Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus public spaces, the question arises whether we can also find any exception to it. That is, an event or place where a more productive and virtuous kind of friction plays out, where a more ‘useful disorder’ can be found (cf. Sennett, 1970). A place perhaps, where people are lured out of their tolerant comfort zones and connect.

4.5.3 Inclusive disjunction: A Schwendermarkt to common

While our analyses of the 15th clearly show a general predominance of the foregoing interpretations and daily practices, the Austrian case also presented us with an eruptive event of social mixing, albeit of a very different kind than the one in Klarendal. From observations and during interviews it repeatedly surfaced as a significant ‘question mark’ and, sometimes, a point of heavy contention. Thus the Schwendermarkt, as it was called, entered our purview as a truly singular event, which in its recent history enveloped its very own disorderly practices of social mixing. For reasons that will become clear below, the irregularly long-shaped market space could be conceived of as a ‘commons’, in the way cultural critic Lieven de Cauter (2015) has recently written about the much larger but similarly underdetermined space of Tempelhof, the former Berlin airstrip. Although increasingly rare as an active legal category, as in the case of the London commons or Istanbul Waqfs, the premodern notion of a space that is neither private nor public property has become hard to comprehend for sedentary urbanites and governors. ‘Underused’ spaces such as Tempelhof and, as we will see, Schwendermarkt, have become rather intolerable to many. In spite of the abundance of references to the old commons lingering around in our modern languages (eg. municipality, *Gemeinde*, *gemeente*) any socio-cultural use of urban space outside of the category of property now seems just about unimaginable. Which is by the way less so where it comes to cultural and natural assets such as neighborhood patois, internet memes, fresh air or our planetary ecosystem as a whole. However, this general lack of interpretive distinction does not mean the common is not practiced all the time, largely beneath the radar and through the interstices of our political economic discourses. Perhaps in this sense it would be better to speak of commons as a verb rather than a noun: commoning (cf. Bresnihan, 2016). Tempelhof has grown into an open space hosting numerous informal practices such as skating, picnicking, gardening and even carpentry (De Cauter, 2015: 264). So while it may be ‘a gigantic urban void’ from the perspective of the planner or the investor, the old airstrip has for the same reason become a space of great possibility and common freedom. In the negative logic of modern governmentality, the common is a nonplace; a neither/

nor; the eternally excluded middle of the public and the private. However, as De Cauter keenly notes, pointing in a more affirmative direction, exactly because it is ‘almost nothing’ it can also ‘become everything’ (ibid.: 262). In the 15th district’s Schwendermarkt (Images 4.20–4.22), we found a similar almost imperceptible potential. Since the 1830s, the Schwendermarkt in Rudolfsheim–Fünfhaus gained popularity as being the oldest daily street market in Vienna. For a long period of time it was one of the biggest and most important markets in the city, drawing customers from far beyond the district’s borders. Since then, the market has experienced its own upward and downward cycles of economic and social vibrancy. Generally though, its popularity has decreased over time. Not just because of physical decay and street crime but also because of the emergence of supermarkets and changing consumption behavior. During the last decade the only in Vienna where the market stall operators own their store buildings and lease the land from the city’s market department (*Marktamt*) lost its importance as a space for daily social and economic interactions. In sharp contrast to other popular market squares in gentrifying Viennese neighbourhoods, such as Naschmarkt, Karmelitermarkt or Brunnenmarkt, the more oddly shaped and situated Schwendermarkt (see Image 4.22) largely disappeared from public awareness and private interest. Some attempts at physical redevelopment in the early 2000s did little to change the situation. Meanwhile, the



Images 4.20–4.22. On the top left photo one can see the fixed stalls on the eastern half of the Schwendermarkt (source: Wikipedia.org, accessed 01-06-2019). The photo on the right looks in the western direction, away from the fixed stalls onto the open space where more mobile vendors may stake their place (source: Artfile.at, accessed 01-06-2019). The air photo below gives an overview of the surroundings, with the busy Maria Hilferstrasse through the middle and right below and parallel to it the Schwendermarkt, with the fixed stalls on the right and the open area on the left (source: Google Maps, accessed 01-06-2019).

inconspicuous place has nonetheless been used for all kinds of transient practices of socialization, of people just sitting and hanging around, chatting, observing, reading, drinking, skateboarding or playing football.

However, during the summer of 2014 Schwendermarkt was abruptly awoken from its slumber when talk of its imminent demolition started going round after the local district governor (*Bezirksvorsteher*) suggested something to that effect on public television. Apparently, the current almost-nothingness of the place proved intolerable. As local newspapers picked up on the rumor (Image 4.23), they unintentionally triggered an eruption of place-making claims, putting Schwendermarkt back on the social map. The new attention turned out to be a mixed blessing, in every ambiguous sense of the word. On the one hand, the contentious process that ensued around Schwendermarkt (to be further elaborated below) ended in disappointment for anyone with a distinct view on what kind of social space it was to become. On the other, however, this drama did firmly reaffirm its only dormant significance to the neighborhood, exert its power to thereby connect surrounding residents and thus set out some anexact yet rigorous demarcations and ‘vertical tensions’ for future place-making attempts. To see how these capacities arose and developed we have to return to the rumors of impending demolition. After a few months of gossip swelling into a roar, a few neighborhood residents started a *Bürgerinitiativ* to save the market (Image 4.24). A longstanding tradition in Vienna, citizens’ initiatives are self-organized, self-financed collectives which on occasion assemble around local issues of city planning. Not married to but sometimes supported by particular political parties they are spontaneous resistance groups rallying and petitioning against dominant political positions and policy plans. In the case of Schwendermarkt the citizens’ initiative aimed to protect the market yet also keep it open and prevent a transition to a more defined economic use or set of planned uses. Nevertheless, the initiative launched a



Images 4.23-4.24. On the left, a newspaper article titled ‘Is this the end of the Schwendermarkt?’. It reports on the TV announcement by the local district governor to possibly close and demolish the Schwendermarkt (source: Heute.at, 22-07-2014, accessed 05-10-2020). On the right, the Schwendermarkt citizen’s initiative offering their petition to the same governor. It was cause for the organization of neighborhood roundtables (*‘Runden Tisch’*) to discuss the market’s future (source: Meinbezirk.at, 31-01-2015, accessed 05-10-2020).

surge of appropriation attempts from both commercial and political stakeholders, all having their own take on what was needed or not to revitalize the space. For instance, how a renewed daily market could serve the neighbourhood beyond basic commodity supply and include cultural events. While all these processes occurred more or less simultaneously, we can distinguish them in terms of their direction of socialization: multicultural tolerance or monocultural displacement.

As intended but not necessarily for the better, the contention raised by the Schwendermarkt initiative was soon picked up and taken over by local politicians and administrators, public institutions such as Wohnfonds Wien, and non-governmental organizations long since active in the neighbourhood. The immediate reaction of the locally reigning social democrats (SPÖ) was appeasement by participatory governance. The party began to organize roundtable meetings to deliberate on the future of Schwendermarkt, “to bring together regularly all local actors from [civic] associations to municipal departments, chamber of commerce and the market department [*Marktamt*] in order to revive the market according to the needs of the population.” (Meinbezirk.at, 09-12-2014). With the goal of reaching some kind of consensus, theirs was a push toward exclusive conjunction: everyone can have their own space and time to satisfy their specific needs. However, it turned out to be a rather impossible ambition. As we observed ourselves at the roundtables and other neighborhood meetings, constructive discussion of possible scenarios became ever likely. This was aggravated by the setting in of a polarization among party lines. The Green Party (Die Grünen), having a reputation as the local ‘change makers’ encouraged the gentrification through greenification of the market. Diametrically opposed was of course the right-wing populist FPÖ, representing the ‘ordinary folk’ of Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus. Playing their nostalgic tune, anything else than nice and quiet traditional Austrian businesses was a disgrace to the old market. With such divergent views on the more general changes going on in the neighbourhood feeding into the discussion on Schwendermarkt, the deliberation process escalated into an intense and ultimately unresolved to and fro between new entrepreneurs wanting to cater to a new crowd through particular food products and event-friendly opening hours; the *Marktamt* sticking to the rules (on the obligation to sell regional products, not just hosting gastronomy, restricted opening hours etc.); the SPÖ district governor desiring to come to a compromise that satisfies and pacifies everyone; and a group of old entrepreneurs and residents opposing any redevelopment plans. In the end, only minimal consensus could be reached on the ‘multifunctional’ character of the space. Or as the public statement after the civic participation campaign explains in a patently disappointed but realistic mood: “Schwendermarkt certainly is a distinct market. It has been reinventing itself lately [...]. [But] it is an open, multi-purpose public space used by different people with diverging demands. It provides enough space for coexisting activities. It is simply more than a market” (Gebietsbetreuungen Stadterneuerung, 06-14-2015).

Meanwhile, as informal and political discussions raged on around Schwendermarkt, a small window of opportunity opened up for some new entrepreneurs to assert themselves there. Early 2015 a handful of them set up shop at the marketplace, appropriating the space in rather different ways than businesses had usually done in

the past. The new operators were not running a traditional, fixed market stall, selling ordinary groceries or wine and beer, but fell more in line with the typical image of commercial gentrification. Aside from selling various local, artisanal and otherwise 'slow' products they also created space for cultural and culinary events, workshops and more daily social gathering. This change seemed to be appreciated by most local residents, who were well-aware that it was primarily a 'hipster clientele' that would be served by the new amenities but also of the demanding environment for the entrepreneurs at the market. Nevertheless, the contentious and therefore unstable business environment eventually got the best of the new stall operators. After less than two years, two out of four new market stall owners closed their business due for a large part to economic constraints and exhausting interactions with political actors and public institutions such as the Market Department (eg. on opening hours and the products allowed to be sold). More generally, most stakeholders were getting rather fed up with the tiresome calls for political participation. The meetings were seen as rather endless, unfocused and therefore pointless. As one new middle class resident exclaimed on the Schwendermarkt Facebook page: "Great! But how many times can we be asked for what we want and what is missing?" (Facebook.com/Schwendermarkt, 13-06-2016)

In the final conclusion, or rather the absence of one, the mutually complicating attempts at economizing (capitalize, gentrify, festivalize) and politicizing (demolish, govern, regulate) simultaneously reaffirmed the shared significance of Schwendermarkt as such, forced neighbors out of their comfort zones and into each other's social remit, and implicitly set a high standard for anyone intent on starting a new business there or appropriate it otherwise. Rather paradoxically then, the actualization of Schwendermarkt as a commons seemed to require its demise, or at least as a tendency toward or process of cancellation. Yet through this imminent passing it expressed itself most pregnantly as a singularity in the neighborhood. Attempts to economize and politicize Schwendermarkt were their own ways of commoning, bringing people together in inclusive disjunction but also putting its subsistence on the line. On the one hand, and despite recent events and the implicit requirements it has set for new users, there remains of course a risk of commercial gentrification, that is, the place transitioning toward a monocultural 'hipster playground' (*Bobo-Publikum*). This, however, is still viewed as unlikely by most locals (Interview no. 056). On the other hand, another threat to the character of Schwendermarkt as a commons and open space of possibilities would be that it becomes the object of a new comprehensive redevelopment plan, possibly implying its demolition after all. Knowing Viennese planning culture, this would no doubt promise a socially safe and guarded multi-functional public space, such as those mentioned in the previous section (4.5.2). However, as long as the population of the 15th is not radically altered one can be assured another *Bürgerinitiative* would try and stop it. And just as likely, under that demographic assumption, would taking the participatory road end up in a political cul-de-sac once more.

Meanwhile, however, the volcanic actualization of the initially inactive singularity that is Schwendermarkt has demonstrated some virtuous, habit-breaking powers. Perhaps the most valuable thing that came out of the arduous act of commoning was

the structure it provided to any future engagements with the space. Even if still a ‘question mark’, the question has been better posed through the process. Thus the historical event endures not only in the form of more permanent acquaintances but also by having set some implicit criteria for anyone attempting to start a business or other initiative at Schwendermarkt. Joining the commons requires heeding the inconspicuous intersection of meanings and affects it embodies, bearing in mind its past and being able to strike a balance. Two examples of where that seems to have been accomplished can be given. The first is the initiative of Samstag in die Stadt (2010–2015, sponsored by many local government and non-governmental organizations). During the five years of its existence it undertook a host of low-key commoning practices at Schwendermarkt, such as intercultural cookouts, guerrilla gardening (producing the ‘Schwendergarten’), furniture making workshops and free social counseling (Interview no. 048, Samstaginderstadt.at, 2015, accessed 05-10-2020) (see Images 4.25–4.27). On a modest scale it invited residents to find common ground, break bread, get out of their comfort zones and break their habitual suspicions, possibly starting new collective histories beyond mere tolerance. The second example



Images 4.25–4.27. Some practices of commoning by Samstag in die Stadt. On the left, some results of the Schwendergarten actions. In the middle, children sitting on some of the self-made street furniture. On the right, the summer harvest from the Schwendergarten is cooked by a Gambian chef and freely shared with the neighborhood (source: Samstaginderstadt.at, accessed 05-10-2020).



Image 4.28. Cafe Landkind (Bauernladen & Markkaffe) serves coffee and sells produce from local farmers. As if orchestrated to comply with the current gentrification aesthetic, it is adorned with a fancy stroller and a fixie bike. Nextdoor is Marktbeisl Schwendermarkt, a traditional Wiener Cafe, as it explicitly says on its front (source: Google Street View, 09-2017, accessed 01-06-2019).

is a more private initiative, cafe and farmers market Landkind (est. 2016). Recently added to the market, it has been relatively successful in mixing cultural styles and connecting people. As the name already references, the shop appears to strike the right balance between traditional values, glorifying the regional countryside, and the hipster aesthetic (Image 4.28). Besides achieving this happy historical and cultural symbiosis, in a similar way to the Ballroom venue in Klarendal, it also seems to carefully embed itself socially by, for instance, participating in neighborhood wide events such as the yearly Reindorfsgassenfest, but also by organizing fundraisers and apprenticeships for local youth and associating closely with the other market stalls or ‘Schwenderkinder’ (including a Vietnamese eatery and shop for products from food waste). To deserve that name, Landkind seems to understand well, one has to, in a broad sense, cater the whole neighborhood.

Concluding on the Schwendermarkt, in comparison with the rest of the district, we have seen practices of economization and politicization evoke each other, intensifying its commoning but also threatening to displace it, whether by exciting yet exclusionary monoculturalization or by inclusive but tamed multiculturalization. In between the private and the public, the common can be destroyed by either displacive economization or regulative politicization. Perhaps it is especially during the precious time before any formal appropriation actually happens that a commons may assert itself as an eruptive event (detering such ‘primitive accumulations’, if one can use such a heavy word). Indeed, as De Caeter concludes, the “spatial common is difficult, temporary, more a moment than a space (a moment of space)” (2015: 267). But if done right, or rather, from the perspective of public appropriation, wrong, it may manage to momentarily include the disjointed and thereby set new informal standards or ‘vertical tensions’ for those aspiring to break habits and create new forms of connection and belonging there.

Part 3

4.6 Conclusion: Mixing socializations

“Singularities make an event different without having to explain difference through the addition, subtraction or negation of an identity.” (Williams, 2011: 15)

Coming back to our first set of research questions, how are neighborhood residents counted, (self)identified and mixed through practices of socialization in gentrifying Klarendal, Arnhem and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, Vienna? And what does this say about capacities for affirming diversity? Working through our cases in parallel trajectories of counter-actualization and in comparative resonance, our investigations have resulted in the exposition of a whole multiplicity of more or less familiar practices of socialization, mixing and gentrification. In the neighborhoods of Klarendal and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, the social is performed and practiced in many ways that co-exist, but also contaminate, interfere with and super(im)pose upon one another. Empirically tracing the spectrum of co-actualizing practices has brought us from statistical to phenomenological to singularizing capacities of socialization. The

latter kind especially, exposed by our particular relational and practice approach, can be seen as a new addition to the discourse, one that complicates earlier, more positivist and dialectical approaches to social difference. What we have tried to show is that some special events and places hold powers of socialization and mixing that amount to neither harmonious effacement of difference nor phenomenological displacement. In this way, it might be seen as a relational and pragmatic continuation and refinement of earlier attempts to formulate the virtues of social dissonance (Mumford, 1938, Sennett, 1970).⁸⁹

Several conclusions may follow from this in relation to social mixing. First, ‘successful’ social mixing does not necessarily imply harmonious ‘integration’ let alone social mobility. Conversely, the absence of these outcomes need not imply failure. Less ambitious goals might also be sufficient grounds to appreciate diversity and plan for mixed living. However, these goals can hardly be enough reason to sell off or demolish social housing in an already tight situation (cf. Gans, 1961: 183). Second, mixing does not have to play out in a domain of ordinary everyday interactions, but can be embodied by unique and significant events. Third, this not-so-daily kind of social mixture does not necessarily imply a warm bath of social comfort, and this should be okay in any real, diverse urban environment (Sennett, 1970). Of course, the ‘uncomfortable’ cultivation of singularity presents an *addition* rather than a total way of life: people also need their public comfort zones. A displacement of such vertical tension, however, would mean an impoverishment of urban life. Moreover, vigilance is needed toward the weaponization of signifiers of singularity, such that it becomes just another emblem of distinction (much like claiming ‘authenticity’ or being ‘tolerant’) and thus a unilateral demand to mix toward the subaltern. In this regard, the devil is in the details of practice, to be unearthed by careful counter-actualization. Lastly, in practice, social mixture, or better, superposition, is not necessarily about a tension between cosmopolitan respect for diversity and segregation, but one between a state of multi- or monoculturalist indifference and an affirmative differentiation of neighborhood life in progress, which takes considerable collective attention, effort and creativity.

4.7 Discussion: Thinking place beyond the average everyday

“If segregation is an integral element of urbanisation then at best policy for mixed communities is trying to push water up hill...” (Cheshire, 2012)

In connection with the last point, about the mono- or multicultural negation of social difference versus its creative affirmation, we may return to the more philosophical question of what defines a neighborhood or ‘place’ like Klarendal or Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus in relational practice. Massey (1994, 2005), to take one prominent conceptualization, conceives of a street or place as a unique intersection of historical and translocal trajectories of becoming, a kind of material-semiotic ‘story-so-far’.

⁸⁹ We see less need than Sennett (1970) to couch these virtues in a rather essentialist (if not paternalist) theory of what constitutes responsible adulthood.

Thus conceived, a place is like a topological ‘fold’ in space and time, a Leibnizian ‘monad’ at once expressing the whole world, while somehow closed to it locally, conserving its identity within a turbulent environment. Even in topological terms, however, a place must also have its points of rupture and transformation. To speak with Deleuze, every monad has its ‘nomadic’ lines of flight (Laerke, 2001). Indeed, in dynamic systems theory, of great inspiration to the French philosopher (Deleuze, 1990a, 1994), there are *two* general kinds of topological features that fold the trajectories of any complex system within its space of possible relations: the ‘attractor’, representing the system’s most probable stable state, and the ‘bifurcation point’, representing an unstable point of transition for the system (DeLanda, 2009, Scheffer, 2009).⁹⁰ Now if gentrification, as suggested in the previous chapter, designates a transition of a place, conceived as a multidimensional bundle of relations and practices, away from one stable state and toward another – almost like in Schelling’s (1978) threshold models of segregation and population flight – then the critical phase of transition *in between* those more probable states of relative homogeneity may be very interesting for a more dynamic understanding of social mixing and its ethics of diversity and encounter (cf. Bruns-Berentelg, 2012: 88). The question becomes, where might a place be situated in between topological stability and transformation?

Generally put, proponents of gentrification would like to see a neighborhood ‘upgraded’ to a wealthier state, according to its ‘highest and best use’ (which implies a richer population), while opponents want to keep it the way it is, or in a broad sense, ‘stay put’. A less well understood position is that of urbanists such as Jacobs (1961) or Sennett (1970), who envision a higher ‘use’ of the ‘disorder’ in between the two. As noted in the previous chapter, Jacobs (1961: 442–443) views the city or the urban neighborhood as a system of ‘organized complexity’, a “high-energy system” producing “the ‘unaverage’”, which can be physical “eye-catchers”, cultural “out-of-the-ordinary theaters” or social “loitering places”. As such, her approach is consciously opposed to conceiving the city as a problem of ‘disorganized complexity’, as did the Modernist planners of her time. Originating from statistical physics, the latter approach is strongly inclined to focus on averages and discount the unaverage (ie. ‘the most vital’) as inconsequential. Today, Jacobs’ critique can still be applied to the two positions of gentrification counterposed above. It differentiates itself not just from (neo)classical economic frames of thought, supporting notions of market clearing and ‘highest and best use’ (also based on analogies with statistical physics, see Chapter 5), but also from the Bourdieuvian theory underlying the critical accounts of gentrification and social mixing treated in this chapter. Indeed, while Bourdieu’s (1985, 1998) social spaces may be more multidimensional (including cultural, social and symbolic capital dimensions), they are just as much fixated on the average conservation of ‘social energy’ in between fields, habitus and group formations (cf.

⁹⁰ If attractors are the sinks or valleys of a state space or fitness landscape, the transitional ‘hilltops’ in between such alternative stable states are technically also equilibria (differential zero points). Yet these are *unstable* equilibria and therefore also known as ‘repellers’, the slightest change away from them starts a runaway process in the direction of one of the attractors (Scheffer, 2009: 21). Both attractors and bifurcations are sometimes called singularities (DeLanda, 2005, 2009), but here we use it in the meaning given by Deleuze (1990a: 103): a ‘metastable’ state in between stability and instability (often said to be at the ‘edge of chaos’) (see below).

Desan, 2013, also see Chapter 5). The habitus, by fixing the ‘tectonic plates’ of class in everyday practice, is an essentially conservative base of the social (cf. King, 2000).⁹¹ What gets lost in both these approaches of mainstream economics and critical social theory is the vital significance of Jacobs’ ‘unaverage’.

So to better grasp the nature of the urban unaverage, we may look to the sciences that try to deal with the special kind of (in)stability exhibited by Jacobs’ ‘organized complexity’. These include ‘high energy’ physics but also the modelling of so-called ‘far-from-equilibrium’ systems, including many systems involving human agents (in some restricted capacity) (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, Ball, 2004, DeLanda, 2009). Particularly suited to explain the state between stability and transition hypothesized above, a fruitful analogy can be made here with a model of traffic behavior (Ball, 2004: 200–207). In the flow of car traffic, defined by the dynamic relation of driving speed and car density, there are three more or less probable road practices. At a certain density, there is first a driving speed that produces an overall steady flow. In social mixing terms, this would be the comfortable, multicultural indifference and distant familiarity described above. Second, there is the speed at which the flow becomes unstable and suddenly transitions to another stable state: the traffic jam. Here, the equivalent would be a monocultural practice of dominance, involving conflict and displacement. In between, however, there is the possibility of a *metastable* state (literally: ‘next to stable’) in which traffic flows faster than in the steady flow, but is also not yet unstable. While getting more people where they need to be in less time, this is a rather improbable and also risky state. As the system nears the critical transition, it becomes highly sensitive and interactions between driving behaviors become more intense. This universal phenomenon of chaotic resonance and intense interaction (ie. intra-action) among system elements right before a phase singularity (see eg. Strogatz, 2004) is the same improbable ‘vertical tension’ that issues from and is approached by the Ballroom Theater and Schwendermarkt. Through often dissonant, uncomfortable and ambiguous relations and practices they inspire to ‘push water uphill’ in the face of strong segregation tendencies. Like the ‘unaveragely’ fast, metastable flow of driving, the singularities approached by Ballroom and Schwendermarkt also harbor the risk of spiraling out of control, collapsing into a more stable, monocultural state and then taking some recovery time afterwards. But they are also highly creative, redefining the common yet singular ‘story-so-far’ that is the place of Klarendal or Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus.

⁹¹ As King (2000) also notes, Bourdieu (eg. 1984: 109) has tried to correct this conservatism and introduce a ‘break in the equilibrium’, by bringing in the physical concept of ‘hysteresis’ (see Scheffer, 2009). Much like the time lag between the reversal of a magnet’s poles and the effects of that reversal on iron materials (ie. them making the transition), the anachronistic habitus may ‘lag’ in relation to the changed field (eg. the gentrified neighborhood). However, besides doing little to explain how social change is initiated in the first place (King, 2000: 428), Bourdieu’s use of the concept only focuses on a negative desyncing of habitus and field. Unwilling to honor positive, unaverage difference (or in the words of King and Sloterdijk: ‘virtuosity’), Bourdieu has no attention for the phenomenon of metastability that accompanies hysteresis.

Chapter 5

Mind the gaps! How real estate agencements gentrify (or may not)

5.1 Introduction: Revisiting the rent gap (and its others) as relations in practice

Prices are rising in little Klarendal, Arnhem. The share of houses over €200.000 has risen from 5% to 31% between 2005 and 2020 (as compared to 15% to 30% citywide, arnhem.incijfers.nl, accessed 02-04-21). And managers at People's Housing, the largest housing association active in the working class district, are glad about it. Indeed, they proudly claim it as their own achievement, which is probably true. They do not see this contradicting their public mandate in any way as it means they are no longer the only bonafide investor there. In many ways then, People's Housing's activities fit earlier descriptions of Dutch state-led gentrification in the 2000s (Uitermark et al., 2007, Hochstenbach, 2017). While having not sold much of its social housing stock (an average of about 15 a year on a stock of more than 2000 in Klarendal), it has played a pivotal role in establishing a 'Fashion Quarter' (*Modekwartier*) in the neighborhood in an effort to revitalize its commercial life and improve its image. Many fresh graduates of Arnhem's fashion academy Artez find in the working-class quarter an 'incubator' for their careers in clothing and accessory design. One very expensive centerpiece to the housing corporation's endeavor has been Station Klarendal, an old post distribution office from another city district carefully deconstructed and rebuilt at the entrance of Klarendalseweg, the area's commercial mainstreet. It now hosts a grand cafe. Another grand investment, in association with the municipality, has been the partial reconstruction of an old military barracks into a 'multifunctional' neighborhood center, including a school, daycare center, gym and a few community organizations. However, and as intended, the new commercial and cultural landscape and the rising prices seem to have attracted the attention of other investors as well. Around the neighborhood one can now find collective sweat equity projects (*klushuizen*), renovations done by landlords big and small and new buildings arising on lots still vacant. With these additions to a stock that has already seen many waves of private and public development (and some comparatively limited speculative use or 'milking' of housing, Ferwerda, 2007), anyone trying to survey the area is confronted with a staggering diversity of real estate practices. While a spike in prices and investment are apparent then, any single market, straightforward frontier of profits, deeper antagonisms or distinct stages are hard to discern empirically.

This local complexity contrasts sharply with the way much of the academic discourse on gentrification has developed. If some recent publications are to be believed, a general homogenization of urban life and cultural imagination is setting in, notwithstanding local variations. From our minds (Schulman, 2012) to the entire planet (Lees et al., 2016) modern social life is rapidly gentrifying. From this perspective, Klarendal seems to be dealing with just another implementation of the neoliberal gentrification formula, as it cascades further down the urban hierarchy

(Atkinson and Bridge, 2005: 16, but see Lees, 2006). As happening around the world, so it is in Klarendal: there is the rundown central area, then there are local public actors investing where others do not dare, which creates a rent gap that eventually results in the influx of private investments and the arrival of profiteers. Or in more theoretical terms, first *actual* land value drops, then the state ensures its *potential* value by hedging risks (direct investment, place marketing, subsidizing, policing etc.), opening up the land for private investors to profit from the *rent gap* between the two. Still today, after Neil Smith (1979a) advanced the theory for the first time, the rent gap and its underlying Marxist theory of (now planetary) uneven development remain at the core of explanations by leading academic voices in gentrification discourse (Lees et al., 2008, 2016, Slater, 2017). However, the seemingly universal model of rent gap economics at best leaves a lot of variety unexplained and at worst clouds our view on current practical potentials for progressive change. As gentrification is framed as the product of the (neo)liberal (re)commodification of land, releasing market forces in accordance with neoclassical economic theory (and causing disinvestment and rent gaps in its wake by Marxist dialectics), political economic ambitions are asserted to ‘make that theory not true’ by decommodifying, redistributing and democratizing the management of land instead (altogether *eliminating* the ‘mechanism’ of competitive bidding for land, Harvey, 1973, Lees et al., 2008, Slater, 2017, Clark, 2017). As universal and planetary the diagnosis, as sweepingly revolutionary its cure.

However, another economic theory and ethics of gentrification is possible and, in many cases, such as Klarendal, desirable. Instead of trivializing the economic decisions of actors in real estate to a point where any behavior whatsoever (short of revolutionary action) will suffice to keep the unequal system essentially as it is (see eg. Smith, 1996: 190–191), we need to look at *if* and *how* potential rents are actually perceived and acted on in practice. As Lees et al. (2008) concur, “there is much that we do not know about the empirical facets of the rent gap: we need to understand how developers, investors, and gentrifiers respond to rent gaps in different cities; to determine how their perceptions of prices, appreciation rates, and other market indicators compare to the concepts of potential and capitalized ground rent” (Lees et al., 2008: 62). Although tapping a different epistemological register, this chapter will take this empirical lacuna to task. Instead of investigating how gentrifiers ‘respond to’ and subjectively ‘perceive’ rent gaps (whose pre-existence is only objectively assessed by the science of ‘potential and capitalized ground rent’), we study how they have to be brought into existence in economic *practice*. Moreover, when we do so, the empirical variety of practice can actually have consequences for rent gap theory, as a retreat in homogenizing magnitudes of rent becomes untenable. We may then come to discover the performance of other, qualitatively different ‘gaps’ (of aesthetics, utility, care etc.), which enables us to see not necessarily mutually exclusive alternatives to rent gap-driven land development and distribution.

Therefore, in the belief that it will bring us a better empirical understanding and more options for progressive but careful action, this chapter endeavors to rethink the ‘rent gap’ and gentrification from relational and practice perspectives, professing concepts of economic assemblage and performativity. As such, it aims to contest prevailing ideal types of rationality and exchange that define both positivist and

critical thinking about urban land markets and their gentrification. Much akin to Michel Callon's research programme (Latour and Callon, 1997, Çalışkan and Callon, 2009, 2010), we combine insights from evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 2002, Kauffman, 2016), practice theories of distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995, Noë, 2009), economic assemblage and governmentality (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, Foucault, 1991, Lazzarato, 2015) and anthropologies of disability and care (Winance, 2010, Mol et al., 2010). Thus combined, these theoretical perspectives will alter both how we conceive of the economic actors involved in the production of gentrified space and the ontology and ethics of that space itself. Analyzing different practices of property development and marketization in Klarendal we will demonstrate how messy and fractal this space can be, far from a straightforward frontier of some globe spanning system. Nonetheless, by focusing on economic practices in combination with an ethics of *care* (cf. Gibson-Graham and Roelvink, 2009), in addition to, rather than replacing the politics of *justice* predominating gentrification discourse, some new insights result around dimensions of (de)commodification, inequality, financialization and market ideology. In other words, on how neoclassical and rent gap theories are and can be made *more or less* true in empirical, ethical practice.

This chapter will be divided into three parts. The theoretical Part 1 attempts to refashion economic theory to meet the ontological demands of (counter-)actualization theory and better suit a practice theory of economic geography and gentrification economics specifically. Section 5.2.1 will first address some problems of more or less traditional Marxist approaches to economic geography, especially about their deficient conceptualization of qualitative economic change and multiplicity. Section 5.2.2 then dives into biological and economic theories of evolution to extract a better concept thereof, one that includes new understandings of epigenetic structures, aesthetics and symbiotic relations. In Section 5.2.3, these evolutionary insights will inform a diagrammatic comprehension of the emergence in the here and now of so-called *agencements* of economization. The resulting theory of economic actualization will then, in Section 5.2.4, frame a deconstruction or rather counter-actualization of the notions of rent and class that have been the core of gentrification theory. A case will be made for looking instead at practices of gentrification. Section 5.2.5 then goes into the ethico-political approach of a practice theory of (gentrification) economics and characterizes its ethos as both critical and 'clinical'. The clinical approach infuses our critical assessments of political economy with an ethics of care that recenters it around the pragmatic habilitation of economic disabilities. In the empirical Part 2, four *agencements* of real estate economization that are active in Klarendal will be studied in detail and compared following a logic of counter-actualization. Hence, the first three cases, described in Sections 5.3.1-5.3.3, vary in their respective *emphasis* (not a restriction) on real estate metrics (of production, accounting), interpretation (symbolism and prestige) and practice (construction skills, use values). The fourth *agencement*, a social housing corporation (Section 5.3.4), tries to navigate and balance the various actants, desires and obligations prevailing in each of the first three in order to serve and care for (the) economically challenged (of) Klarendal. As in the previous chapter, Part 3 consists of a conclusion (Section 5.4) and a discussion section (5.5). The conclusion will return to the research sub-question about how real estate is exploited and cared for in gentrifying Klarendal. The discussion focuses more on

the contiguous question of equality and what it could mean to make rent gap theory not, or rather less, true.

Part 1

5.2 Gentrification beyond the spatial fixations of political economy: Geography, evolution, ethics

5.2.1 Dialectic history versus neoclassical plane (versus overdetermination)

For structural Marxist theories of gentrification, the phenomenon is only the 'leading edge' of a much wider 'uneven development' of a global capitalist system (Smith, 1982, 1996, Lees et al., 2008). This uneven development describes a dialectic of two contradictory tendencies inherent to capitalist economy: equalization and differentiation. Equalization emerges from the need for economic agents to expand and late capital in the face of competition, making them incessantly search the world for production and investment opportunities, thus transforming the planet into a commodity in the process. For critical geographers, gentrification is but one expression of this broader tendency toward capitalist expansion ('in situ'). When it comes to the general description and explanation of this part of the dialectic of uneven development critical geographers are in full agreement with neoclassical ('bourgeois') theories of real estate markets like those of Johann Heinrich von Thünen or William Alonso (Smith, 2008a: 173). However, as gentrification makes so pressingly obvious, this expansion does not occur on a timeless plane, but departs from and runs into an already differentiated economic surface. Through more original accumulations, nature and labor have already been divided by property and class and have already been subjected to the value form in order to be capitalized upon. This is the historical differentiation part of the dialectic that neoclassical economics does *not* sufficiently grasp. In the case of land economics, prior differentiation of property and ground rents sets the fixed, immobilized stage for subsequent flows, mobilizations and accumulations of exchange values (ie. *relative* economic space needs *absolute* conditions, Smith, 2008a: 181). More specifically still, gentrification does not come out of nowhere but is relative to a historically and locally fixed ground rent surface; there are other people living in gentrifying areas.

5.2.1.1 Historical how? The static Gestalt of capitalism

Still, what sort of historical development are we speaking of here? It is indeed a peculiar kind, comprising strangely *ahistoric* moments, those instances of 'idyllic' expansion (ie. rapid urbanization) when the laws of exchange and the tendency toward equilibrium supposedly do become true in the way neoclassicals have professed (Smith, 2008a: 173-174, Clark, 2004: 153). In other words, and as many have remarked before (eg. Clark, 1988, Bridge, 1995), when it comes to the abstract description of capitalist competition and expansion, neoclassical and Marxist economic geography sit awkwardly close (with the latter actually requiring the former as an ideal typical

‘benchmark’, Barnes, 1992: 129).⁹² But what about moments of crisis and devaluation (away from the neoclassical ideal type)? Do they then make the laws of expansion untrue? Not really, while crises do not truly register in the neoclassical scheme other than as exogenous shocks, they are in fact entirely rationalized and functionalized in the Marxist system (Graham, 1990). Throughout all its scales and life cycles of development, the capitalist system or world market tends toward total integration, much like a Hegelian world spirit (Harvey, 1981). So if superficially its rationality seems lost at times of crisis, then below that surface there is a logic of systemic survival at work (much similar to Hegel’s ‘cunning of reason’, Tucker, 1956, Duncan and Ley, 1982). In the words of Neil Smith, in relation to gentrification: “Even during crises, when capital already materialized in the built environment undergoes rapid devaluation as part of the *overall rationalization of the system*, the potential contradiction [between recycling old properties or building new ones] is displaced [by gentrification]” (Smith, 1979b: 32, emphasis added).

Theoretically, therefore, we can say critical economic geography alternates in its description of uneven development between (neo)classical physical analogies and biological metaphors of system rationality, life cycles and evolution (cf. Mirowski, 1990, Barnes, 1992).⁹³ Nonetheless, the evolutionary survival metaphor seems to come mainly as an afterthought, to accommodate deviations induced by ‘contradictions’ of class and space (Clark, 1988: 244–245). Unlike many other strands of evolutionary economics (eg. Schumpeterian), the physicalist benchmark still rather dominates an economic geography biased toward changes of physical location instead of sociotechnical transformations (other than new means of costs reducing ‘spacetime compression’, eg. Harvey, 1996). Reduced then to finding new opportunities for quantitative expansion (cost reduction, accumulation), under the guidance of a singular underlying capitalist logic, any economic creativity and innovation tends to come across as substantially empty, a merely destructive displacement of value (dead and living labor) within a rather synchronic totality (cf. Çalışkan and Callon, 2010: 14). While it may appear then to be more historically oriented than the ‘naturalizing’ neoclassical model, Marxist economic geography likewise denies itself the means and interest of knowing whether certain arrangements are actually making their own history beyond conditions ‘not of their choosing’ – that is, those ‘reformist’ changes short of being revolutionary in a dialectic sense. Marxism’s epochal social ‘history’, meant to denaturalize neoclassical economics, is simply too coarse grained and teleological. Unduly projecting exchange relations into a primitive past while internalizing the whole of nature into the social (ie. capitalism, Smith, 2008a), capitalism might then just as well be taken as natural. True change, making capitalism’s abstractions ‘untrue’, thus attains the character of a total epochal

⁹² Even more strange and contradictory, it is in these ‘idyllic’ times of expansion that the one thing that supposedly signals the ‘physical’ quality of the built environment, that is, its ‘spatial’ inertia, is all but canceled out.

⁹³ Both meanings, of ahistorical mechanism and organismic survival, are indiscriminately mobilized in the so-called ‘spatial fix’, of which gentrification constitutes one prominent representation (Smith, 2008a: 122, Lees et al. 2008: 72–73). On the one hand, gentrification is one way to physically fixate capital in the built environment, while on the other it functions as a temporary ‘fix’ staving off systemic crises of overaccumulation (Harvey, 1981, 2006b).

‘Gestalt switch’ allowing no middle ground whatsoever, becoming all but practically unimaginable and despairingly unattainable.⁹⁴

5.2.1.2 *A multiplicity of nontrivial technologies*

Another way of stating this problem, after Redfern’s interventions (1997a, 1997b), is that the tautological and teleological ‘explanations’ of gentrification found both in demand-side (neoclassical comparative statics, ‘postindustrial’) and supply-side accounts (‘life cycle’ dynamics, uneven development) lead us to trivialize and neglect qualitative differences between sociotechnical practices involved in the process (most importantly on the supply side). Properties are gentrified not because actors structurally *have to* but because they technically *can*. Unfortunately however, Redfern instead offers a rather narrow definition and explanation of gentrification, with the historically unique (rather than cyclical) development of *domestic* technologies accounting for the process (ie. washing machines, insulation etc.). Following Lyons’ commentary (1998), it would be more helpful to take Redfern’s attention to the evolving supply of domestic technologies to heart while extending this focus to also include other calculative, aesthetic and perhaps even caring technologies (cf. SJ Smith, 2010). Instead of appearing a mere shadow of mechanistic and organic ideal types, real practices of economization and gentrification in particular, could then be seen to enact a multiplicity of “value gaps [...] constantly developing and disappearing” (Lyons, 1998: 369).

Despite Bridge’s (1995) premature dismissal of it as a mere promise to understanding local ‘conjunctures’ of gentrification, an obvious theoretical candidate for interpreting such a dynamic multiplicity would be the (post-)Marxist notion of ‘overdetermination’ (Wolff and Resnick, 2012, Graham, 1990, Gibson-Graham, 2006). In this conception the determination of ‘socially necessary’ property values, rents and prices can never be dialectically traced back to an essential set of basic needs, capital-labor contradiction or mode of production (not even ‘in the last instance’, which the initial notion of overdetermination still assumed, Althusser, 2005: 111). Instead it has to be studied as the unique product of nothing less than everything. However, as this invites a problematic epistemological relativism (of overdetermined ‘entry points’ into an indifferent social totality), post-Marxist overdetermination should for us only be a first, decentering move toward an entire retake of the market as a ‘rhizomatic’ or ‘a-centered’ multiplicity or assemblage. Captured by the phrase ‘more than one (system or totality), yet less than many (‘entry points’) this

⁹⁴ For Harvey (1973: 120–126), following Engels’ account, Marx’ interpretation of his predecessors entails a Kuhnian scientific revolution similar to Lavoisier’s discarding of phlogiston in favor of oxygen. Like Lavoisier, Marx demands we shift from one incommensurable paradigm to another, which, like a Gestalt switch, “must occur all at once (though not necessarily in an instant) or not at all” (Kuhn, 2012: 118, 149). To make the Von Thünen theory not true then, requires nothing less than a paradigm shift, or for those who intend to socialize the sciences (Harvey, 1973, Smith, 1980), a political revolution. Like any refined theory of phlogiston, no policy confined to the framework of the market economy will suffice, no matter how sophisticated. In short, there is no room for the theory to ‘become *less* true’.

Deleuzian concept helps us navigate the essentialism and relativism of foregoing economic theories (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 6, 21, Mol, 2002).⁹⁵ Using it in this chapter to interpret the Klarendal real estate market we find there is no singular law of capitalism nor Thünean theory to instantiate there and ‘make true’. There is no (over)determined value or price equilibrium ‘out there’ to deviate from because of either exogenous shocks or systemic contradictions. What we find instead is an ecology of practices of economization painstakingly constructing their own little immanent stabilities along converging and diverging evolutionary vectors. And the empirical assessment and ethical evaluation of such a fractal ecology of practices is not necessarily served by prevalent ideal types of rationality, exchange, value, (de) commodification and capitalism. Therefore, in the remaining sections of this first part some new approaches are suggested toward understanding economic practices and real estate in particular, starting with evolutionary economics. It allows us to write better history, less dependent on physicalist and dialectic logics and more in line with (post)modern evolutionary science. Understanding prehuman evolution and its relevance for economics (5.2.2) helps us better explain our ‘posthuman’ history and present (5.2.3).

5.2.2 Economic evolutions: Adaptation, exaptation, nonadaptation

5.2.2.1 From modern to postmodern synthesis

It should first be noted that for some time now evolutionary theory, including some of its Schumpeterian offshoots in economics, has been developing in this direction of overdetermined multiplicity. While this movement comes in many guises, what unites it in the realm of biology is a constructive critique of the long held consensus in evolutionary theory, dubbed the ‘Modern Synthesis’ (after Huxley, 1942). This ‘neo-Darwinian’ account of natural history, synthesizing Darwin’s theory and Mendelian genetics in a mathematical framework to produce what is known as ‘population genetics’ (as pioneered by Fisher, 1930), was extremely successful in reframing evolutionary biology in a coarse-grained, quantitative and explicitly physicalist language of probabilistic ‘forces’ (mutation rates, selection pressure and so on, Depew and Weber, 2011: 90–92). Thus the image was reinforced of evolution as an entirely gradual process ruled by the iron hand of an all-sufficient natural selection. Subsequent more radically gene centered approaches, as most famously represented by Dawkins ‘selfish gene’ theory (2016), have done little but consolidate these tenets of gradualism and pan-adaptationism. However, as noted, this dominant paradigm has in more recent years come to suffer many criticisms from both macro and micro-

⁹⁵As Deleuze and Guattari remark (1987: 6, see also Deleuze, 1994: 311), while overdetermination is surely a progression from essentialist explanation schemes, it still leans on the notion of a (capitalist) social totality (“all the more total for being fragmented”), thus acceding “to a higher unity, of ambivalence or overdetermination, in an always supplementary dimension to that of [one’s] object”. In what follows therefore, the addition of such a supplementary economic dimension (ie. of utility, abstract labor or social value) is avoided by adopting the notion of ‘rhizome’ to describe markets (‘reducible neither to the One nor the multiple’, Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 21, cf. Mol, 2002).

evolutionary angles, but also at the more familiarly ‘mid-sized’ organismal level. All three angles of critique can have serious implications about our economic theorizing. To see how, it is good to elaborate on them each and then see how they might come together to form a ‘postmodern synthesis’ that proves useful for our purposes here.

5.2.2.2 *Macroevolution*

When organisms or any other order of causal interactors beyond genes (cell lineages, demes, species or clades) become only trivial vehicles or ‘lumbering robots’ (Dawkins, 2016) for those faithful replicators, any of their specific properties or outcomes of their interactions may be averaged out, subsumed under a general fitness score for individual genes, which then portends to represent the ‘bottom line’ of natural selection (Gould, 2002: 654). But this kind of reverse engineering, to use Gould’s apt metaphor, confuses bookkeeping for causality, and bottom line end results for origin.⁹⁶ By imposing a rigid mathematical structure (ie. accounting) onto a living, nonlinearly evolving complexity (conceived as an ontological hierarchy by Gould and others), it is simply flattened into a kind of market for selfish genes to compete, survive and maximize their propagation (‘the universal utility function’, Dawkins, 1995). Moreover, when bookkeeping is elevated to causal analysis, what gets lost is any notion of causally pertinent *non-adaptive* structures. That is, negative ‘physical’ constraints to adaptation (eg. allometry), but also ‘enabling constraints’ disappear under assumptions of efficiency, supposedly enforced by the bottom line, and infinitesimal mutations as the only relevant source of change. Contingency thus largely expulsed, significant and innovative evolutionary events of ‘exaptation’, whereby initially adaptive structures (eg. feathers for thermoregulation) are co-opted for a different function (flight), cannot be distinguished from ordinary variation toward functional adaptation. Moreover, the related *capacity* of species to evolve (or ‘evolvability’, Wagner and Draghi, 2010), defined by their ‘exaptive pool’ of such structural and historical potentials, becomes incomprehensible, as there is no room for any suboptimal solutions (in terms of fitness) that might nonetheless be more evolvable in anticipation of new, sometimes radical structural changes. The notion of exaptation will become important in the empirical analysis of this chapter, including its further classification into so-called ‘franklins’ (inherent potentials of things currently in use) and ‘miltons’ (unused things up for grabs, Gould, 2002: 1277–1286), which include his famous ‘spandrels’ (after the aesthetic byproduct of architectural arches, Gould and Lewontin, 1979).

However, Gould’s alternative to neo-Darwinian orthodoxy, a more complex and less gradual (ie. ‘punctuated equilibrium’) model of evolution, might still envision too neat an ‘inclusive hierarchy’ of biological parts and wholes. Or at least, as he himself acknowledges (2002: 682–683), one pretty much restricted to the ‘plurifaction’ of

⁹⁶ For a direct analogy between genetic natural selection and bookkeeping, and the problem of mistaking results for causes, see eg. Holcomb, 1993: 221–222. When organisms are reduced to trivial extensions of genes (or alleles), in the way pounds can ultimately be reduced to pennies (as ‘units of account’), then one mistakes the smallest unit for the flow of currency itself.

macroscopic ‘evolutionary individuals’.⁹⁷ For Gould, genes situated at the bottom rank of the pyramid of evolution still constitute a sufficient unit of hereditary account (yet not of causal interaction). However, even this hierarchical conception has come under some criticism by new approaches of evolutionary developmental biology, or ‘evo-devo’ (Depew and Weber, 2011). For developmental systems theory (DST) (Oyama et al., 2001) evolution becomes a nonhierarchical, co-constructive entrainment in ‘cycles of contingency’ among various elements of developmental systems.⁹⁸ When promiscuously replicating and differentially expressed genes come to be seen as catalysts in a meshwork (DeLanda, 1997) rather than preformationist information bearers (as in Maynard Smith, 2000), heredity is extended over a wide range of epigenetic resources, not just only “chromosomes, nutrients, ambient temperatures, childcare [...] cytoplasmic chemical gradients and gut- and other endosymbionts” (Oyama et al., 2001: 4) but also, most importantly, ecological niches and symbolic systems (Odling-Smee et al., 2003, Jablonka 2001). Overall, as control over the evolutionary developmental process becomes more distributed, the distinction of organism from environment (as solution to problem) becomes increasingly problematic (cf. Odling-Smee, 2003), and with it, evolutionary individuality.

5.2.2.3 *Microevolution*

In unexpected ways these critiques by Gould and other evo-devo theorists resonate with new insights from genomics and other micro-evolutionary studies, further questioning assumptions of evolutionary individuality and even calling for a ‘postmodern synthesis’ (Koonin, 2009a, 2009b). Already on the molecular level and out of line with orthodox gene theory, we see that most change happens below the radar of ‘positive’ natural selection. While most mutations are deleterious, leading to a negative ‘purifying’ selection, a good part is simply ‘neutral’ or nearly so (Koonin, 2009a, 2009b). Thus a substantial amount of nonaptive variation or ‘junk DNA’ may persist and drift in divergent directions (to perhaps at a later moment be exapted

⁹⁷ Despite his strong criticism of mistaking bookkeeping for causality and the implied causal distinction of genetic ‘replicators’ and organismal ‘interactors’, Gould’s own alternative of ‘plurifaction’ (literally: ‘more-making’, collapsing replication and interaction) retains an element of bottom-line reasoning (appearing as the new ‘goal’ of natural selection, 2002: 611). Realizing that genes and other structures are not just passed ‘down’ by faithful replication but also diffuse in pieces and particles (which already makes it more difficult to still speak of evolutionary individuals), Gould defines plurifaction as exercising the *ability* “to *bias* the heredity of subsequent generations towards more of their own contribution, however [...] packaged.” (2002: 642n, emphasis added). ‘Heredity’, if not faithful replication, becomes only a distributed, probabilistic capacity (‘bias’) to see one’s traits, or bits and pieces thereof, repeated and multiplied. What is primarily plurified (‘passed on’) from a differential point of view, is not sameness and individuality but ‘dividuality’ (vectors, intensities, capacities), with no ‘goal’, end or bottom-line in sight.

⁹⁸ Here we can see a new, radically irreductionist kind of flatness brought forth that is reminiscent of the ‘flat ontologies’ of actor-network (Latour, 1988a, 2005a) and assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2009).

from the junkyard in unexpected ways, Gould, 2002: 687, 1269).⁹⁹ Still, inconsequential as these variations mostly are to the organismal level, neutralism is not so much a refutation of orthodoxy as it is a break on panadaptationist pretenses, not least by introducing a useful ‘null model’ of molecular evolution that disallows taking selection for granted and demands actual evidence for it. More severe issues arise when it comes to the microscopic ‘primitives’ that actually dominate our planet both in terms of physical abundance and genetic diversity (Koonin, 2009a: 2). While we can question in many ways how individuated from their environment they really are, large animals are still fairly walled off compared to the plants and bacteria that make up the lion’s share of our planet’s biomass (we mammals might indeed be considered mere ‘fancy decorations’ of the latter, DeLanda, 1997: 105). It is among these organisms, where hybridization and, in microbial genealogies especially (Knoll, 2003), horizontal gene transfers are of frequent occurrence, that notions of individuality and species can become highly problematic (Margulis, 1998, Margulis and Sagan, 2003). Indeed, when it comes to microbiotic lineages, the classic ‘tree’ of neatly individualized species (Darwin, 2006: 320–321) is no longer appropriate and needs reconception as a rhizomatic ‘net of life’ (Kunin et al., 2005: 957) (see Images 5.1–5.2). Furthermore, these ‘promiscuous’ genetic exchanges are joined by other, rarer but highly significant cross-phylum events of (endo)symbiosis. Thus tying back directly to the above macro-evolutionary perspectives, processes of so-called ‘symbiogenesis’ (Margulis, 1998, Margulis and Sagan, 2003) establish long-term associations between symbionts, often integrating many different genomes and effectively merging lineages whose common ancestor may go back billions of years. As such then, these events are not restricted to the scale of the microbial. Ultimately and still today, as any close inspection of our own guts shows, mid-sized organisms like us are little more than “walking assemblages” of many organisms (Ibid., 2003: 19). However, calling this ‘cooperation’ (or even altruism) as opposed to ‘competition’ would amount to anthropomorphism (Margulis and Sagan, 2002: 15–17), were it not that it is rather questionable whether even the *anthrōpos* complies much to such utilitarian categories.

5.2.2.4 *Aesthetic evolution*

As a last development of evolutionary theory that is of import in the context of this chapter, is the recognition of non-adaptive, non-utilitarian *aesthetics* as a legitimate

⁹⁹At this point, an etymological remark is in order. Adaptation, a term rooted in natural theology and then secularized by Darwin and others, combines *aptus*, or ‘fitting’, and *ad*, ‘in order to’, designating a functional relationship. In Gould’s exaptations, the *ex* stands for ‘effect of’, as the fit results from some structural or historical contingency (Gould, 2002: 1230–1232). A third option would be for a character to drift and mutate neither for directly functional reasons nor as a happy contingency, but beyond current usefulness altogether, beneath the radar of natural selection. This could be called a ‘nonaptive’ feature. As Gould acknowledges, this is a rather negative term for something that is actually quite essential for evolvability. What may presently be ‘useless’, such as ‘junk DNA’, could still have the *potential* to bring forth something useful at some point in the future. For this reason he has suggested the rather awkward sounding ‘potaptation’ (Brosius and Gould, 1992) or ‘potaptive pool’ (Gould, 2002: 1279) to designate the reservoir of potentially aptive transformations of an evolutionary individual. Here, we will use the less awkward nonaptive, with a similar disclaimer that it does not mean without significance or positive potential.

independent factor in evolution. Not a macro or micro evolutionary feat but part of the old organismal scale of classical ethology, aesthetic evolution and female mate choice especially have made something of a comeback after having been largely ignored by utilitarian and androcentric biases inherited from the Victorian times of Darwin and Wallace (Prum, 2012, 2017). Rather than directly presuming universal adaptationism (and utilitarianism) and leaving anyone suggesting other mechanisms with the burden of proof, Prum suggests that the conjecture that beauty or pleasure simply ‘happens’ makes for a better null hypothesis in explaining intersexual selection. This means that the latter, based on displays of aesthetic sensation with little honest or dishonest relationship to utilitarian fitness, is essentially an autonomously ‘runaway process’ of ever-escalating and ever-diversifying distinction, held in check only (imperfectly) by counterbalancing forces of natural selection. In less than metaphorical terms and with reference to the social-psychological ‘animal spirits’ of Keynes (1964: 157, Shiller and Akerlof, 2009), Prum likens the basic process to market bubbles, showing a similar self-referential ‘irrational exuberance’ (2017: 70, 85–86).¹⁰⁰ Not determined by natural selection then, Prum’s aesthetic selection is characterized by a fundamental arbitrariness, much like the modern *l’art pour l’art* and eerily familiar to readers of Bourdieu’s take on it (notwithstanding the latter’s tendency to tie the ‘cultural arbitrary’ back to ‘objective’ class structures). Indeed, both writers (Bourdieu, 1987, Prum, 2013) take art scholar Danto and his interpretation of Andy Warhol’s *Brillo Boxes* (incomprehensible from the classical labor theory of value, Danto, 1964: 580–582, cf. Žižek, 2011: 204–213), as the seminal theoretical discovery of such aesthetic arbitrariness. It should be noted moreover, how Warhol’s work of pop art is really a brilliant feat of exaptation, again quite similar to many nonhuman projects reusing found objects for territorial and aesthetic purposes (the bowerbird being the most magnificent example). *Together*, however, natural and sexual selection generate an infinite number of stable outcomes (Prum, 2017: 42). And in the case of human evolution this already complex relationship is multiplied when several interdependent dynamics of territory, pleasure and sexual violence come together, relatively decoupled from strict sexual roles (Prum, 2017: 233).

5.2.2.5 Postmodern multiplicity

To sum up, what seems to connect micro, macro and mid-level critiques of Neo-Darwinian orthodoxy is how they point toward ‘horizontal’ multiplicity, that is, evolutionary changes that do not comply to the image of gradual adaptation and progress, induced by an unforgiving competition and selection under Malthusian circumstances among properly individualized organisms (or selfish genes). Rather, they demonstrate the existence of physical constraints and nonlinear catastrophes, of quirky shifts, lateral exchanges and spontaneity, if not pleasure – all very real processes that are lost on coarse-grained adaptationist accounts of evolution.

¹⁰⁰ As Prum amusingly observes (2017: 86), by ignoring this arbitrary character, looking for utilitarian reason in the ‘irrational exuberance’ of sexual selection, his adaptationist colleagues are actually denying animals their ‘animal spirits’, making them into hyper-sophisticated appraisers disaggregating every aesthetic display into traits each with separate fitness values (cf. *ibid.*: 78–79).


What we see here is a growing acknowledgement of the radical multiplicity of evolutionary processes, perhaps in the direction of a new ‘postmodern synthesis’ (where postmodernism does not imply any relativism of sorts, but that acknowledges “a pluralism of processes and patterns in evolution that defies any straightforward generalization”, Koonin, 2009b: 3). The rest of this sub-section attempts to see for each of these three kinds of critiques how they impact economic thinking, with special attention to real estate.

5.2.2.6 *Evolution in a bookkeeper’s economics*

Returning to economics proper then, while some of the above insights and criticism of orthodoxy are certainly taken into consideration for understanding economic developments, mostly their uptake remains very selective and scattered, also in economic geography.¹⁰¹ And this while they probably hold *a fortiori* for human ways of making a living. A good reason then to revisit the evolutionary ideas inherent to dominant economic theorizing. As already noted, both neoclassical and Marxist economics are analytically moored by the same ahistorical, physicalist ideal type of market equilibrium, even if they differ in how much and for what reasons they doubt that state can or should ever be reached in reality. Also noted was the neglect of economic practices that this ideal typology fosters. Looking at modern evolutionary economics, of Schumpeterian inspiration, we find a similar criticism mounted against orthodox economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002). Mainstream economists, Nelson and Winter say, assume too quickly that their theories of competition and firm survival accord with evolutionary theory. To make their point, they cite a telling passage by Milton Friedman that is worth repeating here. The patriarch of neoclassical economics writes of evolution:

“Let the apparent immediate determinant of business behavior be anything at all — habitual reaction, random chance or what not. Whenever this determinant happens to lead to behavior consistent with rational and informed maximization of returns, the business will prosper and acquire resources with which to expand; whenever it does not the business will tend to lose resources.... [G]iven natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis [of maximization of returns] can be based largely on the assumption that it summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival.” (1953, in Nelson and Winter 2002: 25)

¹⁰¹ It must be noted that some noticeable inroads into an ‘evolutionary economic geography’ have been made in more recent years (mounting criticisms similar to those made here, of neoclassical and Marxist economic geographies being unable to account for specific path-dependencies and committing teleological reasoning) (Boschma and Martin, 2007, 2010). However, despite some nods to the notion of structural hierarchy (Gould) and self-organization (Kauffman), Boschma and Martin’s evolutionary economic geography, while well-aware of problems of distinguishing innovation from random variety and of determining appropriate units of economic selection (ie. evolutionary individuality) (2010: 46-47), stays close to (neo-)Darwinian orthodoxy (‘generalized Darwinism’) and away from Gould, evo-devo, symbiogenesis and animal spirits. Any criticism toward evolutionary economics presented here therefore also goes for the new evolutionary economic geography.



Images 5.1-5.2. When it comes to microbiotic lineages, the classic 'tree' of neatly individualized species (Image 5.1, source: Darwin, 2006: 320-321) is no longer appropriate and has to be reconceived as a rhizomatic 'net of life' that also includes 'horizontal' genetic exchanges (Image 5.2, source: Kunin et al., 2005: 957). In the realm of human economics, where practices and their lineages are also not neatly individuated but 'promiscuous' exchangers of 'memes' and routines, the image on the right probably gives us a more accurate representation of its evolutionary dynamics.

While Nelson and Winter share a number of issues with this image of evolution (eg. absence of strategic variety, assumption of profit-induced growth), the most important here is the utter lack of any behavioral continuity and adaptation among actors. If there is no causal reason why some kind of behavior is rewarded at one point in time, there is no reason to continue or adapt it at another either. In reality however, it certainly "does matter whether firm behavior arises from systematic and persistent causes or merely reflects 'random chance or what not'" (2002: 27). Now we could think Marxist economics might fare better in this regard, as it does seem to have a 'systematic cause' or rationality in mind to secure behavioral continuity: the capitalist system. In empirical analyses however, this concept is way too abstract to act as a sensible arbiter for deciding which behavior is to continue and which is not, bringing us back again to taking bookkeeping (the 'summary' in the above quote) for causality. To see why, take the following paragraph from Neil Smith's seminal book on the new urban frontier of gentrification:

"The individual decision by an investor or housing developer to reverse direction and to embark on a course of reinvestment rather than disinvestment may result from myriad kinds of information and perceptions, from the data of the Real Estate Board or the words of an astrologer. But assuming individual investors do not control the housing market in entire neighborhoods, successful reinvestment is also contingent upon the broadly parallel actions of a range of individual investors. Whatever the individual perceptions and predilections of a given landlord, developer or financial lender, a successful neighborhood reinvestment reflects a rational *collective* assessment of the profitable opportunities created by disinvestment and the emergence of the rent gap. The more knowledgeable, the more perceptive or simply the luckier investor may make the largest returns by responding more quickly, more accurately or even more imaginatively to the opportunities represented by the rent gap, while the less knowledgeable, the less lucky

and the inappropriately imaginative investor may misjudge the opportunity, making lower profits or even sustaining a loss.” (1996: 190–191)

Again we see a strange nullification of different investor behavior and possible adaptation. At any point in time, independent of the rationality (real estate data-driven) or irrationality (astrological) of the particular investment strategy one might practice, a collective *rationality* nonetheless emerges and selects who wins and who loses out.

5.2.2.7 Adaptive routines, exaptive innovations

To repeat, in analogy to Gould’s criticism of Neo-Darwinian orthodoxy, this is mistaking bookkeeping for causality, whereby bottom line arbitrage is presumed and causality is left to the most abstract kind of ‘underlying’ structures. Much like Fisherian population genetics and the statistical physics from which it derives (the whole point of which is to make individual particle behavior irrelevant to the analysis of aggregates), neoclassical and Marxist notions of ‘evolution’ really do not explain much about how the macroscopic states they describe come about in practice (because assumed random) and might qualitatively change (short of destruction). In other words, just like the genetic reductionists criticized by Gould and others, both Friedman and Smith neglect the enduring behavioral capacities that ensure the supposed selection and passage to the next generation of interactors. For evolutionary economists, this is reason to leave behind the algorithmic optimization of (neo)classical economics and try to account for empirically relevant behavioral continuities and adaptations. But that of course opens up the familiar Pandora’s box of behavioral and institutional economics, introducing bounded rationality, psychological biases, competence, learning, technological change and institutional regulations. To keep the lid on somewhat, careful not to stray too far from orthodoxy, Nelson and Winter (2002) propose that these unorthodox concepts converge on a single notion of individual and organizational ‘routines’, which are like the genes of socio-economic evolution. Incremental recombinations of routines (or their components) then compete through firms to achieve optimal ‘fitness’. However, aside from the difficulty, also in biology, of determining what fitness even means beyond a bookkeepers’ tautology (whatever gets to stay is best suited to do so), this adaptive behavior, for it not to become an empty concept, lacks the transparent overview of possible solutions for a calculated optimization toward a single best solution or market equilibrium. Instead, routines can only myopically search and mutate within a multidimensional ‘fitness landscape’ characterized by multiple suboptimal or ‘satisficing’ trade-offs (Khraisha, 2020). And to make matters even more complex, these rugged solution spaces can altogether change and expand into entirely unforeseen ‘adjacent possibilities’ with the sudden introduction of novelty by exaptation (Kauffman, 2016: 72).¹⁰² In fact, whereas one could

¹⁰² Generalizing Gould’s idea beyond the biosphere and into the ‘econosphere’ and even the abiotic terrain of quantum physics, Kauffman (2000, 2016) has introduced the notion of the ‘adjacent possible’ to think of the incessant incremental movements ‘one adjacent step’ away from competitive equilibrium. The latter state is thereby never achieved and the field of non-prestatable (uses of) economic goods constantly expands. As he has come to recognize from a quantum physics

arguably claim exaptations to be significant but still rare occurrences in nonhuman evolution, they are hard to ignore in human evolutionary economics, where anyone in their own lifetime can witness significant qualitative leaps in technology or, as will be described later in this chapter, in their built environment.

5.2.2.8 *Immortal practices and their symbioses*

However, what is still problematic in these macro-evolutionary interventions, is the sort of Darwinian individuality that is accorded routines or similar suggested units of selection such as Dawkins' (2016) famous 'memes'. As Hodgson (2003) forcefully argues, evolutionary economics (eg. Nelson and Winter, 1982) tends to conflate generative structures such as habits, dispositions or 'routines-as-capacities' with resultant behavioral patterns. In biological phraseology, it confuses 'genotype', the *potential*, and 'phenotype', the *actual*. Unfortunately however, Hodgson then accords economic habits and routines a rather misplaced concreteness and actuality (cf. Margulis and Sagan, 2003: 16). Even when he acknowledges that these capabilities need not be distinctly codified but can be tacit, he frames their individuality within an informational model of gene expression. From a perspective more in line with evo-devo, DST and symbiogenesis theory, such pre-individual capacities should rather be seen as distributed over a whole assemblage of generative components. Instead of routines selfishly replicating "on a substrate of organized and habituated individuals" (2003: 378), they should be regarded as practices *constituting* such 'individuals'. To see how and why, we have to have another good look at recent micro-evolutionary insights on symbiogenesis. Take the following instructive analogy with real estate economics by microbiologists Margulis and Sagan summarizing three billion years of evolution:

"In a very real sense, life is bacteria and their progeny. Every available piece of real estate on this planet has become inhabited by subjects of the Kingdom Monera [unicellulars]: by the enlightened producer, the tropical transformer, the polar explorer. Life is also the strange new fruit of individuals evolved by symbiosis. Different kinds of bacteria merged to make protoctists. When conspecific protoctists merged the result was meiotic sex. Programmed death evolved. Multicellular assemblages became animal, plant, and fungal individuals. Life is thus not all divergence and discord but also the coming together of disparate entities into new beings." (Margulis and Sagan, 2000: 214)

From a more expansive ontological vantage point we can see this evolution recapitulated today, including in human affairs. Taking this analogy further can help devise a more coherent and comprehensive evolutionary economics. First consider bacteria. As barely individuated bundles of tendencies (eg. to swim upward of certain chemical gradients), bacteria really *are* practices (in so far as that copula does not again individualize them too much). And just like bacteria 'do not normally die' (Margulis and Sagan, 2000: 97), practices are also potentially immortal, even in human affairs.

perspective, this implies according potentials (*res potentia*) a reality and influence that classical science denies them (cf. Barad, 2007, see also Chapter 3). For good or ill, life and the economy 'flow' towards and get 'sucked into' adjacent possibles (Kauffman, 2016: 86, 90).

For instance, while some catastrophe may certainly have stopped it in its tracks at some point, the singular practice of ship navigation (as far as it can be individualized as such by an observer) can be said to endure and mutate over seconds, years and centuries (Hutchins, 1995: 372), with no scheduled end in sight. Much in the same way that all of Earth's bacteria can be said to form one giant dividual 'species' (rather than many individual ones), the fund of 'human' culture, which actually involves many alliances with bacteria, can be said to constitute one big bundle of practices (some might call this our 'commons', cf. Hahnel, 2015: 34–36, Hardt and Negri, 2009: viii). And the ontological commonalities do not stop here. As the 'mutable mobiles' that first colonized our young planet, and still today are freely trading genes and changing their metabolisms as they see fit, bacteria also take the award for innovation (Margulis and Sagan, 2000: 154). Similarly, human innovativeness should neither be sought in any individual genius or Schumpeterian entrepreneur nor some company spirit or even national culture but in the right symbiotic process or 'interessement' among economic practices. In the words of Akkrich, Callon and Latour, "innovation is the art of interesting an increasing number of [human and non-human] allies who will make you stronger and stronger" (2002: 205). This is a fraught and uncertain process that adaptationist models of the societal diffusion of finished technologies do not capture. In our words, therefore, innovation is first a common art of nonaptive plurifaction and empowering entanglement.¹⁰³

5.2.2.9 Economics of sex and death

Continuing Margulis and Sagan's story of evolution, our innovative bacterial ancestors also forged many stable symbiotic alliances, often to the point of mutual necessity, producing nucleated organisms and new multicellular 'individuals'. The first of these, roaming our planet about a billion years before any animal or plant arrived, are called protoctists, which include the familiar amoebae, algae, slime molds and *kefir*. The latter symbiotic 'culture' of bacteria and yeasts, known for its precarious role in making the yogurt drink of the same name, is one of those asexual multicellulars that, given the right metabolic reaffirmations and care, can remain forever young (Margulis, 1997). Another, more complicated asexual but nonetheless aging (as) multicellular, is the slime mold *Dictyostelium discoideum*. Unicellular amoebas at first, they congregate when detecting a lack of resources to then each play specialized functions in a multicellular symbiont (Maturana and Varela, 1989: 78–79). About as innovative as their bacterial ancestors, protoctists have subsequently evolved sex

¹⁰³Hardt and Negri (2005: 146–147) also directly connect the commons and innovation, not speaking of bacterial practice but referring to the Marxist notion of 'living labor' (a labor before abstraction in the image of capital). Other than as 'externalities', both commons and innovation escape capitalist economics because of their (quantitatively) 'immeasurable' and (qualitatively) 'excessive' character. Inversely, we could say innovation starts as a 'nonaptive' symbiotic process, which then gets 'exapted' and monopolized through symbolic distinction and violence (eg. patent protection) and is then 'adapted' by computational optimization within practical conditions of accounting, planning and marketization. As such, it is at base a creative process whereby virtual ('tacit') capacities are actualized, and which is only retroactively represented (eg. 'patent', 'demand') as the realization of a possibility originating or already latently present in the mind of entrepreneurs or consumers.

(meiosis), a ritualized and predictable kind of cyclical symbiosis that started out as an ‘abortive cannibalism’ or proto-mating in response to scarcity (Margulis, 1998: 89, 103). And with sex came the programmed death of any diploid cells that result from it (ie. all of our cells except the haploid gametes). The inevitable end point of maturation serves the cyclical symbiont’s continuation by arranging its return to its microbial haploid form.

In not just metaphorical but homological terms (we are sexual and aging ‘individuals’ too) we see similar processes play out in human economic evolution and today, as will become clear below, in empirical real estate markets. On a most general level, if bacteria are the innovative ‘nomads’ of our ecologies, multicellulars are the passionate ‘monads’. Sex, aesthetics, territory and glory constitute the ‘passionate interests’ that define both individuals and their ‘reciprocal possession’ by imitation and distinction (advanced by social monadologist Gabriel Tarde, 2007[1902], as the true essence of economics, see Latour and Lépinay, 2009, Rothe, 2012). More specifically, economic enterprises and projects, to be discussed below as ‘agencements’, historically originate out of ‘human economies’, which trade in the sexual creation and ‘unnatural’ (violent, non-programmed) destruction of sociomaterially disentangled and individualized human beings (ie. bride and blood wealth, Graeber, 2011, 130–164). From these violent assemblages we have inherited on the one hand *property*, as potentially lethal violence monopolized and stabilized into law (by way of ‘contract’), and on the other *money*, as a regulator of ‘nonviolent’ transfers and redistributions of such property. Just as masculine domination (territorial, aesthetic) and the ‘primitive accumulation’ of property are the historical *birthing* of modern practices of economization, so the monetary kind of transfers embody a kind of programmed *death* by transforming everything into capital (ie. ‘dead labor’, Marx, 1976, Baudrillard, 2017).¹⁰⁴ Through waged labor in particular, in the spirited words of Marx (1976: 342), a ‘vampiric’ capital sucks the life out of living labor by subordinating it to its own perpetual survival. Money and its accounting, just like the neoclassical and Marxist theories treated above, present every transfer and meeting of supply and demand as if it restores some ahistorical, inorganic equilibrium (also known as death, Baudrillard, 2017: 174–175) – if only momentarily or ideally, ‘calling it quits’ before the next investment plan is born. Especially visible in the real estate business, an enterprise rolls out its big labor intensive projects only to self-terminate in a planned exchange of the property and to reproduce itself again through the next project. In ‘micro-evolutionary’ reality however, just as the programmed death of a biological ‘individual’ only means the metabolic dissipation into a larger ecology and the unicellular elongation of a multigenerational aggregate, so real estate projects and enterprises retain and share in between them a mutating and hardly bounded reservoir or commons of pre-individual capacities and practices of economization necessary to reactualize any kind of sexual, aesthetic, territorial,

¹⁰⁴ In the words of Deleuze and Guattari (1983), this is the development of a line of filiation (as opposed to alliances) not through bands of people or their despot but money (capital). Following Marx’ famous formula for capitalism (M-C-M) the regulation and cultivation of birth, life and death become regulated in capitalism by money (ie. accounting practices and discipline) rather than tribal rituals or barbaric displays of torture (cf. Foucault, 1977).

legal or financial arrangements. As a more elaborate genealogy of these ‘behavioral continuities’ will follow in the next section, which distinguishes more precisely the evolution of *homo economicus* from *homo sociologicus*, it is for now enough to notice how, in the very early evolution of our planet, the stage was set for an explosion of sexual beings to come, but that these same organisms and their human economic offspring never truly left (the capacity for engaging) those subsisting symbiotic alliances behind.

To conclude this section, the loose confederation of new evolutionary insights and concepts presented here as a ‘postmodern synthesis’ provides us with some initial tools to correct the overly static and crude notions of economic multiplicity and change that we have inherited from (neo)classical, Marxist and more standard evolutionary economic geographies. In particular, the distinction of ‘aptations’ (adaptation, exaptation, nonaptation) and aligned notions of aesthetics and symbiosis will help us further differentiate the practices of economization that make our markets. First, however, we need to further explore how the above general evolutionary dynamics are recapitulated at the time scale of more human genealogies and ‘agencements’. Therefore, the next section will elaborate a theory of *economic* actualization, conceptualizing how symbiotic bundles of practices are territorialized by violence and aesthetics and overcoded by property regimes and actual bookkeeping in the past and the here and now. This will then help us in Section 5.2.4 to revisit (counter-actualize) some basic elements of traditional explanations of gentrification, such as rent, class and the frontier.

5.2.3 *Practices of economization and real estate agencements*

5.2.3.1 *Ontogeny of agencements*

As an alternative to prevalent mainstream and Marxist interpretations and more in line with the above evolutionary insights, this section proposes to study housing markets, their dynamics and the potential for gentrification (rent gaps, displacement pressures) in the framework of a Deleuzian ontology of human assemblages and economic *agencements*. This section aims to set up such a general framework, so it can in the next section (5.2.4) be specified to problems of real estate markets and gentrification. ‘Agencement’ is the French word used by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) to designate any kind of territorial and expressive process of ‘assemblage’. While the latter has become its standard translation, some have proposed importing the untranslated term *agencement* into the English description of economic practices in order to retain its meaning of an active gathering, which gets somewhat lost in assemblage (Callon, 2007, Çalışkan and Callon, 2009, 2010).¹⁰⁵ Here, instead of ditching one, both assemblage and *agencement* will be used precisely to put their semantic difference to work (cf. Lovell and Smith, 2010: 463). *Agencement* then differentiates

¹⁰⁵ “*Agencement* has the same root as agency: *agencements* are arrangements [or assemblages] endowed with the capacity of acting in different ways depending on their configuration.” (Callon, 2007: 320)

and puts emphasis on the *practice* side of economic organization, which will also be central to this chapter. This practice side is never ‘contained’ by the latter organization (however they may try). Rather, from the perspective of agencement theory, organizing representations like ‘projects’, ‘companies’ or ‘markets’ are performative, actively catalyzing and directing add-ons to ongoing processes of economization. Agencements thus embody a more active synthesis than the passive ‘assemblage’ of tendencies and flows (see Section 2.4.1) that we habitually call ‘the (local) economy’ or ‘the market’. This ‘agencing’ by agencements actualizes through various specialized devices and practices (of planning, accounting, brokering) the ‘birthing’ actions and ‘liquidating’ transactions (see Section 5.2.2.9) by which actual projects, companies and markets reproduce, compete and proliferate (cf. Callon, 2016).

In what follows then, assemblages of tendencies bring forth agencements that actively organize capacities to economize such flows. Rather than reasoning from simple parts to complex wholes, and taking basic substances like the ‘social’ or, in economics, ‘value’ as somehow conserved throughout such analytical segmentation and stratification (like energy in classical physics), we see any empirical homogeneity as contingently and painstakingly enacted by interpretive and metric codings within (and ultimately only adding to) a heterogeneous yet continuous assemblage of practices (cf. DeLanda, 2005, 2009). In other words, instead of a *sameness* persevering through different forms, be it in the shape of market value or abstract labor (both instances of what is often called ‘value monism’), we take *difference* as the only continuity to start from (Deleuze, 1994, see Chapter 1). This implies we do not substitute a tangled social constructivism of ‘symbolic’ or ‘social value’ (Duncan and Ley, 1982, Mirowski, 1990) for traditional price or labor theories of value, but that we ask how an extensive, quantitative multiplicity (of eg. prices and transactions) is *actualized* from within a multiplicity of intensive, qualitative differences (ie. as topological-differential in kind, Deleuze, 1990b, DeLanda, 2005). In practice then, as explained in Chapters 1-3, economic value is progressively actualized by differential, projective and metric transformations (cf. DeLanda, 2004). That is, agencements assemble by skills and capacities of production and consumption (building, designing, displaying, feeling etc.) to qualitative distinctions (property rights, divisions of labor, signification of value etc.) to the quantitative establishment of prices (mark up, hedonic comparison, formulaic calculation etc.) (see Image 5.3 below). In this scheme, rather than as generalities related in ‘dialectical’ tension (as in Harvey, 2006a and Smith, 2008a), absolute and relative metrics of value and financial operations thus follow from the quantification of some very specific ‘relational’ interpretations (Harvey, 1973, 2006b), which, in turn, emerge out of an expansive multiplicity of practices. It is in this context that Deleuze and Guattari provocatively promote a ‘modified marginalism’ (1987: 437, Massumi, 2015: 137), which is occupied not so much with quantitative accumulations and profit margins, but first of all with a heterogeneous continuum of intensive differences immanent to economic practices (of material properties, attention, skill, care etc.) organized around a topology of material-semiotic *limits* and *thresholds* (in workplaces, marketing techniques, consumption practices, etc.). These practices thereby attain an ontological autonomy and technological indeterminacy of their own that, as we will see, allow us to rethink and possibly repurpose them away from, in the case of gentrification, displacive tendencies. Brought down to Earth in a

modified marginalism, capitalism is not inevitable.

Metrics		(Prosthetic) prices, other (geo)metrics
Interpretations		Value attributions, positions, claims
Sociotechnical practices	Desires, innovation, obligations, care, trust (nonaptive)	Passion, violence, storytelling, confidence (exaptive)
Flows	Thresholds	Limits
		Property, human, welfare rights
		Legal, calculation, accumulation, risk (adaptive)

Image 5.3. A general diagram of the (ontogenetic) actualization of economic agencements, not yet specified to real estate economics (for that, see Section 5.2.4). It synthesizes the general evolutionary, historical and ontological theories treated in this section and in the previous.

5.2.3.1.1 Bringing capitalism down to Earth

Even though at times it may seem to be so, purely accumulation-oriented or ‘capitalist’ practices never have and never will ‘formally’ let alone ‘really’ subsume all practices of economization (and simplify all labor). Rather, following the previously explained logic of assemblage and agencement, capitalist axiomatics are only ever *added* with much effort to a more expansive wealth of desires, capacities and meanings which they never manage to capture or externalize completely. To see this, we have to reconceive capitalist practices in the way equilibrium systems have been in the complexity sciences, ie. as a special case, visually and physically isolated by artifice. It is from the chaos of practice then, that economic order and circular flow arise, but only with much cognitive effort and, by thermodynamic (rather than neoclassical) principle, ‘externalities’. Much like scientific practices (Latour, 1987), economic assemblages, in order to stabilize themselves, have to create, enroll, connect and mobilize a whole host of practical, interpretive and metric actants (cf. Callon, 1986). In other words, for economic values and their conservation throughout exchanges to actualize, and as marginalist pioneer Von Thünen alluded to long ago (1960[1826], Harvey, 1981), some precariously established ‘laboratory’ conditions have to be put and kept in place (Latour and Callon, 2011). One way to study this is by looking more closely at particular ‘careers’ of products (eg. buildings) as they undergo a series of material-semiotic transformations throughout the process of their economic ‘framing’ (Callon, 1998a). In the empirical Part 2, we will also look at both aspects, focusing on particular real estate objects as they are developed (adapted, exapted) in practice and on their simultaneous framing by specific cognitive assemblages (eg. real estate agents, social housing managers).¹⁰⁶ What this is to achieve, following Braun’s (2006) critique of Neil

¹⁰⁶ In a way, this combination of framing and product career analysis can be seen as a ‘down to earth’ (emic, performative, practice theoretical) rendition of the abstract (etic, positivist, Marxist) combination of the *synchronic* comparison of differential rents across urban space (see below, Section 5.2.4.1) and the *syntopic* comparison across time of differences in actual and potential rents of one particular plot (ie. rent gap analysis) (see Clark, 2004: 155).

Smith (2008a), is to bring the ‘iron laws’ and crude dialectics of political economy down to Earth, showing how the capitalist rationality and calculation they suppose only ‘holds’ and performs in quite specific, non-totalizing ‘socio-technical-economic networks’, that is, those ‘immanent practices’ that Marxist, but also neoclassical and even cultural economic explanations tend to skip over as trivial media of value (Braun, 2006).

5.2.3.1.2 Putting the ‘mind’ into the ‘gap’: Economic perception as sociotechnical practice

This way, whether in passing, from a car window (Lees et al., 2008: 267), or through meticulous statistics (Clark, 1988), or by investment practices in the wild, actually ‘seeing’ rent gaps (ie. actual and potential values) becomes no trivial matter.¹⁰⁷ Only seemingly automatic, perception is always a skilfull sensorimotor activity and not a passive reception of spectral input by an observer. As such it is not tied to a particular part of the brain or even a sense organ, but is rather a specific ‘style’ of *doing*, a sensorimotor topology that reaches beyond the skin, to include environmental affordances (cf. Noë, 2009: 62-63, Barad, 2007). Moreover, not only is our perceptual consciousness, our mind, technically ‘extended’ as such beyond our bodies, it is in many ways distributed ‘socially’ as well, as in practices of air traffic control (Noë, 2009) or the aforementioned ship navigation (Hutchins, 1995).¹⁰⁸ And as behavioral economists remind us, this also goes for the ‘cockpit’ (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013) where economic opportunities and risks are assessed and computed: they have to be enabled and ‘done’ in sociotechnical practice in order to be ‘seen’. As a result, seeing, rationalizing and economizing also become ‘oligoptic’: costly and very specific rather than effortless and panoptic (Latour and Hermant, 2006). This costliness cannot, by ontological definition, simply be internalized as, for instance, ‘transaction costs’, without such internalization practices *adding* new incalculable costs (the aforementioned ‘externalities’). In this sense, the sociotechnically distributed doing of (economic, rent gap) perception is always performative.

5.2.3.2 Phylogeny of scarcities

While issuing neither from organic totalities nor atomic individuals, economic processes nonetheless have a shared history. In other words, the actualization of

¹⁰⁷ Compare Clark’s (1995: 1497) concept of awareness (as different from physiological sensory reception), which hinges on contradistinction: one needs an actual rent to perceive a potential rent (against Bourassa’s (1993) claim that potential rent is enough). Clark accuses Bourassa, who criticizes rent gap theory from a more mainstream economic position, of assuming “that property appraisal textbooks are ahead of land rent theory in providing accurate reflections of urban development, [...] that appraisers dutifully follow textbook guidelines”, and that, moreover, rent gap theory should take the form of an equation that could potentially be part of such an appraisal practice (Clark, 1995: 1501). While the theoretical assumption of such behavior is indeed unwarranted, assuming otherwise is just as problematic. Rather, this should be an empirical question, which Part 2 will indeed pursue to answer in the case of Klarendal, Arnhem.

¹⁰⁸ See also Callon (2008) on ‘distributed calculation’ in economic practices.

economic practices in the here and now is only a segment of a genealogy of a much longer duration. Keeping with the language of ecology: the above ‘ontogenetics’ of economic agencements, can be said to recapitulate topologically (cf. Gould, 1977, DeLanda, 1997) a ‘phylogenetic’ sequence reaching back millennia. In recent years, the lingering Great Recession of 2008 has given us many opportunities to rethink economics and investment practices in assemblage and agencement terms but also look at this *longue durée* history of money and debt with fresh eyes (Graeber, 2011, Lazzarato, 2012, 2015). In this spirit, the rest of this section will further flesh out this financial genealogy to historically support and elaborate the above diagram of economic actualization.

Counter to neoclassical (Menger, 2009[1892]) but also many Marxist accounts of exchange and money (eg. Harvey, 2006a, Smith, 2008a, Lapavistas, 2005), the genealogy of economic practices that we should advocate sees exchange as historically and currently derivative of the moralizing institution of debt (credit money) and, therefore, of the disciplinary state. Instead of taking money either as a rational extension of our natural propensity to truck and barter (A Smith, 2012[1776]), or as a deluding social fetish of pure exchange value (Marx, 1973), money is first of all a form of regulating excess and performing scarcity, beginning in the form of debt. The first Neolithic accounting practices, as a kind of proto-governmentality enabling a first ‘action at a distance’ (Ezzamel and Hoskin, 2002, Robson, 1992), emerged from ‘primitive’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, Luhmann, 1997), or rather ‘human economies’ (Graeber, 2011), in which forms of currency are still subordinate to and largely interwoven with other animistic and sociomaterial obligations.¹⁰⁹ These practices then evolved into centralizing recordings of debt, instituting the first solid debtor/creditor relations in rather violent ways (Graeber, 2011, Lazzarato, 2015). Only much later, during the Axial Age, does minted exchange money come about as an attempt to regulate these often excessive relationships through proto-Keynesian taxation schemes (Foucault, 2013, Deleuze and Guattari, 1983). First then, a *homo debitor* evolves, an agencement enabled to make promises and expecting to pay for what it does or desires (a subject “capable of accounting for himself as a future subject”, Lazzarato, 2012: 89). Money, much like the double meaning of debt-guilt (captured in the Dutch and German *Schuld*), thus figures first as a ‘measure’, in the ethical sense of moderation, that is, as a disciplinary tool sociotechnically regulating excess and establishing socio-economic equilibrium (Foucault, 2013).¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹The qualification of ‘human’ can be rather misleading in two ways. As Graeber (2011) emphasizes, there is nothing particularly *humane* about these primitive economies dealing in bride and blood wealth. They can be quite cruel and violent in their own way. However, neither are they particularly *antropocentric* in their dealings with nature. Rather, by forming what we may call agencements of *Homo curans/faber/ludens* (see below, page 174), they might as well be called *posthumanist*, in that their ‘nonmodern’, animistic economies in many ways do not bifurcate nature into humans and commodities (cf. Latour, 1993, 2010b, Stengers, 2012, Graeber, 2014) and tend to care better for the sociomaterial obligations and requirements that make up their living ecology.

¹¹⁰Of course, much later, in the guise of finance and neoliberal monetary policy, both ill-informed by a debt-blind neoclassical economics (Varoufakis et al., 2011, Keen, 2017), this monetary equilibrium is mathematically stretched to legitimize the greatest of excesses.

5.2.3.2.1 *Two languages of scarcity*

Today, this genealogy of violent disentanglement, actualized by war, slavery, states and markets all feeding off one another (Graeber, 2011), and which in many ways is still re-actualized every day (like a ‘primitive accumulation’, Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, Harvey, 2005), has left us with a host of economic practices that may be analyzed according to the way they govern by debt and ‘dispositifs of scarcity’, that is, by devices inculcating modes of futurity inextricably tied to a moral economy of worth (Tellmann, 2015).¹¹¹ Following Luhmann (1984), we can say these practices economize and discipline according to two genealogically interrelated ‘scarcity languages’, each translating collective and creative sociomaterial desires and obligations into forms of lack, need and debt: one positional, on significant qualities as such, and one legal and monetary, which quantifies some of those positional qualities. The first ‘language’ or rather lineage of sociotechnical practice performs a scarcity of honor and prestige. That is, a scarcity of the ‘surplus of dignity’ taken from indignants within a rather zero-sum game (as found in Hegelian master-slave dialectics or Bourdieuvian social fields, cf. Graeber, 2011: 170, 175, 277). It engenders a ‘heroic’ kind of marginalism, governed by the ‘last violence’ to get even (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 439, cf. Graeber, 2011: 193). Which is of course, despite its often physical character, very much a ‘symbolic’ kind of violence pertaining to position, reputation and credibility (Bourdieu, 1998, 2005).¹¹² In terms of real estate and gentrification, this language gives us verbalized, mediatized and advertized stories and iconic semiotics of an area’s ‘highest and best use’, but also the intimidating and stigmatizing condemnation of its current users, their extra-legal claims of collective entitlement (‘right to place / the city’) and their lived indexes of territorial and community values (Blomley, 2004).

I. *The language of homo sociologicus*

As such, the first language has deep roots in a *homo sociologicus* that precedes but later partly merges with the contractualist *homo debitor* (again, not as human essence but historical sociotechnical agencement).¹¹³ The former agencement has evolved from

¹¹¹ In this regard scarcity should be understood here in a performative sense. Practices of economization are not a reaction to a pre-existing scarcity but they produce it, whether by constructing individuals as monads driven by contradictory, zero-sum (therefore ‘scarce’) possessions or as ‘utility maximizers’ balancing their limitless (therefore ‘scarce’) appetites. It is no fact of nature that we do not know our limits, but economics can certainly force us to see and conduct ourselves that way.

¹¹² There are however some significant problems with Bourdieu’s symbolic economy, which posits a repressed economic truth (price) and *homo economicus* as inherent to any supposedly non-economic interaction (eg. 1998: 120, 113). Despite its intention then to develop a *practice* theory, and even apart from its insistent conflation of dominance and capability, Bourdieuvian social analysis trivializes and disregards the sociotechnically distinctive calculative practices to actually enact such a truth or human being. The effect is that he also ultimately conflates the two languages.

¹¹³ Taking care not to exalt *Homo sociologicus* as the essence of humanity but see it as a historical formation is already present in Dahrendorf’s (1965[1959]) original popularization of the term. Just as problematic, of course, is conceiving it as a complex of (‘annoying’) roles and norms that society (including social science) imposes onto an otherwise free (naked?) individual. Instead, the species

and retained a 'Machiavellian' social intelligence already found in primate societies (Whiten, 1999, De Waal, 1982) which only lacked our technological extensions beyond the skin (clothes, ornaments etc.) to fabricate it into a stable hierarchy (Strum and Latour, 1987). As explained in the previous section, even deeper evolutionary roots can be found in sexual reproduction *per se*. With the simultaneous emergence of birth and death (Margulis and Sagan, 2000) came the respective imperatives of 'individual' action and survival that still define the core tendencies of the two scarcity languages. While invented in rudimentary forms billions of years earlier than Hannah Arendt (1998) had in mind when she first observed the link, the categories of social action and utilitarian labor were the political economic answers to the age-old facts of natality and mortality.¹⁴⁴ Since their emergence the evolution of many species is lead by a complex relation of both sexual selection and 'natural' selection (ie. by programmed death), where the former dynamic is characterized by non-adaptive aesthetic, territorial and affective choices (ie. 'actions') while the latter is a matter of survival and adaptation regulated by the inevitable bottom line of death. In human economic history we see a similar dynamic, where any of the two tendencies may dominate the other. Indeed, as critical observers of this history such as Hegel and Nietzsche have emphasized: while it may be hegemonic in modern times, much of human economic behavior has not been guided by the imperative to live as long and painless as possible (as either a 'natural' or 'legal' person). Thinking otherwise, as most modern economists do, is only celebrating the historical triumph of slave morality, as Nietzsche (2005) would say.¹⁴⁵ The latter's lambasted 'last man' living 'at the end of history', slavishly driven by calculated self-preservation (*ratio*) and a base satisfaction of petty desires (*eros*), is indeed something very different from Hegel's 'first man', a violent social creature seeking above all recognition and prestige (*thymos*, Fukuyama, 1992).¹⁴⁶ What these philosophers underscore is that there are inherent and not just

should be viewed as an evolving multiplicity of more-than-human *practices* (cf. Reckwitz, 2002).

¹⁴⁴ To Arendt (1998), any creature living before the arrival of cultural man (as the 'working' rather than 'laboring' *homo faber*) was an *animal laborans* only driven by necessity and swamped by a mechanical and senseless nature. For Arendt, the political economists, and Marx in particular, were wrong to reduce value to abstract labor and the essence of man to an *animal laborans* (which later became the utilitarian 'economic man' for whom, unlike *homo faber*, value was decided by a "moral bookkeeping" or an "illusory mathematics of happiness and salvation", *ibid.*: 310). However, what both political economists and Arendt (and Fukuyama for that matter) are wrong about, is depicting nature and nonhuman animality in mechanical terms and human life as metaphysically special in the first place.

¹⁴⁵ As will be addressed in the empirical Part 2 of this chapter (Section 5.3.2.2.2), this can also be said of someone like Bourdieu (1990), who despite his apparent recognition of the originality of *homo sociologicus* (ie. sexual/masculine domination and symbolic monopolization/violence) still reduces it to *homo economicus* (cf. Desan, 2013, Steinmetz, 2014).

¹⁴⁶ There is an interesting genealogy still to be written about this notion of a 'last man' and its relation to marginalist economics. There is a distinct homology between Hegel's historic man and Nietzsche's last man and Von Thünen's marginalist notion of the 'last laborer' at the colonial frontier (determining the fair 'natural wage'), which Fukuyama seems to have pickup up on when he wrote: "Just as a modern economist does not try to define a product's 'utility' or 'value' in itself, but rather accepts the marketplace's valuation of it as expressed in a price, so one would accept [in the Hegelian phenomenology] the judgment of the 'marketplace' of world history." (Fukuyama, 1992: 136). See also Harvey, 1981 and Reinert and Reinert, 2006, who also include Schumpeter's entrepreneur of 'creative destruction' into the fold.

epiphenomenal tendencies and desires for violence to economic practices to which most modern academics remain oblivious. From a neo-Hegelian (Fukuyama, 1992) rather than a political economic viewpoint, whether bourgeois or residually so, the latter cannot conceptually register the ‘battle to the death for pure prestige’ that still rages throughout our libidinal economies. First recorded in long ago ‘heroic’ times, then relatively pacified in the feudal figure of the landlord and eventually becoming almost entirely sublimated in the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, the ‘megalothymotic’ drive for prestige – at best a Romantic inclination, at worst reckless imperialism – is still alive and well today (ibid.: 315–316). Alive, that is, as the first practice of scarcity.

II. *The scarcity language of homo economicus*

Capacitized by the power of written property accounts and legal contracts *homo debitor* evolves to temper the incalculable predictability of heroic action (cf. Arendt, 1998: 243–245). Yet a second ‘language’ or practice of scarcity which could rightly be named *homo economicus* only truly comes into being with the promotion of money. This practice of scarcity redoubles the first through accounting practices, thus constituting different legal (property) and monetary disciplinary regimes. As they economize production, circulation and consumption, these calculative practices create and handle debt, individuate owners and disentangle objects to be transferred, producing agencements that pay up and pay the right price (as defined immanently by cross-calculative bidding, comparative techniques, the prevailing ethics and perhaps even economic theory). While differentiating such capacities, economic history has presented us with some tendencies of variation, defined by prevailing modes of indebtedness (disciplinary inclusion) and wealth extraction or creation (ie. stretch limits or ply thresholds).¹¹⁷ A first historical vector, of elitist assemblage, extracts and extends existing wealth through rent (gap) seeking and individualized credit arrangements. A second, populist assemblage, creates new wealth through public debt and investment, collective discipline and individual purchasing power (at times approximating debt-free exchange).¹¹⁸ In recent times especially, the former regime is presented and treated by modern finance theory as the latter, that is, as predicated on equal monetary exchanges, constituting an inclusive ‘democratization

¹¹⁷ Harvey (2005: 152) similarly presents the variable practice of finance as the crucial ‘umbilical cord’ between capitalist regimes of ‘expansive reproduction’ and ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 461–463) differentiate these regimes by the number of economic ‘axioms’ they deploy (to which we could add, the complication of their ‘theorems’), where axioms are “operative statements that constitute the semiological form of Capital and that enter as component parts of into assemblages of production, circulation, and consumption”. The first assemblage, guided by Keynesian type economics, multiplies axioms around employment, union organization, social benefits and so on, in order to approach or breach qualitative thresholds of wealth creation (ie. inclusion). The second assemblage, directed by (neo)liberal economics, minimizes axioms around an equilibrium of the foreign sector, reserve levels and inflation rates (while allowing complicated financial formulae, or ‘theorems’, to extend current limits of accumulation). See Section 5.2.3.3.1 below for a less abstract treatment of these differences.

¹¹⁸This of course excludes what might be called a third, fascist vector assembling a totalitarian war machine creative of arms technology and destructive of human lives and foreign lands (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, Janeway, 2012: 251–254).

of finance' supported by dubious distributions of risk. As becomes manifest in times of personal misfortune or systemic crisis, people are increasingly governed if not enslaved by debts created almost risk-free by large deregulated banks.

Notwithstanding these broad genealogical strokes, it is important to keep these assemblages, including their political economic abstractions, down to Earth as such. When it comes to real estate markets and gentrification, the actualization of owners, users, objects and prices through (re)development, brokering and banking practices (succeeding, failing or refusing to 'making the equilibrium theory true' in one way or another), comprises a whole host of appraisal, comparative and (cross)calculative techniques to determine potential returns and actual payments, employing just as many non-economic data (eg. square meters, point systems) if they lend themselves to monetary appreciation. However, as 'cold' as these calculative practices may seem, they do today connect with a specific morality or 'ethopolitics' (Flint, 2003, 2004), normalizing an individualized 'ownership model' (Blomley, 2004) and, by extension, the often speculative financialization of housing (Langley, 2008, Aalbers, 2008, Fields, 2015, Aalbers et al., 2017). The prevailing *homo debitor* is as much a moralizing *homo sociologicus* as he is an elitist *homo economicus*. As we will see below, semi-public and community housing organizations which deviate from elitist ethic by espousing more collectivized models of ownership still have to deal with its normalizing pull. Yet this is also where important risks and opportunities concerning positive socio-technical development emerge.

5.2.3.3 A diagram of economic actualization

Recapitulating the aforementioned genealogy, Image 5.3 describes the emergence (ontogenesis) of economic formations in the here and now. Any modern real estate agencement has to deal with all four kinds of actants (flows, practices, interpretations and metrics) but may vary in its emphasis on one or the other column. The middle column is written in the violent-symbolic first language of extra-legal values, positions and territorial claims. Agencements emphasizing this column mainly evolve by *exaptation*, that is, of taking practices and products developed earlier elsewhere in order to repurpose them for other uses within another agencement. The right-hand column is written by the second, legal and quantitative language of scarcity. Agencements in this column evolve by *adaptation*, that is, preserve themselves in calculated anticipation of preset 'market conditions'. The left-hand column, on the contrary, concerns *nonaptive* practices in so far as they escape dominant iconographies and normalized regimes of calculation. Here the autopoietic crafting and caring for sociomaterial obligations takes precedence. Agencements pushing in this direction have to follow a bacterial logic of tinkering, bricolage and play. Respectively, these columns share some noticeable affinities with institutional economic concepts of markets, hierarchies and networks (Thompson, 1991, DeLanda, 1997) and with related distinctions of risk, in the form of measurable probabilities; confidence, in symbols and institutions; and trust through lived familiarity as their modes of futurity (cf. Luhmann, 1988, Tellmann, 2015). In relation to the Marxist literature, moreover, the upper three cells (prices, rights, positions) correspond rather neatly with the three

main definitions of class found there: “income distribution (the monetary equivalent of the surplus value definition of class) [...], property ownership (corresponding to the asset definition of class) [and] power relations (corresponding to the domination definition of class)” (Sheppard and Barnes, 1990: 224) – a distinction that will be addressed in the next Section 5.2.4. However, the strength of the diagram should be sought in tying these categories to their sociotechnical and affective base. There we find not simply located material objects and conditions but *flows* of yet formless potential, all the limiting and transformative tendencies, transitions, prehensions and desires that power and embody production-consumption. These flows are subsequently innovated, worked on and captured by *practices* of manufacture, caring, violence and calculation (perhaps as immutable chunks of matter in motion from one location to another). Today as in our deep past, we thus see emerging out of, adding to and merging with a fund of manufacturing and caring practices, which might be designated as a combination of *homo faber*, *homo curans* and perhaps *homo ludens* (cf. resp. Arendt, 1998, Sennett, 2009, 2012; Tronto, 2017; Huizinga, 1949), other agencements practicing more or less violent exaptations (*homo sociologicus*) and more or less elitist or populist adaptations (*homo economicus*).

5.2.3.3.1 *Some reflections on economics and the possibility of economic justice*

With the diagram of Image 5.3 in place, we are now in a position to elaborate on its right-hand column, reconnect it to existing economic models and briefly discuss their normative prescriptions. By differentiating among elitist, capitalist and populist assemblages within that column we can also see how they point to conservative, liberal and radical conceptions of economic justice respectively (cf. Hahnel, 2014: 25-33). But, as we will see below, it also points to their shared performance of scarcity.

Metrics (Models)		rent/interest (‘monopoly’)	profit (‘oligopoly’, ‘mon. comp.’)	(fair) wage (‘perf. comp.’)
Interpretations		values		
		private property/debt		public property/debt
Practices (Homo..)	commons, innovation (faber/ curans/ ludens)	passion, possession (sociologicus)	landlordism, financialization (elitist ass.) (debitor)	competitive management, land/labor exploitation (=< capitalist ass. => (economicus)
Flows	thresholds			Limits

Image 5.4. A diagram summarizing the distinction of assemblages of scarcity, with a more detailed emphasis on monetary regulation (the second, quantitative ‘language’ of scarcity).

Counter-actualizing economics: At a *metric* level, the one unit of account called money may pay out rents, profits or fair wages, taking on several functions of storage, investment and exchange. In actual exchanges this qualitative difference is indiscernible (which is notoriously obfuscatory in ethical terms, cf. Sayer, 2016). Nonetheless, at a most axiomatic level, standard models of market economies (‘monopoly’, ‘oligopoly’, ‘monopolistic competition’, ‘perfect competition’) can already

explain how these forms and functions work relative to one another. However, staying at this ideal level also allows for the performance of the most unstable and violent assemblages as the most perfectly peaceful equilibrium (as demonstrated by most pre-2008 economics). To understand this performativity (and ‘failure’) of mathematical models ‘in the wild’, therefore, one has to descend to the *interpretive* level of property arrangements. Economic axioms are established there through administrative grids backed by legal violence, which separate subjects (‘legal persons’) and the objects they own or use. At this level, any form of private property, which protects the right of one legal person to dispose of an object as it sees fit, can be seen as a monopoly (of that person over the use, marketization and pricing of that object). By implication, getting rid of efficiency disrupting monopolies and approaching the model of ‘perfect competition’ would require liquidating that private property and making it common or public somehow, whether through centralized planning (computation), taxation schemes, auctions or any combination of these. In the spirit of Keynes (1964: 376), rent and interest would thus be ‘euthanized’, and perhaps even profit as well, based as it is on an exclusive ownership of the means of production and subsistence (the condition for labor exploitation). Debt-free, fair exchanges and ‘natural wages’, to use Von Thünen’s phrase, could thus be approached. At the ultimate, socialist limit (the right extreme of the diagram), private monopolies and accumulations no longer exist, all products go by their fair price (all externalities included) and wages are paid in proportion to labor contribution (as opposed to some unlimited communism, Marx, 1966, Bastani, 2019).¹¹⁹ Paradoxically though, this truly Pareto optimal situation requires all economic subjects (owners) and objects, including buildings, to also become entirely ‘liquid’, such that everyone and everything, including real estate (‘fixed capital’), is up to standard (qua utility) and up for (re)allocation at all times, whether for a central planning authority or an all-inclusive auction (ie. ‘radical market’, Posner and Weyl, 2018).¹²⁰ ‘To each according to their contribution’ comes at

¹¹⁹ Marx (1966), in his critique of the German social democratic Gotha Program, famously distinguished between a ‘first’ and a ‘higher’ phase of communism. Lenin would later rephrase this as socialism and communism respectively. Whereas socialism would still work according to a principle of ‘to each according to their contribution’ (implying an absence of exploitation, but not of divided, alienated labor and scarcity), post-scarcity communism could ‘inscribe on its banners’: ‘from each according to his ability to each according to his needs’ (ibid.: 10). Generally allergic to utopianism, Marx remained inexact on the principle’s practical implications, allowing many to nonetheless interpret it as a sublime state of negative freedom. A future level of technology and productivity would gain us freedom from any limits, any necessity of work, any form of scarcity (eg. Bastani, 2019). It is an uncharacteristically undialectical negation that, by going so undefined, smacks of the liberal kind of ‘negative freedom’ that has us crossing so many ecological thresholds in the first place. Less risky and more in tune with actual practices of self-development beyond necessity, is to (perhaps untruthfully) interpret the communist maxim as a task of affirming ‘disability’ in the here and now, while cultivating an egalitarian, non-violent discipline of want (more on which below).

¹²⁰ Posner and Weyl (2018) have recently proposed to organize economic life by way of ‘radical markets’, which combine common ownership (of everything) and self-assessed taxation. Everyone appraises and puts up for sale all their possessions in a giant ongoing auction and pays taxes according to those prices. It is one very counterintuitive but analytically most enlightening way to approach the socialist limit of the diagram in Image 5.4. As the authors admit, with sufficient computing power, the ‘parallel processing’ of values that radical markets would achieve (through the centralization of self-assessments) could also be done by a central demand-anticipating computer. As Posner and Weyl acknowledge, giant retailers (Walmart, Amazon, Alibaba) and online

the price of ‘everything solid melting into air’.

However, at a level of *practice*, it should come as no surprise that this ideal typical situation is most improbable. As *neo*-liberals and institutional economists have understood better than classical laissez-faire liberals, efficient allocation is a historically and institutionally highly ‘artificial’ state (which has mostly kept them from arguing against private property or for its taxation). Similarly, experiences with actually existing ‘Real Socialism’ (Lebowitz, 2012) and a proper dose of ‘socialist realism’ (Gindin, 2018) force any viable progressive practice to face the challenges of actually organizing efficient allocation, incentives, investment and innovation under common ownership. The radical ideals of perfect competition and efficiency obviously disregard and, in an ethical sense, demand some *qualitative* constraints to remain humanly and environmentally possible and desirable. On the one hand, any actually existing (eco)socialist assemblage has to factor in all kinds of immanent sociomaterial *thresholds* (‘natural monopolies’, ‘negative/positive externalities’, ‘basic human needs’, ‘(dis)abilities’) and translate these into limits (constraints) toward which optimization can occur by whatever monetizing incentive or choice architecture is most appropriate (auctions, taxes, subsidies, remunerations, councils etc.). In practice, moreover, dangerously approaching or creatively breaching tacit thresholds by (re)setting productivity and environmental limits (by whatever ‘mechanism’) is always a tricky and uncertain cognitive, technical and deliberative operation (see Section 5.2.3.1.2). It can never be reduced to an exact, ‘objective’ science (as in Walras or Lange), to the ‘subjective’ genius of entrepreneurs (as in Hayek or Rand), or even to merely ‘discursive’ processes of participatory planning (eg. Adaman and Devine, 1996, 2002). Therefore, beyond or rather before the above mentioned grid of economic subjects and objects, we need to further investigate empirically the immediate ethics of sociomaterial ‘interessement’ (cf. Akrich et al., 2002) in both productive and consumptive practices. On the other hand, and perhaps more fundamentally, even a more fair economics is still premised on the assemblage of scarcity, which in turn rests on the cultivation of endless, runaway want (‘utility maximization’, ‘opportunity costs’, ie. the modern economist’s monetary rendition

service providers (Google, Spotify, Netflix) are already uncannily good at this (see also Phillips and Rozworski, 2019). From this perspective, it is not surprising that the CEO of the Chinese Alibaba platform, Jack Ma, has recently suggested (with good reason, Cockshott, 2019), that his company proves that central coordination of the national economy is within reach. Given the steady development of computational power and optimizing algorithms (Cockshott and Cottrell, 1993: 55–60, Cockshott, 2010, 2019), it appears that at least the ‘calculation problem’ of socialist economics, as famously argued by Von Mises (2012[1920]), is being solved. However, solving that problem, whether by radical markets or central computation, still leaves open many non-quantitative questions around the required behavioral surveillance, the autonomy of life choices and the fostering of innovation. As Dagan (2019) notes in relation to Posner and Weyl’s proposals, private property today serves to secure an indispensable autonomy to develop the projects that make us who we are (more on which below). Moreover, much of the benevolence of ‘radical markets’ depends on ‘structural’ conditions preceding the grand computation, which radical economists such as Posner and Weyl tend to ignore or suppose can be taxed away too easily (Hitzig et al., 2019). In sum, in order to be livable and work, radical markets need boundaries toward personal property (passionate interests) and guarantees of a dignified life (for the ‘unproductive’ and ‘disabled’ of society).

of the first, libidinal language of scarcity: consumer sovereignty).¹²¹ In this regard, the various assemblages in the right box of Image 5.4 differ only in terms of how these unlimited wants are to be channeled and curbed, either by instituting class structures (Malthus) or human/environmental limits (socialism).

Against the (neo)classical economics of imposing quantitative limits on unlimited appetites, we need to cultivate some form of qualitative ‘self-limitation’ (Kallis, 2019): a non-violent, more-than-quantified ethics of moderation and self-mastery. Even economic (eco)socialism, which probably implies a redistributive degrowth agenda, requires some kind of culture of limits to become achievable and remain sustainable. Conversely, limited consumption can only be a truly fair cultural demand when equality is reasonably achieved (eg. everyone’s basic needs are serviced). In capitalist practice, this ‘self-limiting’ occurs in a highly inequitable and still wasteful manner through the institution of private property. As explained above, monetary and property arrangements must be seen as a historical product of elitist and populist assemblages of scarcity. Whereas the former focus on practices of landlordism and other financialized rentierships, in which the (violently enforced and legally secured) control over assets becomes the primary mechanism of economic allocation, the latter attempt to institute the above mentioned ‘artificial’ practices of public ownership and fair allocation. A capitalist assemblage of practices, situated in between the two and premised on a private ownership of the means of production, may move in the direction of elitism, in the guise of ‘shareholder capitalism’, or in the populist direction of ‘Rhineland’ or ‘stakeholder capitalism’ (for instance, by giving certain stakeholders more bargaining power by unionization or adding a universal basic income). Supposedly, capitalism thus finds a resolution somewhere in between, on the one hand, the inequality and inefficiency of rentierism and, on the other, the problems of investment and incentive inherent to common ownership and universal welfare. However, history has shown that this is a fragile balance and that capitalism easily slips back into rentierism as private assets accumulate untaxed and uncontested by less fortunate ‘stakeholders’. Over time, opportunities for pursuing passionate interests, but also for taking advantage of common goods, tend to become increasingly unequal. ‘Self-limitation’, moreover, tends to re-enter into a zero-sum libidinal economy and turns into a rather deceptive and exclusionary virtue signalling (eg. ‘ethical consumption’, eg. Liu, 2021).

The obvious alternative for conceptualizing practices of autonomous limitation is the notion of the ‘commons’. The commons can be understood as all the ‘means’, that is, socio-ecological capacities, of (social re)production. For a self-declared commoner such as Bollier (2014: 28–32), it represents the possibility of a non-standard economics, based not on abstractions of unbounded individual appetites but a “practice and ethic of sufficiency”. There is a danger, however, in again reifying the commons as a kind of externally limited, scarce supply, stock or ‘resource pool’

¹²¹ As Lebowitz (2012: 179) observes, this figure is just as present in vanguard Marxism (socialism as it actually existed), in the form of an ‘alienated worker’ who still minimizes labor and maximizes consumption while living under socialism and (perpetually?) not yet in a communist, post-scarcity society.

that requires private or, preferably, communal or state economization (eg. Ostrom, 2010, Harvey, 2013). Instead, the idea of ownership should be subjected to the same assemblage logic as any other positivist or dialectic interpretation. If the living, Earthly commons ultimately *belong to anyone and to no one*, they are always in a dynamic state of becoming. Ontologically and ethically speaking, they are always less than many (private properties) and more than one (collective or public property). The 'self' then, that 'limits itself', can neither be the private ascetic nor a parochial 'self-organizing' collective. In reality, the 'limitation' that a preservation and joyful development of the commons demands is a practice of careful affectivity which we cannot conceptually and practically leave to entrepreneurs or participatory councils. It requires that we reinterpret in posthuman, practice theoretical terms (Section 5.2.3.1.2) the central maxim of most strands of participatory economics, that ownership, use and decision-making over resources should be the purview of 'all those affected thereby' (eg. Hahnel, 2012, Adaman and Devine, 2002). That is, to avoid any idealist, parochial or anthropocentric interpretation of this principle, which would fail to recognize wider 'externalities' of socio-material capacities and interdependencies, it should be couched in the Spinozist ethics of affects presented in Chapter 3 and the here presented (post-)actor-network terms of socio-technical *interessement* and agencement.

If the happy state of 'participatory economics' means *symmetric affectivity*, and we include non-human relations into this symmetry, then a culture of limits oriented toward a dynamic, 'mutable mobile' commons, warrants avoiding the rigid asymmetries of territorial-libidinal immobility ('class') and financial immutability ('price', monetization) by putting into practice an affirmation and care for difference (of ability and need). On the one hand, non-calculative moderation asks us not to normalize and optimize according to immediate quantitative indicators, but to take it slow, trust in the long-term and nonlinearity of economic development and find a happy balance of discipline, participation and care (more about this below in Section 5.2.5). On the other, recognizing that from a psycho-analytic perspective a culture of limits must include some moments of libidinal transgression and adventure (Kallis, 2019), there needs to be room for passionate interests. These 'just' have to be kept out of the economization of basic needs such as housing. Their physical and symbolic violence must be curbed and sublimated to continue the evolution noted above, from feudal to entrepreneurial passions (Fukuyama, 1992: 315–316), into artistic and non-puritan ascetic directions, as suggested in the works of Foucault (1985) and Sloterdijk (2012).

To summarize, real abstractions of value, including labor, so much associated with capitalist assemblage, are just as much a part of socialist performativity. Also within practices that 'socialize surplus production and distribution' (Harvey, 2013: 86), the commons, including 'living labor', have to be subjected to the logic(s) of scarcity to be economized (corralled, enclosed, homogenized, alienated, monetized). However, by ontological necessity (Images 5.3, 5.4), this can never be done exhaustively and, normatively speaking, probably should not be attempted. A qualitatively dynamic (exaptive, nonaptive) and response-able economics instead cultivates the innovative, creative and caring 'positive externalities' that constitute our commons (cf. Hardt and Negri, 2005: 144–149). To get there, any progressive, perhaps postcapitalist

assemblage has to balance the extremes of our diagram while moderating the middle, where today the second, supposedly moderating language of scarcity barely disguises the raw violence of the first (as an ‘equilibrium’).

Bringing together the two extremes (as the economic dimension of the double pronged strategy mentioned in Chapter 3, cf. Harvey, 2013: 81–88) is a matter of speed and slowness. On the one hand, slowing down is the counter-intuitive answer to the ‘neoliberal’ problematics of ‘tacit knowledge’ (the caring for and innovating with sociomaterial thresholds usually passed on to entrepreneurs) and of motivational ‘incentives to work’ (the libidinal investment into ascetic passionate interests usually framed as utility or profit maximization). On the other hand, slowing down serves a more careful speed. As Marx (1966) implies, socialism does not represent a simple negation of capitalism, but rather an ‘acceleration’ of it. Paradoxically, however, as history has shown us, this acceleration can only be a very slow and fragile tinkering, because there are so many unforeseen qualitative thresholds to accommodate (human, technical, ecological commons). ‘Communism’, as envisioned by Marx and many utopian Marxists today as a kind of ultimate future acceleration (eg. Bastani, 2019) would instead, *in the here and now*, be a proper balancing of the speed of economization and the slowness of the commons, beyond the unequal middle ground of capitalism. Formulated this way, the progressive challenge consists of approaching (tinkering towards) an ecosocialist limit while leaving room for non-violent investments, incentives and interests (ie. beyond unlimited private property accumulation and zero-sum symbolic violence) and for innovation and care (ie. a dynamic commoning). From Section 5.2.5 onwards, this two-pronged practice of economization will be described as a combination of, on the one hand, a risky, or rather, trusting long-term and nonlinearly oriented ‘economic dyscalculia’ and, on the other, a counter-zero sum, or rather, anti-stigmatizing ‘economic dyslexia’. Together, they resist ‘the pulls’ of capital and prestige in favor of a dynamic, defiant and sometimes chaotic ‘econodiversity’. As Gindin also concludes, a ‘socialism for realists’ is necessarily messy, more process than end product:

“The disorder within socialism is also an expression of its larger and multifaceted aspirations: its refusal to narrow everything to easy [quantitative] indicators (like those that fit so neatly with profits and competitiveness); the insistence on developing the fullest range of human capacities to build, create, and enjoy; the commitment to creating the most genuine democracy. All this may produce a disconcerting messiness, but it is best appreciated as a manifestation of the fact that, as William Morris put it in his critique of Bellamy’s utopia, ‘variety of life is as much an aim of true Communism as the equality of condition, and that nothing but a union of these two will bring about real freedom.’” (Gindin, 2018)

To conclude this section, we can say our approach tries to make sense of the economic assemblages we designate as markets by conceptualizing them in post-actor-network terms as fractional: more than one but less than many (Mol, 2002, Law, 2004, cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 21). Any market, like the real estate market of Arnhem, is ‘more than one’ in the sense that a description of it as simply ‘the’ market, whether held together by an invisible hand or determined by one, mind-independent system or structure, robs it of its non-trivial qualitative multiplicity

(of real sociomaterial intensities, limits and thresholds). Few markets really permit such panoptic holism. However, it is also 'less than many', as it is neither a random collection of rational decision makers or interpretive subjects. Rather, the market is a fractal meshwork of rather myopic 'oligopticons' (distributed minds, agencements) related genealogically and through their specific framings and perceptions (cf. Latour and Hermant, 2006).¹²² This being said, and as we will see in the empirical Part 2, this does not preclude some practices taking on a special synecdochal role. Enrolled by home buyers and investors, most real estate economization involves a special sort of 'agent' (practices) that concentrate on 'knowing', that is, performing 'the' market as a whole. We should however, consider this abstraction only a 'peripheral totality' which exists alongside 'its' parts, not unifying them but 'added to them as a new part fabricated separately' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 42). Such a 'whole', which is a representation emerging and adding to practice, 'is always smaller than its parts' (Latour et al. 2014) and is not a panoptic but an 'oligoptic' product. It visualizes only very task specific processes (eg. a wholesale fruit market, Latour and Hermant, 2006: 37-40). Moreover, throughout this meshwork of a market, certain genealogically differentiated normalization pressures can nonetheless be discerned, constituting a rather indirect superposition, asymmetry and even struggle among varying economic practices and devices. This entails much more than the kind of direct 'auctionary' confrontation of competitive 'bidders' we know from economic and evolutionary theory. And neither is it simply an inter- or intra-class contradiction of interests playing itself out. To understand this we have to return once more to the issue of rent and class and see what happens to these categories when we counter-actualize them.

5.2.4 Counter-actualizing real estate: Rents, classes and practices of gentrification

5.2.4.1 Gentrification as extensive rental normalization

Because of its structural orientation Marxist geography displays a very curious and contradictory relationship with the (neo)classical, Von Thünen model of land economics. On the one hand, it also accepts and takes as axiomatic the same norm of economic rationality and model of competitive bidding as truthfully describing the structure and workings of market society in general and the property market in particular, at least as a tendency that might come true during moments of unimpeded growth (or perhaps only as a horizon of 'real subsumption'). In the words of Neil Smith et al., "[h]owever disparate [...] *individual* decisions [by owners, landlords, local and

¹²² According to assemblage theory (DeLanda, 1997) and actor-network theory (or less attractively, 'actant-rhizome' theory, Latour, 1999b: 19), market agencements together form 'rhizomatic' processes, 'reducible neither to the One nor the multiple' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 21). This can also be geometrically imagined as the development of a fractal form, ie. an infinite line filling a surface but never truly adding up to one (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 486, DeLanda, 2005: 149n71). Within a (Riemannian) manifold of potentially infinite (n) dimensions, such a line of differentiation, representing an agencement, develops itself immanently (at $n-1$) instead of being subjected to an all-homogenizing, supplementary dimension ($n+1$). Applied to economics, the coming together of different practices produces vectors of change not determined by a transcendent, homogenizing dimension of 'value' (engendered by a single medium of equivalence, money, and guided by a single point of equilibrium).

national governments and an array of financial institutions] may be, they represent a broadly *rational* if not always parallel or predictable set of responses to existing neighborhood conditions” (Smith et al., 1989: 240, emphasis added). It is this broad tendency, thought to be determined largely outside the land market by factors like demographic developments and generally “given levels of technological development and societal pressures to maximize profit” (Clark, 2004: 151, see also Clark, 1988: 245), that establishes an ‘extensive’ differential rent on a metropolitan level. This rent level, obtained by the equal application of capital on unequal lands (qua locational advantages, *ibid.*, Sheppard and Barnes, 1990), determines what at a certain moment in time *can* be extracted from a particular site and thus gives the ‘normal’ intensity of investment for that site at that moment. However, individual investments may deviate from this norm because of self-reinforcing lock-in effects inherent to the property market. Past constructions, always of a particular technological level, style period and physical age, may in a particular space become a ‘barrier’ to new investments (or a catalyst of risky ‘overinvestment’). Investments that could at least keep currently capitalized rents on a par with the always rising metropolitan norm (of service, style and quality) may stay away because of landowners’ unwillingness to sell, the physical fixity of earlier developments (although see Redfern, 1997a) or the presence of higher profit rates elsewhere, which can be other economic sectors with shorter turnover periods (Smith, 1979a: 541). Through time then, a ‘neighborhood cycle’ of devalorization and (over)investment emerges involving gaps between the extensive level of rent and the ‘intensive differential rents’²³ that deviate from it locally by the unequal application of capital to equal lands, thus providing special opportunities for landowners to extract more profit and, of course, presenting risks of displacement for low-income households.

5.2.4.2 *The entry through class and scale*

On the other hand though, Marxist structural geography does not accept the individualism and the conception of prices found in the neoclassical model, and this complicates the reality or ‘truth’ of the capitalist abstraction. This is because on deeper inspection, and from the *supposedly* preferred ‘entry point’ of *class* (Smith, 1992a, Wolff and Resnick, 2012), values, wages, profits and indeed rents actually turn out to root not in competition among individuals but are arbitrarily established as ‘social necessities’ (Sheppard and Barnes, 1990). Prices, or rather, quantitative but non- or hardly observable values and rents, are determined by many political struggles among and within differently scaled social aggregates, groups and collectives, with just as many ‘unintended consequences’ and interaction effects causing economic disequilibrium. Rent and the rent gap thus become (still rather hidden) manifestations of the operation of class power within the urban land market

²³ Note that this ‘deviation’ or ‘intensity’ is of a rather abstract, quantitative kind, not as described in Section 5.2.3.1. For instance, in Sheppard and Barnes (1990) it is conceived in terms of more or less profitable techniques of production. Likewise, in production theories of gentrification (Smith, 1979a, 1981), valorization or devalorization (over or below the norm), (dis)investments closing and creating rent gaps, are thus always thought of in qualitatively homogenized quantities (of ‘abstract labor’).

(Smith, 1992a), most prominently of landowners. By sheer monopoly power, the latter secure income (rent) from the land without adding any value (labor). Moreover, for geographers this class power also entails a certain spatial *scale* of social action – a factor explicitly recognized only later in the rent gap debate (Hammel, 1999) and typically deployed for defusing (or rather diffusing) structure–agency controversies. The rent gap thus becomes a problem of collective, neighborhood scale action and can indeed be prevented from appearing, as when old wealthy neighborhoods keep actual values on a par with the norm (or rather, secure the ‘socially necessary’ rent).

5.2.4.3 *Descent into overdetermination*

One typical way the tension of taking both the land market (as a rent structure) and class as ‘entry points’¹²⁴ is relieved then, is by designating both to different ‘levels of abstraction’ and, by characteristic geographical conflation, scale (cf. Cox and Mair, 1989, Smith, 1992b, Bridge, 1995). Gentrification is then a process that takes shape under the influence of spatiotemporally scaled processes of political economic development. On the most abstract and formal level, that of the global capitalist mode of production, we find an antagonism between capitalists and workers, but also, and more important to some than to others, landowners. A leftover of a feudal mode of production, yet still ideologically essential to the workings of capitalism (Harvey, 1974, 2006a), the unproductive holders of monopoly power over non-produced land (following the labor theory of value) siphon their rents off the productive efforts of the other two classes. From this level, albeit already hard to observe empirically (Clark, 1995), rent could still be conceived as a distinct entity pertaining to a distinct class. However, in a predominantly urban (ie. ‘serviced’, produced) economic environment; with landowners becoming more active entrepreneurs; and with property’s supposedly increasing insertion into capital circuits as a financial asset (‘fictitious capital’, Harvey, 2006a), class distinctions between landowners and capitalists, and between rent, profit and interest blur into each other.¹²⁵ To analytically cope with this while maintaining Marx’ envisioned two-

¹²⁴ According to Wolff and Resnick (2012), neoclassical and Marxist economics entertain different ‘entry points’ into economic phenomena. The former then starts from individual preferences and productive capabilities (resources, technology) while the latter begins with class (societal organization of surplus). However, Marxist land economics, as the base of gentrification theory, is highly ambiguous in this regard, often seeming content with its axiomatic world of capitalist competition rather than probe the messy world of class differentiation (which indeed disqualifies the performativity of that axiomatic world so severely, one might as well let it go altogether as a benchmark).

¹²⁵ For Harvey (2006a) land ownership became capitalistic from the 1970s with the onset of neoliberalism. Land becomes a purely financial asset, or ‘fictitious capital’: it does not embody any ‘real’ substance (labor) but only a legal claim to future labor. In the process, the class contradiction between rentiering landowners and profiting capitalists is overcome. However, from a more *longue durée*, cyclical historical viewpoint (Graeber, 2011) one could say land is really the oldest form of ‘fictitious capital’, caught up in relations of debt and claiming ‘future labor’ for millennia. However, since debt as a temporal arrangement is entirely basic to quantified economization, the issue here is not *whether* debt is involved but *in what forms* (ie. assemblages of scarcity and futurity). Beyond how debts are ideologically interpreted (eg. ‘democratization of finance’), by what conservative, liberal or socialist disciplinary practices is ‘future labor’ constructed, calculated and ‘claimed’?

class system and its attendant tendency for proletarianization, one already has to group actors together quite artificially. For instance, an urban economy comprising ‘speculator-developers’ and ‘inner city residents’ (Harvey, 1974, Bridge, 1995). Even more problematic, when descending further to lower levels of abstraction like ‘social formations’, ‘conjunctures’ or ‘mechanisms’ (characterized by, or rather conflated with, more historical and geographical particularity, ie. scale), the central opposition of interests is progressively complicated by all kinds of ‘local’ intra-class conflicts and inter-class alliances. As classes start interfering significantly, they produce ‘contradictory’ positions of, for instance, workers in management ranks, or workers owning property (and even renting it out as petit bourgeois landlords). In addition, many state institutions work to strengthen inter-class alliances, while dividing and pacifying workers. Classes are thus fragmented, supposedly crippling the latter to enact the right kind of collective action (ie. action in accordance with their ‘true’ interests in light of eventual proletarianization). Yet despite this descent into conjunctural overdetermination, where, to sum up, actors are methodically and politically deindividualized, rents blur into other forms of income and classes are persistently superpositioned, critical geographers and gentrification analysts still hold as general fact the (at least formal) actualization of a market society of competitive individuals, emerging from some abstract underlying contradiction and constituting an essentially straightforward political economic ‘frontier’ in urban space (Smith, 1996).

5.2.4.4 Straight-line frontier or local complexity? How not to assume Von Thünen’s laboratory (but study it)

Indeed, the problem of class overdetermination soon recurs as well in Marxist analyses of urban land distributions. When Neil Smith speaks of gentrification as a ‘frontier of profitability’, it is only the latest ‘edge’ of an at least centuries old capitalist system of uneven development (1982, 2008a, 1996). The ‘new urban frontier’ of late twentieth century New York, complete with its own ‘natives’, ‘real estate cowboys’ and political ‘cavalry’, is thus as much a product of that system as was the original American frontier. For Von Thünen, writing in those perhaps simpler times of global capitalist expansion (and epistemologically, of absolute extension, Smith, 1992b: 66–67), while even then conveniently omitting the presence of its native peoples, the North American frontier lands indeed exemplified best his hypothetically ‘Isolated State’, approximating the pristine ‘laboratory’ conditions for establishing a proper interest rate and ‘natural wage’ (1960[1826]: 282–283, cf. Harvey, 1981). This is however, despite the popular homesteading rhetoric and Smith’s suggestions of structural equivalence, very far removed from any urban ‘frontier land’ in our time. Indeed, even in his own account of New York’s Lower East Side, there supposedly is, on the one hand, a division of areas of disinvestment and reinvestment as clear as that between nineteenth century colonial ‘civilization’ and Native American ‘wasteland’: “an economic line [...] sharply perceived in the minds of developers active in a neighborhood” (Smith, 1996: 187). While on the other, when investigated more methodically, and just like the original frontier, actual patterns of gentrification show

much more “local complexity [and] deviation from a straight-line diffusion” (Smith et al., 1989: 250, Smith, 1996: 205).

The reason why in so many places this straight-line is absent, even in the relatively free(d) land market of the American city, is that even historically speaking *practices* tend not to comply fully to capitalist axioms, bottom lines and norms, neither quantitatively, qua rental optimum, nor at the level of actor identity (individualist, utilitarian, profit/rent-seeking). And that is not because of imperfect competition or limited rationality, but because of inherent, ubiquitous and persistent controversy about, resistance to, and simply difference of, economic practice. When attending to practices, metric norms and interpretations of necessity no longer center around Capital as a matter of course and become radically multiple and relational, converging or diverging according to many (qualitatively) competing and normalizing practices and agencements. In this light then, it is time to acknowledge that rent gap formation (ie. enactment, ‘perception’) is multiple, messy and difficult in practice. To establish and act on the ‘extensive’ norm in practice, one needs to set up a Von Thünen-type ‘laboratory’ in the midst of an always ‘intensive’ situation shared with many sociomaterial obligations. So when ‘the’ frontier or gap is not simply ‘out there’ materially ‘underlying’ things, to be either ‘perceived’ or not, it must be secured and enacted in practice, despite the unruly mess that is ‘the’ property market. Moving truly beyond the dualism of materialist structure and idealist perception (Smith, 1996b), we must therefore investigate how nature is bifurcated and capitalism is erected not once and for all, in some original past or as a future promise, in either form or reality, but multiply actualized in the here and now, in practice and among other interfering practices, contradictory intentions and ‘non-economic’ metrics.

5.2.4.5 The ‘property mind’ distributed: Practices of real estate economization

When we observe the economic concept of rent only to find it an overdetermined product of social struggles and find that there may be many types of return beyond the monetary that different actors expect from owning, developing and investing in real estate, a further step would investigate the *practices* from which both those rents and their related identities emerge. Then we may better evaluate these rent and class issues according to their actual performativity and ethics (cf. SJ Smith, 2005). Making use of only the most abstract but empirically most concrete categories of practices, interpretations and metrics, we ask the question, *how do producers enact land rent (gaps) themselves in practice?*

To answer this question, we could take a first cue from Haila (1991), who in order to escape the high theoretical deadlock between neoclassical and heterodox explanations of property’s peculiarities empirically discerns several types of investment that are able to deal with a great variety of users, investors and motives. Following Langer’s (1984) cultural classification of urban imaginaries, she deduces four types of investment in land and property: the ‘bazaar’, oriented toward present use value; the ‘jungle’ dealing in short-term exchange values; the ‘organism’ planning for future use values and lastly, the ‘circus’ speculating on future exchange values (in

Langer: the growth ‘machine’). All four types might be said to be more or less rent (gap) seeking, but a mere classification by orientation to ‘exchange value’ does not identify this specifically enough. Although there is much merit in the value/timeframe dimensions of the scheme and although there are significant elements of these ideal types of bazaar, jungle, organism and circus/machine to be found in the empirical cases that follow below, they rest too heavily on rather general cultural images. This is something Haila seems to have acknowledged in her subsequent work as well. In a more recent publication (2017) she criticizes Ley and Teo’s (2014) interpretation of Hong Kong gentrification as a matter of ‘property culture’. Looking at Singapore’s real estate market, she proposes instead to look at how a ‘property mind’, with a ‘passion’ for property investment, development, calculations and gambling, is not (just) some culturally given identity but is institutionalized and enabled by a ‘property state’. Thus she points at how economic motivations and market watchers – in short, the property minds of investors – are effectuated by and entirely entangled with incentivizing institutional practices. Further pursuing and radicalizing this strand of enquiry here, we look at how within and around Klarendal certain affects and practices of housing economization (construction skills, calculative equipment etc., see Image 5.5), rather than rent levels, classes, cultures or even institutional designs, give rise to unique ‘real estate agencements’. Out of this empirical analysis we hope to distill some convergences and divergences in relation to the aforementioned extractive and creative genealogies of a longer duration. Yet before attempting to do so, some words have to be spent on the ethics that gives this undertaking its political economic relevance.

‘Rents’		(Accounting) prices, valuation models, point systems, metric properties
‘Class’	Non-quantified values of housing and location, extra-legal property claims	Property/welfare rights, values quantified
Socio-technical practices	Common desires and capacities of dwelling, construction and caring	Passionate interests, material hermeneutics, media of housing discourse
..... continuum of co-actualizing practices of real estate economics (cf. SJ Smith, 2011): affective – behavioral-cultural rationality – hedonic/comparative calculation		

Image 5.5. A more specific diagram of the (counter-)actualization of practices of real estate economization. Its logic secures an ontological autonomy for elements of practice beyond the usual categories of rent and class: No values produced by passionate interests, material hermeneutics and housing discourse can be subsumed by ‘rent’ unless actually quantified in calculative practice. No free desires and capacities for dwelling, construction and caring are subsumed by class (eg. as ‘habitus’) unless actually qualified by passionate interests, material hermeneutics and media of housing discourse. That being said, the practices across the spectrum, as the dotted line between them indicates, are fluid and connect to each other in unexpected and innovative ways (ie. they are not as clearly distinct as discursive interpretations of, for instance, property).

5.2.5 *Ethics of economy: critical and clinical*

5.2.5.1 *The critical and the clinical*

Apart from an inclination toward ethnography perhaps (cf. Ronald, 2011 on the need for ethnography in constructivist and post-social housing studies), an ontology of multiplicities of practices and the performativity conscious epistemology that comes with it do not so much entail different methods of research, but certainly imply a specific critical ethos. Following Deleuze (1997), we may espouse a mode of analysis that aims to be both critical and clinical. Left on its own, *critical* interpretation has an inclination to polarize objects as embodying *either* a sublimation *or* a resolution of an underlying, often hidden problem (D Smith, 1997). Oriented toward transcendent values, its logically and morally exhaustive judgement tends toward the universal and the constant. In ethical discussions on gentrification this is reflected in the way they turn on either affordable *rents* or basic rights for certain *classes* of city dwellers (rights to shelter, to stay put or 'to the city'). As a counterweight, a Deleuzian *clinical* mode of observation, understood primarily as a symptomatology (of *new* and different problems) rather than an etiology (which often all too hastily follows it), orients our diagnoses toward singularity, variation and ethics (ibid.). Applied to questions of economics, the clinical perspective leads us into two unconventional directions: disability studies and feminist ethics of care (cf. Winance, 2010). To extend the discussion on housing rights, we will in this chapter focus on two specifically economic disabilities, dyslexia and dyscalculia, and the special kind of care they might require.

5.2.5.2 *Economic (dis)abilities distributed*

As suggested by Callon and others (eg. Callon, 2008, Sloterdijk, 2012), also in relation to practices of economization (Callon, 2008, Çalışkan and Callon, 2010), there is much to learn from disability studies about everyday practices and the abilities they take for granted. What they share is a commitment to think against or beyond medical normalization and its inherent essentialisms (eg. Moser, 2000, 2006a, 2006b, Winance, 2006, 2007). Often in direct reference to notions of extended mind and distributed cognition (Moser, 2000), their accounts problematize and raze essentialist distinctions between, on the one hand, the prosthetically extended disabled and, on the other, the supposedly unextended, autonomously abled, thus making plain, as we all become situationally (dis)abled, that abilities, economic or otherwise, are always only relative to the 'normal', that is, to specific disciplinary practices (or 'dispositifs', Foucault, 1977). Instead then, of some ill 'condition' simply located in people's genetic or neurological nature, schizophrenia, for example, can become a 'clinical' correlate of capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 1987). Or less controversially, dyscalculia and dyslexia only emerge with the invention of accounting and writing (and, diagnosed as such, with the rise of mass education and psychology). Like bodily paralysis or impaired speech (Moser, 2000), reading and calculative disabilities are then better described as specific dyslexic and dyscalculic formations of body, brain and culture (Ferguson, 2008: 243), today comprising a

whole ‘arena of governmentality’ of their own (cf. Campbell, 2013). In our account of rent gap performance and gentrification economics we will attempt to build on this critical clinical approach and theorize practices of economization as more or less culturally and financially (dis)abled in light of a situationally defined norm. Thus we observe the production and (re)habilitation of economic disabilities along the two resonating performances of scarcity mentioned above, one positional, requiring literacy in a local cultural lexicon, and one quantitative and monetary, demanding calculative competence and equipment (ie. prosthetics).

5.2.5.3 *Ethics of justice and care*

Disability studies open up ways to rethink the kind of ethics we practice in matters of economic and spatial inequality. In this regard, the gentrification discourse has been dominated by a particular ‘ethics of justice’, militantly concerned with defending or expanding housing *rights*, from the legally formal (‘to stay put’) to the more informal (‘to place’ or ‘to the city’, Hartman, 1998, Newman and Wyly, 2006, Imbroscio, 2004, Blomley, 2004). However, as feminist investigations of the ethics of *care* show, this critical discourse on rights does not necessarily exhaust our ethopolitical repertoire. Studying practices of health care (taken literally here, ie. in disciplinary language) (Mol et al., 2010), they demonstrate that rights and care do not always align. Juridical and caring modes, also of ‘doing good’, can contrast and interfere with one another in resonant or dissonant ways, as Pols (2003) shows for emancipatory patient laws and their different enactment in two mental hospitals. Strikingly similar observations are made by Susan J. Smith (2005, Easterlow and Smith, 2004, Smith et al. 2004), as she finds modes of caring outside of state institutions and redistributive rights in the unlikely place of the real estate market, which in many ways can offer more choice, flexibility, autonomy and security to the chronically ill. In terms of an ethics of care, she asserts, housing markets need not be the private antithesis of public provision, but might be cared for in many ways, perhaps making for ‘a thousand tiny markets’ producing ‘a thousand tiny tenures’ (in reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘rhizomatics’, SJ Smith, 2005: 17, 2010: 271). Furthermore, extending Pol’s argument into economic territory, Callon and Law (2005: 725) notice how care by its nature also tends to escape calculative accountability, or rather requires the hard work of unaccountability, which they find exemplified in Quaker communal practices of ‘agapé’ (non-reciprocal, selfless love, or ‘pretrust’, *ibid.*: 723–725). To enable themselves to care for the community, Quakers have devised material and discursive practices (eg. silent ministry) that remove or ‘disentangle’ themselves from resources and relations of calculability (ie. ‘calculative rarefaction’, *ibid.*: 723). Where rights and accounts end, care begins, involving messy processes of adjustment and experiment, a tinkering with practical variables until a suitable material and affective arrangement is reached (Mol et al., 2010, Winance, 2010).

5.2.5.4 *Caring as the affirmation of the differently abled*

More than a discourse of rights or money, and beyond the disciplinary domain of health care, care also forces us to think about the productive dimensions of power, that is, beyond repressive and possessive (or ‘sovereign’) understandings of it (cf. Foucault, 1977, 1978). Clinical dyslexia, which diagnoses a troubled relation with sound-symbol representations (Ferguson, 2008: 235), presents a great case in point. Even though its correction, pressing neurological heterogeneity into the mold of normality, involves a great amount of pain and effort from both caregiver and caretaker, literacy is undeniably an enrichment of one’s skill set (even beyond its indispensability in daily transactions). However, the genealogical ‘spandrel’ of dyslexia (cf. Gould and Lewontin, 1979) can also be seen as an ‘evolutionary asset’, in general because dyslexic brains often show exceptional visual and verbal strengths, but especially when dyslexics’ pedagogical need for more multisensorial engagements with normalized (‘molar’) language give new opportunities to explore its more creative and excessive dimensions (‘molecular lines of flight’, Ferguson, 2008: 239–240, cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Care then, in this case, amounts to an attentive accommodation between normalization and the affirmation of ‘cerebrodiversity’ (Ferguson, 2008). In short, normalization, especially in relation to chronic and psychological ‘conditions’, is a rather janus-faced process because it aims to include by performative exclusion: one is declared abnormal to in turn be included (Moser, 2000: 210). Alternatively, therefore, one can either work on the norm (Winance, 2007) or attempt to radically deconstruct normality and affirm the ‘differently abled’ (Moser, 2000).¹²⁶

5.2.5.5 *(Non)capitalism or econodiversity*

In the context of capacities and regimes of economization, Arnsperger and Johnson (2011: 61–62) similarly argue for an ethos of ‘econodiversity’ and against a disciplinary state which merely functions “to optimize its citizens’ insertion into the cogs and wheels of the capitalist economic machine, even when [they] work as civil servants or as third-sector, nonprofit employees”. Much in the spirit of Gibson-Graham (2006) and, in relation to housing, Hodkinson (2012), they espouse to a genuinely plural economy, fostering economic experimentation (ie. care) and the fundamental right to the opportunity to do so.¹²⁷ In order therefore to try and resist the strong pull of capitalocentric discourse, shared both by proponents and critics of capitalism, we will here juxtapose a range of economic practices, giving “the full diversity of economic relations and practices the space to exist in all their specificity and

¹²⁶ To accomplish the latter, Moser calls upon ‘cyber-prosthetic discourse’, captivated by mind expanding technologies (making bodies less important), actor-network theory, showing how disabilities are not given ‘conditions’ but rather specific material-semiotic configurations (including non-humans), and the figure of the cyborg (Haraway, 1985), emphasizing the politics of acknowledging that we are all cyborg hybrids rather than given conditions (and have always been).

¹²⁷ Gibson-Graham explicitly relate their program of the ‘diverse economy’ to an ecologically inspired ‘ethics of care’ that is “concerned with the question of how to enact our interdependence with each other and with nature in a manner that respects the other in all of its forms” (Gibson-Graham and Roelvink, 2009).

independence”, hopefully with the effect of rendering ‘noncapitalism’ more of a “positive multiplicity rather than an empty negativity” (Gibson–Graham, 2006: 59, 70). Reading local market realities for difference (in practice) rather than sameness (value) and (class) dominance, we aim to foster “conditions under which images and enactments of economic diversity (including noncapitalism) might stop circulating around capitalism, stop being evaluated with respect to capitalism, and stop being seen as deviant or exotic or eccentric – departures from the norm” (ibid.: 56). For economic practice and housing in particular, this reading could affirm the ‘differently abled’ or at least work on the norm defining economic (dis)abilities.

5.2.5.6 Affirming economic dyslexia and dyscalculia

Bringing together our genealogy of the two normalizing ‘languages’ of scarcity and the foregoing reflections on the care for (dis)abilities and cerebrodiversity, we may propose two concepts for assessing experimentations with and care for ‘econodiversity’. Applying these to housing developments in Klarendal can shed a new light on old questions around gentrification, residualization, ‘third way’ welfare and democratization, issues usually framed only or chiefly in terms of distributive justice and rights to place rather than care. First, *economic dyslexia* describes those practices that are sociotechnically ‘disabled’ or rather ‘differently abled’ because they are obliged in their pursuit of progressive change to honor value diversity, navigate extra-legal property claims and resist the many temptations of the zero-sum game of prestige that is real estate development. As we will see below, in the case of social housing provision and careful neighborhood redevelopment this means knowing how to avoid risks of megalomania and paternalism in combating territorial stigmatization. Secondly, (dis)abilities of *economic dyscalculia* delineates capacities for warding off the pull of capital (financialization). Below, we will see how this is achieved by a social housing corporation through constructive unaccountability and by calculating with different, more (eco)socialist magnitudes. In sum, we approach economics and its empirical practice not only critically, tying ideological constructs to dominant practices, but also clinically, paying attention to material variations and experimentation that are never entirely contained by such constructs.

Part 2

5.3 A Klarendal–Arnhem to economize: Of machines, kings and symbionts of gentrification

In the first part we derived a general theory of economic multiplicities and how they generate through various evolutionary processes a diverse range of practices and agencements of (real estate) economization. In this second, empirical part this framework is brought to bear on a series of four agencements that have been active in Klarendal in the last ten years in order to describe, explain and evaluate in detail how they bring gentrification into practice (or not). These four cases do not represent any ‘stages of gentrification’ (Lees et al., 2008), which is simply not applicable to the area’s recent history. This might be because Arnhem is from a perspective of a global

urban hierarchy a small city of lower rank not (yet) having to deal with strong spill-over pressures from investment-saturated cities of higher rank such as Amsterdam or Utrecht (cf. Lees, 2006). More probable, from a less hierarchical and globalizing perspective, is that it is just as ‘ordinary’ a city as every other in that it constitutes its own unique combination of social, political, and economic configurations (Robinson, 2006). Within the city of Arnhem this ‘chaotic’ image of a multiplicity of processes and temporalities (cf. Rose, 1996) indeed makes more sense than any old or new stage model. On a spatial plane, furthermore, as Clark (1992b: 19) notes, rent gaps cannot simply be read off a concentric model of the city and “are highly place-specific and refer to single properties” (notwithstanding the probability of ‘neighborhood effects’). And here we might add, the ‘reading’ of the gaps itself is very practice-specific and agencement-specific too (and in theory could indeed be done with the performative use of concentric models of the real estate market). However, the first three of the four agencements to be discussed enact ‘the’ real estate market of Klarendal in very different ways, practicing and propagating quite different techniques and ethics: a machine, a king and a symbiont of gentrification. All three bring to the fore and illuminate different (dis)abilities that define the matrix of capacities that the fourth agencement, the social housing corporation, has to embody to function as a proper ‘prosthetic’ for its clientele.

5.3.1 Clockwork Inc.: a gentrification machine scanning for rent gaps

On 1 March 2016 the ‘circus’ comes to town, to speak in Haila’s (1991) terms. On that date the Arnhem housing corporation Vivare sells 600 social rentals for almost 54 million euro to QSP ESS BV, a company owned by famous Hungarian-American investor George Soros (Hendriks, 2018). It is part of a global trend, of social housing being sold off to internationally operating private equity funds and other institutional investors. And it is actively advertised by the Dutch national government, including the lure of a huge ‘value gap’ (Hamnett and Randolph, 1986, Clark, 1992b). As the website says “it is estimated that about 1 million regulated dwellings are of such quality that these houses can enter the non-regulated market” (Hendriks, 2018),¹²⁸ this has understandably caused quite a stir at a moment when years of waiting time for appropriate housing reaches double digits in some places. Meanwhile the governing conservative party (VVD) has been pursuing a conscious strategy to level and residualize the national social housing stock by forcing housing corporations through landlord levies and other taxes to sell off their properties, preferably in large quantities to foreign investors who are willing and able. Besides these external pressures on the Arnhem corporation, there have been internal reasons for the big sale as well. Vivare has not exactly shown itself a paragon of patient capital. Much like its larger sibling Vestia, which lost more than two billion euros to risky speculation by its CEO and treasurer, Vivare frittered away 15 million euros in public assets during the financial crisis (Verbraeken, 2014). Meanwhile, at the height of the sectoral crisis, just before selling off its stock to Soros, Vivare’s company CEO manages to accord

¹²⁸ See the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: <https://www.investingindutchhousing.nl/> (accessed 04-2019).

himself a bonus above his already maximum salary (as stated in their annual report of 2014). However, while this kind of financialized agencement falling squarely in the extractive and megalomaniacal middle of the spectrum surely is informative of an increasingly prominent trend in Dutch housing, it is still quite atypical in Arnhem (compared to Amsterdam for instance, Griffioen, 2015). Moreover, we do not yet find any trace of it around our neighborhood, Klarendal.

How does the case of Klarendal then relate to the thesis that rent gaps have now become ‘planetary’? According to Slater’s most recent update of Neil Smith’s theory of the rent gap, Von Thünen has now been ‘globalized’ as “the circulation of capital within secondary circuits of accumulation [eg. real estate] is *everywhere*” (2017: 132, 131, emphasis added). Is Klarendal not part of everywhere (yet)? Convinced today’s neoliberal capitalism does not either, Slater is hardly bothered by “such distinctions” and just assumes the economic system has planetary reach. *How* exactly this extensive rent seeking happens (or not?), the mechanics of practice, is irrelevant for Slater. Instead we just need to look for where it happens, identify the culprits, the “agents of capital (the financiers, the real estate brokers, policy elites, developers)”, and expose their justifications for the stigmatizations they are (ibid., 19–20). However, while it may be so that financial(ized) companies are more globally networked than ever, either directly, as in the above story of QSP ESS BV, or indirectly through banks loaning out mortgages to gentrifiers, it should always remain an empirical question whether and to what degree that is the case in any particular enactment of a rent gap. To answer that question, one has to look closely at practices and describe how capital is actually mobilized, show how certain actants carry and construct the international market (or do not). One would find then that there is a great non-trivial difference in calculative practices between companies like Soros’ mobilizing money onto 600 existing dwellings for the pure purpose of rent seeking, and another investor having to mobilize a whole productive apparatus of ‘immutable’ besides money (but in a way becoming money as much as possible) to insert a new block of houses at a profitable location. Now, while the former agencement is still absent in Klarendal, the latter we do find there.

5.3.1.1 Clockwork by spreadsheet: A first obligatory passage point

In the last decade or so, Klarendal has seen the new construction of three large blocks of middle class dwellings on plots where other types of uses prevailed, including social housing for seniors (see Images 5.5–5.9). With that, and also considering their surroundings, they can thus be classified as ‘new-build gentrification’ (Davidson and Lees, 2009). One of these construction projects, a lightning fast one, we witnessed being built ourselves. Since 2012 the terrain lay fallow, waiting for a care institution to realize homes for the elderly there to service the growing population of aging Klarendallers. However, in a context of post-crisis austerity and decentralization of care services (Gemeenteraad Arnhem, 12–11–2012) these plans were arrested in



Images 5.5-5.9. At the top, the temporary buildings used as elderly homes and youth center 'de Mix' all the way on the left in the photo (Google Street View, 10-2008, accessed 05-10-2020). The second photo from the top, shows the empty plot with a billboard announcing the Achter de Linden development. It depicts a man and woman drinking tea in the tall grass, with a slogan below 'Convivial living in Klarendal' (Sfeervol wonen in Klarendal) (the photo is somewhat glitchy because of Google Street View, it is dated 04-2016, accessed 05-10-2020). Below that, on the left, the new middle class houses built by Clockwork and on the right the surrounding working class dwellings (Google Street View, 08-2018, accessed 05-10-2020). The aerial photo below shows the construction site next to the park and playground (Google Earth, 2019, accessed 05-10-2020, circle added).





Image 5.11. Clockwork Inc.'s headquarters, located at a remote industrial site (Google Street View, 08-2017, accessed 05-10-2020).

an already advanced stage. They were too expensive for the target audience, that is, working class seniors (Wijkkrant Klarendal, 01-2016). Some years later, in 2015, new flexible zoning rules finally led a big developer to acquire the land and plan the construction of twenty middle class dwellings there.¹²⁹ Later, we learned that it was a way for the developer to gain a foothold on the Arnhem market.

The project 'Achter de Linden', referring to the monumental lime trees in the area, is the product of our first agencement of real estate economization, which we here give the name *Clockwork Inc.* Clockwork Inc. is a veritable machine of rent gap enactment and gentrification. When we traced its base of operation it took us outside of Arnhem altogether, to an inconspicuous office building at a remote industrial site in Nijmegen (see Image 5.11). As a machine, and we will explain below, it is built for efficiency, specialized in rational calculation. It is not so much an agency of renovation as it is an assembly line for houses. Its main business consists of churning out new buildings on 'featureless plains'. However, to do so within an existing inner city environment it has to include a component of practice that is able to find and measure the potential of that empty plot within its messy surroundings. That is, it needs another calculative practice that can virtually homogenize the area's heterogeneity and probe any potential rents issuing from it. This other component of the gentrification machine we find in the

¹²⁹ The area represented one of four major amendments to the land-use plan (*bestemmingsplan*) for Klarendal-Sint Marten, since the plan of 2004 (Sint Marten being the neighborhood directly adjacent and to the west of Klarendal). Already announced in the latter, is a possible future change from 'social' (*maatschappelijk*) to 'housing' (*wonen*) (Gemeenteraad Arnhem, 03-2004: 24). Later, in the new land-use plan of 2012, the social function was actually changed to 'mixed' (*gemengd*), which meant any housing (Gemeenteraad Arnhem, 12-11-2012: 50). The others concerned the use of houses on commercial axis Klarendalseweg for the new Fashion Quarter and also the installment of Station Klarendal (Gemeenteraad Arnhem, 26-03-2007, 12-11-2012, see Section 5.3.4.4); the area where a school was located, behind the row of houses renovated by Richman (Gemeenteraad Arnhem, 2012, see Section 5.3.2, see also image 5.35); and redevelopment of the old military barracks into a multifunctional community center (Gemeenteraad Arnhem, 13-05-2011, see Section 5.3.4.5). On the politics attached to these changes of land-use plans, see Chapter 6, Section 6.4.1.

modern real estate broker who has the economic tools to ‘know the market’. While new electronic tools of comparative appraisal may give agencies increasing independence from local materialities, this knowing of the market still demands enough triangulation between computer data and situated expertise to require the enrollment of a broker with experience in Arnhem. As one Arnhem-based agent explains:

“It gives me an enormous advantage, having knowledge of the market. Normally speaking, developers always need an agent to come to certain insights, which for me is a lot easier because I have that knowledge of Arnhem. Put me in Nijmegen and I would need an agent too!” (Interview no. 024)

Both sets of practices, of the builder and the broker, will be described in what follows. However, first we need to take a look at their actual nexus, the central component practice and obligatory passage point within the agencement. Visiting Clockwork’s office, one of its project developers (*projectontwikkelaars*) sitting before an extensive spreadsheet demonstrates to us how his company decides to develop projects where it does:

“We simply [*gewoon*] have our standard files – models – which simply include the home, or type of home, what we call Basic House. That is simply our standard row or corner house. It can be extended to duplex or detached, but in this case it’s row and corner. Those we have put in a matrix. Then we insert the Energy Performance Coefficient [*EPC*] and other points in accordance with Building Decrees [*Bouwbesluit*]. We enter all that into the model. Then a certain amount of building costs comes rolling out. A rough estimate [*richting*], which is not quite precise yet, with the kind of door, bricks etc. [still left open]. But it gives us a good basic starting position. Then there are building costs. Next are land costs [*grondkosten*] about which you’ve made an agreement with [the seller]. Then some added costs such as sales charges, which we estimate by past projects. And then there is the revenues tab [*opbrengstenblad*]. That’s where we take advice from real estate agents and make presumptions [*aannames*]. Then, again, we insert our own labor hours and see what’s the bottom line [*wat er overblijft onder de streep*] and then we decide yes or no.” (Interview no. 023)

Here we see a remarkable coming together of material, labor and land costs and value estimates and how they inform eventual investment decisions. Let us first look at the cost side input for its rent gap performance and eventual closure.

5.3.1.2 Determining costs: Adaptation through standardized flexibility and supply management

Looking at Clockwork’s spreadsheet, the precision of the numbers rolling out is quite remarkable, especially considering the construction business’ years long struggle with so-called ‘costs of quality failures’ (*faalkosten*) (Abdul-Rahman, 1993, Love et al., 2018). For several decades, the Dutch housebuilding industry has been grappling with significant cost increases resulting from dwellings not conforming to customer requirements. In 2001, Dutch market research firm USP Marketing Consultancy reckoned these costs of failure to be some 6% of turnover for architecture, engineering

and construction industries. Ten years later, the same USP and others estimated the total costs of failure around 11%. This was believed to amount to significant delays and budget overruns – highly relevant concerns for a company like Clockwork that finds itself in a crisis-plagued and exceedingly competitive environment.

To better understand its strategy and drive for cost reduction, including those pesky quality failure costs, we need to first look at how Clockwork describes the market it operates in, which comes into even sharper focus during times of sectoral crisis. Its annual report of 2012 states:

“With the presence of a very large number of players in construction, capacity thinking and low profit margins are the order of the day. Net margins are very narrow, even among the best performing companies. The continuous fierce competition is a significant cause of this. The crisis has reinforced these tendencies. The small margins make it hard to absorb setbacks. This is a short description of the market circumstances Clockwork operates in at the moment. Keeping our heads above the water in our eyes demands decisiveness and adaptivity.” (Klokgroep, 2013)

Finding itself in such a harsh environment, and as a proper capitalist should, Clockwork is always monitoring its ‘margins’ most carefully to ensure its survival. The observance of small profit margins induces (reportedly) conservative financial strategies to keep solvability ‘setbacks’ at bay and a steady but wary expansion into new markets. Although cautiously extending its activities to Germany and Poland, Clockwork still mostly operates and grows within Dutch national borders. Arnhem, so we learned (Interview no. 023), was unknown territory and the Klarendal project actually functioned as a way to lodge itself into the local market and start building a reputation there. However, this does not mean it would be willing to subsidize any losses for that purpose (and neither does it gamble or speculate willingly). In contrast to the other agencements to be described later in this chapter, its main mode of survival and evolution is adaptation, of the kind rather superficially described and essentialized by both neoclassical economists and critical economic geographers (ie. cost reduction through ‘spacetime compression’, see Section 5.2.3). As the above-cited annual report attests, this adaptivity becomes most pronounced during times of recession. In effect, at the nadir of the housing crisis Clockwork found it had to demonstrate ‘decisiveness’ and adapt, by reducing costs through spending cuts, asset devaluation and ‘reorganization’, meaning mostly layoffs. In recent, more normal years however, adaptivity for Clockwork means finding new ways to minimize building costs, including costs of failure.

In practice its main vehicle for achieving this adaptability is its trademark building concept, which we translate as BasicHouse. This specific practice of ‘conceptual building’ (not an entirely unique idea in the industry, there are many others like it) allows Clockwork to maximally standardize its products while maintaining sufficient flexibility to serve a broad enough range of clients. Everywhere it builds *basically* the same houses that can be adapted to customer preferences adding extra components much like with a Lego or wooden toy house (see Images 5.12–5.15). Firstly, a BasicHouse comes in several different forms, including a terraced house, semi-detached houses



Images 5.12-5.15. Some BasicHouse prototypes and one end result from the website of Clockwork Inc. The top right prototype is of the same basic shape of the Klarendal project (source: Klokgroep.nl, accessed 14-05-2019).

and detached variant. For the standard terraced house dimensions range from 5.1 x 9.26 to 5.7 x 10.46 meters. Next, customers are offered a choice of three roof types (flat, sloping and sloping with rooms built-in) and may add modules such as a dormer, garage or carport. Lastly, they can also decide about materials and colors used for the exterior wall cladding of the building.

Technically, the BasicHouse concept is made possible by a particular version of computer-aided design. As the website explains, this is a core instrument to suppress costs of failure and therefore essential to the company's operation:

“For years now BIM (Building Information Management) has been a standard component within Clockwork's building processes. With BIM every BasicHouse is already built virtually at our own workplace. Because of this all parties involved work together efficiently and costs of failure are reduced.”

The BIM software package is a fully developed version of what was first designed already in the 1970's at Carnegie-Mellon University under the name of 'Building Description System'. Of particular import was the system's built-in topological flexibility, so that a change in any one building component's dimensions would automatically adjust any others where needed. Back then already it was suggested that the model could easily generate cost estimations as well (Eastman, 1975). Today at Clockwork, this is exactly how it functions, by enabling the developer, together with all those involved, to calculate, account and simulate projects in all their dimensions before any on-site realization takes shape. It is thus an invaluable piece of technology

to prevent costly construction mistakes by making it possible to nail down into a strict step-by-step plan, the whole process of house design, cost calculation, acquisition of building permits and then realization and even post-realization maintenance.

Secondly, a standardized but flexible assembly line for houses allowing customers to add or remove elements according to preference also implies changes in the organization of the production process. In fashionable terms, Clockwork aims to smooth out its operation under a general supply chain management philosophy of ‘lean construction’ (*lean bouwen*). More generally, a product of the ‘quality revolution’ (Dale et al., 2016[1994]) from which also came forth the notion of ‘costs of quality failures’, supply chain management is a strategy that substitutes an adversarial open-market bargaining to dealings with suppliers by all round more beneficial long-term partnerships characterized by common goal setting, mutual integrity and the sharing of data and quality management systems (ibid.: 141-142). Decrying how ‘the market is plagued by suspicion’ (*hangt aan elkaar van wantrouwen*, ABN Amro, 2012: 14), Clockwork puts a lot of effort in supply chain collaboration. The BIM system plays a key mediating role in this. Already at an early stage of the development process the company efficiently involves its customers and other construction parties (architects, contractors, constructors, installers, material suppliers). Before anything materializes on site everything is digitally rendered and calculated to the utmost extent, technically as well as financially. The resulting model then controls much of the supply chain, directly instructing even the factory where its concrete shells are made. However, as most business studies on the subject will tell us, another key ingredient of good supply chain management is human feelings of trust and commitments among collaborators. This less technologically outsourced but just as ‘calculative’ kind of trust (Chen and Paulraj, 2004: 141) we see factored into the agencement as well, in the form of leisurely team building activities such as paintball games accompanying building projects (ABN Amro, 2012: 14). To sum up, what we get from this picture of the building agencement is an idea of the sort of apparatus that is needed to deploy the right kind of houses at minimal costs over large, even international distances. If not just digital, deregulated global capital merely speculating on existing properties, new building developments require a sophisticated set of sufficiently immutable and mobile actants that carry them out. When speaking of ‘planetary rent gaps’ (Slater, 2017) we have to keep that in mind. Already in the building process there are often heavy costs involved that codefine rent gaps.

5.3.1.3 Determining values in the wild: Standardized appraisal, probing demand and intuition

Having thus described the cost-determining part of rent gap construction, we now have to look at the value-determining part, that is, those practices attached to the ‘revenues tab’ of the spreadsheet. As stated, this is where Clockwork hooks up with real estate agents who ‘know’ the local market. To properly understand this task, is to see how the market for properties is performed. Indeed, housing markets have to be performed like any other (Callon, 1998b) and those most actively doing so, the market intermediaries (surveyors, solicitors etc.), practice it in many different

yet interrelated ways. For a large part, the market is simply ‘talked into being’ like so many other social institutions (cf. Heritage and Clayman, 2010: 21). As Susan J. Smith et al. (2006) demonstrate for the city of Edinburgh, this verbalization of the housing market enacts many ‘social devices’ such as scripts of professionalism and market objectification (‘do it scientifically’) and rules of thumb for pricing (‘for an old house, 10 per cent above the upset’). Devices that can also break down when markets experience bubbles and come to be unstable, as in relation to some rapidly gentrifying areas of the Scottish capital. At that point, when the line between ‘informed respectable speculation and ill-conceived gambling’ starts to blur, people are left to their ‘herd instincts’ and decisions (that are never really without accompanying emotions) become ‘irrational’ in the eyes of professionals. However, while Smith et al. may move beyond institutional and sociological approaches such as Bridge (2001), describing in detail how real estate agents indeed verbalize the (gentrifying) housing market into being, what they leave out are all the non-verbal practices involved in market and price construction, despite being well aware of work on (mostly financial) markets that does take these important mediators into consideration (eg. Mackenzie and Millo, 2003). Yet to understand the differences between different practices of real estate economization and thus of gentrification we would be advised to look at these more carefully (cf. Munro and Smith, 2008).

One way to get the above professional(ist) verbalizations expressed more precisely and technically, is to look at educational material studied by aspiring real estate intermediaries, such as a textbook of valuation theory. One such document we thought of as fairly representative we obtained through a student, who before doing his bachelors in Spatial Planning at our university, followed a realtor training with an institution active in the Arnhem region, the Morel Makelaars Instituut. In lessons 12 and 13 of the five-hundred-plus-page training syllabus, dealing with valuation theory and methods (*taxatieleer*), we can trace in somewhat more detailed steps how to get from theories of value and valuation to the actual practice of appraising a property. Firstly, the document defines value “in an economic sense” as an “amount of money” (*geldbedrag*) (Morel Makelaars Instituut, 2011: 6). An exchange or barter (same word in Dutch: *ruil*) of property for that amount of money is what constitutes a “sale/buy”. In this exchange money is a “measure of value” (*waardemeter*). Quite confusingly, it continues: “The price of an end product can be determined by adding up the price of the materials [*grondstoffen*] and the costs of labour. This is how the economic value of the end product comes to be. Whether this is also the true value [*werkelijke waarde*] remains to be seen. [...] The market value is [also] determined by other factors.” The *real* value according to the doxa is thus determined not so much by materials and labor added to the property (confusingly called ‘economic value’), rather than by ‘the market’, that is, “the place where demand and supply meet”. Here supply and demand are taken as entirely given, with exchanging parties having no influence on it whatsoever. So with materials and labour not being indicators of the real value, something else has to be the source of it: the volatile human and its subjective preferences. Thus we find a subjective (or marginalist) theory of value underlying their work: “In real estate we follow the subjective theory of value [*waardeleer*], because the appraisal depends on judgement of humans [*de mens*]” (ibid., Lesson 12: 7). This then is the background assumption that sets the general problem for brokers

to address: “the market as an ideal valuation model [*waarderingsmodel*] brings together subjective, unmeasurable and constantly changing valuations, ultimately resulting in an objectively measurable market price.” (ibid. Lesson 12: 9) So, it is this eventual price that is the only objective value, while everything that happens before, including cost calculations and professional estimates, remains entirely subjective. Nonetheless, as we will see, this does not stop the agent to ‘objectivize the subjective as much as possible’, making objectivity/subjectivity more a matter of degree.

But first the argument goes on. While on a “well functioning market costs and returns cannot remain unequal [as] can be mathematically proven by the neoclassical equilibrium model”, the real estate market does not comply to this ideal assumption of “perfect competition” and “homogeneity” (ibid.: 10, my translation). If it did, the job of the then rather redundant broker would merely consist of tracking down the actual building costs or, if intransparent, approaching them by going on averages. Yet because costs and returns do not match up, thereby excluding a possible “cost approach to valuation [*kostenbenadering*]” (except for unique properties where there is no or little market for, ie. no comparatives), the broker is left with taking a “comparative approach [*comparatieve benadering*]: What is the value of the object in the open market? Here comparison and experience play an important role.” (ibid.: Lesson 12: 20) This conclusion is reflected in the (suggested) standard template for the surveyors report, as appended to the textbook (See Images 5.16–5.17 below).

Having thus defined the real estate appraiser’s general problem and having deduced the only method for solving it, a number of ‘concrete factors’ are suggested by which plots can be compared. Foremost, these are the ‘object data’: “nature [*aard*], size and layout; building year; saleability [*courantheid*] and utility [*bruikbaarheid*]; location; supply and demand; date of transaction.” These primary data are then checked by secondary ‘correction factors’, such as: “quality/maintenance; improvements/renovation; finish; surroundings [*omgeving*]; attached claims/duties; financial possibilities; alternative uses [*bestemmingen*].” (ibid.: Lesson 13: 5) When these primary and secondary data have been put into ‘key figures’ (*kengetallen*), they are to be multiplied by the surface of the land or the volume of its superstructure. This is how to arrive at the ‘objective’ ‘basic value’. However, the other half of the comparative appraisal is said to rest on ‘intuition’:

“The intuition of the appraiser plays an important role. The value – irrespective of the method he [*sic*] uses – is for a large part determined on subjective grounds. Here the experience of the appraiser plays an important role. The appraiser acquires that thorough market knowledge only when he is *in direct contact with the market*. At that moment he is capable to make that translation to the value to be assessed. Besides that the appraiser can calculate, with the use of aforementioned object data and the correction factors, a kind of ‘theoretical’ market value. After that a *practical test* always follows. In other words: the appraiser will try to *objectify the subjective as much as possible*.” (ibid.: Lesson 13: 5, emphases added)

Here we have finally narrowed down the task of the appraising agent, but also located the space for a divergence of practices. In between being ‘in direct contact with the market’, ‘objectifying the subjective’ and a ‘practical test’ (cf. Munro and Smith, 2008:

Bij dit taxatierapport behoort het Normblad Taxatierapport financiering woonruimte januari 2011

TAXATIERAPPORT

financiering woonruimte

MODEL, januari 2011 vastgesteld door CHF, NVM, VastgoedPRO, VBO

ALGEMEEN

A. OPDRACHT/OPNAME

Waardepeildatum :-201..
Naam opdrachtgever(s) :
Adres opdrachtgever :
Opdracht namens opdrachtgever
versrekt door :
Opdracht is uitgevoerd door taxateur
ingeschreven in het register : onder nummer
Lid van /aangesloten bij :
Naam kantoor :
Adres kantoor :
Datum opname en inspectie :-201..

B. OBJECT

Woningtype(conform Fotowijzer Woningen):
Adres :
Postcode, Plaats :

C. DOEL VAN DE TAXATIE

Het vaststellen van de marktwaarde ten behoeve van:
a. het verkrijgen van (hypotheek) financiering.
b. verkrijging Nationale Hypotheek Garantie (NHG) : ja/nee

D. WAARDERING

Het object is per waardepeildatum getaxeerd op:
- Marktwaarde : zegge:
- Executiewaarde : zegge:

Optioneel:
- Marktwaarde in verhuurde staat
- Executiewaarde in verhuurde staat
- waarden voor verhuuring
- waarden na verhuuring

L. ONDERBOUWING WAARDEORDEEL

1. Toegepaste methodiek

De onderhavige waardering is mede gebaseerd op:

- objectvergelijking nee, omdat
 ja, met de volgende (minimaal 2) referentieobjecten
(eventueel uit modelmatige vergelijking)

2. Courantheid

Bij aanbidding aan de markt tegen de getaxeerde waarde zal deze waarde naar verwachting van de taxateur kunnen worden gerealiseerd binnen een termijn van circa : 0 tot 3 maanden / 3 tot 6 maanden / 6 tot 9 maanden / 9 tot 12 maanden / anders omdat,

3. Geraadpleegde modelmatige rapporten (optioneel)

Aantal geraadpleegde rapporten

a. Bron

Modelmatige waarde
Overige gegevens uit modelmatig rapport
Getaxeerde marktwaarde (zie D.)
Percentage afwijking ten opzichte van de getaxeerde marktwaarde
Gebruikte referentiepanelen
Commentaar taxateur op modelmatig rapport

b.

Bron
Modelmatige waarde
Overige gegevens uit modelmatig rapport
Getaxeerde marktwaarde (zie D.)
Percentage afwijking ten opzichte van de getaxeerde marktwaarde
Gebruikte referentiepanelen
Commentaar taxateur op modelmatig rapport

(c. Bron, etc.)

Images 5.16–5.17. Photoscans of two pages of a template appraisal report (taxatierapport) taken from the realtor training syllabus (Morel Makelaars Instituut, 2011: Appendix to chapter 12). On the left is a part of the front page, including the assessed ‘market value’ and ‘foreclosure value’ (executiewaarde) in money, and on the right, on the last page but one, is the part demanding substantiation of the valuation: “(1) Applied methods [including only!] ‘object comparison’ [and the added yes/no response]: No, because... [or] Yes, including the following (at least two) reference objects... (possibly from a model comparison)...; (2) Timeliness...; (3) Consulted model-based reports (optional).”

352–353) there is a lot of room for difference in marketization techniques. To the third, more hermeneutic component (the ‘practical test’) we will come back only in Section 5.3.2.4, as it has a small role to play in Clockwork’s deployment onto its featureless plane. Indeed, we could say the agencement tries to squeeze out this component as much as possible, by maximally ‘objectifying the subjective’.

5.3.1.3.1 Objectifying the subjective: New prosthetics of valuation

To start then with the latter intention, of maximally ‘objectifying the subjective’, there is today a host of tools available to the agent to do so. This comes down to a prolific construction of so-called ‘prosthetic prices’. From a practices of economization perspective (Çalışkan and Callon, 2009, 2010, Çalışkan, 2010), the ‘actual price’ is merely an end result of a whole process of price realization. While actual prices certainly constitute special performative events, supported as they are by legal contracts and banking practices (and theoretical subjective/objective distinctions), they are always embedded within an extensive series of prosthetic pricings. This is something that is actually much more obvious in housing markets than in say, supermarkets, as the stakes are much higher and there typically is much more room for price negotiation (but see Garfinkel, 1967: 69). Although not exclusively, the bulk of these prosthetics are prices previously realized and archived somehow. Admission to such prosthetics is however not free and requires access to some archive of prices. Not too long ago, when Arnhem real estate offices still used a system of paper property info cards (*stamkaartjes*), this access entailed quite some effort on the part of the agent (Interview no. 031). The old archive, consisting of numerous folders including hundreds of photos of everything for sale in Arnhem, had to be maintained and updated by hand. This was also the card system used to make all the object comparisons (and the cards were carried along to site visits). Today, however, market monitoring and object comparison proceeds through general digital databases (see Image 5.18). As is the case in Britain (Munro and Smith, 2008: 353), prices are stored in national databases and accessed through software packages such as RealWorks (also seen on the photo below). As seen in the photo, the software presents an assortment of properties and their attributes within a synoptic interface. In practice, constructing the comparison is now simply done by ticking boxes to select properties and attributes to be factored in. The valuation aid has the benefit of producing systematic looking printouts while still allowing a lot of room for massaging data toward a desired outcome by ticking the right boxes.

However, as convenient and advanced as these technologies of market intelligence may have already become, such large integrated digital databases also enable further sophistication in the form of automated ‘model-based’ valuations (as the standard appraisal form of Image 5.17 already requests). While mentioning its potential rise as a valuation practice, Munro and Smith (2008: 353) at their time and place of writing do not see much reason yet to further explore the emerging automated models. Today in the Netherlands however, pushed by the banks and the government to fight fraudulent appraisals, they have become a force to be reckoned with. Certified valuation institutes now check valuations along the yardstick of the models. As a




Image 5.18. Real estate database software RealWorks shown on a computer in the office of one of our interviewees (source: own photo, 22-01-2014). It assists in making object comparisons as demanded by the appraisal procedure. The rows present the individual properties, the columns present 'Kind' (photo, ground floor / upstairs etc., sold/on sale), 'Address/price/agency', 'Dates', 'Details 1', 'Details 2' (qualified location, maintenance inside and outside and the 'Advertisement text' (as found on Funda.nl).

rule of thumb, when they deviate more than 10% from the price generated by such an institution's automated pricing model the appraiser can expect a request for explanation. The agents, otherwise boasting a 'scientific' way of working (SJ Smith et al., 2006), experience this as an annoying intrusion of their professionalism. It puts them in the position to explicate something they cannot in the space they are provided with (which impels them to call up the institute to smooth things out) (Interview no. 031). Apart from noting its increasing institutionalization in practice, it can be theoretically enlightening to look more closely at these models, as they give us an idea of what 'objectifying the subjective' could come to mean if these models were to become dominant in the real estate business and its practice of price. In the Netherlands, one of the market leaders is Calcasa. On its website its methodology and ambitions are formulated as follows:

"The statistical valuation model Calcasa calculates the value [*leeftwaarde*] of a house by 'comparable sales' (rule-based [*sic*] hedonic model). The model takes into account, among others, location, house type, living space, building year and land area. [...] The model looks for reference material until a set emerges of 25 of the most comparable reference sales. Then these reference prices are indexed after the desired valuation date and its appropriate house price index [*woningprijsindex*] (HPI). As a standard practice the HPI per house type is calculated on a neighborhood level [*buurtniveau*] (as defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics), but in some cases it is possible to index them even more specifically. The model not only generates the most probable market value, but also the reliability

level [*betrouwbaarheidsverdeling*]. This level is derived from the statistical uncertainty that arises from differences in house, location, price and time characteristics of reference sales in relation to the assessed object. Calcasa HPI is demonstrably the most reliable house price index of the Netherlands [...] with a strong scientific foundation. A growing number of companies such as mortgage lenders, investors, intermediaries, validation institutes, housing corporations, consumer organizations, real estate companies, real estate associations, governments and oversight committees trust in the value solutions of Calcasa.” (Calcasa.nl, 2018a, my translation)

While of course this last sentence is mostly a sales pitch, the new technology is certainly making itself known in the industry. That is not to say its introduction and diffusion has not met with considerable contention from some real estate professionals. Which is understandable since in its boldest claims Calcasa seems to make real estate agents and their intuition and experience entirely obsolete:

“Calcasa automatically selects the relevant market information and the appropriate method of aggregation needed to ascertain the value of the property. This method allows for an objective valuation that is free of human subjectivity and possible bias.” (Calcasa.co.uk, 2018)³⁰

Well-aware of the threat, the agents we spoke to moderated these pretenses, confident that “to get at the right value there will always have to be someone with know-how, or you would have to accept a deviation of 10 to 20 percent.” (Interview no. 031). For them, it is Calcasa and similar technologies that are actually ‘subjective’, by which they mean, to be more precise, at least three shortcomings. First, the selection of variables is too reductionistic, especially excluding those crucial ones that require some more on site hermeneutics:

“The government [ie. through validation institutes] wants to make everything transparent. That is not going to happen. You would have to check for every house the accidental emotional value [*gevoelswaarde*], which comprises colors, or a view. And it can be different two years later. Which is fortunate, because agents would be robbed of their livelihood. But they try, right? [...] No, there will always be enough variables that you can’t put in a calculative model.” (Interview no. 032)

Although we will address this reported hermeneutic deficit of overcalculative valuation practices again in more detail below (Section 5.3.2.4), for now it is enough to notice the protest of the real estate agent. As one of them confidently claims: “you might be able to make a mathematical model, but you also need the model of practice. And the model of practice is emotion.” (Interview no. 032). Even elevating the observation of this basic primacy of emotion over calculation (noted before by Christie et al., 2008, Munro and Smith, 2008) to a general cultural critique, he complains “everything has to be made measurable these days” (as if his job is not doing exactly that). The second point of critique chimes rather well with the worldview

³⁰ Notwithstanding the scientific confidence, this of course does not mean any rights may be derived from Calcasa’s objective metrics. Legally speaking they are ‘merely indicative’ and any damage caused by them, the company takes no responsibility for.

implied here. Ultimately, emotions are more real than numbers: “Because numbers you can manipulate, feelings you cannot.” (Interview no. 032). Notwithstanding this almost Romantic ontology, and as a third criticism, there is the hard reality of the fundamentally unpredictable price trends. These, a model ‘too much controlled by history’ (Interview no. 033) will never intuit:

“You also have to look closely at trends and in [computer] programs you can’t build any trends. Those may partly arise from reference objects, but only if they are recent. [...] Even if you have a house of 5 million, that may only be worth 1 million in a crisis. But only a few years later when the market picks up again it could go for 3 million again. Much is based on the trust in the future by the consumer. Try and put that in a model.” (Interview no. 032)

Still, however far from uncontroversial and universally adopted, what Calcasa nonetheless achieves to a maximum extent, is homogenize and linearize real estate objects and their relations, thus performing and formatting a very specific market. This is stated quite explicitly in the developer’s description of how Calcasa ‘clusters value areas’:

“In theory the sale of one house influences the appraisal value [*taxatiewaarde*] of all other houses in the Netherlands [see Image 5.19]. Calcasa has coupled all comparable housing market areas by [inhouse developed] Street clusters [*Stratenclusters*], so that all comparable houses and markets can be related to each other. *Homogenous* Street clusters have emerged after analyzing circa 500.000 small geographic areas (6ppc) [ie. the most detailed postal code level, spanning 15 households on average]. This clustering takes into account the housing stock, location features and the market price development for the area.” (Calcasa.nl, 2018a, my translation, emphasis added)

Preparing prices in this way, as we will see, is a far cry from how most other practices of economization in Klarendal construct their market. And these

2018 Q4 WOX Online [All 3070 boroughs in the Netherlands]





Image 5.19. A 2018 map of price developments for all boroughs in the Netherlands based on Calcasa’s own house price index, called WOX. Through a combination of ‘repeat-sales’ and hedonic methods (rather than only the former, as is traditionally used to construct indexes), it claims the WOX does not map the ‘coincidental developments of sales prices’ but the price developments of the total housing stock. While hardly visible at this scale (one has to pay to see in more detail), Klarendal is colored red, meaning prices have on average gone up by 10 percent or more (source: Calcasa.nl, 2018b).

practices, often employing much more qualitative methods of value assessment, do not necessarily lose out against others over time. Still, analytically it serves as a great, actually existing and performative extremity. However, before moving on to how the kind of data issuing from Calcasa-type technologies enter the Clockwork agencement, one last development needs mentioning here, delivering still another metric input. Not only do comparative statistics on past sales prices become increasingly sophisticated, market intermediaries are also developing techniques of demand tracking. What facilitates this is website Funda.nl, the dominant Dutch online real estate platform, boasting millions of unique monthly visitors. And as a proper platform type of firm (Srnciek, 2017), Funda has, with the institutional support of the national realtor association (NVM), completely monopolized intermediation of house hunters and real estate agents, bringing it into a unique position to extract data on virtually all home search behaviour in the country. These data are then made available to brokers by a special software package called ‘Demand Scan’ (*Vraagscan*, formerly known as *Marktverkenner*, or Market Explorer), which is equipped with



Images 5.20–5.21. Two screenshots of real estate demand tracking software *Vraagscan* (from *Funda.nl*, accessed 05-10-2020). Depicted on the website is an example from *The Hague*. On the left, the user can enter ‘object features’ such as residential or commercial, sale or rent, family home or apartment, location (zip code or place), house type (row, corner, detached etc.) and even precise metric dimensions. On the right, the cartographic interface of the demand scan that gives the number of ‘seekers per neighborhood’, from light blue (such as the selected area, with 3 seekers) to dark blue (such as the area in the lower corner, attracting 92).

algorithms to track ‘actual’ demand in real-time. Big Broker is watching you – and informing development decisions. As one agent explains to us:

“So yeah, what do past figures have to say? Not that much about demand. So I use Funda-explorer [ie. *Marktverkenner*] with which I can check on a neighborhood level what demand there is. [see Images 5.20-5.21] [...] A developer may come to me who wants to build some apartments somewhere. Then I say, ‘that’s all fine’, but then I check Funda-explorer [...] and say, ‘well, you know, in the last six months only twenty people have queried that spot and I think that’s too few.’” (Interview no. 033)

5.3.1.3.2 *Quantitative intuition: Making direct contact with the market*

After having thus maximally ‘objectified the subjective’ one may wonder what is left of the supposedly key ingredient of the appraisal that is ‘intuition’ and ‘direct contact with the market’. Despite all (geo)metric prosthetics of past supply and demand, however ‘real-time’, there seems to be an irreducible element of surprise and nonlinearity to price realizations. Indeed, as Çalışkan writes of ‘pricing routines’ in the cotton trade (already of itself much more homogenous than our housing market): “Everyone, from traders to market experts, knows very well that the coming together of what [the geometrical figure of Cournot/Marshall found in economic textbooks depicts as] ‘supply and demand’ is a temporal and scattered practice which cannot be captured by a metaphor based on space” (2010: 45). In other words, as market makers understand very well, all comparative tabulations and graphs in the world cannot expulse the irreducible subjective element to actual pricings (Çalışkan, 2010: 44). It appears then, that we are left with a rather residualized subjectivity, one surprisingly redolent of the philosophy of intuition as found in Henri Bergson’s *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* (2001[1889]). In a performative sense, an increasingly radical dualism is actualized in the realtor’s practice between a homogenized space of market metrics (including its chronometric, linearized or ‘spatialized time’) and what Bergson would call ‘duration’: the nonlinear(izable) time of subjectivity (‘free will’), intuition and immediate experience, in this case of the market. Consequently, as in Bergson’s philosophy, all language and hermeneutics, as opposed to pure intuition, tend to collapse into metrics, or space (an important reason why Bergson’s once hegemonic legacy in France fell into near oblivion with the rise of his Heideggerian successors Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida). Intuition thus becomes an almost mystical immediate experience of the market beyond its spatialized representations, that is, a rather obscured prehension of the nonlinearly diverging tendencies of the aforementioned ‘a-centered multiplicity’ that is the local housing market.¹³¹ In practice however, and in accordance with Bergsonist philosophy,

¹³¹ Intuition here, it should be noted then, is not exactly the methodical, precise operation Bergson had in mind. As Deleuze’s (1990b) seminal take on Bergson emphasises, intuition for the philosopher denotes a strict method (not unlike the one applied in this chapter), of (1) *problematizing* badly states questions based on wrongly homogenized composites, (2) carefully *differentiating* their real immanent tendencies (rather than ideal conditions) and thereby (3) *temporalizing* problems in terms of duration (or creative evolution) rather than space (ibid.: 13–35). The leftover intuition of the realtor however, for obvious pragmatic reasons, is at best a flat and confused version of this

this rather hollow subjectivity mostly comes down to a memory function, a timely gathering together of local durations or vectors of change. Or in the words of Deleuze reading Bergson: if the market in itself, as a bundle of durations, “essentially defines a virtual multiplicity (*what differs in nature*)” then memory “appears as the coexistence of all the *degrees of difference* [ie. tendencies] in this multiplicity” (Deleuze, 1990b: 112–113). Our interviewees working with the above described systems confirm this. To serve as a market intermediary, especially in a heterogeneous and volatile gentrifying market, one has to stay in sympathy with its many divergent tendencies:

“I think you could do it too... if only you were constantly [*de hele dag*] busy monitoring what sells well and what’s in demand, talking to people about what they sell. Talking to people myself I come to insights... [or really] you wouldn’t even have to constantly [*de hele dag*] talk to people if you would just constantly or regularly monitor what sells well or not, then you could do that as well.” (Interview no. 024)

And this feeling of, or sympathy with the local market may fade quickly when one checks out of the business for a only brief period:

“So I can only work well locally when I’m up to date about all kinds of things. When I’ve been on vacation for three weeks and I haven’t done anything I need half a day to [...] check which mutations have been reported and what has been sold” (Interview no. 031)

Indeed, the not-so-secret but mystified key ingredient to ‘market intelligence’ [*marktkennis*] is *time*, be it one of the irreversible, nonlinear kind that does not fit with any practical comparative model. The key to ‘being on top of the market’ is to (be able to) make the time to absorb all the diverging local price mutations and their implicit, unsolvable differential relations. It is to intuitively anticipate, adapt to and thereby reinforce a non-denumerable mass of minute price inflections and their differential vectors. Again, it is a capacity that reveals itself when ruptured, whether by a vacation or, more severely, a total change of measuring unit:

“...that feeling can be gone quickly. Look at when we changed from the guilder to the euro. It took me a while to handle that. *All those references you have in your head*, as there is almost no street in Arnhem – excuse my bragging – with owner-occupied dwellings where I haven’t sold a house. So I have been everywhere. *Those reference points come from selling houses or because you’ve got a number in your head, not always exact*. With that change to the euro that it took a while to adapt.” (Interview no. 031)

This describes a very quantitative intuition, or rather the intuition of the quality of a number, of a literally confused rather than distinct non-denumerable quantity (‘all those references’), one that from a positivist mathematical point of view can only be already present ‘out there’ but is still obscured (cf. Lapoujade, 2018: 27). As Bergson explains this in typically strict dualist terms and with express reference to the pricing practices of ‘tradesmen’: “[w]hen we explicitly count units by stringing them along a spatial line, [it is] the case that, *alongside* this addition of identical terms standing out from a homogeneous background, an organization of these units is going on in

method. That is, it comes down to an unarticulated, almost entirely tacit capacity of feeling out numerical tendencies.

the depths of the soul...” (2001: 123). The ‘soul’ in this case denotes not not so much an individual but a collective kind of monad, a socially distributed memory (cf. Hutchins, 1995, Terranova, 2006). While the above quote speaks of ‘having all those references in his head’, it is clear from other statements by the agent and his colleagues, that price estimations are constantly bounced around and influenced by collegial deliberation and networking and encounters with clients (cf. Munro and Smith, 2008: 355). Valuation is indeed a relational practice (ibid.), in which a myriad of affects accumulates before erupting into an actual valuation (cf. Lapoujade 2018: 11). In sum, alongside the *active* (cross)calculative construction of a *quantitative* multiplicity of supply and demand by many real estate *agencies* (today using Realworks, Vraagscan etc.), brokers and their clients also enter into a *passive* synthesis, becoming a tense and affective *real estate patient* (cf. Lapoujade 2018: 20). That is, a patient memory function at once embodying and intuiting the ‘coexistence of all degrees of difference’ subsisting in the market (cf. Deleuze, 1990b: 113). What happens in these valuation practices then is not simply the discovery of ideally pre-existing prices but their realization through a mass of imperfect and highly uncertain calculations and intuitions enabled by an extensive range of more or less sophisticated and largely black-boxed mediators.

To conclude this part on Clockwork Inc., what we find moving from the new houses to the spreadsheet and through the supply chain onto the market is a gentrification machine distributed over a staggering amount of practices. Entering and shaping Klarendal in the way it does, the agencement is about as close as one can get to what we could specify as a *homo economicus*. Maximizing its profits, based for a substantial part on land rents, while minimizing costs, Clockwork seizes an opportunity to lodge itself onto Arnhem territory in order to reproduce itself there at another future rent gap. Meanwhile it reinforces a norm not just of metric value but a way of doing things. Notwithstanding their still changing, controversial and sometimes fragile status, the value and cost performing practices bundled together by Clockwork rapidly become more widespread in the Dutch real estate industry, perhaps even dominant where appropriate. However, not in a long way does this imply the disappearance of other, juxtaposed practices of real estate economization, embodying quite different modes of gap construction. The following agencement of real estate economization is one example of that.

5.3.2 Richman: the gentrification king on a quest for iconic gaps

Urban studies often have the peculiar habit of forgetting about the actual buildings that make up the city and the particular kind of agency they can have. Either the form of buildings is identified entirely with a specific intended use, as in ethnographic or historical studies of institutional functions, or it is rendered trivial as a rather homogenous material substrate for social processes (value), as in economic geography. Gentrification research largely falls in the second category (Guggenheim, 2010) and for similar reasons as its neglect of practices explained before. For Neil Smith’s (1982, 1996) macroscopic analyses of capitalism’s uneven development, a building ultimately represents just a stock of value (‘fixed capital’), the product of a certain amount of abstract labor sitting on a monopolized piece of abstract land. All other qualities of

the building are subsumed by that abstract value and underlying ground rent, much like neoclassical economics reduces all estate value to location and price. However, this abstracting away of buildings even holds for most of the more culturally inclined geographies supposedly more attentive to form. Jager (1986) in his seminal paper on gentrification aesthetics, inspired by the Neo-Marxist theories of Baudrillard and Bourdieu, cannot resist ultimately treating buildings as mere symbolic vehicles for the ‘accumulation of social distinctions’ by gentrifiers. Zukin (1990, 1993) also, by comparing gentrified spaces to Disney theme parks, reduces the former to an abstract formula, a mere commodified simulacrum of authenticity embedded in a circuit of cultural capital that in the end only reflects the demands of economic capital (“gentrification and Disney World as prototypes of a new organization of consumption reflect their ability to increase the value of investment capital”, Zukin, 1990: 48). Gentrification, in this narrative, becomes a kind of cultural factory, “a large circuit of cultural capital that is in turn made up of smaller, specialized circuits” (1990: 48), wherein buildings can only figure as its little cogs, at once trivialized, immutable (mobile) and monofunctional. Now if all developers were gentrification machines like Clockwork Inc. this might apply, but they certainly are not.

According to some actor-network theorists, a non-trivializing and multifunctional conception of buildings should instead view them more dynamically, as projects rather than static objects or fixations of value, even once they are built (Latour and Yaneva, 2008) and as a particular kind of technology endowed with its own degrees of freedom and agency (Guggenheim, 2010). Buildings change, not merely in value, but qualitatively, in the way they are used. As existing technologies, they usually lie somewhere in between a rock and a CD-player. Even the most specialized buildings, such as factories, hospitals or prisons (Foucault, 1977) – the closest real estate equivalent of a CD-player – can be converted into something else. But rarely is a building as formless as a rock, allowing just about any kind of use (much like an empty, featureless plot of land does). Materialized history matters, not only in adaptive terms (how far is its ‘fixed’ value removed from the quantitative norm, or potential rent), but also in many cases as a possible stage for exaptations, creative switches of function. The latter however, in processes of gentrification, require their own specific kind of agencement of economization.

5.3.2.1 Richman by facade: Being the obligatory passage point

Across the playground from the Achter de Linden project done by Clockwork we find a very different row of houses, renovated just before. The sixteen three-story houses (see Image 5.22-5.25) were first built in the 1890s. The developer responsible for the transformation is Mr. Richman, who focuses his real estate activities mainly on nineteenth century buildings in substandard condition, ‘rotten apples’ in his words (Interview no. 025). When we refer to him we are of course denoting a whole agencement including all his human and non-human allies, some of which we will describe in more detail later. Nevertheless, he is certainly at the center of its operation, and an obligatory passage point for studying it. When we meet at the construction site to interview the developer, Richman wants to take us somewhere



Images 5.22–5.25. Above, on the left, the row of prewar houses before renovation by Richman. On the corner, one of the many old Dutch snack bars of the neighborhood (source: Google Street View, 07–2009, accessed 05–10–2020). On the right, the facades are under construction (source: Google Street View, 10–2016, accessed 05–10–2020) On the bottom left, the houses just after completion, with the big ‘for sale’ sign in place (source: Google Street View, 06–2017, accessed 05–10–2020). To the right of it, a frontal view of the facades, with one property sticking out having not participated in the transformation (source: Google Street View, 06–2017, accessed 05–10–2020). Here one can also see the short band courses in between windows and doors and their ‘original’ and ‘wrong’ coloration.

else first, to show us ‘how he makes deals’. It turns out he ‘makes them in seconds’, as he shows us at our first stop when he pops in and out of a broker’s office to sign some contracts. Richman is not exactly shy about his achievements and, using a somewhat archaic term signifying class, calls himself a ‘true merchant’ (*echte koopman*). Later we read of a similar bravado in other interviews with the businessman: “I am led by my own credo [that rhymes in Dutch]: ‘The one who doesn’t offer and who doesn’t see it, does not become a true merchant.’ I feel myself to be a true merchant, I have knowledge of the market and guts. Not everyone has that.” (Financial Focus, 06–09–

2017, my translation) As we will indeed see, Richman not only talks in slogans but acts fast as well, by way of his gut, not his calculator. At the same time he is very image-conscious, also towards us.

In the gentrification debates, as they have been historically canonized (eg. Lees et al., 2008, 2010), there has been a division of ‘production’ and ‘consumption explanations’, with the former focusing mostly on rent structures and capitalizing institutional actors (developers, banks, planners etc., eg. Smith, 1979b) while the latter looks primarily at the housing preferences or the ‘conspicuous consumption’ of a particular ‘gentrification aesthetic’ by a new post-industrial urban middle class (eg. Jager, 1986). However, this pairing of, on the one hand, economic and production explanations and, on the other, cultural and consumer perspectives, is regrettable when we try to understand any ‘extra-economic’ motives involved in the production of gentrification. Which is unfortunate also in the case of Richman, who indeed might be designated a ‘conspicuous producer’. This play on Veblen’s (2007[1899]) original idea of conspicuous consumption, indicating the non-utilitarian and wasteful usage of goods by the then emerging ‘leisure class’, is not new. Michael Polanyi (1997) already introduced it in a 1960 paper to explain the Soviet Union’s exaltation of its collective productivity despite its obvious wastefulness and inability to satisfy individual consumer needs. More generally however, the concept of conspicuous production denotes an economic practice that “is characterized by investment decisions that seek status and reputation alongside or, in many cases, ahead of profits” (Overton and Banks 2015: 473). Taken seriously, this kind of practice flies in the face of most economic theory, which is, as Overton and Banks put it sharply, “predicated on the evolution of productive economic systems and institutions that valorise a rational, economically efficient system” and has a “tendency to see capital as relatively homogenous and solely concerned with seeking out least-cost locations and maximising profit” (2015: 475). By now it needs little mentioning how the economic geography underlying ‘production theories’ of gentrification is predicated on just such an assumption. Richman however, as a producer, embodies a divergent evolutionary thrust.

5.3.2.2 Reaching for the monumental: ‘Looking up’ and ‘giving back’

So how does the conspicuous developer go about his work? Continuing our tour after visiting the realtor’s office, walking in the direction of our focal properties, Richman has another seemingly spontaneous visit for us in store. Just as we are about to pass a particular building he abruptly stops us in our tracks and asks ‘haven’t you noticed?’. As a real estate merchant, he ‘always looks up’ (Interview no. 025, Financial Focus, 06-09-2017). It is a significant initial practice of perspective that primes Richman’s agencement of gentrification into action. At that moment, standing in front of the building (looking like Image 5.27), his practice still does not amount to anything more than that, just a rough sensing of potential.

A few weeks later we read a news article for the provincial newspaper *De Gelderlander* about a rediscovery of four colonial era tile tableaus in the building

we were standing before, an old grocery store. Richman, ‘proud as a peacock’, calls them ‘a beautiful present for the neighborhood’ (De Gelderlander, 14-01-2016). The statement is very similar to what we were told in the interview: Richman wants to ‘give the properties back to the neighborhood’. Like many of his phrases we see them return in other sources, for instance, in an interview for the neighborhood newspaper:

“...about Richman’s method. He explains: ‘What then is giving back to the neighborhood?’ He continues: ‘Buildings can be iconic [*beeldbepalend*] for a neighborhood and I like to think about how a building used to be a part of it. That local meaning I find interesting. I go and find the building in the municipal or provincial cultural historical archives. What did it look like in the past? What was its function? Take [the building of Image 5.27], it is a city monument and I would like to restore it to its old look [*in oude luister*], for the neighborhood, even if it changes in terms of function. So no longer a shop but rented as an upstairs and ground floor apartment [*boven- en benedenhuis*]. The tiled tableaux are interesting and beautiful, so you could think of opening it up for visitors during a monument day [event], so people can see them again.” (Wijkkrant Klarendal, 03-2016)

‘Giving back to the neighborhood’ – it is a phrase that characterizes well the agencement of which Richman is the center. It implies a very particular discursive or rather material-semiotic intervention. At first sight at least, and it surely is that, this is a typical cultural power grab that is often ascribed to gentrifiers (eg. Jager, 1986). When Richman refers to ‘the neighborhood’ he has both a very physical and cultural idea of it, so that ‘giving back’ means physically restoring buildings to their old look, not necessarily for the people currently living there, but for a rather general,




Images 5.26–5.28. On the left, from the municipal archives, a photo of the original facade of the 1912 grocery store later to be renovated by Richman (1934). In the middle, the building when we passed it and were instructed to ‘look up’, that is, past the ‘ugly’ lower part (2010) (source: Bastionoranje.nl, accessed 05-10-2020). On the right, the property ‘saved’ and ‘given back’ (2021) (source: own photo).

historiographic observer or visitor (cf. Zukin, 1991: 193–194). The Richman *habitus*, endowed with “a monopoly over ways of seeing and classifying objects according to their criteria of good taste”, thus participates in an act of “reclassification” in which the area becomes “once again invested with ideas of status, style and cosmopolitanism” (Bridge, 2001b: 92). Or even beyond the acting out of a *habitus*, in the words of Zukin, it displays a “willingness to research [historical] details and painstakingly restore, re-create, or reproduce them in homes [and as such] also expresses a striving toward the monumental, elitist, essentially cultural power that some central urban spaces have always retained.” (1990: 40). Re-actualizing a meaning and a dormant power ‘retained’ in the built environment of Klarendal, Richman thus reaches for the monumental. And as we will later see, this indeed comes with its own symbolic violence (cf. Bridge, 2001b: 92) – although, *pace* Bourdieu et al., need not necessarily do so.


5.3.2.2.1 Economization by heritage exaptation

However, while surely enacting a monopolistic ‘accumulation of social distinctions’ we should be careful not skip the non-trivial capacities of Richman’s practices and the buildings he acquires, not least in order to also ascertain their possibly virtuous ‘evolutionary assets’ such as a healthy dose of economic dyscalculia and an authentic appreciation and craftsmanship toward materials. With respect to his practices then, Richman’s ‘property mind’ (Haila, 2017) is not simply one of calculated speculation or cost efficiency, neither circus nor machine. Rather, his agencement enacts an aesthetic ‘heritage strategy’ (*erfgoedstrategie*, Financial Focus, 06–09–2017, my translation). Whereas Clockwork is a machine operating through the deployment of standardized volumes of exchange value, potential demand, construction costs and consumer requirements, that is, immutable mobiles flowing up and down a production chain geared to supply adequate objects to profitable locations at minimal cost, Richman’s is an agencement that enacts a discursive switch of type, use or function of an inherited object, that is, it mutates the immobile (cf. Guggenheim, 2010).¹³² Unlike the immutable, metrically standardized and monofunctional actants mobilized in the Clockwork assemblage, Richman deals with (post)phenomenological objects whose identity depends on hermeneutic relations (Ihde, 1993, Verbeek, 2000). Remaining in place phenomenologically (‘thrown’ before a subject), they mutate instantly from one observation to the next, akin to the Gestalt switches induced by ambiguous images like the Necker Cube or rabbit–duck (see Images 5.29–5.30). As such these objects are

¹³² As mentioned in Section 3.5, the ‘mutable immobile’ actant is a discontinuously ‘flickering’ ‘fire object’ (Law and Singleton, 2005). Guggenheim (2010) reuses the concept, which Law and Singleton first apply to alcoholic liver disease, to describe the changes of use of buildings through rezoning and gentrification. More generally, the mutable immobile can be said to be a material-semiotic rendition of the linguistic or (post)structuralist *sign*, at once distinguishing presence, manifest absence and absence as Otherness (Law, 2004: 83–85, cf. also Luhmann’s (1997) indication–distinction–operation, or Bourdieu’s (1998: 80) phenomenology of ‘quasi-presence’). In real estate, for example, any indication of the presence of potential value immediately implies by distinction the manifest absence of actual value. What (regressively) retreats and remains Other is the operation of distinction itself, that is, the ‘immobile’ positions of the valued object ‘out there’ and hermeneutic subject ‘in here’. This is the condition of (im)possibility for value discourse to go on ‘flickering’ indefinitely.



Welche Thiere gleichen ein-
ander am meisten?



Raninchen und Ente.

*Images 5.29–5.30. The Necker cube is an optical illusion first published as a rhomboid in 1832 by Swiss crystallographer Louis Albert Necker (source: Wikipedia.org) (see also Ihde, 1995: 77–81). The rabbit–duck illusion is an ambiguous image in which a rabbit or a duck can be seen. The earliest known version is an unattributed drawing from the 23 October 1892 issue of *Fliegende Blätter*, a German humour magazine (source: Wikipedia.org). Although the mind-bogglingly rapid switches of perspective these images induce can seem effortless, even they demand a change of position of the observer (ibid.). When we view buildings as ‘mutable immobiles’ (Guggenheim, 2010), capable of switching their ‘use Gestalt’, as in a gentrification process, but also see them as projects rather than static objects frozen in time (Latour and Yaneva, 2008), then the hermeneutic work involved in the transformation can reveal itself.*

‘multistable’, they can be (stable so as to be perceived as) many things at the same time (Ihde, 1993). Within an instant, relatively speaking, they can acquire a new meaning, use or function. This, we could add, makes them highly susceptible objects of exaptation, something Richman’s agencement specializes in. Indeed, in contrast to Clockwork’s metric adaptations, its mode of operation is one of passionately interested material hermeneutic exaptation. As explained above, exaptation denotes the co-optation of structures that evolved for one use in the service of another – an idea that was originally conceived, not incidentally, through the architectural metaphor of the ‘spandrel’, naming the triangular space that is a necessary by-product of mounting a dome on rounded arches and which is subsequently co-opted for other, aesthetic purposes (Gould and Lewontin, 1979: 581–583).¹³³ The postphenomenological notion of multistability may be expanded and dynamized in evolutionary terms by reconceiving it as a form of cognitive technological exaptation (cf. Roden, 2015). Indeed, Ihde (1993: 116) unintentionally gives a very clear example of the latter when describing the multistability of the typewriter: While first invented to aid the visually impaired, it was soon exapted as a universal writing technology.

¹³³ Indeed, Gould is quite fond of architectural analogies, for instance, when he clarifies the concept of developmental parallelism through ‘pharaonic bricks and corinthian columns’ (2002: 1134–1139). More to the subject at hand, he explains the phenomenon of exaptation by reference to the transformation of function of a church building, from a house of worship into a shelter and soup kitchen for homeless people (ibid.: 1230).

In the case of Richman, his agencement seems to produce a weird kind of exaptation, as it appears the case that after having shifted away from its original function, a building is returned to it. (To our knowledge, this does not happen in the animal world, but then we would not be surprised if it did.) However, as Jager notes in relation to the gentrification aesthetic, “urban conservation not so much conserves or preserves history but *reuses* and recycles it” (1986: 87, emphasis added). And indeed, how could it be otherwise? The old grocery shop becomes a residence, but one with an touristic purpose as well. And although the row of houses of Images 5.22–5.25 are in many ways restored to their original state, they are of course adapted to facilitate modern requirements and conveniences such as (wide) hallways, tilting windows, spacious toilets and condensing boilers (cf. Redfern, 1997a, Zukin, 1990: 41). But even here Richman goes out of his way to have them aesthetically fit the monumental house. When choosing the modern windows or new door handles he refuses to put efficiency and cost calculation over aesthetics. In the end it might have little effect on the selling price and thus the return. There really is no way of knowing (or will to know) in this practice (Interview no. 025).

Another way then of understanding these kinds of transformative event is in terms of ‘reuse’, as Gould himself (1991) but also many others following his lead have done in relation to evolutionary psychology. The brain especially, that cognitive organ so central to human development, is a highly (but not infinitely) plastic and evolvable utensil for exaptation. Its evolution is one of massive redeployment of existing neural modules (eg. sensorimotor) for new purposes and combined to support new capacities (eg. conceptual, linguistic) without disrupting their participation in existing functions (Anderson, 2007, 2010). Thus, in codevelopment with our nonhuman instruments of cognition, exaptation in cerebral evolution runs all the way up to abstract conceptual functioning, metaphorical thought and ultimately numerical, mathematical and economic cognition (Lakoff and Núñez, 2000: 33, Anderson, 2010: 253–256). Hence the aforementioned possibility of seeing dyscalculia and dyslexia not as natural diseases but possibly productive spandrels and opportunities to profit from ‘cerebrodiversity’. We need to be able to assess the dyscalculative affects of Richman’s agencement to appreciate its specific virtues.

5.3.2.2.2 Refusing to calculate to make beauty happen

Before describing Richman’s practice of economization then, another has to give way first. That is, Richman has to practice some dyscalculia to make room for his conspicuous productions. His passionate interests are accompanied by a refusal to calculate much. As an interviewer for the municipality’s Heritage newsletter also reports about the ‘passionate renovator’: “when push comes to shove, he rather talks about beautiful ornaments than money” (Gemeente Arnhem, 2009). When reaching for the monumental, the qualities of the building are much more important than precisely estimating the costs and benefits of the renovation scheme. As he explains:

“If I consider a certain block of dwellings I can approximately indicate the renovation costs. I may be off target by 5000 to 10000, but this will not pose any problems since my estimate of

the sales price might also be off by 5000 to 10000. In the end, these estimates will meet at some point. You should not focus your energies on the last few thousands of euros. This is impossible and I think you shouldn't want to." (Interview no. 025)

At no point during our onsite interview do we catch Richman explaining his choices in terms of costs and revenues, also where it comes to more detailed choices of design, such as putting in cheaper window panes. In addition, unlike Clockwork's careful calculations of land values, costs and market risks, Richman has a different attitude toward time. On the one hand he does not contemplate too much his past losses, saying "I never talk of mistakes or losses, but only of solutions and lessons learned. I never lose, I always say 'I learned something'. When my daughter tells me that she has lost a game I tell her: 'You did not lose, you have learned'." (Interview no. 025) While this may express a certain orientation and confidence toward the future, it would be wrong to take it for a calculated kind of learning characteristic of risk management. Instead Richman stresses the fundamental uncertainty of the future, which in his view makes any effort to precisely estimate project cost and revenues useless: "Let's be honest we cannot change the past, and we do not have control over the future. We live today, don't we?" (Interview no. 025)

At first sight, this is simply an instance of what Bourdieu expresses in Freudian terms as 'the taboo of calculation' (1998: 96-97, 104). By not wanting to talk explicitly about money, but only about honor and symbolic values, Richman merely 'represses' his economic calculations, thereby displaying a disinterestedness and distance from necessity that really only his class position allows him. This however, would be too reductionistic or economic toward his actual practice. Which is somewhat ironic, considering Bourdieu goes out of his way to warn us of the scholastic fallacies of economism perpetrated by neoclassical contemporaries such as Gary Becker. In fact, when we look at the basic scientific paradigm underlying his general 'economy of practices' it is just as classical as his opponents'. The 'quasi-magical' imposition of form, the 'symbolic alchemy' that accrues to the culturally dominant so much recognition and benefits, only masks an equal amount of 'work of socialization' and is thus really "only an apparent exception to the law of the conservation of social energy" (Bourdieu, 1998: 102-103). In other words, while on the one hand he recognizes that symbolic domination (originally: masculine domination) operates through implicit monopolization of cultural capital rather than the more explicit exploitation and accumulation characteristic of economic capital (Steinmetz, 2014: 205), in the final analysis Bourdieu reduces the former to the latter, with the 'economic economy' described by (neo)classical economists as just the brutally honest and transparent version of the more general 'economy of practices' (Desan, 2013). This, however, is the sociological equivalent of a biological panadaptationism like that of Wallace or Dawkins that ultimately denies Gould's exaptation and Prum's aesthetics any significant evolutionary force of their own. In the end, from this perspective, the latter are only surface effects, misrecognitions of the real underlying economic equilibrium. Alternatively, from a practice approach, a Richman refusing to calculate is not merely an implicit equivalent of a Clockwork conserving energy by adaptation. We are dealing with a fundamentally different operation here, not just in terms of exaptive strategy, as explained above, but in terms of aesthetic mechanism

as well. Neither ‘irrational’ exuberance nor disguised calculation – both economic interpretations – Richman’s practice primarily makes ‘beauty happen’ for its own aesthetic sake, much like Prum’s (2012, 2017) ‘runaway process’ of ever-escalating and diversifying distinction. With as its driving mechanism an epically concentrated proliferation of aesthetic expressions, of beauty and passion but also territory and paternal masculinity, Richman rides a self-reinforcing wave that makes economic sense: “[When] a rotten tooth healed by me [it] creates a flywheel effect for my other assets [*posities*]. I am proud of that. For my children I want to leave behind a nice portfolio and for society I want to conserve the heritage.” (Financial Focus, 06-09-2017)

5.3.2.2.3 *Material hermeneutics of real estate*

Notwithstanding his general lack of interest in bookkeeping, Richman of course knows very well when to jump in: “I love properties that are in a pitiful state. I can see the forest through the trees. When I hear of financial penalties [*dwangsommen*] and diverse owners, I am unstoppable. Then I have to have it.” (De Gelderlander, 14-01-2016) In this regard, he has a nose for the typical signs of disinvestment associated with rent gaps (cf. Smith, 1996: 191-194) . Still, one has to ‘see’ the cultural potential through the decay. And get excited by the challenge it presents: “The property should really be a disaster, so I can roll up my sleeves and get my hands dirty [*handen uit de mouwen steken*]” (Gemeente Arnhem, 2009). Indeed, ‘looking up’ is only an initial step in the process. A comparison of Richman’s reading of ruins to Necker Cube-type Gestalt switches should not give the impression of an altogether effortless transformation. In real estate, where changes of form obviously take some time to materialize, we can see that in reality *any* such switch of perspective involves more or less energy consuming practices (even with the Necker Cube, cf. Ihde, 1995: 77-81). That is, looking at a building as a project (cf. Latour and Yaneva, 2008) rather than an object effortlessly flickering from one static meaning to the next, it takes an



Images 5.31-5.32 (at the properties of Images 5.22-5.25). On the left, one of Richman’s workers is scraping off layers of paint to reveal a more ‘original’ identity of the property. On the right, Richman and a municipal official inspect an old door of one of the properties (both photos from 2016, by Zefanja Hoogers, Oogoparnhem.nl, accessed 03-2016). Much enamoured by Richman’s projects, the municipality and the department of Heritage in particular is pleased someone is picking up the work of conservation and gladly assists him in his endeavors with permits and advice, going and scraping through the properties together (Gemeente Arnhem, 2009).

accumulation of many material-semiotic distinctions to make the eventual switch.

In other words, the aesthetic transformation of buildings, of mutating the immobile, entails its own interpretative labor or ‘material hermeneutics’ (cf. Ihde, 1993, Verbeek, 2000). When Richman starts development on a new project he first starts searching for architectural details that have become obscured over time in the course of many repairs and renovations in order to find out the architectural style and design as originally constructed. This is where scrapers of many kinds plug into the hermeneutic agencement. A paint scraper is used for removing old layers of paint off ceilings (Image 5.31), doors, window pains, in order to reveal original colors and ‘the intention of the architect’ (Interview no. 025). Likewise, a vapor steam cleaner removes deposits of dirt that have formed on walls over the years, such as the black grime that hides the distinctive yellow sandstone of band courses (ibid.). And of course sometimes stuff simply reveals itself wholesale when carefully taking down interior isolation walls and plaster, such as the tableaux depicting colonial and domestic scenes or decorative brown and orange jugendstil tiles (Wijkkrant Klarendal, 03-2016). Limited to assessing how the building should be restored, Richman himself does not carry out the actual restoration work himself, but hires personnel that does all the work of painstakingly removing paint layers and restoring other architectural details (Image 5.31). As Zukin (1990: 40-41) observed before, “authenticity [...] in a contemporary home” does not come for free and requires the employment “of an entire cottage industry of low-paid, usually non-union, carpenters, house painters, and plumbers”. In the case of Richman, a team of Polish construction workers.

Furthermore, apart from ‘making deals’ and the initial scrapings, Mr. Richman’s own job consists of the more intellectual labor of reconstructing the past, not only by carefully probing and scraping the property itself but also by diving into history. That is, when acquiring and then renovating a building he searches the city and provincial archives (Gelders Archief) for historical documentation about the property, such as original plans or photos. These then serve as a ‘blueprint’ for the restoration work (Financial Focus, 06-09-2017). For Richman, rummaging through the archives brings a passion and excitement that he compares to unwrapping presents on Christmas Eve (ie. *Sinterklaasavond*) (Interview no. 025). One such discovery was the original color of the band courses (*speklagen*) also present on the facade of the sixteen Klarendal houses (see Image 5.22-5.25). In this case, it was actually old black and white photographs that got people all over town mistakenly repainting the courses white, thinking that was their initial color from the photos. Whereas they should have been left in their original mustard yellow hue, a color, Richman found out, coming from the sand particular to the local soil.

5.3.2.3 *Bricks don't whine? Indexes, icons and symbols of gentrification*

What are we to make of this passionate practice in ethical terms, displacement-wise? According to cultural critics such as Zukin we should not be fooled into thinking such efforts of restoration are anything but a disguised impetus for the wholesale commodification of the *place* that is the inner city neighborhood (in the humanist

geographic sense). Writing from an Anglo-Saxon perspective, specifically that of 1980s New York, Zukin accounts the sobering revelation of gentrification's true face in typical Bourdieuvian parlance, debunking its ideological illusions:

“With its respect for historic structures and the integrity of smaller scale, gentrification *appeared* as a rediscovery, an attempt to recapture the value of place. Appreciating the aesthetics and social history of old buildings in the center showed a cultural sensibility and refinement that transcended the postwar suburban ethos of conformity and kitsch. [...] By constructing a social space or *habitus* on the basis of cultural rather than economic capital, gentrification *apparently* reconciled two sets of contradictions: between landscape and vernacular, and market and place.” (Zukin, 1991: 192, our emphasis)

Extending Neil Smith's and Harvey's theories of uneven development through geographic versions of Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi, Zukin (1991) thus describes gentrification not just as an economic but a cultural frontier of 'creative destruction' enacting a 'great transformation' by market society of inner city neighborhoods into 'nonplaces' comparable to Disney theme parks. What is created (or rather reproduced?) by gentrification, despite an appearance of honoring local identity, is a disembedded global market culture, at the cost an inexorable destruction and *displacement* of authentic local cultures: “Initially treated as unique, the cultural value of place is finally abstracted into market culture” (Zukin, 1991: 195) What to make of this generalization, so infused by stagist teleology, making any attempt at creative engagement with a neighborhood's material heritage complicit to bootstrapping its eventual destruction? And is there not something aesthetically dishonest in the rather abstract equation of gentrification and Disneyland (to both perhaps)? Is this really a fair assessment, or does it rather cloud our discriminatory powers?

We should not think Neo-Marxist sociology is free of *aesthetic* judgment (not only is capitalism bad, it is ugly). In fact, the constant use of terms like 'gentrification kitch' betrays a reluctant participation in the 'bourgeois' game of distancing by abstraction. The objectivism toward class positions (an academic kind of claim to a 'monopoly' on truth) allows the outside observer to repeatedly condemn the aesthetic to be essentially arbitrary and fetishistic. Unfortunately this hermeneutic of suspicion only amounts to a *negative* aesthetics that in the final analysis sees only cultural destruction and displacement by simulacra and no longer knows how to affirm the creative other than by recourse to the political economic subject position of the producer or consumer. Again, what is obfuscated in this approach are the actual material objects, practices and obligations that do the work of gentrification, including the displacement. The ethics of matter, literally. The two ways of thinking about buildings mentioned before, that is, the technical (or emic) view of them as monofunctional apparatuses and the social theory of buildings as a mere substrate for economic and cultural circuits of production, share a hylomorphic inclination to deny matter its own authentic possibilities to change its form and its immanent capacities for self-organization (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 408). In this sense, both see buildings the way architects do. Designers of the kind enrolled, standardized and partly automated in a Clockwork agencement. As we saw in the case of the latter, the architectural agencement preferably operates at a maximum distance from the

site of construction, made possible by geometrically scaled blueprint drawings, and with an operative independence from builders and clients (C Smith, 2015). By design, building ratios and a construed authenticity ('gentrification kitch') are thus imposed on an inert, formless matter, or rather predictable materials explicitly chosen for that quality (and by minimally skilled manual workers). Artisanal practice, by contrast, designs *in situ*, follows a flow of matter rather than subjecting it to a precalculated form, like a woodworker follows the fibres of her wood, in tune with its immanent tendencies to bring out its most stimulating haptic capacities (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 409). Rather than the instantiation of a technical, economic and cultural order or habitus, the artisan enacts an expressive event in which difference (flow) precedes signification (Massumi, 2002: xvi-xvii). As such, artisanal expression is first an assemblage or "mixture of the cultural and the natural" (Massumi, 1992: 11) while judgements of cultural arbitrariness (or objective beauty) come after, as the product of a discursive practice on its own.

However, as with Bergson's dualism of space and time, the first including metrics as well as language in general and the second naming an assemblage of diverging tendencies and capacities, the binary of architectural and artisanal procedures drawn rather sharply by neo-Bergsonian philosophers Deleuze and Guattari similarly squeezes out a relatively autonomous practice of hermeneutic distinction and exaptation in between the two. That is, a practice specialized in (re)constructing interpretations of body, class, place, cultural heritage and so on (cf. C Smith, 2015: 407). Therefore and in line with the genealogical distinction of the two scarcity languages elaborated above, we could try and turn this dualism into a more plural contrast. At other places in their work, Deleuze and Guattari already suggest such a refinement when they employ the Peircean triplet of indexical, iconic and symbolic signs in the material-semiotic description of 'assemblages of enunciation' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 112). Signs, as anything "that triggers a material process in a properly attuned body" (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 141), also come in forms other than the materially arbitrary signifiers of linguistic difference, social distinction or abstract value which we know from structural linguistics, sociology and political economy (corresponding also to the aforesaid conception of a building as formless material substrate for social processes). This latter kind of signs is of the symbolic kind, those deterritorialized and deterritorializing (but just as material) inscriptions which only ever seem to point to other such signs, the ultimate example of which would be the mathematical sign and its self-contained sign system (which indeed constitutes an anchor point for the structuralist imagination (eg. Piaget, 1971) much like classical physics is a benchmark for neoclassical and Marxist economics). Indexical signs are quite something else. They do not function like truthful denotations, finally tying back arbitrary words to things, such as the one true functionality of a building (the foregoing monofunctional conception of a building). Rather they are connotational markings of a territory, indicating indistinct zones of audible, olfactory, visual, corporeal and movement-based intensities that constitute the shared affective milieu of, for instance, an urban neighborhood. At some point indexes can become icons, as "objects of veneration and adoration [that] stand for the whole but do not lose their substance and adorable materiality (unlike symbols, which are stand in for other materials)" (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 97). It is this intimate, non-arbitrary connection to their materiality

which becomes especially marked in matters of human territoriality and heritage real estate in particular.

Moreover, when it comes to differing narratives of the 'highest and best use' of a property or area this pragmatic distinction of signs might shed a more subtle light on the matter. Land market economists after Von Thünen tend to tautologically equate 'best' use with the 'highest' rents extracted (anything otherwise is seen as a deviation, Blomley, 2004: 175n42). Which would rather ludicrously imply that a legally owning speculator leaving a building entirely untouched and unoccupied could still constitute its best use. However, this would be a 'highest use' entirely defined in the 'symbolic' sphere of exchange value metrics (cf. Blomley, 2004: 84). Opposite of this, and akin to the connection of artisans to working materials, we would find the collective, extra-legal entitlements and obligations of a neighborhood community indexed by a territory. Speaking comparatively in terms of 'highest and best use' by definition refers to something outside of this assemblage of indexical signs, hence implying a need for change that is often lacking with those immersed in it. But not necessarily so. While local communities may detest and protest their neighborhood turned into a symbol of speculation and commodification, they may nonetheless appreciate some of its indexes to be exapted into monumental icons. For this to happen, the indexical links already present cannot be violated too much and (should) require material care. However, while this iconography may happen quite autonomously from the dictates of 'symbolic' exchange value, it inevitably invites into the discourse that other, nonmetric scarcity language evolving around sex, territory and beauty (Prum, 2013, 2017). In Richman's case, we see expressed the contentiousness of these kind of iconic translations but also the strong connection with materials already indexed.

Now Richman's redevelopments are clearly oriented toward the iconic and less toward the metric. The question is however, if we want to honestly assess whether 'history' is being displaced by 'heritage' in Klarendal (cf. Blomley, 2004: 101), how does Richman's practice relate to the indexical attachments already inherent to the place? Clearly he displays a certain respect and care for the specific materials (re)used in his iconic projects. Like the artisan he knows how to appreciate 'the smell of old wood'. Moreover, because his carefully researched and reconstructed material histories are not (and cannot be) arbitrarily concocted out of thin social air, they are not necessarily exclusive on an aesthetic level. Neither monofunctional nor homogenous but as 'multistable' objects, Richman's more unique projects carefully reveal and thus afford the people and visitors of Klarendal ample aesthetic attractors and interpretive leeway to appreciate it on their own terms. For a lot of different reasons, many Klarendallers can appreciate an old grocery shop building restored. Much like the venue hosting Ballroom and its furniture of Chapter 4, it kindles their pride of place too. However, in the final analysis the question of an economic agencement's ethics hinges not only on its aesthetic respect for nonhuman materials but on how it deals with people already residing at or around the place of redevelopment. So how violent is Richman?

As already suggested, Richman's is an image-conscious agencement, monitoring its reputation for the sake of itself, carefully guarding and managing it. When I wrote

a column in the local newspaper (Wijkkrant Klarendal, 01-2016, see Appendix IV), addressing quite mildly how 'giving back to the neighborhood' can mean very different things, Richman immediately called us up to share his opinion and responded in the next edition of that same paper (Wijkkrant Klarendal, 03-2016). Besides demonstrating a characteristically vigilant public relations management, the reaction also betrayed an actual consciousness of the sensitivity of his choice of words. By interpreting 'giving back' in an entirely physical rather than social sense, by localizing the essence of the neighborhood in its pre-suburbanization real estate rather than (also) in the people currently living there, Richman participates in a kind of reclassification that certainly exerts its 'symbolic violence' (cf. Bridge, 2001b: 92). However, this would still be just a smart critical inference if it was not also evidenced by his practice. And looking at the redevelopment project we studied we did indeed find just that. Ironically, the still present neighborhood can become an obstacle to 'giving it back' its properties (cf. Blomley, 2004: 100). Although privacy considerations prohibit us to reveal more about the story, we can say that when an old, working class resident owning one of the properties refused to sell their house or pay the price that was stated for the renovation by Richman, some serious not-so-symbolic intimidation befell the sitting tenant (Interview no. 043). Today, the one house still stands out among the other fifteen, to the great chagrin of the gentrification king. Suddenly one of his stated reasons for getting into the real estate business make a lot more sense: "Investment in bricks pleases me greatly. Bricks don't whine." (*'Stenen zeuren niet aan je hoofd'*, Financial Focus, 06-09-2017). The question that arises here, is whether this more or less symbolic violence is a necessary correlate of any reclassification of the neighborhood. Assuming an essentially dialectic nature of human meaning making, it seems there will always be a slave and a master, every creation matched with equal destruction. But is neighborhood economics really only ever a zero-sum game where one man's glory is another man's loss?

To conclude, Richman's agencement would be better described as a *homo sociologicus* than a *homo economicus*, albeit one in which the *socius* includes not just human subjects. It constitutes an extended, distributed Machiavellian intelligence, supported by a scraper, an archive and some migrant workers. Its reputation precedes its bottom line calculations, the former being boosted by the monumental acts inherent to its exaptive heritage strategy. The buildings it targets meanwhile have to allow for the hermeneutic relations central to its projects. Static as they may seem, they are not passive objects on which one may project any meaning at will. Not bothering with these obdurate material qualities, Bourdieuvian interpretations of gentrification aesthetics tend to gut cultural objects and practices of any real significance apart from reproducing class power. Buildings become 'cultural arbitraries' and it all becomes just empty display. Yet, even in agencements on the 'productive side' of gentrification, we find a materiality that matters and that requires substantial work, delicate aesthetic skills and at least, from a non-anthropocentric perspective, an admirable and very real sense of obligation toward the 'non-complaining' stones. It is just rather unfortunate and unnecessary that it is accompanied by a culturally repressive and exclusive symbolic violence. Neighborhood residents of all stripes, but especially old working class Klarendallers who member a time before urban renewal and supermarkets, do certainly appreciate the renovation of a store building like the

one done by Richman (Images 5.26–5.28). With more *care* perhaps this might be done in a more inclusive and less reactionary way. To better understand how, we may look at the ‘dyslexic’ economizations of the housing corporation, the fourth agencement to be described later in this chapter.

5.3.2.4 *The ‘practical test’: Appraisal practices revisited*

As promised, however, first a word about how Richman’s practices might relate to those of real estate agents and the ‘practical tests’ included in their appraisals. While the agents were certainly part of Richman’s agencement, there was not as much need for them to advise about the potential of properties. They mainly serviced its transactions, of buying up and selling or renting after renovation. Nonetheless it should be noted that some elements typical of Richman’s economization practices could be discovered in the work of appraisers as well. As already mentioned, most agents we spoke to, the veterans in the business in particular, were similarly wary of overly calculative practices, especially when it came to assessing the heterogeneous real estate of gentrifying inner city neighborhoods like Klarendal. As one agent exemplifies:

“It’s also striking when you arrive somewhere for a sale and two other agents were there before you... and they did [appraise] it by calculation [*rekenkundig*] because they simply... because they no longer know that emotional value [*gevoelswaarde*], that gut feeling [*buikevoel*]. [...] When I’m sitting next to a working class neighborhood [*volkswijk*] where people have their radio on loud all the time then it yields 130[000]. Or maybe when the



Image 5.33. When visiting a property as part of the appraisal procedure the agent brings along a writing case including the standard appraisal forms (as exemplified in Images 5.16–5.17) and some printouts of comparable objects from the price database, priming his on-site interpretations (source: own photo, 19-06-2015)

environment is very nice [*leuk*], it will yield 170. You can't put that in a calculative model."
(Interview no. 032)

Whereas the cheaper computerized practices ostensibly popular among many other colleagues (or even made available to the public by land registry SMS) might indeed apply fairly well to the homogeneous row houses (*rijtjeshuizen*) dominating some of the suburbs of Arnhem, an area like Klarendal probably warrants a bit more hermeneutic work according to the agents we talked to. In practice this means paying the property a proper visit and closely inspecting it inside and out. For this the agent brings along a writing case containing not just his appraisal forms (such as those in Images 5.16-5.17) but also a print-out of the available database information on the property in question and several comparable properties (Image 5.33).

While this 'practical test' may seem entirely obvious, it apparently no longer is with all the technological temptations on offer. As one agent explains when relating to us his disdain for so-called 'facade appraisals' (*geveltaxaties*), whereby one for whatever reason does not enter the property before appraising it:

"Yeah some people can appraise behind their desk but I can't, I have to see it there and get a feeling... That one house where that one person lives can be situated favourably in relation to those other six and then I can accord it some other values. That's how I do it. Slowly you learn stuff, like I said, learning experience, making comparisons by what people weigh more heavily there." (Interview no. 031)

'There' is where to discover any physical or aesthetic deviations or possibilities but also the rather intricate indexical and iconic relationships that may be translated into (add or detract) exchange value. That is, all those attributes that facadal appraisals let alone desktop surveys fail to bring out. One example mentioned by the just cited agent of a physical aberration one could encounter in Klarendal that is impossible to detect from a distance, would be if the building housed an illegal cannabis plantation (which indeed can leave parts of a property quite devastated). A more positive material quality that would warrant a bit more close reading would be the hackneyed 'garden on the South' or 'West-facing balcony'. Yet these are not exactly feats of hermeneutic deep diving. And this goes for interpreting neighborly relations as well. Take for instance in this report the mention in same breath of some next door buildings that are physically dilapidated or considered ugly and the presence of marginal groups of neighbors:

"[Taking again a house in Klarendal:] When you look at the back you see a neighboring property in a bad state and you see it is rented to students. So you immediately get the question from the viewer, 'who's living next door?' And if you then look at the property across the street you'll see some buildings from the eighties and some flags of.. Surinamese flags, for example. Then you quickly get the question, what is the neighborhood like? Who are the immediate neighbors? You get that question a lot, more than in other districts."
(Interview no. 034)

A property's environment thus becomes a rather flat canvas where superficial material indicators and social stereotypes are read off with the most generic, apparently

rather racist and classist customer in mind. The acquiescent intermediaries doing the reading invariably present themselves as a mere channel for such ‘preferences’, devolving any moral responsibility to clients and their given demands (cf. Elibol and Tielbeke, 2018, on rampant institutional racism among Dutch market intermediaries). Whether it concerns the questionable entertainment habits of the *volkswijk*, as mentioned in the quote on page 223, or the presence of ‘Surinam flags’, their values in Klarendal are for a substantial part determined by rather superficial negotiations of the exact (negative) exchange value of territorial, racial and class stigma. In conclusion then, we should not exaggerate too much the hermeneutic work involved here, as compared to Richman’s. They are much more constrained in their time for every individual property. More importantly, they do not reinterpret the property in any material sense. They certainly tentatively look for and conservatively advertise ‘highest and best uses’, even in qualitative, exaptive terms (eg. suggest adding a dormer), but never fantasize too much. That is mostly left to the customer, something to go along with, as with the stigmatization.

5.3.3 Court of Saints: a gentrification symbiont fixing up utility gaps

The third agencement concerns the renovation of a block of buildings in the same street as Richman’s but a bit closer to the city center. What we call the ‘Court of Saints’ is a U-shaped group of houses first built in the 1890s and some of which were shops before being exapted for living purposes. The properties are so-called sweat equity projects, *klushuizen* in Dutch, from the word for home improvement or fixing up (*klussen*). *Klushuizen* are a familiar phenomenon in gentrifying neighborhoods whereby rundown dwellings are renovated by their owners’ sweaty labor and private capital, as opposed to hiring someone else to do it or buying a ready-made home on a conventional mortgage. As already mentioned, Klarendal’s gentrification is not quite amenable to an interpretation in terms of stages. Yet this seems about the only framework in which sweat equity projects are understood in the literature (but see Rose, 1996). They are considered to be part of the first *seemingly* benign ‘pioneer’ phase, only to fatally clear the stage for a more affluent and less industrious class of in-movers (eg. Clay, 1979, Lees, 2006, Lees et al., 2008: 23, 153). Whenever the sweat equity



Image 5.34. The life cycle of the protoctist slime mold (*Dictyostelium discoideum*), with the fructiferous body formed by a grouping of cells (redrawn from Maturana and Varela, 1989: 78–79). The collective building project of the Court of Saints recapitulates a homologous trajectory. While relatively short-lived as a productive agencement, it also lays the ground for longer lasting sociomaterial bonds within and beyond the Court.

pioneers are assessed in more detail, it is as part of ‘consumption explanations’ of gentrification (Lees et al., 2008: 35). However, considering they are as much producer as consumer, we would do better to call them ‘prosumers’ of gentrification. As such, they deserve a more detailed empirical study, if only to get an idea of what kind of economic (dis)abilities are involved and how those might be affirmed or compensated for to those economically less abled.

A first look at the Court of Saints reveals some affinities with what Haila calls a ‘bazaar’ type of investment, where ‘serendipitous’ actors invest in property with no intention to speculate on its exchange value but are focused on present use-value:



Images 5.35–5.38. The air photo shows the block of sweat equity houses (with Richman’s row still visible in the top right corner) (Google Earth, 2019, accessed 05-10-2020, circle added). To the right of it, some of the row before redevelopment, occupied by squatters. The doorway shows the graffiti of a bloodied pig in police uniform with an anarchist logo on its hat. The posters on the windows read ‘more sun, less police’ and ‘more sun, less Portaal’, protesting the housing corporation then still owning the property and about to sell it (Google Street View, 07-2009, accessed 05-10-2020). On the bottom left a house on the same block advertising itself: ‘house seeks handyman’ (Huis zoekt klusser) (04-2013, from a blog of one of the handymen, accessed 05-10-2020). Next to it are some of the refurbished buildings with the large shop windows characteristically left intact (Google Street View, 04-2016, accessed 05-10-2020).

“Individuals with different tastes and skills produce rich and heterogeneous space with many nuances and differences”, that is, a ‘bazaar’ (Haila, 1991: 349, emphasis added). This applies quite well to the Court, with the important difference that the investment involves a strong supra-individual component. In evolutionary economic terms it is quite a different animal, or rather a different symbiont, one more akin to the protocists (Image 5.34). As explained above, these ancients are assemblages of cells using “other cells in close cellular proximity as a medium for realizing their autopoiesis” (Maturana and Varela, 1989: 77), or in other words, bundles of practices forging symbiotic alliances to further actualize their virtual capacities. In the Court of Saints several households, each a unique assemblage of desires and capabilities, merge in the service of their own plurifaction, more so than for the production of an icon, the survival of the enterprise itself or an accumulation of capital. In the process, lasting material and social affects and commitments are forged which transcend the economic. Exactly how this proceeded will be described as follows. The data used comes from transcribed interviews of three of the participating fixer-uppers (Interview no. 044, 045, 046) and a blog (Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com) by another resident reporting on the whole renovation process (December 2010 - March 2015).

5.3.3.1 Prehistory: Rules of assemblage and displacing the squatters

For decades the twenty houses had been neglected, to the point where the artists that were still housed there by SLAK, a foundation arranging cheap studios for artists, had to leave for their own safety. One of these old tenants, the writer of the project blog, later returned as one of the DIYers. When the municipality, who together with housing association Portaal owned the properties, declared the dwellings uninhabitable and planned to demolish them altogether, she and others protested this successfully. The whole block was to become a fix-up project (*klushuizenproject*). All candidates could register and did so in such numbers that they had to be selected by lottery. Those that got in were to organize themselves into a ‘collective private commissioner’ (*collectief particulier opdrachtgeverschap*), a form of real estate development that gives a group of private persons full control over the realization process. Nonetheless, this came with some initial minimal demands: the group was to hire a shared contractor to deliver the shell (*casco*) and roof isolation and the facades were to be restored to their old form (to become a protected city view) without dormers or anything else added. The rest was up to the collective. For the next five years they would slowly renovate their houses and build a community. While most had already lived in the neighborhood for years and therefore were not deterred by any territorial stigma of Klarendal, none of them knew each other well before they embarked on their shared enterprise.

Before anything could get started, however, a battle was to be waged on a group of squatters that had occupied six of the houses just before, in 2009. The story brings out well the kind of identities and motivations that were at play in the process. In between the evacuation of the old renters and the decision to turn it into a fix-up project a year or so passed by in which the buildings were left vacant. This gave a group of squatters the opportunity to occupy a large part of the block well into the

start of the project. Familiar with the area's history, the DIYers were at first quite sympathetic to the squatters' cause, much more so than the older working class Klarendallers (which only a distant cynic could call the false consciousness of a lumpenproletariat). The latter experienced the current cohort of squatters as much less socially and politically involved than earlier generations that rallied together with them against the 1960s gentrification plans (see Chapter 6, Interview no. 026). However, the initial sympathy waned as the squatters insisted on staying put. One of the DIYers explains why:

"I have squatted myself too. The idea is, or so I thought, but today that may be different, you squat because you think otherwise it will get into the hands of a seigneur [*grootgrondbezitter*]. But here it was obvious that people were going to live there, yet they still wouldn't leave. Well that's kind of strange.. [Did you hear how they legitimized it?] Yes they said 'but those speculators always say they will live there themselves and we don't believe that any more. We also don't believe you'. Well they were quite wrong. A year later one of them came by and was really surprised we actually did. But there were also some mental cases that just wanted to live there and did not have any ideals about it. And indeed you could do it, things just stood around vacant. In the beginning I thought the squatting was great, because when they were declared uninhabitable nothing happened. After a year the squatters came, nobody wanted to live there anyway. Totally solid action! It was just that in the end only idiots [*randfiguren*] were left who were lighting up barrels of garbage and playing really loud music. That was nonsense. For that I will call the police." (Interview no. 044)

From these statements, but also reading back the blogs and comments about the process, we can see the rather small ideological difference between the two parties allows the squatters little reasonable resistance. In any case, it so happened that squatting, considered a great Dutch tradition by many, was outlawed in October 2010. This made it much easier to get rid of those squatters that brought their case to court (at least one did). The others that did not move voluntarily were eventually removed by force.

The sympathetic understanding of the squatters' initial actions and aversion to speculation tells us something about the motives that came with the sweat equity project. Part of this was instituted from the beginning, as the local authorities demanded of the new buyers that they would stay for at least five years in order to ward off speculation. This seemed to be quite successful in attracting the right crowd. One eventual member of the collective even changed from absentee speculator bent on flipping or renting the property into a socially engaged resident and co-organizer of the whole enterprise (Interview no. 045). Nonetheless, to the disappointment of the group, there was still at the time of interviewing (Interview no. 046) one property left in its old wretched state by an apparent speculator. Another had been bought by a father to house his son and another student. Apparently these had up until then managed to escape the rules. But these deviations only confirm the group's commitment to other motives than profit or financial depository. That is, a combination of a challenging, fun and prestigious building project, the entering into a new community and a concern for the neighborhood most of them already lived in. Within this range there were still differences of course, which also tied in

with differences of building practices and roles within the project. For instance, the speculator-turned-socializer nonetheless self-identified as ‘not your typical fixer-upper occupant’ (*kluswoner*). And he did indeed express a divergent motivation:

“Some people are most happy when they have held every stone in their hands and that’s totally fine... they experience feelings of honor [*leer*] from their own work, but for me that comes more from the image that we had in our minds, of which no one thought it could be done...” (Interview no. 045)

He describes himself in terms more like Richman’s, as a proud entrepreneur. And like Richman his motives lean towards reaching for the monumental which ‘no one thought could be done’. Thus the conspicuous prosumer tells us how the project won an important architectural prize and we find him showing his particular home interior on national television. In the interview, like in the television show, he displays his ‘creativity’ and ‘playful handling of materials’, again reminiscent of Richman. With every respect for his DIY inclined neighbors, as the quote above testifies, he rather hires a contractor to get things done quickly and, so he claims, often more cheaply (especially during those years of sectoral crisis). Where others were working on their house for years, he did it in a few months. Moreover, he states, many fundamental things, like a basic electricity connection, they were not even allowed to do themselves anyway because of building codes, so why even bother doing part of it yourself. Nevertheless, despite his distinct attitude and building practice, he was enticed to commit to the collective project and, as we will see below, also willy-nilly entangled himself into a new community.



Image 5.39. Fixing-up together as a collective commissioner means ‘learning to calculate together’. (source: sintmartenshof.wordpress.com, 01-02-2012, accessed 05-10-2020)

5.3.3.2 Skills, trials and errors: Struggling with/for economic dyscalculia and dyslexia, together

Not surprisingly, the different motives for participation were correlated to the assortment of skills commanded by the different group members. Collectively renovating twenty houses takes quite a range of capabilities which are not equally distributed over those taking part. This, a certain division of labor can at least partly overcome. Apart from the entrepreneur, skilled in project management, and the blogging artist, well-versed in aesthetics, we encountered a professional musician, who grew up with a DIY-builder as a father and now lives together with an architect, and lastly, an ICT project manager, experienced in leadership and bureaucratic procedures. Thus quite an extensive set of skills was brought to the table. Nonetheless, the nature of the project was such that many ways of doing things had to be invented anew and everyone involved had to be able to follow to a certain capacity what had been decided on. With little experience to go on – the project was the first of its kind in Arnhem – the collective commission involved a lot of ‘improvisation and experimentation’ from the get go:

“[We began by] setting up a buyers’ association. This includes daily management and committees that focus on, for instance, selecting an architect/engineer, a fitting contractor for the heavy duties (foundations, casco, roofs) and on sustainable renovation solutions. [But it also involves] intensive study of our contracts of purchase and the associated demands. As a first of its kind in Arnhem, the fixer-uppers project requires all parties involved to improvise and experiment. Which means: complications and details [*haken en ogen*], and then more complications and details. And therefore a lot of deliberation [*vergadere*].” (Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com, 28-12-2010)

Indeed much of the free time invested by the collective – for its chairman something like a ‘second job’ – was not spent on sweaty construction work but countless hours of deliberation. Which, as the chairman told us, required from her and everyone else a lot of patience, tolerance and generosity towards one another. There was little room for solipsism. Much of the collective decision-making on the issues cited above were divided over similar practices of economization found in the previous agencements: calculative, technical, legal and aesthetic. As to the first of these, what is an entirely standard exercise for Clockwork Inc. had to be reinvented on the fly by the Court. But then ‘costs of failure’ in the sense of the end product not meeting user requirements are rather unlikely, as the ‘customer’ is directly and intensely involved in every part of the building process. However, to calculate differently, as extreme singularization demands, is greatly helped by doing it together. As our blogger explains under the title ‘Learning to calculate together’ (*Samen leren calculeren*):

A fix-up project like this is a learning process. Not only are you working on your language skills [referring to a previous post, to be cited below] you also develop your arithmetic talents. Comparing cost estimates of contractor, cost expert and seller is like rocket science [*hogere wiskunde*]. They are incomparable magnitudes, because one calculates this way and another that way, and another from A through B to C and D to E. [*sic*]. The best you can do then as a group of DIYers is cozy up, add coffee and tea, and go over every cost item or estimate. Laptops and papers ready, and go calculate. Together we’ll figure it

out. Or in fact: together we are getting sharper and sharper.” (Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com, 01-02-2012)

However, it was not just economic dyscalculia that had to be surmounted. As the blog passage already hints, becoming a fixer-up agencement also requires clearing many linguistic barriers. First of all, there was an avalanche of technical lingo to process:

“Parlez-vous fixing up? As a new DIYer you are busy demolishing, stripping, calculating and deliberating. You would almost forget how important language skills are. Indeed, you get a crash course in jargon. That begins with the architect. Next makes a design in ‘so’, ‘vo’, ‘do’: sketch, provisional, final. Meanwhile, we are talking with the buyers’ association in the three-weekly general meeting on the outcome of the building team and the news on cpo-projects. The reports go into the dropbox. A hot topic is sustainability: which re-values do we want for our roof bars or beams? And do we do coconut-isolation, precipitation drainage or a sun-boiler? And what is the rate of recovery of each? [Another DIYer comically adds in the comment section:] So many choices. HR+ or HR++? What do we do with the trimming? Spramex concrete B25? The insertion of beams? How do you handle an sp? And oh yeah, in the dropbox there is still a list of OA-LEV to apply for... Bring in again the PvE [program of requirements], wat does it say about BVO and NVO? How are things with the connection of the hwa’s [precipitation drains]? The MS-partitions? Questions, questions, questions.” (Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com, 20-01-2012)

In addition, some *legal* literacy was required, for instance when they found asbestos in some of the properties and had to argue the municipality’s accountability for taking care of it from the purchase agreement (Interview no. 045). More generally also, an understanding of bureaucratic rules and procedures was essential.

Lastly, many aesthetic decisions also had to be made, which again brought in all kinds of material-semiotic distinctions and jargon that had to be mastered. For example, the group had to make up their minds on an expensive but more original ‘cut pointing’ (*knipvoeg*) in between the bricks for the facades. From the beginning



Images 5.40–5.41. On the left, with samples on the table, the deliberations on the colors of the rear of the houses facing the communal garden. On the right, the architect reveals the design of those same rears (source: sintmartenshof.wordpress.com, 01-11-2012, accessed 05-10-2020).

the idea was to align such choices as much as possible in order to achieve ‘one level of quality’ (*kwaliteitsniveau*). Contracting one architect rather than twenty could have been fun perhaps but would most likely produce a mess (Interview no. 046). Therefore decisions had to be made one way or the other. On the one hand, the hired architect helped narrow down the range of choice with aesthetic authority:

“[T]he rear facades should not all be of the same color, but you don’t want a ‘Copenhagen situation’ either, where bright blue [*knalblauw*] alternates with intense red [*felrood*]. [...] Instead, we choose softer colors that match. *Ton-sur-ton* it is called in professional jargon.” (Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com, 27-06-2011).

On the other hand, as the collective had to have the last word, internal differences of taste were ultimately settled by majority vote, as for instance about the uniformity and color of front doors (Interview no. 046). And although such decisions were not in any way legally binding anyone’s deviation from them was experienced as deeply disappointing by others. For example, when one resident of the Court decided he found the wood and plaster suggested by the architect too expensive and bought his own, to the discontent of all the others. Sometimes then, the calculations and aesthetics of the majority could be rather demanding.

However, apart from all the organizational deliberation and calculation, it was still mostly the material work that was preferred by the DIY collective. That is what *klussen* is all about, as our blogger explains under the title ‘Rather this’ (*Liever dit*), contrasting the excessive jargon and abbreviations of construction talk with the



Image 5.42. One of the Saints doing some demolition work in the back of one of the stripped properties. The blog reports how satisfying and fun the actual manual labor can be after all the required paperwork and collective planning is finally done: ‘Rather this’ (source: sintmartenshof.wordpress.com, 17-07-2011, accessed 05-10-2020).

simple names for the actual construction work:

“Hours we spend in rooms. Drinking coffee. Deliberating over felling permits [*kapvergunningen*], digging reports [*KLIC-meldingen*], provisional design [*VO's*], additional costs [*staartkosten*], cadastral measurements [*kadastrale inmetingen*], BIMming [*BIMmen*], isolation values [*RC-waarden*], additional packages [*pluspakketten*], liability insurance [*CAR-verzekeringen*], partial planning [*deelplanningen*], responsible timber certificates [*PEFC-certificaten*], clean soil declarations [*bodembeschikkingen*], building subsidies [*CPO-subsidies*], dropboxes, technical programs of requirements [*technische PVE's*], delivery dates [*oplevermomenten*] and whatever else is brought to the table [*wonttk*]. And we do it gladly. It is all worth the sacrifice for our ‘brick children’ [*huizekindjes*]. But we’d rather do this: demolish and smash. Break, fragment, tear loose. Hammer, wrench, push. Shovel, gather stones, wheel [*kruien*], separate waste, fill waste containers. Unscrew, uncover, dig out. Sweat. Remove nails [*ontspijkeren*], transport, strip. Tear down and carry off. Demolish it, so we can start building.” (Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com, 17-07-2011)

As mentioned before, for those handymen and handywomen who actually do it all by themselves, the building requires many manual skills too. Being experienced in self-building helps with knowing what one can and could do. But even for the accomplished home improver much of it is a matter of trial and error. For instance, knowing how to saw wooden floorboards just short enough to avoid their cracking after they settle, something a paid professional would do right away. In such a case “a fall into the pit is a gain in your wit” (*door schade en schande wordt je wijs*) (Interview no. 046).

More perhaps than the intellectual activities, it was the physical work, the actual *klussen*, that created a true sense of community. One of the renovators compared the atmosphere at the work site and later the common garden to the conviviality at a family ‘camping’. Another spoke of ‘one big village party’ (*dorpsborrel*). The intense sociomaterial process of collectively reconstructing the Court created a lasting bond unlike any ‘normal living conditions’:

“[Is it like a community you’re involved in on a daily basis?] Well, during the building process.. Because then everyone was working [*klussen*] and you would constantly run into one another. Now that all the houses are done that is less so, but you still have a huge common garden [and a] common bike parking where you run into each other daily and in summer everyone comes out and uses the garden and children of the neighborhood all play there, so yes, there is a lot more contact than in a normal living situation [*woonsituatie*]. At my previous home I barely knew my neighbors... two weeks ago all my neighbors were at my birthday party [...] that’s a whole different social interaction than you’ll find in a normal neighborhood [*buurt*]... [Is it a kind of neighborhood in a neighborhood?] Yes, but events are also organized [...] houses are opened up to have bands perform there or exhibit art with *Wijken voor Kunst* [ie. a low-key Klarendal art event]. [...] Or we have roulette diners, where you go over to eat and prepare food at each other’s places. So that’s all a very different way to relate to each other...” (Interview no. 045)

5.3.3.3 *Myopic exaptation: Insinuating displacement or singularization?*

Taking all these practices together, what to make of this symbiotic agencement? Compared to the foregoing cases, it is on the one hand more short-lived as a productive agencement, in the sense that the prosumer at a certain point largely sheds its producer skin and becomes only a consumer-maintainer (although the difference can be blurry). On the other hand, its programmed death as a ‘multicellular’ economic agencement does not mean the end of a looser confederation or preclude its reactualization for other purposes. Moreover, in contrast to Clockwork and Richman, the Court is less easily characterized by either adaptationist or exaptationist economic strategies. What seems to be at play is a certain kind of exaptation, or perhaps nonaptation. Again Gould’s (2002) expanded theory of evolution may help out to make the distinction. In further developing his concept of exaptation, he divides it into two broad classes: franklins and miltons. The first category, named after the president whose head is on the thin American dime, denotes the exaptation for a supplementary function of adaptations currently in use, such as the coin functioning first as money being exapted as a screwdriver. This is the least controversial category of cooptations, those of a technological kind: thermoregulative feathers become flying instruments or, as mentioned before, an aid for the blind becomes a universal typewriter. The miltons, however, which Gould finds most fascinating because they so obviously challenge panadaptationist orthodoxy, are those coopted features that are not currently in use and may not even have an adaptive origin. The name was inspired by a 1652 sonnet by John Milton that praises those consigned ‘only stand and wait’ to serve God in contrast to more active proselytizers and crusaders of the day. However, looking at the history of those evolutionary features consigned to ‘stand and wait’ we can with Gould refine this taxonomy of exaptations even further into so-called *manumissions* and *insinuations* in order to illuminate some differences between Richman’s agencement and the Court of Saints. Richman’s exaptations fall mostly into the first category: “Features that [first] lose an original utility without gaining a new function. In a first group of ‘unemployments’ or ‘manumissions,’ previously utilized features become liberated from functional or selective control, and gain freedom to become exapted for other uses.” (ibid.: 1281). Insinuations, by contrast, are those nonaptive features entering the exaptive pool by neutral drift, ‘beneath selections scrutiny’ (ibid.: 1282). When the DIYers unfold their conjoined projects over several years they try and err their way toward their own unique index of sociomaterial relationships. In Bergsonian terms (Deleuze, 1988), whereas Richman’s manumitted miltons re-present the formerly absent, or *realize* the *possible*, the Court’s insinuated miltons *actualize* the *virtual*, bringing true novelty into the world. Like the woodworker or metallurgist in relation to their wood or metal, but also toward their social-economic obligations (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 408–412), the Court’s practices entail less an architectural dictating from a global blueprint or an iconographic heritage strategy than it does a slow and myopic *following* of divergent material, social, aesthetic and calculative vectors or creative ‘lines of flight’.

5.3.3.4 Homo faber *versus* homo debitor?

At this point, having sufficiently diversified the economic ‘minds’ or agencements at play in Klarendal, we are in a position to address the conditioning role of debt in its transformation, specifically mortgage debt. The financial crisis of 2008 has especially raised concerns and consciousness of how private debt has become central to economic assemblage and gentrification in particular (Keen, 2017, Kallin, 2017, 2020). According to rent gap scholar Kallin, the increased availability of credit and private indebtedness since the 1990s, cloaked as a neoliberal ‘democratization of finance’, has been absolutely essential for conjuring up and ‘liberating’ the potential rents of gentrification. The general switch from ‘making houses more affordable’ for working people to ‘making residents able to afford housing’ (ibid.: 1) has given rise to a society-wide regime of debt-based discipline. Described above as an elitist assemblage of scarcity, the new financial regime normalizes ‘ownership’ through immense housing debts (cf. Flint, 2003, Blomley, 2004) and lays claim to a sheer endless amount of future labor in exchange for securities the welfare state no longer provides (Lazzarato, 2012, 2015) (see Section 5.2.3.2.1, II). Thus mediated and recentered around private debt finance, divisions between the working, landowning and entrepreneurial classes, relations of exploitation and differences between rent (gaps), interest and profit have been both ‘scattered’ (‘we are all middle class now’) and ‘exacerbated’, between creditworthy owners (borrowers) and unworthy renters (Kallin, 2020). More than that, the neoliberal debt regime has begun to make Haila’s speculative ‘property mind’ (see Section 5.2.4.5), and by extension gentrification, into a taken-for-granted, even coercive common sense (ibid.: 4–6). However, while convincingly sweeping and truthful on a most general level (which Kallin deems appropriate considering the inherent abstraction of finance itself), this epochal narrative of ‘fifth-wave gentrification’ (Aalbers, 2018) still remains to be empirically supported at the level of practice. Indeed, besides the fact that it is not modern finance that for the first time blurs what were crisp class divisions before (but perhaps reminds us of their fundamental overdetermination, see Section 5.2.4.3), making debt the new ultimate axis and frontier of class power and gentrification seems premature and rather essentialist.

On the one hand, all investors and buyers indeed have to deal with getting their plans financed somehow. Despite not having investigated it in depth, which is also hard because of the general discretion about money and debt, the data collected for this study gives some clues about financial strategies. We already saw how an investor such as Clockwork Inc. appears to go about its finances in a much more rationed and guarded manner than Richman, who makes deals in seconds and operates on guts. They also enact potential (rent, prestige) in different ways. However, neither have to worry much about whether there are people able to acquire a high enough mortgage to buy their product (‘gentrifiers’). About their particular clients’ accounting we know nothing, but if other new Klarendal homeowners are any indication (Interviews no. 047 and 021), it has not been particularly difficult to obtain a mortgage there in the last two decades.¹³⁴ For both buyers and banks, calculations of credit scores are

¹³⁴ As to whether the withholding of capital was a factor in Klarendal’s previous neglect, by

pretty standard and straightforwardly based on loan-to-income and loan-to-value calculations, personal savings and stable labor contracts (Aalbers, 2006a: 331). This is not to say that a deviation from the consumerist norm set by the likes of Clockwork and Richman is easy. In the case of the more risky fixer-uppers and their relatively marginal future occupants, acquisition of the required mortgages was often a close call, and sadly enough some had to pull out for failing to meet criteria after the costs of renovation turned out higher than initially estimated (Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com, 30-12-2012).

On the other hand, that private debt is currently an inevitable component of *any* real estate development does not make it a sufficient cause of gentrification and the complete subversion of economic diversity. For one, suburbia is (being) built on credit just as much. But on a deeper level, empirical investigation does not suggest that the speculative 'property mind' (*homo debitor/economicus*) has wholly taken over or displaced other types of agencements and is therefore not hegemonic, certainly not in Klarendal, Arnhem. The fact that the DIYers had to take out a loan did not automatically whip them into a speculative mode of practice. If anything, the opposite happened (as in the above mentioned case of Interview no. 045, Section 5.3.3.1) and not just because the municipality demanded (softly 'disciplined') the new owners to live there for the first five years. Beyond its institutional footing, the collective agencement enticed its participants to pursue, honor and care for more common utilities and obligations. Through agencements such as the Court of Saints then, there is a still unsettled evolutionary struggle going on in Arnhem's ecology of real estate practices, between the pull of *homo debitor/economicus* and the desires of *homo faber/curans*. As will also become clear in relation to the social housing corporation, these genealogical lines may cross-cut agencements and present various frictions and challenges of displacement. As we will see below, the housing corporation, serving as a 'prosthetic' for the economically disabled, has the double task of, on the one hand, including those deemed 'abnormal' and 'unworthy' by taking on the debt for them (making it 'public'), thereby 'making housing affordable', while on the other, actively defying the norms set by debt-based disciplinary regimes, countering normal calculations of potential rent and 'best use' with alternative practices (more about which in the following section).

redlining and other mortgage discrimination practices (making it ripe for gentrification, Smith, 1979a: 544-545), there are some signs that did and still does happen (also in our own interviews, no. 043 and 032), but these should not be overestimated (see Aalbers, 2006a: 348-350, 2006b: 102, also on Arnhem and Klarendal specifically). If price developments are any indication, these have not slumped much after the financial crisis, which would have been an expected outcome of redlining by credit rationing banks (Aalbers, 2010). The strongly related speculative practices of slumlording and property 'milking' (Smith, 1979a: 545) also seem to have been limited, as compared to other Dutch cities (Ferwerda, 2007, reports only 25 'contaminated' properties in Klarendal). However, while these financial and speculative practices can certainly have a disproportionate effect on neighborhood well-being and livability (eg. the presence of a drug dealer making a whole street feel unsafe), the fact that the area consists largely of homes maintained by social housing corporations (almost 80% before 2000) has significantly diminished their possible impact on the state of Klarendal housing and cohesion. It is safe to say the decline that was there in the 1990s was an effect of wrongheaded drug policy and neglect by public institutions (naturalizing the neighborhood life-cycle, see Section 5.3.4.3.2 below).

Concluding on the case, what might we take away from the Court of Saints' practices? Can we speak of gentrification? If closing a rent gap is the defining essence of the process, then yes, that is what happened. But in terms of displacement the case is much more ambiguous. How violent or saintly are the DIYers really? In the most direct sense, taking in mind the squatters, no one has been forced out of their house without good reason. Less directly, however, the designation of the land and existing properties for private redevelopment makes it no longer available for social housing. And, given set prices, inaccessible to possible working class buyers. Less directly still, the fixed-up houses have probably contributed to rising prices for privately owned properties in the immediate neighborhood, making them less accessible said buyers. Nonetheless, apart from the fact that most of the DIYers were already living there before they entered the project, the collective enterprise also worked to further embed themselves into the neighborhood. If the area's locational value is largely a quantification of an 'urban commons', the Court of Saints amply contributes to the latter. This is not a negligible difference with other, simple consumers of housing (the clients of Clockwork and Richman) or with anyone lazily speculating on the properties. Lastly, this leaves the possibility of symbolic violence (ie. displacement in the first language of scarcity). While arguably the transformation may indirectly stigmatize surrounding properties, here again, as in the case of Richman, the iconic value of properties, especially of the 'protected' facades, leans more toward the indexical embeddedness than the symbolic. In short, the case of the Court of Saints shows that real estate economization does not necessarily follow the evolutionary line of a consumerist and 'property minded' *homo debitor*.

Indeed, we can take this evaluation even further into a 'clinical' direction. We then find that for those involved in the project it has also been a story of overcoming economic dyscalculia and dyslexia together. Not by normalization but singularization, by a playful affirmation of difference. As such it is also a story of will to power, capacitation, learning and becoming more affective and evolvable as prosumers. On the one hand then, in comparison to the foregoing agencements, "the occupant or client has equal capacities for ideation and imagination at all project phases", or at least in principle, such that "the boundaries which [usually] separate architects, builders and client-occupants are, in practice, somewhat [more] fluid, heterarchical and complex." (C Smith, 2015: 406). This less distant sociomaterial entanglement has contributed to instilling in the collective a deep sense of connection and obligation toward their immediate neighborhood. On the other hand, it also becomes clear how the heterarchical nature of the artisanal-architectural project is not just very rewarding for its prosumers but also highly demanding. Even within a well-functioning collective like the Court of Saints, stripping and fixing up twenty properties is obviously hard and difficult work. Apart from the financial requirements this is certainly not an option for everyone (let alone a desirable). In this way the Court case also nicely testifies to the amount and variety of care work that the next agencement is officially tasked with to take on for its 'disabled' clients. This is the housing corporation.

5.3.4 *People's Housing: an (un)gentrifier caring for social wealth gaps*

Having described those calculative and positional practices in Klarendal that embody certain powerful capitalist and symbolic norms, but also at times manage to defy them, we can now introduce even more economic diversity to its real estate market. As part of the agencement that is People's Housing, the largest social housing association active in Klarendal (as of 2020 still owning about 50% (2020/4083) of the neighborhood's housing stock and 16% citywide (12880/77839), arnhem.incijfers.nl, accessed 02-04-21), we can find many practices trying to rework or defy these norms. We 'clinically' interpret these practices as strategic dyslexia and dyscalculia. To understand how these particular ethics of care have taken shape in the sociotechnical practices of People's Housing, we need to understand its past first.

5.3.4.1 *Housing the people: Recent Dutch history*



Recent social housing history, in particular the British and the Dutch, has for good reasons been explained within a framework of privatization and (re)commodification (eg. Forrest and Murie, 1995, Kadi and Musterd, 2015, Boterman and Van Gent, 2014). Hence, from the 1990s onward a 'neoliberal restructuring of the urban housing market' toward recommodification is said to have occurred as part of a general switch from a Keynesian, social democratic to a post-Fordist, liberal welfare regime (Kadi, 2014). However, while on an ideological level this economic history makes a lot of sense, it appears somewhat one-dimensional and conveniently polarized from a practices of economization perspective. That is, from a more *longue durée* view starting from the nineteenth century, and including the much glorified sixties and seventies (eg. Uitermark, 2009), the Dutch social housing sector has exhibited a constant struggle between a rich plurality of philanthropist, commercial, statist, professional, associative, cooperative and informal practices (Beekers, 2012). Current critics are therefore missing the mark when they represent the privatisations of the 1990s as somehow a 'neoliberal' revolution in Dutch housing. To understand why already in the sixties Dutch housing associations, born from an ideologically 'pillarized' corporatism rather than a universal program, were to become more autonomous 'social entrepreneurs' and why the most Leftist government the nation has experienced (Den Uyl, 1973-1977) initiated the first push in that direction, an ideological analysis downplays other matters that prove decisive in practice. Especially, when the post-war need for sheer quantitative expansion somewhat subsided and statist practices proved rather blunt to care for newly emerging, qualitatively diverse housing needs (of youth, elderly and other 'new' households). In accordance with the arrival of a new expressive individualism the more entrepreneurial housing providers more or less successfully tried to move away from the disciplinary and coercive paternalism inherited from uniform, industrial, quantity oriented times toward a more egalitarian 'partnership' responsive to specific needs and cultural norms of what became individual 'housing consumers' (Van Ginkel, 2001, 2015).

In tandem, however, there were strong New Left pushes toward 'democratization' to grant tenants more influence over corporate policy. These translated into either

associative or professional forms, and with mixed results (Ouwehand and Van Daalen, 2002, Beekers, 2012).¹³⁵ Direct 'internal' democratization, whether achieved through board coups (eg. Patrimonium, Amsterdam, 1965) or in cooperation with departing regents, ran into technological myopia and parochial self-interest but mostly indifference among member residents, all overshadowing more complex and expansive investments and progressive objectives (let alone embodying broad worker solidarity). In practice, the degree to which tenants actually participated in decision-making varied independently of the corporation's legal economic form, whether it was a more 'internally' democratic association of members (*vereniging*) or a professionalized foundation (*stichting*) with 'externally' democratic advisory committees of 'housing consumers'. As Beekers recounts, "it was not always clear what was pleaded for by residents when calling for more democracy: was it active participation in housing work, was it about having a voice in administrative affairs or just good communication?" (2012: 225, my translation). Overall, however, it seemed people just wanted their specific housing needs to be cared for without much cost or complication. For reasons understood then, 'external' democratization and tenant empowerment won out eventually and is still dominant today, with the housing association obliged by law to institute channels for participation (*overleg*) but responsibility for its management falling with employed professionals (and with local and national tenant organizations monitoring general housing rights). Locally, this watered down participatory economy (cf. Albert and Hahnel, 1991, Hahnel, 2012) then comes with all the perpetual challenges of participatory governance like getting tenants involved in the first place, asymmetries of ability, (self-)selective representativeness, the sharing of control, reaching beyond personal daily nuisances and in general, truly listening (Overmeeren and Zijlstra, 2009, Kruythoff, 2008, Huisman, 2014).

There are two further developments that crucially define the predicament that Dutch housing associations find themselves in today. The first concerns the period leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, a defining time of experimentation and abundance for the sector. While the professionalizing social entrepreneurs grew in size and capital toward the end of the century and were indeed in 1995 largely cut loose from the state financially, they were to reinvent themselves as the harbingers of a new kind of 'third way' housing politics. As 'Robin Hoods', operating in between the market and the state, they would fund their unprofitable social work through real estate development and commercial activities, which indeed worked quite well, at least as long as 'the' market allowed (Beekers, 2012: 281-283). Their calculative

¹³⁵ There were also small-scale initiatives toward cooperative, shared ownership (cf. DeFilippis, 2004). Christian communitarian housing directors especially felt this would be an ideal legal form for the 'housing corporation' (*woningcorporatie*, since then the Dutch term for housing associations), as it honored both the call for tenant influence and their precious 'subsidiarity principle' according to which political economic responsibilities should be devolved as much as possible. Although they never stopped being a popular ideal among many parties, and are again mentioned as a viable alternative in the current national government agreement (Rutte III, 2017-), cooperative initiatives have never really gotten off the ground, as they are simply very demanding on tenants' time, effort and skills (as observed in the previous Court of Saints case).



Images 5.43–5.45. On the left, the cover of a prominent textbook on ‘integral real estate management’ for Dutch social housing professionals: ‘Humans, bricks, money 2.0’ (Van Os, 2013). The ‘2.0’ simply refers to it being the second version in five years, as things were changing fast in the sector. On the right, two images from the book’s introduction (*ibid.*: 19–20). On top, a plastic depiction of the two functions of real estate: The bricks ‘carry use value’ for humans and ‘hold exchange-value’ as money. The bottom diagram depicts the same elements in the production process of housing (utilization, new-build, sale, services) as sandwiched in between the input of financial means (plus competencies of the organisation) and the output oriented to societal goals (housing costs, use of rental subsidies, livability). After some unfortunate financial adventures and decadent social projects (and after the publication of the book) the social housing sector has been ordered to bring back focus on the middle, the ‘stacking of bricks’:

practices started changing accordingly, while before corporation property was valued mainly by past production costs, now future ‘business value’ and then ‘market values’ became decisive, cranking up their collateral and paving the way for further financial ventures (Van Eijk et al., 2013). Moreover, by the same state that had earlier cut them loose they were charged with increasingly comprehensive and rather vaguely defined ‘fields of performance’. Two relevant non-basic domains counted among these fields were ‘livability’ and ‘housing and care’ (added in 2001).¹³⁶ The period found its apotheosis right before the crisis, when Ella Vogelaar, the new Minister of Housing, Work and Integration, made the housing corporations, enriched by seemingly ever growing real estate values, commit to investing a shared 2,5 billion into forty of the country’s supposedly worst problem areas, called ‘areas of attention’ (*aandachtswijken*) or ‘splendid neighborhoods’ (*brachtwijken*) to vainly avoid stigmatization. Klarendal was one of these and although People’s Housing was already investing heavily in the area this was another great boost for its plans there (Lavooij, 2014).

¹³⁶ Thus the law stated broadly: “The permitted institution [*toegelaten instelling*] contributes according to reasonable wishes to bringing about housing for elderly, handicapped and persons that are in need of care or guidance.” <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005686/2015-01-01> (accessed 25-09-2017)

However, the crisis and its long aftermath were unforgiving to both the Vogelaar neighborhood program and the social housing sector. A combination of its vaguely broad job description, faltering governmental oversight and resource abundance had resulted in some totally off the mark side projects, risky billion-euro financial adventures and in some cases blatant self-enrichment of corporation management (Van Eijk et al., 2013). A subsequent parliamentary inquiry into these excesses evoked a stern response from a new liberal conservative Minister of Housing, Stef Blok, ushering in a second and the latest period for housing corporations. The latter were to 'go back to basic', which has mostly come down to austerity and further residualization (Musterd, 2014: 472). Today a combination of heavy taxing and a widely supported restriction of their job specification (to 'stacking bricks' for the poorest) rather stealthily forces many housing corporations to either raise rents, liberalize or sell parts of their stock. Backed by European directives on fair competition, Blok's main ideological target in this new policy narrative are the 'skewed renting' (*scheefhuurders*), an actually very small group who supposedly earn too much to be living in their social rent houses and are expected to (borrow money and) buy a house, or rent it in a tight and increasingly expensive liberalized segment. Thus the norm of homeownership is further reinforced. Consumers are chased into buying property, incentivized (again) by lenient banking and tax benefits. The latter then again jack up prices, making social renting look disproportionately cheap (and 'skewed'). Meanwhile, being denied social rent while not eligible or willing to take on mortgage debt, and with the private rented market too tight and thus unaffordable, many, often young low- to middle-income households are increasingly frustrated in meeting their housing demands. However, for reasons that become clear below, this second development has not had much of an impact on People's Housing and its operations in Arnhem, at least for the time being.

Historically then, housing corporations find themselves again at a critical juncture. Their entrepreneurial hubris and its political reprimand have led to something of a sector-wide 'identity crisis' (Beekers, 2012). To not let the crisis go to waste then, it might be taken as an opportunity to calibrate anew our 'ethical coordinates' around the housing question (cf. Gibson-Graham, 2006, Hodkinson, 2010). The past scandals have shown how tempting the pull of capital and/or prestige can be, driving housing corporations to financially and symbolically excessive behavior either directly or indirectly causing gentrification. Their hybrid, 'third way' form of social entrepreneurship thus presents itself as a delicate balancing act between the magical and monstrous (Blessing, 2012). Where to go from here? Rather than continuing our tiresome Third Way into a neoliberal communitarian direction (cf. Patton, 2009), giving those able to pay for care services a pass while slyly twisting established rights of voice, choice and autonomy into very demanding duties for those who cannot (Tonkens, 2011, Tronto, 2017), we could instead give autonomist, pragmatist and feminist approaches to the housing question a chance (eg. Hodkinson, 2012). Central to this, should be the further development of an ethic of care in the domain of housing and real estate markets (cf. SJ Smith, 2010). But as long as care is associated not with difference of ability but mere abnormality, there is a risk of further marginalization of social housing. Just as quantitative expansion of social housing to include middle incomes made it more accepted in the past (Musterd, 2014: 482), today residualization

and stigmatization feed on each other to undo this acceptance. As further credit-based expansion of individual homeownership becomes increasingly untenable this might change, but now, in the overall absence of quantitative expansion, an ethic of care should be promoting and practicing an ontological interdependence and universal vulnerability of all things human and non-human. This would subvert distinctions drawn too sharply between the caregiving and receiving, or the autonomous and the needy residual. This is not an easy feat in most housing situations. However, while in most of the world the housing question still or again revolves mostly around matters of quantity (shelter for all), ownership, distributive justice and the right to stay put, the Dutch situation and small-town Arnhem in particular for now still seem to offer some rare breathing space to empirically explore the issue along more subtle ethical coordinates. In what follows therefore, we will take a shot at how an ethics of 'economic care' could take shape in relation to and beyond basic rights to shelter (or 'stay put') and voice (internal democratization, a 'right to place') (cf. Pols, 2003, Tronto, 2013). This means approaching questions of democratization and empowerment from a more pragmatist and 'clinical' perspective, as a care for asymmetries of economic (dis)abilities. The empirical vehicle for this exploration is the Arnhem housing corporation People's Housing.



Images 5.46–5.49. Seen here are the before and after pictures of some of People's Housing's stock of social housing in Klarendal (Google Street View, 05-2014 (left) and 10-2016 (right)). With sitting tenants staying put the blocks opposite one another have been intensively redeveloped to meet modern customer and ecological requirements.

5.3.4.2 *Introducing the agencement of People's Housing*

People's Housing is a housing corporation employing about 120 people and owning about half of the housing stock in Klarendal (in 2020). Their main presence in the neighborhood consists of the maintenance and updating of existing social housing properties (Images 5.46-5.49). However, beyond this basic activity, they have in recent years (2004-2015) erected a 'creative cluster' in the area in an attempt to revitalize its impoverished commercial life. In two phases, roughly from 2004-2010 (Volkshuisvesting, 05-05-2004) to 2010-2015 ('Phase B', 100% Fashion XL, Volkshuisvesting, 12-07-2011), the housing corporation and its local partners (the City of Arnhem, the Klarendal Neighborhood Council, the newly established business association DOCKS and consultancies such as Seinpost) have established the Fashion Quarter, ultimately including about 75 shops, restaurants and open workshops (more about which below). The organisational structure of People's Housing consists of four departments: Housing (*Wonen*), Real Estate (*Vastgoed*), Business Operations (*Bedrijfsvoering*) and Finance. Each department has its own director, together led by the General Director. Interview data comes from three long sit downs with the Director of the Housing Department (*Directeur Wonen*, Interviews no. 015, 016, 017), one with his predecessor (Interview no. 018), and one in-depth interview each with the General Director (*Algemeen Directeur*, Interview no. 019), the head officer for Research and Strategy (*Onderzoek en Strategie*, Interview no. 020), the Project Manager of Social Development (*Projectmanager Sociale Ontwikkeling*, Interview no. 021), the Housing Consultant (*Woonconsulent*, Interview no. 022) and an outside contracted real estate agent (Interview no. 035). Other data has come from observing the workplaces and delving the archives of the above mentioned interviewees. Thus peeking into the 'cockpit(s)' of People's Housing, as a rather heterogeneous bundle of economic and caring practices, shows housing to be an indefinite tinkering to find suitable living arrangements for a large number of diverse clients. As we will see in what follows, the twin competences of strategic economic dyscalculia (keep developing, but stay away from excessive risk) and economic dyslexia (improve the image of a place, but stay modest and dignified) are essential in this ethical endeavor.

5.3.4.3 *People's Housing's Dyscalculative patience*

Recent years and especially the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, have seen a surge of scholarly interest into processes of 'financialization', whereby exterior financial management techniques infiltrate both private and public institutions to gradually enmesh them in an "ecosystem of consultants, investment bankers and accountants through debt and derivatives transactions" (Aalbers et al., 2017: 573). Real estate has shown itself an especially favorable object of such financial innovation and, as the already mentioned Vestia and Vivare demonstrate, the affordable housing sector has been no exception (Fields, 2015, Aalbers et al., 2017). With its typically long turnover times, Van Loon (2016: 721) observes, real estate can indeed test its owners' patience. However, up to now less attention has gone out to real estate corporations that manage *not* to financialize and patiently resist the temptations of fast returns. In Van Loon's international comparison of real estate industries, Dutch investors

turn out markedly more pervious than the Belgian to the seductions of ‘impatient capital’ (ie. financialization) and to transforming, in Haila’s terminology, an ‘organic/machine’ environment into a speculative ‘circus’. By contrast, in the real estate ‘bazaar/jungle’ that is Belgium, real estate development runs on a more patient family capital. Conservative, multigenerational developers there possess both a ‘vivid memory’ of the past as a ‘mental duration’ for a more long-term approach satisfied with lower but much more stable returns (ibid.) – surely a very different ‘property mind’ than the Singaporean described by Haila (2017).

However, the wave of mergers that hit the Dutch social housing sector in the years after its privatization and that enabled the build-up of a seductively high wall of money to speculate with was also obstructed in Belgium by these strong affiliations, making for another reason why capital did not become impatient: “To remain in control, families [in Belgium] are averse to mergers and acquisitions, maintaining a landscape of many small, locally oriented real estate developers, and thus hindering financial innovation.” (ibid.: 721) So while social housing constitutes an invaluable mechanism for the creation of collective wealth, it makes it more vulnerable to the risks of financialization as well (ibid.: 716). However, while Van Loon and others may be right to point out how some housing associations, despite having easy access to cheap state-guaranteed loans, still terribly mismanaged their financial assets (with great political repercussions for the whole sector), this nonetheless concerns rather exceptional cases. So although they might make for a great critical case that undoubtedly teaches us some invaluable lessons, taking them as representative for the whole sector would treat other, better practices unfairly if not obscure them from our view entirely. Like many others, it should be said, People’s Housing somehow did manage, without the private family attachments, to remain patient amid pressures and temptations (eg. to sell social housing for profit rather than other motives). Practicing some healthy economic dyscalculia was instrumental in this regard.



How did People’s Housing do this? One striking way the hybrid nature of the Dutch housing association expresses itself is in the ambiguous term *maatschappelijk rendement*. With ‘maatschappelijk’ simply meaning societal but ‘rendement’ sharing an ambiguous etymology with the Dutch ‘rente’ (interest in English), the phrase carries a promise of modern progress but also a heavy economic connotation of profit. For People’s Housing, however, it seems to function as a catch-all term for a heterogenous set of sociomaterial obligations that work in nonlinear ways and tend to fall outside the purview of narrowly economic calculations. Two very different methods of trying to come to grips with this idea are worth exploring further here and which rhyme quite well with two aspects mentioned in Van Loon’s definition of patient capital: “Whereas impatient capital stimulates corporations through at arms-length relations to achieve short-term financial goals, patient capital stimulates corporations through [1] *enduring, close relations to achieve long-term goals* that include many [2] *non-financial objectives such as socio-emotional wealth* improvement.” (Van Loon, 2016: 712, emphasis added). These methods, to be described in what follows, are the ‘water table’ and the ‘cluster monitor’ respectively. The first practice embodies a way of facing uncertainty by refusing to calculate, while the second introduces more diversity and complexity into People’s Housing’s calculations. Both can be seen as

dyscalculic buffers against the impatient ‘pull of capital’.

5.3.4.3.1 Refusing to precisely calculate: The water table

In defense against rather linear and neoliberal evaluations (cf. Vedung, 2010) of Dutch neighborhood investment programs (ie. ‘Proceeds of the streets’ (*De baat op straat*), by Marlet et al., 2009), and to better grasp and convey the rather elusive thing that is social return (*maatschappelijk rendement*), Breeman devised a conceptual instrument which he, after some handywork, made into a collapsible, fully mobile policy ‘concept’ that he would take around the country to whomever wanted to hear his counterstory. Reminiscent of the rhetorical workings of the ‘MONIAC’ machine (Image 5.50), teaching macroeconomic monetary flow with water pumps (as an antidote to neoclassical comparative statics, Keen, 2011: 195), Breeman’s ‘water table’ (*watertafel*, see Image 5.51) performed his idea of holistic, non-linear neighborhood investment. He recounts:

“At a certain moment stories arose of scientific evaluations saying investments of associations [including] in housing for sale had no impact... they could not prove that it had any added value for the present population. While we were in the middle of things, working hard, so I thought ‘this is ridiculous’, so I conceived something to show how neighborhood development works... [...] I made this table with [transparent] plastic



Images 5.50–5.51. On the left, William Phillips, famous for the curve connecting unemployment and wages, standing next to his MONIAC machine (ca. 1958), an analog computer simulating the British economy with water flows (source: Wikipedia.org, accessed 05-10-2020). The Keynesian model of ‘hydraulic economics’ served as a stylistic device to denounce the comparative statics we know from neoclassical theory in favour of a model of the economy that could account for feedback effects and disequilibrium dynamics (Keen, 2011: 195). On the right, a sketch of the water table constructed by People’s Housing’s general director for similar reasons. Unfortunately it was dismantled after it had done its rhetorical work without any photo ever taken of it. (source: this sketch is drawn by me in consultation with the director, 23-11-2020).


tubes sticking out of it which would represent things one could invest in [...] in youth, in culture, in new houses, in existing houses, in education, in commerce... all tubes of different height, that was the neighborhood. [...] Then I would show what happens when you invest. I would take some jugs of water, and would start investing in 'culture', and start pouring into a tube and the water would disappear beneath the table [...] and they [audience] would laugh... [money gone]. Next I would invest in houses for sale and zzzzt, again investment 'gone'. Then there was another one that I had deliberately left open, so the water would immediately fall on the floor, and I would at once stop pouring; with some projects you just immediately see them go wrong, so you stop investing at once and switch to other investments. So then I would start investing in the existing housing stock and pour some more water and then, since I connected the tubes together underneath the table, slowly the water level would rise [above the table] and you would start to see the yield appear..." (Interview no. 019)

Much like Richman he is counting on, or rather not exactly counting for, a certain 'flywheel' dynamic to take effect, yet in his case, one involving a more comprehensive notion of value. But as this takes patience, the water table functions as a way of buying time with stakeholders. Echoing Van Loon, Breeman tells us "it's a matter of patience and endurance [*lange adem*], and of much investment directed at multiple terrains, of which the value [*rendement*] remains invisible at first and is such that in the end it is no longer traceable which investment added most to the result" (Interview no. 019). In his own way then, the executive is trying to come to grips with the 'a-centered multiplicity' that is Klarendal as a neighborhood and real estate market. Much like the afore described estate agents and their clients he has to at some point submit to its impenetrable, non-denumerable complexity and, through the device, become a 'real estate patient'. Albeit one oriented to a duration much more comprehensive and intricate than a single location's rent gap.

Furthermore, when we look at the role played by the outside agent employed by People's Housing we see a similarly more expansive time horizon and a 'more social way of working' (Interview no. 035). Hired to broker the acquisition of some 30 buildings and apartments as part of the 'Phase B' extension of the new Fashion Quarter (Images 5.52-5.55, more on this below), the realtor told us how his practice changed working for the housing corporation. On the one hand, more streetwise than his principal, the agent kept the affluent housing provider from being shortchanged, encouraging patience where needed, taking it easy, and taking into consideration not just the one property of interest, as he would normally do, but entire building blocks, even the whole streetscape. On the other hand, he gladly felt prompted to signal problems of alcoholism or slumlording and adopt a broader view on the livability of the neighborhood:

"...I have the simple goal of acquiring those shops with the upstairs apartments *and* revealing possible problems behind front doors, in order to then together see whether we even should acquire and, if not, what we can do to transform things, so that the environment becomes more livable, that's what I really liked about the assignment..." (Interview no. 035)

This taking into account of the social and livability aspects of homes and shops,



Images 5.52-5.55. Four photoscans of some more or less saillant pages from the report of the research done by the real estate agent contracted by People's Housing. The broker's report covers an extensive catalogue of 27 properties that might be acquired for 'Phase B' of the Fashion Quarter project. It shows the more comprehensive orientation of the assessment, in terms of scale and in terms of signalling needs for disciplinary/police action or care work. Every page includes a small table indicating for every property its 'importance' within the larger plans for the area, the 'chance' and 'desired term' of acquisition, and the prices of 'purchase' and 'renovation'. The text in top left Image 5.52 reads (selection): "Dilapidated property at visible location next to old [supermarket] Albert Heijn. Interesting with an eye on redeveloping the entire corner (including AH). [...] [The next door property] we have already acquired." In top right Image 5.53: "Somali Qat-shop. A lot of nuisance and threatening appearance. Extremely high rent-sublease contract causing earlier attempts at acquisition to fail. Small property. Qat is not illegal, so police cannot do anything." On the window, a poster that reads "Arnhem against racism" and another that promotes local dance party 'Maison Africaine'. In bottom left Image 5.54: "Hardware store is leaving. Property for sale, including upstairs apartments. Good shop window. Upstairs apartments can be resold." In bottom right Image 5.55: "Potentially nice little property next to [shop already transformed to fashion business] in the heart of the fashion district. Only downstairs apartment. In the garden a tiny shed that serves as a (tiny) house. This illegal situation is no longer tenable in case of acquisition by People's Housing. Owner is a handyman and small-time entrepreneur (artist). Shopping window improvement is an option in consultation with owner. [Employee of PH] has discussed willingness to sell in 2004, which was nil." (source: archives of Volkshuisvesting, Arnhem).

above and beyond short-term, single-property values (see also Images 5.52-5.55), already points to how the agencement of People's Housing not just refuses to, but also calculates *differently*, beyond financial objectives.

5.3.4.3.2 *Calculating differently: The cluster book*

Although it is a relative theoretical novelty the performativity of economic models has not entirely escaped political economic accounts of gentrification. For instance, Lees et al. (2008: 46, 239) recognize the importance of economic and urban life-cycle models in urban policy, observing how they were given 'material expression' when "neoclassical frameworks that had been devised to *explain* urban structure came to be *imposed* on cities in the form of planning and zoning regulations, transportation investments and housing policies". In particular, it was neoclassical spatial economics that legitimized the devalorization of later to be gentrified inner city neighborhoods. Hence the wish for Von Thünen economics 'to become not true' (ibid.: 48). In the Netherlands and Arnhem, it could be argued, similar ideas on neighborhood life-cycles legitimized particular housing policies in the 1960s and 1970s. While rapidly expanding into suburbs, old inner city areas such as Klarendal were to be demolished in good time, or 'sanitized' (*gesaneerd*), and could thus be safely neglected in the meanwhile (Lavooij, 2014). However, in contrast with these more traditional accounts of the ideological function of bourgeois economics, some attempts have been made recently to delve more deeply into the actualization of site-specific models from a performativity and practices of economization perspective (perhaps in response to a refinement of economic modelling 'in the wild', ie. "the economic techniques, models and calculations embedded in the wider world of business, finance, consulting, policy and regulation", Christophers, 2014a: 81). Most notably, and indirectly related to gentrification, Christophers (2014a) demonstrates how economic models and metrics assessing the financial viability of affordable housing developments, like those from consultancy firm Three Dragons, are progressively actualized in – and thereby in a specific way physically actualize – contemporary British cities. As with the aforementioned neoclassical economics, but now with more precision, the models that were invented by academic or 'caged' economics in order to *discover* a site's specifics actually began to *format* it when released in the wild. One crucial component of the viability models Christophers (2014a: 87) describes is that of a built in and thereby black-boxed 'necessary profit' for developers. Rather than derive such a thing from an abstract class analysis ('socially necessary profit'), here we find after opening the black-box sitting in plain sight the 'normalization of developer profit'. However, for Christophers, adamant to rejoin practices of economization to "the macro-dynamics of urban political economy" (2014a: 96, see also 2014b), this unfortunately can only take on a serious meaning when serving a context of 'capitalist urban political economy' (2014a: 96). Perhaps this is because he does not (know how to) earnestly consider any alternative 'context'.

By deferring a surrender to capitalism, however, we might discover a different economics in the wild. A key problem facing People's Housing's 'organic' investment practice, oriented toward future use values and not just toward present needs (Haila, 1991), is how to take heed of diverse and changing housing demands and other

broader socio-ecological goals. To help it do that a large fund of knowledge has been building in an experimental, mostly bottom-up fashion, as housing corporations have been spurred to reinvent themselves in accordance with their expanding responsibilities. Nonetheless, instrumental in this knowledge production has been the Delft University of Technology, more specifically, Hugo Priemus and colleagues, from what is today the department of Real Estate and Housing (eg. Priemus, 1983, Van Vliet, 1993, Gruis and Nieboer, 2004, Overmeeren and Zijlstra, 2009). For decades now they have been studying, reflecting back and promoting a variety of models for social housing management. Thus in a synoptic 2002 publication, explicitly targeting foreign students, visitors, practitioners and politicians interested in the Dutch housing model, two scholars from the technical university allude to the problem of devalorization and the housing corporation's responsibility and capacity to respond to it:

“Dwellings are built to last. On completion, they satisfy the demands set on the housing market at that moment. But, as the years pass, the quality norms rise and the social housing becomes older. It is a housing association's responsibility to be aware of market changes and develop and carry out a timely strategy to ensure that its housing stock is able to meet the requirements of changing demand. We refer to that as a *strategic asset management*.” (Ouwehand and Van Daalen, 2002: 55)

Here we indeed see a version of life-cycle theory and how it requires a strategic management of assets. Notice as well the quantitative notion of value and the normation it implies reminiscent of rent gap theories ('the quality norms rise'), but also the primary orientation toward the requirements of demand (and not rent or profit). Accordingly, the document continues, while anticipating on 'the' housing market, the corporation is to keep its plans in check by bringing a whole range of other data into the economic 'frame':

“In that policy [of strategic asset management], the housing associations endeavour to bring a number of developments into the *frame* together. These include data on the housing market, the environment, neighbourhood developments, the residents, the characteristics of the dwellings, and the objectives and opportunities of the housing association. By bringing these data together, a housing association can determine its policy per complex.” (Ouwehand and Van Daalen, 2002: 55-56, emphasis added)

Before 2002 these ideas had been developing for a while. As housing associations were increasingly expected to become social entrepreneurs, the pioneering Delft researchers, in particular Jeroen van Vliet (1993), naturally looked toward theories of private 'strategic business planning'. More specifically, to the 'strategic portfolio analysis' designed for profit-oriented businesses to analyse and close the 'gap' between the extrapolation of *actual* growth and the growth *potential* after 'competitive analyses' and 'portfolio balancing', (Ansoff et al., 2019[1984]: 28, see also Gruis en Nieboer, 2004: 6). However, while portfolio analysis in its classical form is centered on the prioritization, balancing and allocation of financial resources among business areas, in social housing management the technique is repurposed for weighing different interests tied not only to financial but technical and social goals. In concrete terms, knowing what values flow in and out of buildings can help deciding on asset specific investments (real estate and social, sustainability) and managing

Clustermonitor

Jaar: **2014** **2015**
 Cluster: **FIN-1048 - Woningen**
 Bouwjaarklasse: **D) Vanaf 1992**
 Aantal woningen: **96**

Klantwaarde



selecteer een clusternummer
FIN-1127

clusternaam
Woningen Vogeleijk

SVS-clusters
[4VE-1127-Q-4WON.H-4VE](#)
[1127-Q-WON.H-4VE-1127-Q](#)
[WOM-V-4VE-1127-R-NWON.H](#)

Technische clusters
[TECH-1127](#)

adressen
[Oudestraat Kleinschalig Kluis](#)
[Bakkenis Loozenbergstraat](#)
[Aldersstraat Oude De Loozen](#)
[Thomaz & Kermestraat](#)
[Veststraat Vrijland](#)
[Warmstedtse Zwaansstraat](#)

aantal OGE's
170

bouwjaar
1910 - 1919

plaats
Arnhem

wijk
Kluisdijk

Model • Cluster • Cluster • Monitor • USP Leefbaarheid


USP Leefbaarheid

Monitorpunt	2011	2013	2014	2015
Aantal waarnemingen	25,0	28,0		29,0
Leefbaarheid in totaal	7,7	8,0		7,6
Tevredenheid bereikbaarheid van de buurtbewoners		7,1		6,8
Tevredenheid omgang van buurtbewoners/buren		7,6		7,0
Tevredenheid gevoelsoverlast van buren/buurt	6,5	6,9		6,2
Tevredenheid uitstraling van de woningen		7,5		7,2
Tevredenheid tuinonderhoud van de bewoners zelf		7,0		7,0
Tevredenheid mate van thuis voelen in de buurt		8,1		7,6
hoeveelheid groen in de wijk	7,8	8,1		7,7
Onderhoud groen in de wijk	7,2	6,9		6,8
Recreatiemogelijkheden in de wijk	7,3	7,3		
Speelmogelijkheden voor kinderen	6,8	7,5		
Aanwezigheid voorzieningen voor jongeren		6,7		6,9
Aanwezigheid winkels in de omgeving	6,9	7,4		6,2
Aanwezigheid zorgvoorzieningen	6,9	6,9		6,4
Overlast van Hangjongeren		7,6		7,1
Overlast Vandalisme	7,0	7,3		7,4
Overlast van Drugstrandel		7,6		7,4

Clusterinfo
[Adressenchema T-1127-Vogeleijk](#)
[Bouwjaar 1127](#)
[Bouwk 1127](#)







Images 5.56–5.59. Some screenshots of parts of the cluster monitor co-conceived and employed by People's Housing to manage their property's 'client value' [klantwaarde], 'societal value' [maatschappijwaarde] and 'financial value' [financiële waarde]. These figures of 2014–2015 concern a cluster of 96 homes, built in 1992 in Klarendal. Image 5.55 shows the client and societal value in a radar chart. It includes the cluster-specific (orange) and average (gray) scores on: 'house' [woning], 'burglary/safety' [inbraak/veiligheid], livability [leefbaarheid], value for money [prijs/kwaliteit], energy label [EPA klasse]. As seen in Image 5.56, showing the full interface for regular users, these values can each be inspected in more detail by traffic light color-coded scores. This image specifies the livability scores of another cluster in Klarendal, including figures on neighborliness, green space, recreational opportunities, care facilities and nuisance. The bar chart in Image 5.57 gives the financial value by the cluster's average exploitation balance per unit (blue) as compared to the average of the whole corporation (gray) and other properties of the same building year class (orange). Exploitation balance is the rent received against maintenance costs. Image 5.58 depicts a kind of internal rent gap: 'actual rent in % of the maximum reasonable rent'. The latter is determined by the national home valuation point system (Woningwaarderingssstelsel). The bar chart gives the average actual rent over the entire corporation (gray), the average actual cluster rent (orange) and the target rent [streefhuur] (blue) in relation to the statutory maximum.

finances more generally. For instance, it would allow for connecting financial flows and goals of affordability in more precise terms. Making a loss on a building does not have to be a problem, but might become questionable when its residents are relatively affluent. Conversely, the financial leeway freed up by a profitable building can permit a lowering of the rent for those living there and struggling to meet it at present. However, although Van Vliet's initial 'integral stock management' (*integraal voorraadbeheer*, originating with Van Leent, 1986) includes not just 'physical or technical' aspects, but also 'social' and 'financial management', it is the social that still receives scant elaboration. For obvious reasons, ecological considerations are also still largely absent. Over the years however, in tandem with the progressive expansion of tasks beyond the simple maintenance of properties and even beyond financial responsibilities, conceptions and models of asset management have become more elaborate too. For instance, the afore cited Overmeeren and Zijlstra (2009) suggest to include customer or 'demand-driven' and customer group or 'area-based' strategies, thus attempting to address a kind of social wealth gap. Lately, with global environmental catastrophe looming and corporations being asked (while heavily taxed!) to lead the transition to sustainable living, environmental metrics are also supposed to enter the asset management models. All these elements we also find in People's Housing's attempts to economize differently, most specifically in its asset management practices.

Looking then at the Arnhem corporation's policies it took little hermeneutic effort to find the actual performative connection between theory and practice. As its head officer Research and Strategy tells us, the instrument for the strategic management of the corporation's assets has been developed over the last decade in close collaboration with Batavia Groep BV, a company directed by Van Vliet (Interview no. 020). The central actant in this practice, gradually making itself an obligatory passage point within the agencement of People's Housing, is the 'cluster book' (Images 5.56-5.59). This database registers for every housing 'cluster', and informs in 'real time' on: the target group, price, price policy, whether to further utilize [*doorexploiteren*] or sell, rentability, residential mutation rate (also in relation to the neighborhood) and so on. Attached to the book is a 'cluster monitor' that assists the asset manager. He explains:

"For every cluster [ie. qualitatively meaningful set of complexes] we link this information [of the cluster book] to financial information and information about society. This is how we work; we say real estate is a means to achieve our mission to provide quality and affordable living in Arnhem. Therefore we look at three aspects to which our real estate is to contribute. We call them client value [*klantwaarde*], societal value [*maatschappijwaarde*] and company value [*bedrijfswaarde*]. The first means our client has to feel positively about the home. It should be good quality housing. This includes the [client's] scoring of the home and living environment. [...] Then there is societal value, as we are a social organization [*maatschappelijke organisatie*]. We think we have to contribute to, for instance, the housing of special target groups [*bijzondere doelgroepen*, ie. the disabled] or to the social questions around carbon emission and energy efficient housing. That works for the client and toward the societal task of reducing emissions and respectfully dealing with materials in the houses; those kinds of social effects. And third, there is company or financial value. Which means our property has to realise a return [*rendement*]. If we do

not obtain returns, we cannot pay out socially and improve the neighborhood's livability.”
(Interview no. 020)

Unavoidably many tensions arise between client value (demand), societal value (area/region) and company value (financial), but now in a precisely quantified way. Choices for using costs, point systems or market prices to (internally) value properties are made clearer and ‘rent gaps’ can be made commensurable with gaps in other ‘fields of performance’. Along with the particular construction of scale distinguishing client and society, or demand and area (as in Overmeeren and Zijlstra, 2009), a kind of social wealth gap is thus measured between actual needs and potential needs (ie. calculations of socio-ecological necessity) which spurs and guides action.

Thus the cluster book enacts a different, unorthodox kind of economics. One way to interpret it, from a *critical* perspective, is as an attempt to address and renegotiate by calculative means the contradictions and boundary struggles that constitute the ‘deep structure’ of the institutionalized social order called capitalism (Fraser, 2017, Fraser and Jaeggi, 2018). From a Polanyian perspective (Polanyi, 2001), looking beyond what is usually considered the sphere of production, capitalism is based on the distinction and externalization of the sphere of social reproduction (family, friendships, neighborhood ties) and of non-human nature, each the sources of the ‘fictitious commodities’ known as labor and land. However, if it overreaches and starts internalizing these into market society as well (eg. by demanding double earner households, introducing commercial healthcare, marketizing fresh water supplies, urban land speculation), it runs against its own social and natural limits causing multiple kinds of crises. Today in the West, especially since 2008, we see in many places the coming together of ecological cataclysm, a housing crisis and, in the sphere of social reproduction, a ‘crisis of care’ (Fraser, 2016a, or ‘care gap’, Sevenhuijsen, 2003, Fraser, 2016b). As Karl Polanyi (2001) recounts, these contradictions and crises have historically lead to popular resistance, state interventions and market planning. Rather than an unobstructed march of capital toward its rent gaps, from this perspective the story of gentrification is just as much a story of a ‘double movement’ in between government enablement and regulation (Bernt, 2012). However, as Fraser notes, there is little merit to liquidating this movement Soviet Union-style and we instead need to think about and experiment with other practices of the distinction of polity and economy (Fraser and Jaeggi, 2018: 172–173). In its own way, People’s Housing is doing just that. Apart from patiently managing its financial flows (that third fictitious commodity of money and debt) it attempts to internalize the contradictions in its calculations per housing cluster, or per social wealth gap. With the ‘right to stay put’ largely guaranteed by national law, it attempts to address the people’s right to decent and sustainable housing at affordable prices in the face of aforementioned crises.

Another complementary interpretation however, from a pragmatic or *clinical* vantage point, tries to look beyond capitalist contradictions, crises and the legal and extra-legal rights that respond to them in the name of justice. Securing rights to socio-ecological inclusion and caring for their enactment are two different things. Inclusion can be difficult in practice. As the above told history has demonstrated, democratization and

tenant empowerment is no simple subject in the universal provision of social housing. In addition, and quite similar to dilemmas of democratization in health care, caring for housing, also in the future, takes some measure of expertise and imagination. From a clinical perspective then, or that of an ethics of care (Tronto, 1993, 2013, 2017), these last two difficulties correspond to more general tendencies within practices (re)allocating caring responsibilities. These are the twin dangers of parochialism and paternalism. In Tronto's explanation, *parochialism* is about how caring relationships tend to be drawn in too narrow circles, around social groups. The residualization of social housing is one way this is happening just about everywhere. While not yet as strongly in the Netherlands as elsewhere, the 'ethopolitical' distinction between the economically dependent (social renter) and supposedly independent (owner) is becoming increasingly pronounced and stigmatizing (Flint, 2003, 2004), further eroding support and feeding a vicious cycle of escalating parochialism (cf. Tronto, 2013: 144-145). For now many housing corporations are still reluctant to pursue any aggressive campaigns against their more affluent 'skewed' renters, perhaps waiting for the tide to turn. But, as mentioned, fiscal pressures are mounting. Another interesting way some Dutch housing corporations address this polarization, as far as they are still allowed, is by tenure differentiation (eg. fixed rent contract, fixed rent increase contract, socially-bound ownership, ownership with buy-back option etc., Gruis et al., 2005), as if heeding the call of Susan J. Smith to "instead of offering [...] a stark distinction between the option to own a home in its entirety (the ideal) or to rent (in a residual sector), housing systems may one day comprise 'a thousand tiny tenures,' in which every property would be a heterogeneous mix of occupancy rights, title ownership, and investment vehicle." (SJ Smith, 2010: 271). This would be one possible translation of caring practices into the domain of housing economics, by that aforementioned 'tinkering' with practical variables until a suitable material and affective arrangement is reached (cf. Mol et al., 2010, Winance, 2010). However, caring for econodiversity cannot just mean the introduction of a one-off choice of tenure type for clients (which for many may be too demanding anyway in terms of calculative skills). There are many more decisions and calculations to be made during other times and on other scales than the individual home, such as that of the housing complex, neighborhood or corporation. Another kind of parochialism then, one already mentioned in relation to earlier democratization efforts, is that of a restriction of caring commitments to the particular demands of sitting residents, risking losing sight of more expansive social-ecological needs (ie. 'future use values', Haila, 1991). This is where on a practice level, different, more caring kinds of calculations can come in.

Not just embodying a prosthetic for the dependent, dyscalculic and residualized (never to be quite normalized), the housing corporation also defies the *economic* norm, the 'societal pressure to maximize profit' (Clark, 2004: 151). By its own enactment of the market, deviations from the optimum rent demand justification and practice with reference to other, socio-ecological values, synthesized in a laboratory different from Von Thünen's. This then need not be viewed as an answer to some 'deep' contradictions of capitalism, but a local reshaping of 'the' market itself into more just directions. However, decommodification by any degree still leaves one with a 'calculation problem' (Von Mises, 2012[1920], Polanyi, 2016[1922], Lange,

1936). If the crude distinction between capitalism and socialism we have inherited from the Cold War is not so much about the use of calculative practices in itself but rather the projected private or public ends to which these are deployed (Albert and Hahnel, 1991, Cockshott and Cottrell, 1993, Cockshott, 2010, Bockman, 2011, Phillips and Rozworski, 2019, Cockshott, 2019), then these should be explored more fully if we want to see beyond critical negation. Indeed, the information systems for supply chain management one finds in the internal organisation of typical profit-oriented capitalists such as Walmart, Amazon or Alibaba, but even, as we saw earlier, in the Clockwork agencement, can be repurposed for more socio-ecological objectives. The above appropriation of commercial strategic portfolio analysis can be interpreted in this light as well. Nevertheless, the technicalities and efforts of practice should not be trivialized here. One still has to actually design and make it work in practice, with the right metric prosthetics, somewhat in the way ‘shadow prices’ were employed in the past by socialist economists (such as Lange or Kantorovich) and implemented in need-based distribution systems (ibid.: 55, 197). Historically, and on a national scale, this was done in the Soviet Union’s highly centralized practices with the use of a mass of human calculators and, while it lasted, in Allende’s Chile through a more decentralized cybernetic system (called Cybersyn) that was for that time quite sophisticated. In the absence of prices – an imperfect coordination mechanism in their own way – the failure or success of these alternative calculative practices depended for a large part on the quality and timeliness of information about demand and production (undistorted by authoritarian terror and traveling fast enough).¹³⁷ For similar reasons, People’s Housing and many other Dutch housing associations have in recent years been putting huge efforts in collecting and organizing all kinds of data about their renters, properties and neighborhoods. It provides them with the prosthetics to calculate differently and negotiate the economic norm on behalf of their (prospected) economically disabled tenants.¹³⁸

¹³⁷Critical of central planning schemes (of eg. Lange, 1936), socialist economists such as Karl Polanyi (2016) and more recently Hahnel (Albert and Hahnel, 1991, Hahnel, 2012) have proposed more democratic and participatory practices of economization. These would also be better equipped to handle (ie. produce sufficient data for) the ‘dynamic efficiency’ that (de)growing, learning and innovating economies require (Adaman and Devine, 1996, 2002, Gindin, 2018). For good reasons, post-neoclassical liberals such as Schumpeter, Hayek and the later Von Mises, pointed to the failure of both liberal (Walras) and socialist (Lange) models of ‘static efficiency’ in predicting and steering the actual dynamism of capitalist innovation and entrepreneurialism. There are, however, crucial differences among recipes for handling this fact. Some proceed through axioms of individualization, private property and rule of law (‘micro’, eg. Hayek), others through programs of collectivization, public investment and mass psychology (‘macro’, eg. Keynes). A third option, promoted here, emphasizes participatory processes, sociomaterial *interessement* and care (‘meso’, eg. Hahnel, Latour and Callon). While departing significantly in practice, the social ontologies performed by ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ practices are nonetheless *derived* from static systems. ‘Meso’ practices would instead reason from ‘the middle’, that is, the far-from-equilibrium dynamism that *generates* individuals, collectives and their inequalities (cf. Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) (see also Chapter 6, Section 6.5 on ‘urban mesopolitics’).

¹³⁸What can still be understood as ‘calculating differently’ is of course a matter of degree. Recently, the author of the textbook ‘Humans, bricks, money 2.0’ (Images 5.43–5.45) has proposed a model that uses linear programming (invented by aforementioned Soviet economist Kantorovich) to optimize the allocation of housing resources, including indicators of social return (Van Os, 2014: 389–459). This neoclassical modelling, however, requires a linearization and monetization of an economic problem that is inherently nonlinear(izable) and more-than-monetary in kind. Indeed,

Still, this also brings along important questions about the limits of quantification, privacy from intrusive surveillance and technocracy. The second danger then to a proper allocation of care still has to be addressed and that is the possibility of *paternalism*: the risk, inherent to the intrinsically unequal relations of care, that caregivers start substituting their own judgement of caring needs for those of the care receivers themselves (Tronto, 2013, 2017). This becomes apparent in the effort to include tenant demands in investment decisions, at the level of individual buildings and beyond. On the one hand, building, maintaining and properly administering fitting social housing requires employing teams of experts including strategic asset managers and housing counselors. Technology and economy in this sense need not be viewed as the opposites of care (cf. Mol et al., 2010). Nonetheless, a kind of *technocratic paternalism* may lurk in the formatting of needs through customer surveys and other measurements. Within People's Housing this risk is avoided by not relying on the cluster book's metrics too much (which of course connects to the sector-wide discussion of how commanding asset managers should be in the corporation's organization). Anyone who handled the cluster database, took care to assure us it only supports the corporation's investment decisions but never automatically determines them. In line then with the advice of, for instance, Overmeeren and Zijlstra (2009), the 'rational-analytical' models are constantly triangulated and complemented with 'qualitative' assessments and deliberations.¹³⁹ For the managers of People's Housing (Interviews no. 020, 016, 017, 019) this meant simply 'being there' regularly, especially in the always eventful district of Klarendal. Much more intensive, however, was the qualitative information gathering by the building maintenance crew, the Housing Counselor (*Woonconsulent*) and the neighborhood's Social Development Project Manager (*Projectmanager Sociale Ontwikkeling*). Standing in direct contact with their tenants and firmly embedded in institutional networks of care professionals (including youth counselors, social workers, home carers, municipal civil servants and police), these employees performed an essential signaling function toward policy makers and asset managers. In caring for the neighborhood then, physical (re) construction and social policy become inseparable. Maintenance projects are seen as valuable opportunities for networking (Interview no. 021). In the operation room of the Social Development Project Manager, this tending to sociomaterial obligations and requirements is coordinated with the use of large paper printed, block-level maps to color in and comment on 'vulnerable spots' (*kwestbare stukjes*), based on their shared on-the-ground experiences (no photo available due to sensitive material,

it was exactly for this reason that the director of People's Housing devised his dyscalculative 'water table'. Both the study that motivated making the table (Marlet et al., 2009) and Van Os's allocation model use the same method of monetization, so-called 'social costs and benefits analysis' (*Maatschappelijke Kosten-Batenanalyse*). It must be said, however, that Van Os does make some suggestions about how a future version of his model might handle more (restricted) complexity. Also, as Kantorovich showed (in contrast to Lange), monetization is not necessary to optimize (social) production (Cockshott, 2010). Still, taken on its own, any such calculation remains rather technocratic in its outlook. From a more pluralist perspective, the model could support not just professional decision-makers but also invite a more participatory approach to (long-term) economic strategy (cf. Albert and Hahnel, 1991, Hahnel, 2012). Here again, the external/internal democratization issue resurfaces.

¹³⁹ See also Albert and Hahnel (1991: 65-73) on how in a socialist kind of accounting 'indicative prices' of social costs and benefits always need detailed and empathic qualification to work accurately.



Images 5.60–5.61. On the left, Image 5.60, two maps in the Social Development Project Manager's operation room, showing ongoing (lopende) and finalized (afgerond) sustainability projects (duurzaamheidsprojecten) of the housing corporation. More detailed, block-level maps (1:1500) were also shown to me that were used to manually mark and scribble on-the-ground observations of 'vulnerable clusters'. They cannot be included here for privacy reasons, but they were very similar to the commercial planning map on the right (Image 5.61).

but see Images 5.60–5.61). This practice of mapping what we might call 'care gaps', especially in relation to the so-called 'special target groups' (*bijzondere doelgroepen*, ie. physically and mentally disabled), is and remains an invaluable qualification of the more distant cluster book metrics. Notwithstanding these checks and balances against technocracy, this still leaves open the question of a *moral* kind of paternalism to be dealt with. This risk, however, pertains less to calculative practices than to that other, positional practice of economic scarcity. Apart from having to engage differently with normalized calculative practices, the housing association also tasks itself to lift some of the territorial and social stigmatizations its clients experience in Arnhem's moral economy.

5.3.4.4 People's Housing's dyslexic exaptations

As critical geographer Kallin observes in his study of the state-led gentrification of Craigmillar, Edinburgh, a rent gap can only exist and close itself there through gentrification if it is preceded by a policy-enforced territorial stigmatization or opening of a 'reputational gap' (2017: 115). With reference to the aforementioned Blomley (2004) and Clark (2015), he explains that potential ground rent or 'highest and best use' do not simply exist 'out there' but have to be *imagined*, and increasingly so in a financialized economy built mostly on fantasies of value (Harvey's 'fictitious' values). This imperative produces an intense geography of stigmatization parallel to (or preceding?) Von Thünen's or Smith's 'non-fictitious' geographies. In Kallin's words, "metropolitan-wide factors' [...] create, foster and constantly reaffirm the negative perception of an area, both materially and discursively", a percept which is then "contrasted against a promised future vision" in order to imagineer a reputational gap that can justify gentrification policies (2017: 113). As we found in Richman's case of conspicuous production, there are many ways to extract glory from a reputational deficit, also to the detriment of others. And this could apply just as well to public

institutions and their leaders, as with Soviet production managers shelving customer satisfaction in the name of 'collective' glory (Polanyi, 1997), but also in the West within the domains of healthcare and higher education (Overton and Banks, 2015). Similarly, 'state-led' gentrification by housing corporations and city governments can be opportunities for public officials to reap the prestige that comes with saving rundown areas, often over the backs of its marginalized incumbents. Thus becoming part of a kind of zero-sum reputation game, gentrification efforts seem mainly geared toward exalting the supposed saviors from blight: "the more negative the reputation of an area, the more righteous the light in which those who decree its demolition have been able to bask" (Kallin, 2017: 106). Considering, however, the very real 'material and discursive' deprivation and humiliation that places like Craigmillar or Klarendal experience, the question arises how, apart from the foregoing calculations of care, one may ameliorate their collective reputational deficit without only adding to the stigma (and the prestige of supposed saviors).

This is a question of whether the game can be played differently. Territorial stigma, like any other stigma (Goffman, 1963), relies on the definition of a place and its people as abnormal, set against the normality of an imagined good majority. Addressed in such 'clinical' terms, can this relation perhaps be altered, either by radically deconstructing normality or 'working on the norm'? Somewhat inconsistently, Kallin calls gentrification an 'anti-stigma strategy' (2017: 113), while the process he describes actually only displaces the stigma. A genuine anti-stigma strategy would rather have to rework territorial categories into more inclusive forms, but that seems impossible in the zero-sum world portrayed by Kallin (and other critical geographers). Not to detract from his particular interpretation of Craigmillar, but rendering any commitment to fight stigma suspect by unequivocally stating that "it is through notions of fairness and 'helping' that stigma legitimates intervention" (which thereby can only 'seem' or 'appear' genuine, 2017: 111) rather stifles the construction of viable local alternatives. What we should be wary of therefore, is that our hermeneutics of suspicion gets in the way of seeing how helping raises not just "all sorts of issues about power, control and government" but is also about designing more caring practices. Recognizing deprivation is real and that only a certain interpretation of it invites gentrification and displacement (ibid., 109), a "symbolic metamorphosis between the denigrated past and the promising future" (ibid., 103) does not have to be problematic in itself. We just need to enable ourselves to see a way out of the zero-sum stigmatization game. Therefore, when discursive norms prescribe a certain stigmatizing lexicon in favor of those who are literate in it, change has to come not necessarily from critical analysis and oppositional negation but also, in a more caring or clinical mode, by active affirmations of econodiversity. In tandem with the dyscalculic practices of the previous sections then, this anti-stigmatization implies the enactment of a healthy dose of economic dyslexia. Which is not a passive, diseased or reactionary state, but an active, attentive and caring process of bringing forth new valuations that accommodate in between normalization and the affirmation of difference.



Images 5.62-5.65. Above, the corner of Sonsbeeksingel-Klarendalseweg before and after the installment of Station Klarendal with the grand cafe Goed Proeven on its ground floor and Hotel Modez directly behind it (source: 5.62 by Zefanja Hoogers and 5.63 from Wikipedia.org, 28-01-2011, accessed 05-10-2020). In the middle a view of its former location at Arnhem central station, which is then under construction (source: Gelders archief, 14-04-2003, accessed 05-10-2020). Below the site under construction. The info board reads 'Klarendal shows creativity: Here comes the fashion center of Klarendal' and explains how the building fits into People's Housing's '100% Mode' program (source: Gelders archief, 11-03-2007, accessed 05-10-2011).

5.3.4.4.1 Station Klarendal: Megalomaniac or anti-stigmatic exaptation?

It should be interesting to see how People's Housing tries to navigate this discursive problematic more or less successfully. As recent history has demonstrated, the leadership of some Dutch housing corporations were not just impatient with the capital at their disposal, but also ventured their organizations into some seriously off the mark prestige projects in the name of society. News outlets describing the cast of conspicuous administrators spoke of 'sun kings' (*zonnekoningen*) with 'royal salaries' (NRC, 14-06-2014) but also 'genuinely passionate [yet] uninhibitedly megalomaniac' (*oprecht gepassioneerd, ongeremd megalomaan*, Financieel Dagblad, 06-09-2014). Corporations were reported to go on shopping sprees for monuments, erecting flagships in defamed neighborhoods in an attempt to turn the symbolic tide there. In Rotterdam, housing corporation Woonbron literally acquired a monumental cruise ship to renovate it and exapt it as a museum and hotel. Still today the old ocean liner turned hotel lies permanently docked at the waterfront of peninsular Katendrecht as part of its gentrification. The ambitious project's general mismanagement and failed oversight, joined by some unfortunate setbacks involving asbestos and nesting birds, led to budget overruns into hundreds of millions. Still haunting the sector right next to Vestia's billion-euro misadventures the *SS Rotterdam* has become the most disgraceful example of paternalist megalomania committed by a housing corporation. In the redevelopment of Klarendal, an obvious candidate for such gentrifier megalomania would be 'Station Klarendal'. And as the main feature of a larger anti-stigma offensive in the neighborhood it is worth further looking into. It concerns a large nineteenth-century structure on the corner of Sonsbeeksingel-Klarendalseweg that houses the middlebrow grand cafe Goed Proeven (est. 2008) on its ground floor. Although first constructed in 1887 the building has not always been there, surprisingly. As an old post office building it was first located next to Arnhem central station about 1,5 kilometers from its current position (Image 5.64). To move it, it had to be decomposed into 125 mobile pieces and reconstructed in Klarendal. There, the icon was to be the heart of the Fashion Quarter, of which plans were already a few years underway (more about which below). At the time of writing the upper floors above the restaurant also harbor a few fashion initiatives. At the back of the building is fashion-themed Hotel Modez. The comparison of Station Klarendal and the *SS Rotterdam* is not far-fetched. In fact, when asked about recent sectoral history and his own role as a general director of People's Housing since 2000, Breeman himself segues without prompt from the 'sun king behavior' and 'megalomania' (*grootheidswaan*) of some of his former colleagues to his own special projects. He names Station Klarendal in particular, which they were redeveloping around the same period as 'that boat'. At the time participating in the same policy platform as the people responsible for the Rotterdam project (*De Vernieuwde Stad*), Breeman recalls:

"It was simply a solid story (*een goed verhaal*). Only at a certain moment they just wanted more, more, more, bigger, bigger, bigger. But the significance... Well we were to think big, 'think on a city level, try to contribute there'. From the point of view of the city of Rotterdam that ship is of course a fantastic icon. It just got out of hand. And one of the things we didn't do [in Arnhem]... this was something surprising about that boat, it was placed in a neighborhood where Woonbron didn't even own any houses... [in contrast] we have always done these special investments in relation to our housing stock. And with

that, and that is certainly a difference, I would say we are more careful.” (Interview no. 019)

Stronger than any financial temptations, Breeman recounts, was the lure of buying up monumental buildings which were often in a rather dilapidated state, as regular investors did not know what to do with them. “The temptation was like, ‘let’s buy another nice building. I have seen one, let’s buy it and then later we think of a function for it. You know, like that [...] but you should place that in its context [...] commercial parties were not investing in our districts [...] So when the [housing] corporations started getting into risky projects that was also because the market did not” (Interview no. 019). Just like the impatient pull of capital, the lure of prestige could have one forget one’s territorial ties, making one think too much ‘on a city level’ and start buying up monuments and erecting icons entirely disembodied from any careful local strategy. For patient capital, Van Loon explains, “immaterial components such as reputation, embeddedness in local communities, paternalism towards employees and endurance are (almost) as important as financial considerations” (2016: 711–712). He, however, is speaking of family real estate businesses, for which that local reputation, embeddedness and paternalism come somewhat more naturally. Notwithstanding the equally constructed nature of family ties and their tendency for paternalistic care giving, inclusive territorial commitments and strategies by housing associations have to be constructed on a different basis and by other means, just like their patient investment required their own dyscalculic practices. As the General Director explains, it starts with the cultivation of integrity in the organization through dignified leadership. Acting ‘holier than the pope’ will resonate through the corporation and eventually to its clients (Interview no. 019). Although it should be noted that, while this includes a salary below the legal norm and no bonus (as opposed to the failing CEO of Vivare mentioned earlier), it still allows for a substantial yearly pay of around €180.000 (Volkshuisvesting, 2016). However, another source of territorial commitment is a sense of historical awareness, or in the words of its Director of Housing “I always say to anyone who can and wants to hear it, we have been here [in Klarendal] for a hundred years and if we want to we’ll be here for another hundred years.” (Interview no. 016)

5.3.4.4.2 The Fashion Quarter: ‘Bottom-up’ neighborhood redevelopment

In order to see how Station Klarendal was more embedded in a larger territorial commitment and anti-stigma strategy we have to look at the wider Fashion Quarter project of which it was part, that is, the integral redevelopment of the two main commercial axes of Klarendal through the eventual installation of around 60 fashion shops and the restoration of their facades (Image 5.66). At first sight, this comprehensive transmogrification of an old working class quarter into a highbrow shopping experience seems to be a commercial gentrification of the purest kind. What were once vibrant mainstreets lined with mom and pop stores has been Disneyfied into an upper class shopping walhalla. The case would indeed comply perfectly with Zukin’s formulation of the process: “goods and services that cater to gentrifiers’ consumption needs [...] displace existing, lower-income residents as surely as higher




Image 5.66. A promotional map of all the establishments participating in the Night of Fashion 2018, most of them located on the first part of the Sonsbeeksingel and along the long Klarendalseweg. It includes about 60 fashion boutiques, food stores and crafts shops, but also some 15 cafes and restaurants (source: Modekwartier.nl, accessed 05-10-2020).

rents. Shopping thus joins with architectural restoration to create a coherent space of consumption” (Zukin, 1990: 41). However, this humanist geography of a lived place abstracted into a coherent circuitry of cultural capital would inappropriately strip the Fashion Quarter of its less-than-neoliberal capitalist meaning. Despite its integral conception it is at closer investigation much less gratuitous, rootless and clear-cut exclusionary than such a framework permits us to see.

As briefly mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1, the decline of Klarendal commercial life had already set in for decades. Cruel as the not returning of residents after urban renewal (ie. leaving customers), the arrival of supermarkets (ie. big business) and the deliberate policy of concentrating cannabis sellers in the area (a half-criminal business by design) were, by the 1990s the sad fact was that there was no obvious and viable way to resuscitate the old commercial landscape. While the neighborhood covenants following *Klarendal Come On!* (2001) clearly expressed a desire for the old ‘butchers and bakeries’ to come back, it was evident that such businesses would not survive in an era in which a more mobile population did their weekly or monthly shopping at the supermarket and in the city center. Still it took a few years for the idea of a cluster of fashion businesses to arrive and address the commercial conundrum. While the Fashion Quarter knew ‘many fathers’, according to then sitting Director of Housing at People’s Housing (Interview no. 018), perhaps the first step toward an answer to the questions posed after *Klarendal Come On!* came from local consultancy office Seinpost, which specialized in ‘bottom-up neighborhood redevelopment’ and was based in the neighborhood for more than a decade by then. One of the two employees working in the area for Seinpost explains his ‘bottom-up’ way of working back then:

“I just started walking around [...] looking very closely what was already in the area and where there were vacant properties, who their owners were and how long they were vacant. What is happening in this neighborhood, is there really no economy at all? [...] It’s like finding a needle in a haystack.. You ask, where is my line? [...] We thought this is a working class neighborhood, it doesn’t have a chance, that was the image... But then there was a little thread there... a colleague of mine had started a test project for starting entrepreneurs, we’re talking 2003. ‘Are there perhaps people in the neighborhood that might think about maybe starting a business and want some help and do not know how to find their way?’ [...] He went from door-to-door you could say. He had the assignment to find about twenty people like that and eventually found about twenty-five. [...] Now to my great surprise... because when you think about Klarendal you think working class neighborhood and then you think bricklayers and that sort of groups, or car services... but they were high-educated women that wanted to start something in Klarendal. That was the larger part of the group. Then I looked further into who they actually were and they turned out to be people trained at [local school academy] Artez, first came to live here as students and now wanted to do something...[...] so there was some entrepreneurship behind those front doors.” (Interview no. 001)

Looking for a line flight from further economic destitution it was found with what could be called ‘marginal gentrifiers’: mostly highly-educated women precariously employed in cultural professions (Rose, 1984, 1996, Caulfield, 1989). Eventually thirty-five potential entrepreneurs declared themselves willing to consider Klarendal as a place to establish their business. Meanwhile, already in 2004, the housing corporation had begun buying up properties at the junction of Sonsbeeksingel and Klarendalseweg without yet knowing exactly what to do with them (Interview no. 018, Volkshuisvesting, 05-05-2004). Through the sinews of local governance, including Seinpost and People’s Housing but also other stakeholders such as the municipality, art school Artez and community leaders, the idea for a Fashion Quarter was born (none of the ‘many fathers’ was willing to take sole credit or was even able to reconstruct its exact origination). Seeing many successful fashion academy graduates flee Arnhem, most often for national fashion capital Amsterdam, there was a shared desire to keep them within the city. Thus the plan emerged to buy up and rent out many more of the vacant store buildings along the commercial axes of Klarendal to more or less recent Artez graduates, several of whom were already living in the area as Seinpost had found out. In fact, since at least the 1960s Klarendal had been home to Arnhem art students but they always played a subordinate and largely invisible role in the neighborhood’s public life, withdrawn as they were to their own studios and dorm rooms (Interview no. 010). In the Klarendal to come the artists and designers were to have a more visible place and use their residences as both a home and an open workshop.

After the initial bottom-up enrollment of the first entrepreneurs and properties, the following years the Quarter was further developed within a patient and – as if having Haila in mind – ‘organic’ planning practice: no large-scale demolition or planning from blueprint, but a thoughtful, step-by-step phasing in (Interview no. 018, Volkshuisvesting, 12-07-2011, Scale-Stipo, 2011: 19). For instance, to not only retain success but also hatch more fresh local talent, a Fashion Incubator was conceived and established in the Quarter. Gradually it transformed into a shared



Images 5.67–5.69. Top left, the logo of business association DOCKS, established by People’s Housing and its partners to organize all the new Klarendal shops, restaurants and workshops into a ‘creative cluster’ (source: *Modekwartier.nl*, accessed 05-10-2020). Below, a 2010 promotional map issued by the Fashion Quarter (Modekwartier), showing the forty odd shops participating at that time (source: *Volkshuisvesting*, 2011: 7). At that time, People’s Housing had just started the ‘100% Fashion’ phase of the cluster’s development (internally known as ‘Phase B’). Eventually, about thirty more businesses will be added. On the right, a promotional flyer for the 2013 Night of Fashion [Nacht van de Mode] (as reproduced in fashion magazine *Elle* (source: *Elle.com*, 09-06-2013, accessed 05-10-2020).

makerspace where textile machinery too expensive for starting entrepreneurs could be utilized (Interview no. 011). Through the incubator and strict branch management (*branchering*) by People’s Housing and the new business association (with mandatory membership), the entire fashion production chain was to be represented in the Quarter, including designers, sewing workshops, textile and color samplers, photographers and modelling agencies, but also manufacturers of accessories, hair salons and so on (Interviews no. 001, 047). Inspired by the inevitable Richard Florida and agglomeration economist Michael Porter (channeled through local academics of the Artez-linked Arnhem Centre for Creative Economy and Innovation and the Organza European network of mid-sized creative cities) the idea was that in this way a proper cluster could emerge that would not only provide the creative entrepreneurs of Klarendal with some synergistic economy of scale but also a sense of craftsman’s pride for being part of a larger whole (Scale–Stipo, 2011: 36). Whether this economic collectivity is or even can be achieved is still a matter of debate among the entrepreneurs. While their business association, DOCKS,¹⁴⁰ is quite successful

¹⁴⁰ DOCKS is an acronym for ‘Durven Ondernemen Centraal Klarendal & St. Marten’, which translates to: ‘Dare to Enterprise Center Klarendal & St. Marten’. St. Marten is the neighborhood

in organizing the yearly Night of Fashion (Images 5.67-5.69), achieving cooperation in more mundane areas of shared marketing and opening hours remain arduous. However, starting with only four pioneer designers in 2006, all situated close to where Station Klarendal was later rebuilt, the whole Quarter amounted to about 75 open businesses in 2018. The majority of these came with 'Phase B' of the project, titled '100% Fashion XL', of which Station Klarendal was the centerpiece (Volkshuisvesting, 12-07-2011). With the latter as an iconic lever and the addition of the last twenty odd extra shops, the Fashion Quarter was expected to reach a new plane of development and stand on its own feet. While it has remained a fragile achievement at least up until the end of our research (beginning 2018), not least because of the uneasy cooperation among entrepreneurs, its persistence at the time of writing suggests it might have actually reached that stage.

5.3.4.5 *The People displaced?*

How should we evaluate this project of commercial overhaul in terms of displacement? At the time of its inception, the initiators at People's Housing were well aware that a Fashion Quarter would not align much with two-thirds of the neighborhood's cultural tastes, but were convinced the change of image away from stigma would give all of its residents more confidence (Interview no. 018). That real estate prices, also of their properties, have risen since its establishment they see as evidence of that change. Up to now, and if we are to believe the corporation's commitments to 'another hundred years', also in the foreseeable future, this has had little impact on its tenants' rent levels. Looking more closely at the make-up of the Quarter itself, we can see People's Housing has not been housing a purely economic people (*homines economici*) and this should mean something. Just as they house the dyscalculic and dyslexic resident, so they tried to make some room for materially and socially committed crafting, caring and playing entrepreneurs (*homo faber/curans/ludens*). However, despite all the good intentions, the prioritization of fashion designers (ie. commodity producers) backtracked many of the first prevailing group of 'autonomous', less economically oriented artists in the neighborhood (Interview no. 007). This can certainly be seen as a kind of economic gentrification, where artisans are pushed to become more like *homo economicus*, but also status-hungry *homo sociologicus*. That is, as 'cultural entrepreneurs' they were not allowed to just be creative but also had to become both proper bookkeepers and respected artists among relevant peers and experts. Candidate tenant-entrepreneurs were actively selected by a branch management committee on this 'double success criterion', a formula devised and promoted by one of Artez's more prominent lecturers (Jacobs, 2014: 104, Jacobs et al., 2014).¹⁴¹ As

directly adjacent to Klarendal. The Northern side of the Hommelseweg, one of the main streets participating in the Fashion Quarter (which also includes the buildings of Images 5.24, 5.28 and 5.37), is officially part of St. Marten. The neighborhood also houses a few of the cluster's workshops.

¹⁴¹ "...for artists and creative enterprises especially, a double success criterion applies. On the one hand, they have to develop a cultural reputation on the basis of expert reviews, attention in specialized journals, awards, invitations to show their work in exhibitions and work sold to museums or well-known art buyers. On the other hand, they have to develop a viable revenue model." (Jacobs, 2014) Jacobs' influence on and collaboration with Arnhem officials (eg. Jacobs et

a consequence, the thus actively cultivated taste for revenue and hunger for status undermined the functioning of the fashion cluster as a collective enterprise (which would not survive if it was a third ‘success criterion’). As mentioned, cooperation on opening hours or shared marketing was difficult, as efficiency required differently and ‘higher’ segment designers did not feel much for being advertised together with their ‘lessers’ (Interview no. 012). A more external sign of displacement, furthermore, came from some of the older Klarendal enterprises, who felt treated unfairly by the ‘subsidizing of the creatives’ (Interview no. 013), especially when many of the latter, for reasons mentioned, turned out to be less socially involved in the neighborhood than promised.

So while credibly ‘bottom-up’ and ‘organic’, there were certainly some insisting tendencies of displacement and tension. Nevertheless, despite largely failing to institute an efficacious economic collective, many bridges were eventually built between old residents and (some key) entrepreneurs, on a street level (Interview no. 009) but also through neighborhood events such as the Night of Fashion (Image 5.69) and the Neighborhood Council, to be described in the next chapter (Interview no. 014). For instance, through prominent figures such as the tobacco store keeper and the new cafe owner (see also next chapter, Section 6.4.4.3), economic images of entrepreneurship (eg. ‘no nonsense’, ‘getting things done’) could become bridging signifiers. Similarly, the manual labor found in the creative enterprises (now made visible) and the image of craftsmanship more generally are not a far fetch from the cultural appreciations of the old working class Klarendallers. Nonetheless, the inescapably high product prices understandably remained a point of occasional outrage and indignation (‘two hundred euros for a handbag!’ has been the go-to outcry). However, by listening closely to its resident base at the initial economic, social and physical ‘tables’ accompanying the process (see below, Section 6.4.2), the Neighborhood Council and elsewhere, People’s Housing has been persistent in making serious efforts to address any exclusionary effects of, or discontent over the commercial metamorphosis. Apart from a conservative policy in selling off social housing, it has supplied ample space for social enterprises and sheltered workshops (eg. a restaurant or textile laundry service). Similar initiatives were attempted to interest marginalized minorities for production work in the new local textile industry but unfortunately failed (Lavooij, 2014: 59).

Another effort to balance the commercial with more social investments has been the development of a new multifunctional community center (‘MFC’). At the site of an old military barracks, the housing corporation has renovated (exapted) the

al., 2014) makes for an interesting case of the performativity of *evolutionary* economics (or ‘Darwin in Fashion’, Jacobs, 2006), in the service of an outspoken neoliberal agenda. While using strongly naturalizing language (‘scarcity’, ‘fitness’, ‘selection environment’), Jacobs also takes a clear normative stance: “For a long time selection in the art environment (including applied arts such as design, architecture and fashion) was mostly culturally based, which could lead to a kind of art trap. Many artists remained within a purely subsidy-dominated hierarchical selection system and did not learn to work in a more economic environment. It is, of course, nice when governments provide a stimulating environment in which new talent can develop. However, when artists do not learn to break out to private selection environments, they remain too dependent on the whims of a relatively small and sometimes fickle hierarchical selection system.” (2014: 104).



Images 5.70-5.72. On the top left, a postcard drawing of the old military barracks, Menno van Coehoornkazerne (source: Arnhem.nl, accessed 17-07-19). To the right, the renovated main building of the barracks and the newly built Multifunctional Center Klarendal (source: BRControls, 2013). Below a view of the whole complex as situated at the Klarendalseweg, thus also 'topping off' the Fashion Quarter (source: Google Earth, 2019, accessed 05-10-2020).

garrison's main building to host cultural activities and built a new complex housing a primary school, daycare center, social corner, gym and other community services and organizations (Images 5.70-5.72). The housing corporation sees it as a second neighborhood 'icon' besides Station Klarendal but then at the opposite end of the Klarendalseweg (Volkshuisvesting, 2014). Clinched between the two 'poles' is the Fashion Quarter. Notwithstanding some complaints among old Klarendallers about its somewhat peripheral location, insufficient accessibility and unsocial interior, it seems to have settled as the new go-to place for caring needs and political gatherings. However, there were also smaller but nonetheless symbolically powerful efforts by the housing corporation to establish or maintain good rapport with those living through the transformation, such as giving a coffee machine to the tobacco shop that functions as a meeting place for old Klarendallers (in defiance of the uncsoy MFC) (Interview no. 021).

Coming to a more general conclusion on the case of People's Housing in Klarendal, we have seen the economic agencement defy prevailing languages of scarcity and thereby enact a caring, egalitarian form of paternalism (cf. Van Ginkel, 2015, Tonkens and Duyvendak, 2003, Van den Berg, 2015). It has done so within the inherited framework of 'external democratization', that is, a historical situation were tenant self-

government through the ‘association’ form proved too demanding for an indifferent, unable or too parochial people (which is of course to say nothing of a possible people to come, perhaps one supported by new technologies of collective decision-making). In typical ‘Third Way’ fashion (Finlayson, 1999), or so it seems, empirical metrics of tenant needs and lifestyles have prevailed over democratic decision-making in property management (which would, according to many be required to become a truly progressive institution, eg. Polanyi, 2016, Gindin, 2018). Only indirectly does the local democratic platform, the Neighborhood Council, influence it, mostly as a channel for complaints, signals and referrals. However, within this framework of external democratization, inherent to the ‘foundation’ form, the housing corporation tries hard to practice its very own ‘third way’, which is perhaps better appreciated from the autonomist, pragmatic and feminist perspectives put forth in Part 1 of this chapter. Orienting itself primarily on gaps in social wealth instead of rent and calculating with patience and with different social and ecological rights in mind, People’s Housing wards off norms of ‘necessary profit’ and avoids present tenant parochialism. Then, to avoid possible excesses of paternalism, be it technocratic or moral, it triangulates its alternative metrics with care workers’ on-the-ground assessments and tries to align its anti-stigmatizing icons such as Station Klarendal and the Fashion Quarter with already inherent capacities and sentiments (‘bottom-up’) and through patient and persistent planning (‘organic’). On many fronts then, displacement is minimized through strategic economic dyscalculia/dyslexia in terms of accessibility (ie. sale of stock), affordability and territorial identity, without sticking to a parochial conservatism. While Klarendal’s redevelopment over the last two decades has certainly not been a perfect process and while it may be a highly contingent result that is most surely impossible to simply copy to other places and times, we nonetheless have distilled here some ‘ethical coordinates’ (cf. Gibson-Graham, 2006, Hodkinson, 2010, 2012) for other progressive practices of economization that aspire to defy the pulls of profit and prestige in the name of a more inclusive abundance and econodiversity.

Part 3

5.4 Conclusion: The gap multiple

“Revolution never proceeds by way of the negative. [...] [T]he negative is the objective field of the false problem, the fetish in person. The negative is both shadow of the problem and false problem par excellence. Practical struggle never proceeds by way of the negative but by way of difference and its power of affirmation, and the war of the righteous is for the conquest of the highest power, that of deciding problems by restoring them to their truth...” (Deleuze, 1994: 208)

Returning to the second set of research questions presented in Chapter 1, how is real estate exploited, valued and cared for through practices of economization in gentrifying Klarendal, Arnhem? And what does this say about capacities for delivering equality? By adopting and then simply negating (neo)classical fetishes of the market and its structure, critical geographers of gentrification have retained a false definition of the problem that housing practices are trying to address. What if

		(Prosthetic) prices, valuation models, point systems, metric properties
	Non-quantified values of housing and location, extra-legal property claims	Property/welfare rights, values quantified
Common desires and capacities of dwelling and construction	Passionate interests, material hermeneutics, media of housing discourse	Calculative practices of finance, production (costs) and appraisal
Continuum of co-actualizing practices of real estate economization		

Image 5.73. The diagram of the actualization of practices of real estate economization (presented in slightly different form before in Chapter 3 and Section 5.2.4 and a specification of the diagram of Image 5.3).

the question is not so much whether Von Thünen’s or Neil Smith’s solutions are true or not, but whether the one-dimensional way in which they state the problem has any truth to it in the first place? How to restore the problems of real estate markets and gentrification to their truth? The problem-event of gentrification in itself is defined by as many ‘gaps’ as there are agencements of economization. And these gaps vary not just in quantitative terms of actual and potential rent, but qualitatively as well. There are gaps of actual and potential rent, prestige, utility, social wealth and care, all interfering with one another. Accordingly, the primary meaning of ‘real estate’ as such changes meaning from one agencement to the next, varying from financial to aesthetic to sociomaterial. Still, Klarendal-Arnhem may be *more than one* marketplace defined by a single normal level of rent, but it is also *less than many* disparate and unique locations and utilities. Indeed, among its agencements there is a genealogical coherence to be found which we can now, by way of summary, further specify by our familiar diagram of (counter)actualization (Image 5.73). As we have seen, agencements may differ quite radically in their emphasis on parts of the spectrum. While Clockwork Inc. emphasizes the right column (quantitative ‘exploitation’), Richman the middle (qualitative ‘valuation’) and the Court of Saints the left (practical ‘caring for’), People’s Housing, by virtue of its status as an economic prosthetic, has to navigate all three with equal competence. Gentrification, or ‘economic displacement’ (as distinguished from the social and political displacements treated in other chapters), is fought out somewhere in between the co-evolution of these agencements, with the nonaptive caring practices (*homo curans/faber/ludens*) as the most likely victim of exaptive and adaptive practices (*homo sociologicus/debitor/economicus*). Delivering equality thus becomes a question of protecting, habilitating and affirming the endangered econodiversity. Currently, this mostly implies defying the strong normalizing pull towards elitist assemblage (of private debt and stigmatization of renters and their territories) in favor of tinkering towards new populist assemblages that take heed of our commons and their inherent socio-ecological thresholds and obligations.

5.5 Discussion: Making rent gap theory less true?

To reconnect these ethical considerations of ‘capacities for delivering equality’ to the mainstream political economic dialogue on gentrification and how to fight it, we should return to the aforementioned wish by critical geographers ‘to make untrue’ the neoclassical and rent gap theories of urban land markets (Harvey, 1973: 137, Lees et al., 2008: 48, Slater, 2017, Clark, 2017, Kallin, 2020). We are now in a better position to say something about how this might proceed in practice. Unfortunately, for the same reason that practices which actually make rent gap theory true have been neglected, have those that make it *less* true been disregarded even more. If rent gaps flow from a system that can only be toppled wholesale in a revolution (as happens to the ‘truth’ of theories in Kuhnian paradigm shifts, Harvey, 1973: 137), then thinking about smaller steps does not seem worth the effort or even complicit in perpetuating an oppressive system. But even in the unlikely case, is it highly questionable whether abolishing the ‘very simple’ mechanism of competitive bidding (Harvey in Lees et al., 2008: 49) is going to cut it. As experiences of the Soviet Union have shown, eliminating rent altogether can degenerate into a rather “disgraceful attitude toward land” (A Kommunist Roundtable, 1990: 135, quoted in Clark, 2004: 158:9) and then may still not eliminate gentrification (Andrusz, 1984: 202–203, 218, see also Morton, 1984, on housing allocation in the USSR). Reasoning from the framework set out in this chapter, how can we instead, beyond wishful thinking and highly improbable revolutions, take smaller steps that make rent gap theory less true?

Recently, Clark (2018) has sketched out some more sophisticated ethical coordinates, including a set of four economic ‘forces’ that together, in ‘dialectic’ co-evolution, ‘make the rent gap true’ or, when undone, make it untrue. Together, they provide a nice framework to sum up the arguments made in this pivotal chapter and see whether and how any results from our studies may deepen, thicken or correct the prevailing ideas around the ethics of gentrification. We first need to look at the four forces of gentrification as presented by Clark, to then revisit their status by our own new terms. The first force in Clarks account ‘making the rent gap theory true’ concerns the incessant push within capitalism to privatize and (*re*)*commodify* common lands and public housing. Conversely, making the theory untrue requires *decommodification* through shared ownership and a cultivation of social practices of commoning such as, first and foremost, squatting. Thus common ‘rights to place’ should override the ‘right to extract rent’ made possible by private property. Directly related, a second force to make the rent gap true is the fact of *inequality*, which we can interpret as concerning the quantification of property rights and the class relations they institute. Unequal income and wealth distributions define both the power to act on rent gaps or resist others from doing so. But, as Clark recognizes but does not explain in relation to a rent gap’s veridiction, inequality is not just about the ‘size of wallets’, but about the ‘socio-cultural’ distribution of capabilities too. Nonetheless, floors and ceilings on income and wealth alone should already go a long way to *equalize* power relations in the housing market and make the rent gap theory untrue. Thirdly, there is the present trend of *financialization*. This force of gentrification entails not just a change from use value oriented economic activity (C-M-C) toward an exchange value directed capitalism (M-C-M), but an entirely extractive practice

making money out of money (M-M).¹⁴² Against this current, but without specifying what it means exactly, Clark proposes a *democratization of housing* where investment decisions become use-value oriented and create wealth rather than extract it. Lastly, to make the rent gap untrue, neoliberal myths of *market fundamentalism* and the rugged pioneer individualism they offer have to be countered and denaturalized to make way for alternative myths and metaphors that carry an *egalitarian ethos* and emphasize a fundamental interdependence of individual and collective.

Looking at each of these four ‘forces’ (or ‘mechanisms’ or ‘spheres’), of privatization (1), inequality (2), financialization (3) and neoliberalism (4), we can see how they change character and mutual relations when rephrased in terms set out in this chapter, starting with the last (4). Ironically, as explained in Part 1, critical geographers of gentrification have been participating all too much in the ‘market myth’, largely admitting to it but only disapprovingly ‘wishing it not true’. While in practice, ‘the’ market, as imagined both by the fundamentalists and their Marxist critics, only makes itself true in some cases and with great effort. That Clark has to resort to economic anthropologist Karl Polanyi rather than Marx to parry the (quasi) naturalization of the market is telling in this regard. Moreover, many other, less-than-revolutionary agencements of economization evolving into a diverse range of aesthetic, autonomous and socialist directions complicate and multiply the reality of ‘the’ property market such as the one found in Klarendal. When regarding this assemblage in terms of practices actualizing agencements instead of an underlying capitalist structure, the search for alternatives need not rely only on oppositional myths and metaphors. For instance, besides, before and beyond a ‘right to place’ or ‘to the city’ we should promote the obligation to *care for the city* and require the concrete cogitation of ‘ethical coordinates’ for doing so (cf. Gibson-Graham, 2006, Hodkinson, 2010, 2012).

Revising our conception of markets away from (neo)classical economic myths of equilibrium and system rationality (as done in Part 1), questions of property, inequality and economic democracy attain a new, shared coherence (thereby losing their arbitrary ‘dialectic’ relationship). *Financialization* (3), or alternatively, a ‘democratic’ real estate economy, becomes a matter of agencements that through specific (extra-) legal and accounting practices actualize *property* rights (1) and monetary (*in*)equality (2). In Part 2 we have studied a series of such agencements active in Arnhem. Doing so, we have indeed encountered instances of financialized capitalism (M-M), in the form of the Soros-Vivare deal, but this is not the new normal. If there is a norm to be found there, it is instead the one propagated through the likes of Clockwork Inc. (ie. industrial capitalism, M-C-M). For the latter agencement, enacting rent gaps still involves a host of commodity production and marketization-related calculations and adaptations. Still, in the conspicuous practices of Richman we find an altogether different economic norm at work. This is an agencement no less ‘undemocratic’, but far from financialized or rationalized. Instead it demonstrates a passionately

¹⁴² In the widely adopted Marxist formulations to represent precapitalist and capitalist modes of value circulation, ‘C’ stands for commodity and ‘M’ stands for money (see eg. Marx, 1976: 247-248, Harvey, 2006a, Smith, 2008a). Clark (2018) does not use these himself.

dyscalculic orientation toward the hidden monumental potentials of commodities (C-M-C). According to the same (and as such rather indiscriminate) scheme of production (C-M-C), the Court of Saints also orients itself toward potential use values, meaning not just the basic utilities resulting but also the aesthetic and social challenges presented by a collective sweat equity project. The heterarchical building project demonstrates what hard work is involved in acquiring the needed calculative, aesthetic and technical abilities, thereby also pointing at the pragmatic limits of its democratic potential. People's Housing hybridized some of all these practices into one agencement, giving them a dyscalculative and dyslexic twist of its own. Caring for econodiversity not only means acting as a prosthetic for its differently abled tenants, but also addressing more general gaps in socio-ecological wealth and territorial reputation.

What does 'democratization of housing' mean in these terms? Shared ownership? Decision-making power? Consumer satisfaction? Affordability? Or all of these? This brings us to the issues of private property (1) and inequality (2). As we have seen, in practice neither private nor common *property* (1) by themselves guarantee the presence or absence of financial speculation, displacive aesthetics, paternalism or economic cooperation. As stewards of our housing commons, corporations such as People's Housing may be led astray by impatience and megalomania. As seen in the Court of Saints case, Clark's proposed squatting can very well miss its commonist mark too, while private property does not exclude economic cooperation and social embeddedness. Even Richman's material hermeneutics are not as detached from history as one might expect and as such may be appreciated in their own right. What is important to conclude from this, is that like any other economic rights, property rights and class relations by themselves do not say all that much about their role in practice. Similarly, where it comes to *inequality* (2), the housing question cannot be reduced to a matter of affordability. As Clark also notes, but then leaves unexplained, inequality is not just about the 'size of our wallets' (and, we could add, property and class relations) but also about 'capabilities'. Indeed, in accordance with the (counter) actualization approach to economics proposed here, inequality becomes not simply an expression of the competitive bidding among unequally sized 'wallets', nor even of a struggle among classes and their property claims. These become rooted in a fray of practices superimposing their capacities of economization onto each other, pushing and pulling their economic evolution into many converging and diverging directions and 'gaps'. Therefore, addressing inequality implies digging into this less direct competition of agencements of economization and marketization and acknowledging that economic caretaking cannot be reduced to a redistribution of money or property rights.

Wishing a bad theory to become not true might start by ceasing to participate in the fetishization of its abstractions. To close off, let us be reminded of Karl Marx' own ambiguous participations in the reification of monetary abstraction:

"The properties of money are my, the possessor's, properties and essential powers. Therefore what I *am* and what I *can do* is by no means determined by my individuality. I *am* ugly, but I can buy the *most beautiful* woman. [...] As an individual, I am *lame*, but money

procures me twenty-four legs. Consequently, I am not lame. I am a wicked, dishonest, unscrupulous and stupid individual, but money is respected, and so also is its owner. [...] I am *mindless*, but if money is the *true mind* of all things, how can its owner be mindless? [...] Does not money therefore transform all my incapacities into their opposite?" (Marx, 1975[1844]: 377)

Wallets of money and capital appear like the most magical enablers of the disabled. With money in place 'as the true mind of all things', no further mind seems required or relevant to economic geography and politics. Capital just 'moves back to the city' and turns it into its opposite. However, as we have seen in this chapter, addressing gaps of 'lameness', beauty or respect certainly requires their own kind of minds, minds distributed over very specific sociotechnical agencies. To appreciate and enable econodiversity, to recognize and push for revolutionary practice in the here and now instead of a negative future, we need to put the mind back into the 'mindless' gap.

Chapter 6

Politicizing gentrification: The careers of a complex urban issue in two European neighborhoods

6.1 Introduction: A pragmatist take on gentrification politics

This chapter explores what a pragmatist take on politics (Dewey, 1954, Latour, 2005b, 2007), as combined with counter-actualization theory, could mean for gentrification studies and geography and planning more broadly. On first inspection, the politics around gentrification appear straightforward. Rooted as the concept is in a Marxist frame of thought, gentrification signifies a clear clash of class interests based on a capitalist production of (frontier) space (Smith, 1996). The gentrifying neighborhood seems to present us with a clear frontier where neoliberal capitalist forces of profitability and revanchism meet working class neighborhood resistance (eg. Smith, 1996, Robinson, 1995, Betancur, 2002). However, over the last two decades, especially coming from European contexts, other, more complicated viewpoints on gentrification politics have also entered the debate, especially from post-Marxist and post-structuralist perspectives (eg. Davidson, 2010, Paton, 2009, Loopmans, 2008, Uitermark et al., 2007, Uitermark, 2014, Lees, 2014). Recent studies of neoliberal urban policies in particular have combined Marxist critiques of political economy with Foucauldian governmentality approaches to political subjectivation (eg. Swyngedouw, 2007, 2016, Uitermark, 2005, 2014).

On the surface, the Turkish and Dutch cases of gentrification we examine in this chapter seem to exemplify these typical class oppositional and governmentality types of politics. By closer inspection, however, we show how a pragmatist focus on political practices can both deepen and dynamize traditional understandings of gentrification politics as a rather onefold antagonism, whether of class interests or governmental subjectivations. When instead of having *issues* of gentrification fit a theoretically preset arena or frontier (parliament, class opposition, bureaucratic field, discourse etc.) we start following their emergence and mutation as they ‘find their public’ (Dewey, 1954, Latour, 2005b, 2007), things may turn out more messy and complicated, but also more promising than our current views on politics and the state allow for. In an attempt to better handle the heterogenous expression of issues, this chapter progressively assembles and applies a new, coherent ontology of the political, including political *practices*, *interpretations* and *metrics* (see Chapter 1–3). This presents us with a differential space of possibilities (cf. DeLanda, 2006) that allows us to bring more focus on the *issues* of displacement (or ‘matters of concern’, Latour, 2005b), but also on the material-semiotic *practices* of politicization that express them and mark their historical careers in such wildly different places as Arnhem or Istanbul. Besides expanding our understanding of gentrification’s ‘cosmopolitics’ (Blok and Farías, 2016, after Latour, 2007), this focus suggests a variety of strategies of politicizing gentrification, that may be less than revolutionary but therefore also less despairing perhaps (cf. Gibson-Graham, 2006).

Accordingly, the chapter runs as follows. Part 1 lays the theoretical groundwork. Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 examine the literature on Turkish and Dutch gentrification politics, also briefly reintroducing our own empirical cases and how they might apply to previous analyses. Moving through these two reviewing sections, the aforementioned ontology of possible political practices is constructed schematically, synthesizing concepts of opposition, hegemony and governmentality. Section 6.2.3 will then add to this more familiar ontology the Latourian concept of ‘matters of concern’, which gives the whole framework a pragmatic twist. In the empirical Part 2 we turn to the specific Turkish and Dutch cases of Beyoğlu/Cihangir, Istanbul (6.3) and Klarendal, Arnhem (6.4) and see how earlier conclusions, following more conventional interpretations, fall short in many ways, and how a more pragmatic approach could help out both analytically and politically. Constituting the concluding Part 3, Sections 6.5 and 6.6 will synthesize our findings and propose a new way forward for studying issues such as gentrification and discuss an alternative ‘mesopolitical’ mode of doing urban politics.

Part 1

6.2 Gentrification as war or governance? Or both?

6.2.1 Class war and bulldozer neoliberalism in Turkey

In most critical accounts of gentrification, politics aligns neatly with its economic and cultural ‘frontier’ (Smith, 1996), resulting in a rather clear-cut ‘dialectics of power’ between the ‘forces of gentrification’ and ‘forces of neighborhood maintenance’ (Betancur, 2002: 809n10). In Smith’s (1996) famous reports of the ‘class warfare’ raging around New York’s Tompkins Square Park, this power struggle makes itself felt in a most violent and outspoken way. Following a century old history of working class resistance, the park again became the stage of many direct confrontations in the late 1980s, this time between police forces and “a diverse mix of anti-gentrification protesters, punks, housing activists, [homeless] park inhabitants, artists, Saturday night revelers and [local] residents” (1996: 3). The riots around the park were a reaction to what Smith saw as the emergence of a new ‘revanchist’ urban regime bent on ‘reconquering’ for the white middle class a city stained by the presence of a wide range of minorities. Structurally marginalized groups, like the homeless of Tompkins Square Park, thus became the targets of violent policing, legitimized through sustained territorial and racial stigmatization in the media. Ideologically then, the demonstrations around Tompkins Square Park challenged a discourse dominated by rozy euphemisms of ‘revitalization’ and ‘urban pioneering’. There on the streets, romantic frontier myths were fiercely debunked as a mere ‘camouflage for a raw economic reality’ (1996: 22), which for Smith of course means the larger scheme of global capitalism’s uneven development. Within the larger, Marxist scheme of things, today’s gentrification stands in a long line of structurally equivalent ‘spatial fixes’ together with the old frontiers of European imperialism (Smith, 2008a, Harvey, 2006a, 2005). Like Colonel Custer’s expedition against the Sioux of South Dakota in 1874, Tompkins Square Park was what happens when capitalist expansion

is obstructed: war.

However, exceptionally explosive as these events were, it remains to be seen whether the concept of war might be as fitting to other, less eruptive frontiers. At least a gradual distinction would be appropriate between the head-on type of ‘war of movement’ described by Smith and a more covert and sublimated ‘war of position’ as theorized by Gramsci (1971: 232, Loopmans, 2008). As an example of the latter, Betancur (2002) in his detailed account of gentrification politics in West Town, Chicago, describes the alignment of a manifold of electoral and nonelectoral confrontations. In explicit contradistinction to concepts of participatory planning and the ‘general interest’, he recounts how, through practices of community organizing, lobbying, campaigning, but also vigilantism and intimidation, a war of position plays out, with fundamentally irreconcilable interests based on class, ethnicity, and race vying for local hegemony (cf. Loopmans, 2008: 2502). Notwithstanding a multiplicity of practices then, a stark, one-fold antagonism between ‘community’ and ‘accumulation’ still underlies and binds them all.

In this antagonistic view generally prevailing in gentrification studies, the state figures almost invariably as a powerful ally if not handmaiden to ruling class interests. For Smith, in keeping with the frontier imagery, city government becomes a mere ‘cavalry enlisted by real estate cowboys, reclaiming the land and quelling the natives’ (Smith: 1996: 22). Behind a facade of neatly demarcated jurisdictions, plutocratic alliances take shape through local elite networks and overlapping positions (Smith, 1979b: 28). With the ‘neoliberalization’ of the state and the onslaught of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey, 1989, Weber, 2002), these alliances have often taken on brazenly explicit forms. In several waves spanning half a century (Hackworth and Smith, 2001, Lees et al., 2008: 173–186), gentrification policy has evolved from sporadic beginnings to rapidly becoming a ‘global urban strategy’ (Smith, 2002), with the state, after a short *laissez faire* period in the 1980s, becoming increasingly actively involved in the process. As Lees et al. summed it up a decade ago: “the neoliberal state is now the agent of, rather than the regulator of, the market. As such, a new revanchist urbanism has replaced the liberal (often welfare-orientated) urban policy of First World cities, and neoliberal urban policy now expresses the impulses of capitalist production rather than social reproduction” (Lees et al., 2008: 163, see also Slater, 2016).

Recent Turkish gentrification politics and state policies are predominantly and understandably conceived in similar ways as the above. Rightly so, a lot of attention has gone out in recent years to the often violent ‘urban transformation’ by TOKI (Housing Development Administration) of informal housing areas in Istanbul (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011, İslam and Sakızlıoğlu, 2015, Sakızlıoğlu and Uitermark, 2015), Ankara (Türker-Devecigil, 2005, Özdemirli, 2014) and Izmir (Saraçoğlu and Demirtaş-Milz, 2013). With an eye on Istanbul, Lovering and Türkmen (2011) find the Turkish state enacting a brutal rent-seeking brand of ‘bulldozer neoliberalism’ which shows little remorse for long-tolerated working class squats, or *gecekondu*. Legitimizing the new economic regime is an increasingly exclusionary and revanchist discourse (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2014) no longer fostering any hope of emancipation but only vicious

stigmatization of *gecekondu* territories as crime-ridden, morally depraved ‘enemy lands’ breeding criminals and terrorists (Yonucu, 2013, Sakızlıoğlu and Uitermark 2015). Despite these deeply offensive representations and a severely weakened position compared to the height of industrial working class power in the 1970s (Yonucu, 2013: 221–223), the plans for urban transformation still manage to spark fierce resistance among the deprived, even in politically conservative areas (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, Lovering and Türkmen 2011).

By many accounts, the massive Gezi insurgency of May 2013 has also been interpreted as protesting neoliberalism and its massive state-led gentrification projects (Gürcan and Peker, 2014, Akbulut, 2015). In their ‘Marxian analysis of the political moment’, Gürcan and Peker point at the rise of ‘AKP’s political economy’ to explain it. The AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* or Justice and Development Party) government is said to aim to ensure the stability and expansion of capitalist accumulation through TOKI’s regeneration efforts and other massive ‘neoliberal’ projects (a rather liberally applied term, including virtually any infrastructural investment). Behind this, as in Smith’s account, lie powerful plutocratic alliances maintained among a new elite of conservative-Islamic capitalists, including TOKI realty corporations, and the AKP government (Gürcan and Peker, 2014: 75–77, Aksoy, 2012, Eraydin and Taşan-Kök, 2014). However, crucial for this elite’s attempt at a ‘political-economic’ spatial fix is the establishment of a corresponding ‘political-cultural fix’ by which ‘neoliberalism is legitimized and reproduced’ (Gürcan and Peker, 2014: 86). Not unlike the neoconservative wave in the US, this takes on a specific Turkish form as a neo-Ottoman, Islamic authoritarianism and social interventionism, carried by a new elite taking power from secular republicans, or ‘kemalists’ (cf. Yılmaz, 2009, Eraydin and Taşan-Kök, 2014).

Smith’s frontier conjunction of capitalist development and bourgeois revanchism and Gürcan and Peker’s social ontology of ‘political-economic’ and ‘political-cultural’ fixes exemplify well Marxist thinking of politics, including many of the difficulties with its implied base-superstructure thinking. Material and cultural capital converge in a centered and agential ontology of power where some people, classes and organizations possess it and many others do not. Revolutionary politicization requires a seizing of power by an egalitarian uprising of the many against the few. We may schematize this political ontology as Image 6.1. For *critical* theories and studies of gentrification, the right side of the diagram is most important, whereas especially the top-left cell functions primarily as a utopian background idea. The horizontal line on the left is made transparent to represent the idea that when bourgeois ideology is overcome by Marxist revolution, the material and spiritual realign in universal truth. For conservative thinker Carl Schmitt (2007[1932]), this is a typically ‘depoliticizing’ move, where (Marxist) science tries to displace politics (cf. Barnett, 2010). Ironically, it is Schmitt’s thinking that has recently been taken up by many post-Marxists who have given up on a positive socialist *Aufhebung* and instead celebrate the impossible (as will be discussed below).

Interpretations	Socialist universalism	Bourgeois institutions / ideology
Practices	Mass proletarian resistance	Capitalist regulation and class policing

Left < == politicization < == Right

Image 6.1. A Marxist ontology of material practice and ideology, applied to (neo)liberal capitalist political economy and its resistance. Those basically in power, the capitalists, plan and protect their material property, while ideological institutions, including law, party politics, media and universities, primarily act to legitimize and reinforce this power on an ideal, superstructural level. Politicization means (working toward) demystifying these legitimizations, resisting en masse and ultimately seizing and universalizing production.

In the next two sections, by working through the latter post-Marxist and recent pragmatist views on politics, the foregoing simple ontology will be progressively elaborated and complicated, resulting in a more subtly differentiated and dynamic contrast of practices, one in which they do not necessarily conform to basic antagonisms and become less trivial as political mediators.

6.2.2 Technocratic integration efforts in The Netherlands

Parallel to more general critiques of a Marxist neglect of the state as a ‘relatively autonomous’ field (eg. Bourdieu, 1994, Jessop, 1990, 2006), some writers on gentrification politics have introduced neo-Marxist and post-structuralist approaches to counter all too economic explanations of gentrification. There are post-Marxist accounts (eg. Paton, 2009, Davidson, 2010, 2012) that reveal a political dimension to the most mundane, daily and naturalized (ie. hegemonic, ‘depoliticized’) practices of neighboring, thus characteristically investing the whole of social life with power and politics. In a similar vein, following the ‘political ontology’ of Rancière (2010, Deranty, 2003), some geographers divide urban politics into an expansive domain of ‘police’, again covering (ie. governing) anything between parliamentary politics and everyday social interactions, and ‘the political proper’, signifying those rare events when this order of police is spectacularly disrupted – that is, for those activated subjects who supposedly grasp their universal truth and underlying antagonism (Dikeç, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2009, Uitermark and Nicholls, 2014).¹⁴³

However, leaving these rather axiomatically inferred events aside for a moment and focusing on the ‘police’ side of its politics, gentrification in this perspective becomes

¹⁴³ Some neo-Marxist commentators, like Žižek (2008b: 236–238), would say the true and proper political intervention, acting out ‘the art of the impossible’, can only be one that challenges social relations on the ‘most fundamental level’ of the means of production, thus supposedly securing it (through a rather depoliticized ontology) for the Left and from the Right. As we will see below, post-Marxists such as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) move away from this position and no longer privilege production.

part of a specific ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991) geared toward the biopolitical (self) management of urban populations and consisting of technologies and rationalities to govern conduct ‘at a distance’ (as opposed to direct legal intervention) (Rose and Miller, 1992, Uitermark, 2005). For theoretical as well as empirical reasons the work of Uitermark, mostly on Dutch urban policy, is of seminal importance here. Uitermark (2014, cf. Van Eijk, 2010) theorizes gentrification as a governmental strategy that may not only take on revanchist and segregative forms like the ones discussed above, but can also have genuinely integrationist objectives, especially in Western European contexts. Hence, in a well-known study of the Rotterdam district of Hoogvliet, Uitermark et al. (2007) show how despite the absence of prior market interest (from both developers and consumers) and without any ‘entrepreneurial’ incentives to ramp up the local tax base (most taxes being nationalized), city planners implement housing differentiation policies to specifically alleviate perceived social problems and maintain state control. Gentrification, which ensures the presence of a docile civil society in disadvantaged neighborhoods, thus becomes part of a wider assemblage of governmental ‘technologies of integration’, including statistical monitoring, making neighborhoods legible in terms of composition, livability and safety; decentralization of decision-making, enforcing local actors to regulate themselves; and an integral, de-compartmentalized and networked organization of government (Uitermark, 2014: 1428-1431).

In Dutch urban policy and gentrification efforts in particular this whole package is mobilized, with a special role reserved for participatory planning procedures and platforms. More or less regularly, responsabilized citizens meet with territorially assigned (ie. integrally operating) civil servants to communicate, deliberate and decide on prepared statistics, budgets and plans. The dominant perspective on these consultation practices among critical observers, especially concerning housing differentiation policies, seems to be that they are first and foremost ‘post-political’ instruments for the manipulation of local consent, luring people into their own displacement (Uitermark, 2008, Huisman, 2014, Baeten, 2009, Lees, 2014, Lees et al., 2014). Combining Foucauldian and Marxist perspectives (Uitermark, 2005, Huisman,

Metrics		Statistics (of population, mix)
Interpretations	Revolutionary enunciations	Rationalities, programmes
Practices	Counter-hegemonic events	Disciplinary technologies

political subjectivity < == politicization < == objectification by police

Image 6.2. Governmentality and post-Marxist perspectives added to the political ontology. Instead of the structuralist stratification of political economic base and ideological superstructure, post-structuralist and post-Marxist ontologies see (neo)liberal politics, or rather ‘police’ in the broad sense of governmentality, as a field of objects (population, resources etc.) produced, planned and governed through disciplinary technologies and rationalities. Politicization means rupturing this material-discursive objectification through counter-hegemonic events and revolutionary subjectivation (see eg. Søyngedouw, 2014).

2014), citizen participation efforts are thus conceived as the disciplining ‘micro-physical’ counterpart of a general governmental strategy to smooth out, coopt and ‘depoliticize’ persistent class antagonisms and gentrification. All of civil society thus effectively becomes an extension of the neoliberal state, “part of a seamless web of governance [police] rather than an uncontrollable site of multiple [politicizing] resistances” (Uitermark and Nicholls, 2014: 976).

However, with this post-Marxist conjunction of Marxist ‘macro-physical’ and Foucauldian ‘micro-physical’ perspectives (eg. Jessop, 2007, Uitermark, 2005) we see problems of empirical distinguishability emerging, rooted in an underacknowledged incommensurability between centered and decentered ontologies of power (cf. Barnett, 2010).⁴⁴ For on the one hand, the decentered, Foucauldian approach produces rather abstract and neutral descriptions of the workings of power, having at most a ‘defamiliarizing’ kind of critical effect. It demands we take seriously what actors say and do “instead of viewing their discourses as mere expressions of deeper structures” (Uitermark, 2014: 1422). Also, it allows for considerable ambiguity in urban politics, accounting for the fact that in urban politics “there is *rarely, if ever*, a clear opposition between communities on the one hand and authorities on the other. Sometimes residents suffer as they are subjected to surveillance or displacement; at other times residents appreciate or even call for more comprehensive and intrusive governance of their living environment” (Uitermark, 2014: 1423, emphasis added). On the other hand, the more debunking kind of Marxism, in which true politics demands “taking an explicitly antagonistic stance against extant institutions, values and practices” (Uitermark and Nicholls, 2014: 974), urges to ignore much of this complexity and ‘repoliticize’ the analysis by introducing again a central rupture of class interests and political practices. When taking the one before last quote seriously, however, this implies in *most, if not all* cases not so much a revelation but a theoretical *creation* of antagonism where no clear oppositions of concerns and interests empirically exist.

The often confused dialectics found in post-Marxist analysis of urban politics, veering arbitrarily between plutocratic exclusion and technocratic integration (paradoxically also exclusionary, eg. Ong, 2006), traces back to a rather opportunistic oscillation between centered and decentered political ontologies. This critical strategy is bound to have rather asphyxiating and despairing effects, as empirical subjects are clinched within a totality of economic structures and subjectivation mechanisms, while room for political manoeuvre becomes a practically elusive, theoretical void (literally, Badiou, 2006, Dikeç, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2011). Notwithstanding this defect, we can still build on this extended political ontology, adopting the post-Marxist idea of a (gentrification) politics with more autonomy than traditional Marxist analyses admit. The simple hierarchical ontology of Image 6.1 should thus be complicated, yet also flattened (like an autonomous ‘field’, ‘discourse’ or ‘system’, cf. Bourdieu, 1994, Luhmann, 1990). No longer do we have an economic base of class opposition and a superstructure of ideological mystification, stigmatization and opposition. Instead, as shown in Image 6.2, a new ontological distinction is made between on

⁴⁴ We see a similar tension arise with interpretations of Foucault, whether he himself condoned or condemned neoliberalism (Zamora, 2014).

the one hand a government apparatus, managing a population of subjects (ie. its *metric* composition) with governmental *technologies* (eg. housing differentiation) and guided by political *rationalities* (eg. ‘social balance’), and on the other those counter-hegemonic events and subjects that radically contest it.

While undeniably a step in the right direction, by allowing for more empirical variation in political practices (especially on the ‘police’ side) and displaying an advanced (nominalist) sense for the performativity of numbers and statistics (eg. Rose, 1999: 197ff), this more complicated ontology still remains only a promise for taking seriously the contingency, ambiguity and non-dialectic dynamism of most actual political practices and alliances, as it recenters these on a principal antagonism. What we propose in the following, therefore, is a further building on this scheme by radicalizing the ontological decentering of power instigated by the Foucauldians, doing away with the structuralist distinction of the micro and macro-physics of power in favor of a pragmatist ‘mesopolitics’.

6.2.3 *Matters of concern: Issues first!*

Rather than immediately focus on settled actors, interests and (op)positions of power, we could try and follow how, by which *practices*, a bundle of social and economic concerns around a neighborhood gets politicized or not. Or in the words of Latour, “the key move is to make all definitions of politics turn around the issues instead of having the issues enter into a ready-made political sphere to be dealt with” (2007: 815). To achieve this, Latour (2007: 816–818) introduces a full range of arenas for issues to traverse, which does not exactly correspond to the foregoing Left–Right and political–police distinctions.¹⁴⁵ Reworking Image 6.2 then, along this new continuum, while adding to it the Latourian notion of ‘matters of concern’ (Latour, 2004b, 2005a),¹⁴⁶ we get Image 6.3. As we will see, adding underrepresented matters of concern (cf. ‘the

¹⁴⁵According to Latour’s intellectual biographer Graham Harman “the trajectory of life stages of a political issue is surely one of Latour’s most fascinating loose ends” (2014: 172). Indeed a loose end, as it contradicts his later, again more essentialist Luhmannesque characterization of *the* mode of politics as a rather mundane ‘circle’ of Schmittian decisions (Latour, 2013, see also below).


¹⁴⁶As a philosophical category, concern is first highlighted by Heidegger (2010: 118), who considers it (as *Fürsorge*) to be constitutional for practical human subjectivity (or *Dasein*). According to Heidegger, human concern for being-with-one-another is defined by a basic anxiety or worry that arises out of anticipation of the future, but that also pulls *Dasein* together as a unified, autonomous self, temporally situated in between birth and death (Inwood, 1999: 35–37). Important for him is how resolute or ‘authentic’ this anticipation and relating to excluded others takes place (Heidegger, 2010: 118, Mulhall, 2005: 160). Adopting the concept into his own thought, Latour (2004b, 2007) subverts Heidegger’s anthropocentric notion of concern (cf. Harman, 2009: 137–139). By including all ‘matters’ into the relation of concern, he undermines Heidegger’s humanist criteria of authenticity, which lean heavily on the human/non-human distinction (briefly stated: treating people and things as ‘mere’ technical objects is wrong). This has the effect of blending the Heideggerian concern (*besorgen*) for non-human ‘things at hand’, also in a broken ‘present at hand’ state, with the concern (*Fürsorge*) for other people (including the sick). Here, the category of concern is taken up in a similar spirit: it is a basic tendency of affective assemblages, including human and non-human relations, to start anticipating and worrying about a shared future, and this is what constitutes (through ensuing practices of politicization) their collective subjectivity.

political’ (Rancière, 2010) has the double effect of making this category less exotic or void (and no longer reserved for the traditional Left), while also giving the whole political ontology a more pragmatic focus. As we will further elaborate below, this new scheme thus juxtaposes, rather than essentializes, a whole series of interfering practices of politicization, ranging from *pragmatic* publics around matters of concern (Dewey, 1954, Latour, 2005b) to more established Machiavellian power plays among ideological *interpretations* (Mouffe, 2005, 2013) to a full-fledged Foucauldian governmentality characterized by distinctively political *metrics* like votes and other budgetary and statistic policy evaluations (Foucault, 1991, Rose, 1991, 1999).

Metrics			Electoral, financial and scientific evaluations of power
Interpretations		Political ideologies and movements (demonstrations, organizations etc.)	Political parties, programs, plans, regulations, laws, offices, territories
Practices	Emerging, buzzing yet underrepresented concerns	Organizational power play, networking skills, charisma	Technologies (and affects) of ‘governing at a distance’
Continuum of possible political practices (cf. Latour, 2007): matters of concern - public problems - sovereignty - deliberation - governmentality			

Image 6.3: The full ontological spectrum of practices, interpretations and metrics of politicization.

Considering Image 6.3, we can imagine concerns arising from the left hand column and then historically traversing this space of possible practices (nonlinearly, possibly circularly), constructing a more or less stabilized, polymorphic *agora* around them along the way. As an extreme example, in most Western countries sewage was once a materially and semiotically buzzing (ie. killing, stinking and puzzling) concern before it worked its way to the right to finally end up almost entirely depoliticized as part of the routine, governmental apparatus. Perhaps for the better, concerns around gentrification (displacement, stigmatization, crime, livability etc.) are unlikely to ever reach that stage, even though, as we will see in the Dutch case, there have certainly been attempts to do so. However, one way to visualize a hypothetical ‘phase space’ for political issues to traverse in this way is depicted in Image 6.4. Note that this is a preliminary outline that only represents a first attempt at conceptualizing the dynamic relationship between political practices.



'pre-political' subjectivity < == politicization == > 'post-political' objectivity

Image 6.4. A sketch of a pragmatic 'phase space' for the politicization of concerns. 'Pre-political' matters of concern (the red area) can be expressed by an ordinal series of practices of politicization (the other colored planes), to potentially become 'post-political' objects regulated by governmentality (black line). The decreasing slope of the red area represents the diminishing susceptibility or accessibility of the various political practices to new or marginalized concerns. Which implies, conversely, that the likelihood of their translation ('institutionalization') into actual plans and governmental practices increases. The height of the vertical lines dividing the practices is of course determined by the role played by interpretations and metrics in the respective practices: whereas matters of concern (A) and molecular publics (B) are low on interpretive content, antagonistic (C), agonistic (D) and consensus (E) practices are discourse driven. And whereas the latter are low on performative metrics, aggregative voting procedures (F) and technocratic governmentalities (G) are quantification driven (for more on this difference, see Image 6.5).

Again, in search of political representation (cf. Dewey, 1954) and translation into laws, plans or disciplinary practices, concerns can take on any trajectory throughout the diagram.¹⁴⁷ Based on, but also extended from Latour's (2007: 818) list of political phases, Image 6.4 sketches a space for issues to traverse and be actualized by a range of practices. The decreasing slope of the red area signifies the diminishing susceptibility or accessibility of the various political practices to new or marginalized concerns trying to traverse the space. The dividing lines and their height indicate the points of transition between practices as determined by the enrollment of certain representational mediators, from fuzzy, oppositional or consensual signifiers to the votes, budgets and other governmental metrics used to quantify them. Together, the lines and planes thus mark a landscape within which any political issue moves and

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Latour, 2003, 2013, on the political curve of 'representation' and 'obedience'. Here Latour's view on the 'existential mode' of politics bears many resemblances to Luhmann's (1990, 2002) view of the political 'system': a contingent, circular processing of problems by a complexity reducing political system (Brans and Roszbach, 1997: 422). For us however, this presents politics as too much of an abstract and closed system, betraying, as Habermas suggested, a rather too technocratic vision of it ('die Hochform eines technokratischen Bewußtseins', 1971: 145).

evolves in between two poles of 'depoliticization'. These asymptotic limits, never fully actualizable, are a '*pre-political*' *subjectivity* on the left, as discernible in the work of, for instance, Deleuze (as a 'larval subjectivity' rather than a post-Marxist 'void'),¹⁴⁸ and a '*post-political*' *objectivity* on the right, as conceptualized by, for instance, Žižek, Mouffe or Swyngedouw. Before moving on to further explain this bipolar landscape, it should be noted that the left and right side of its diagram cannot simply be equated with the political Left and Right (as is arguably still the case with Images 6.1 and 6.2). Rather, we could say, in this new political order the Left generally *orients* itself to the left side of the diagram, as it aims for inclusivity of marginalized concerns, while the Right looks away from them, reinforcing and conserving the state as is (cf. Deleuze and Parnet, 1989, on the Left as a matter of 'perception' and minority). Of crucial importance, however, is to conceive this inclusivity or exclusivity in *relational* terms: the Left aims to include as many matters of concern as (com)possible, which implies they have to be mutually inclusive (eg. preserving the white race may be a marginalized issue, but it is not exactly inclusive to other concerns).

Proceeding now, in more detail, to move from the left to right of the diagram: far from the forced equilibria of governmentality and its averaged, 'molar' political aggregates, emerge what we propose to call *molecular publics*: those assemblages of concerns that barely reach the level of political representation and dialectics (ie. stable interpretations).¹⁴⁹ They include the kind of politics of crowds, mobs and publics that fascinated late nineteenth and early twentieth century social observers like Le Bon, Tarde, Park, Lippmann and Dewey (and more recently Hardt and Negri on 'multitudes') (Borch, 2012). Perhaps more obviously than their molar counterparts, to be discussed momentarily, these molecular accumulations of concerns, generating intense public pressures and outbursts, are material-semiotic assemblages, in which agency is distributed over a crowd of human and non-human actants (cf. Marres, 2005): services break down, human bodies get agitated and injured, warnings are cried or fired, buildings are arsoned, barriers deployed, unruly congregations dispersed.¹⁵⁰ Still, this 'phantom of the public', to use Lippmann's phrase, is also expressed in more technologically mediated ways: 'riots' also break out in the press or on Facebook. However, taking the fleeting, ambiguous and multiplicitous nature

¹⁴⁸ In Deleuze (1994) the 'larval subject' is a proto-subject that cannot itself act (yet), but nonetheless subsists, persists and insists, often throughout great trials of violence (read: marginalization), much like the forces that a larva endures during early embryogenesis. As such, it may be a discursive void but in vitalist terms produces an abundance of 'pre-political' tensions and concerns. In Latourian terms, this embryonic, transindividual 'subjectivity' would be a 'matter of concern', which can be viewed as a (nearly) pre-political event, a phantom yet without a public.

¹⁴⁹ Assemblage theorists Deleuze and Guattari introduce the molecular and the molar against the more traditional, mereological distinction of the micro and the macro (1987: 32, 219). The latter are both aspects of the molar aggregate (eg. the resistant 'class'), whereas the molecular designates the multiplicity of forces that both side-steps and generates the one and the many (eg. the flowing and leaking 'mass') (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 127, Brighenti, 2010: 298-299).

¹⁵⁰ As Borch (2012: 301) acknowledges, the 'human-nonhuman relation' is still a loose end in the literature on 'crowd theory'. It is also in this regard that the here designated 'molecular public' differs from the everyday 'micropublics' proposed by Amin (2002). While the latter likewise wrest political practice out of the institutional arena, they still lack attention to the nonhuman element (which becomes much more present in Amin's later work, eg. Amin and Thrift, 2002, 2017).

of these public assemblages seriously means reducing them neither to expressions of ‘private troubles’ (Mills, 1959) – although they can be *subsequently* privatized by individualist ideologies and psychologies – nor to sociologically preset class interests. We should think of them rather as constituting a subsistent phase ‘before’ the critical point where an ‘accumulation of popular grievances’ gets properly bundled into multiple molar aggregates like demonstrations, social movements and ideological performances like the ones at Gezi park (of green, Islamic, local, liberal, left, right, progressive, conservative, etc. identities) (Gürcan and Peker, 2014: 86).

When concerns do get bundled as such, moving on toward the right of the diagram, it has to be decided *what concerns whom* exactly. Among the discursive practices geared to do that, and the interpretations produced therein (signs, identities, positions), several can be distinguished by their degree of animosity, or rather their capacity to express or reduce it. On the one side there is the Schmittian assemblage of *antagonism*. With Machiavellian *virtù*, belligerent passions (morale) and violent actions, sovereign decisions are made on enemies, friends, subjects, groups and frontiers (Schmitt, 2007). The urban ‘class warfare’ described above, with its irreconcilable conflicts of interest, would also fit this form. But also in a less violent, more institutionalized setting, we can still find the same antagonistic morale and instrumentalist action among urban activists (Alinsky, 1989, Castells, 1983) and other planning actors (Flyvbjerg, 2002). If we, however, accept that other practices are possible, that is, if we are careful not to posit the antagonistic form as also covertly ‘underlying’ all other practices, even in the absence of its actual performance, we find at the other end of the discursive spectrum the Habermasian practice of *consensus* building (Forester, 1989, Healey, 1993). It holds the attractive promise that, when communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984, 1987) informs urban politics and planning, a political discourse can be achieved that is minimally distorted by partisan power struggles and illusory conflicts of interest, such that an agreement can be reached dialogically on a shared public interest. In between antagonism and consensus, we find still another attractive form: *agonistic* politics (Mouffe, 2005, 2013). Whereas the rationalist models of deliberation (and ‘aggregation’, see below) tend to abolish adversarial passions and collective identities (and thereby ‘the political proper’), antagonism tends toward essentialist rigidities and ultimately violent outbursts (two tendencies which, Mouffe and others claim, reinforce one another in ‘post-political’ times). Therefore, what this practice aims for, albeit still rather abstractly, is to sublimate ineradicable antagonistic passions and ‘wars of manoeuvre’ and mobilize them towards democratic procedures which facilitate a less violent but more open and dynamic ‘war of position’, between conflicting hegemonic projects (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 70, Mouffe, 2013).

When we think of these three types of practices as material-semiotic assemblages, we will find they have to be materialized very differently (in streets, on squares, on protest signs, around tables, etc.), requiring very different skills (of leading, organizing, negotiating, communicating, etc.) – materializations and capacities that become of non-trivial importance once ‘underlying’ interests are bracketed. Furthermore, these different political practices tend to provoke isomorphic formalizations, from ‘coercive’ to selectively ‘enabling’ bureaucratic organizations (Adler and Borys, 1996:

80–83). However, instead of making a case for either one of these types of practices, as empirically or normatively essential, we can affirm their diverse capacities (affects, ethics, risks and affordances) in contingent situations.¹⁵¹ Moreover, note that molar assemblages practiced in these ways are always ‘leaking’ and ‘overflowing’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 214, cf. Callon, 1998a, see also Chapter 3), haunted by the phantoms of molecular publics – a persistence represented in Image 6.3 by the porous lower layer of practices. Concerns are never entirely represented or contained and that is what keeps the political wheels turning (and, as we will conclude below, might also invite strategic modes for switching between different practices).

However, modern statecraft has also found ways to more or less precariously transcend political discourse through axioms of quantification (eg. ‘will of the people’, ‘one man one vote’, ‘majority rules’). Thus, in liberal democratic forms of ‘aggregative’ politics (Mouffe, 2005), consensus or a ‘general will’ is enforced through polling techniques (Rousseau, 1998), in practice severely framing and restricting political subjectivities (cf. Rose, 1991, Coles, 2004). An extreme version of this is of course the referendum, where political subjectivity is reduced to a yes/no vote on an issue (for example, for or against gentrification, as in Rotterdam in 2016, see Doucet et al., 2016). However, from this numerical subjectivity it is only a small step to complete governmentality in which ‘men’ effectively join ‘things’ as atomic objects of policy practice (Foucault, 1991: 93). Depoliticization is accomplished when adherence by planners and policymakers to a technically established public interest is evaluated bureaucratically in terms of money (budgeting) or truth (performance measurement) and no longer through the vote. Again, when it comes to sewage issues this does not have to be a bad thing at all, but with gentrification, as we will explain below, matters literally turn out more complex.

Having thus arrived at the outer right column of the diagram of Image 6.3, we are now in a position to extend and specify it in a way parallel to Image 5.4 in the previous chapter, thus allowing us to reconnect in more detail to established institutions of modern statecraft and models of democracy (see Image 6.5 on the next page). While practices of politicization are of a broader category than states and big-P-politics, the latter can ultimately be seen as highly stable, slow moving actualizations of some of the former. As such, these are not just neutral arenas, but practices that exert substantive influence on what concerns can be politicized at a certain moment or ever.

¹⁵¹ Mouffe seems to allow for this when she states that “[t]he agonistic model of democracy aims to tackle all the *issues that cannot be properly addressed by the other [deliberative and aggregative] models*” (2013: 6, emphasis added)

Metrics		electoral laws (axioms)	polls, votes, seats	performance indicators, budgets
Interpretations	ideological demonstr. organizations	territory, constitution, laws	parties, programs, leaders	(resources and goals of) policy
Practices (Powers)	emerging concerns	organizational power play	judicial (classic/populism) (<= comp. elitism =>)	legislative admin. executive (pluralism)
Flows (Speed)	fast			slow

Image 6.5. A diagram summarizing the distinction of practices of politicization, but with a more detailed emphasis how these are institutionalized in modern liberal states.

As the threshold marked red implies, the axiomatic distinction of the modern ‘legal state’ (or *Rechtsstaat*) happens first through a constitutional(ist) principle of rule of law: all citizens, including those in government, are equally subject to the law of the land. It marks and institutes the distinction between private particularity and public universality. Still, as will be the subject of the following empirical analysis and as indicated by the dotted red line, this formal distinction can be quite permeable at the level of practices and many concerns manage to push their way into the modern state through ‘informal’ molecular, antagonistic and agonistic practices (riots, demos, networking, charisma etc.). However, as indicated by the green demarcation, in a *democratic* legal state, issues and leadership are voted on, which demands the institution of all sorts of electoral axioms. These are rules of proportionality scripting referenda and parliaments such as ‘one person, one vote’, ‘winner-takes-all’, number of parliamentary seats, electoral thresholds, electoral colleges, simple or supermajority requirements etcetera. The axioms then translate political mobilizations and ideologies into their quantitative mold and leaders, parties and programs start to orient themselves to the competition for votes and legislative positions. This can happen to a degree (cf. Held, 2006), with classic, direct democracy tending toward populism and ‘demagoguery’ (not meant in a pejorative way, cf. Samons, 2004: 43-45) and with modern ‘competitive elitism’ (Schumpeter, 1942) and pluralism tending toward technocracy (again, in a neutral sense). However, electoral metrics do not exhaust the quantified evaluations that state practices are subjected to. In practice, most policy implementation is not subject to constant parliamentary scrutiny but is monitored and steered bureaucratically by budgets, evaluation studies, audits, performance monitors and control rooms. Sewage systems, for instance, are monitored internally, externally, financially and scientifically. Of course, these technocratic evaluations may supplement electoral politics, helping voters and representatives decide on matters of concern, but they often start replacing democratic control when electoral bodies stay undecided or policies simply become uncontroversial.

Thus we see the modern *trias politica* expressed as a continuum of practices. It is important to notice, however, that executive power may vary across the spectrum according to the strength of that arrangement. In the above diagram, and as will

be important in our empirical analysis, it becomes clearly visible how constitutional and parliamentary practices stand in between the (modern, administrative) executive reverting back into (premodern) Machiavellian power play. If the separation and balance of powers is subverted at a practical level, through antagonistic majoritarianism for instance, the *Rechtsstaat* is in danger. Executive sovereignty, as opposed to algorithmic administration, is a matter of asymmetrical mobility. It means instituting immobility *for others* (ie. other concerns) through the production of supposedly universal laws and, when rules are already in place, their selective application. Following Schmitt (2007), this antagonistic practice is often considered the violent heart of modern statecraft. However, we should be careful not to essentialize it as such. The other formalized practices can actually perform to expulse and fragment sovereign violence such that it transforms into something else. That said, it is certainly possible that antagonistic practices hollow out constitutional and democratic institutions. Planning for the public interest and rule of law, which are supposed to act as a break or deceleration on political particularism, can be subverted and abused in antagonistic practices by both ‘neoliberal’ universalized particularism, which imagines government as plagued by public sector zealotry but then favors a class of ‘job creators’ in its legislation, or by ‘socialist’ particularized universalism, which depicts the state as corrupted by private interests and then exempts a certain ‘vanguard’ class from its rules (more on this below). Depending on what happens in judicial and legislative practices then, executive power is ‘graded’ somewhere in between arbitrary sovereignty and algorithmic technocracy. As we will see below, this largely hinges on legal and planning capacities for past and future anticipation, which at a level of flows (ie. the processing of matters of concerns) require a slowness that fast-moving executives cannot tolerate much. At base then, and as will be further developed throughout this chapter, the balance and dynamics of political powers, or rather, of matters of concern, become a question of political speed (cf. Scheurman, 2004, Glezos, 2013).

Concluding this section, when we follow the emergence and evolution of issues, we find them not necessarily fitting old and new frontiers, and nor should they. On the far right of our political space of possibilities, all the actants encircling an issue, including humans, become ‘objects’, simple intermediaries translating (some) concerns into plans without much friction. On the left, all actants, including non-humans, become ‘subjects’: chaotic, intense and unpredictable mediators, endlessly generating new concerns and diffracting old ones.¹⁵² Politics, or a ‘mesopolitics’, thus appears as the pragmatic “regulation of the interchange of molar segmentation and molecular flow” (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 127).¹⁵³ By this definition and against the micropolitical idea that ‘everything is political’ or that ‘power is everywhere’, we could ask the pragmatic

¹⁵² On the distinction between intermediaries and mediators see Latour, 2005a. Of course, and in accordance with the pyramidal form of Image 6.3, actants, even those constituting metrics, never become completely transparent, frictionless intermediaries, as they always retain, for good or bad, their degrees of freedom (ie. unactualized capacities, affects, cf. DeLanda, 2006).

¹⁵³ Note that this is a concept of regulation that is more comprehensive than both cybernetic-technocratic (see note 147 and Section 6.3.2.2.2, II) and Marxist regulation approaches (ie. a state’s balancing of class interests in favor of the capitalist class, eg. Jessop, 1990, 2013).

question of when and where it is needed, and then *how*. As Latour points out (2007: 819), we might not *want* politics everywhere, as certain depoliticizations can be very welcome indeed – again, think of the sewage system, or at the other pole, concerns with preserving the white race. Any contingent, path-dependent ‘choice’ of political practice along the continuum (‘regulation’) will always and inevitably be fraught with uncertainties (cf. Mol, 1999), so we might as well be glad some things are not up for discussion all the time and for everyone. With a complex issue such as gentrification, the question is not so much of whether it should be politicized, but how. As we will see throughout Part 2 and the conclusion, addressing it (‘regulation’) usually requires more ‘mesopolitical’ diplomacy than concerns of sewage or eugenics.

Having thus set out the general theoretical stakes of an anti-essentialist, pragmatist take on politics, premised on following issues and their politicization, Part 2 will do so empirically in two very different European neighborhoods. Section 6.3 traces the complex issue of gentrification through practices of planning and resistance in Istanbul-Beyoğlu-Cihangir. Section 6.4 does the same for Arnhem-Klarendal, looking at how gentrification is (de)politicized through metrics-driven practices.¹⁵⁴ Both cases show surprising genealogies and practices that do not align neatly with crude categories of antagonistic and governmental urban politics. In the conclusion (6.5), some comparative links will be made between the two trajectories of politicization.

Part 2

6.3 An Istanbul-Beyoğlu-Cihangir to politicize

6.3.1 Introduction: Counter-actualizing majoritarianism

The theoretical universalism of ‘the political proper’, as exclaimed by the post-Marxists, leaves a lot, or indeed everything, unsaid. In practice, one universalism “Tompkins Square everywhere” (Smith, 1996: 4) is not the other “Everywhere is Taksim” (Tuğal, 2013: 147). Unlike the class war at Tompkins Square, an expression of a universal proletarian struggle, the Gezi revolts of May 2013 would be seriously misrepresented as such (Tuğal, 2013). Starting out as a protest against the park’s demolition, or perhaps against Istanbul’s massive gentrification more generally, it soon attracted and embodied an inextricable multiplicity of grievances and concerns. That participants were drawn mostly from the middle classes, motivated primarily by commonist, ecological and aesthetic concerns (Akbulut, 2015) does not chime entirely well with Marxist interpretations like Gürcan and Peker’s (2014). Much like the Occupy movements, Gezi activism did not propose any unitary alternative (at least as seen from the view of politics as a dialectic struggle between class ideals) (Tuğal, 2013: 160).

¹⁵⁴ The strategy of counter-actualization takes on a different, less strict form than in Chapter 4. While metrics, interpretations and practices are distinguished and the former two traced to the latter, there is no strict narrative movement from metric practices (ie. electoral, evaluative) to interpretive (ie. parties, policies, laws, ideologies, movements etc.) to practices (specifically underrepresented concerns).

What did certainly unify all participants was a shared concern about the majoritarian rule of the AK party and how it was violently blocking any politicization of concerns other than their own:

“The issue here is not the legitimacy of the Turkish government – it was elected democratically in 2002, 2007, and 2011, with up to 50 percent of the vote – but the way in which the opinions, beliefs, and lifestyles of the other half of the population are disregarded, when not suppressed.” (Pierini, 2013)

To understand how this disregard and suppression of concerns is practiced and see how this structures political responses, we will look at the career of the issue of gentrification as it is politicized through plans and protests in and around the historical district of Beyoğlu, Istanbul. Our particular focus here is on the neighborhood of Cihangir, directly adjacent to Taksim Square.¹⁵⁵ Although some the first studies of gentrification in Turkey were actually on Cihangir (eg. Uzun, 2001) for some time now most attention goes out to the aforementioned, more marginalized *gecekondu* areas, Tarlabası being an example within the Beyoğlu district (Sakizlioglu and Uitermark, 2015). In the meantime then, Cihangir has become somewhat of an exceptional case. As the neoliberal Ottomans have risen to power, ‘The Republic of Cihangir’ (İlkuçan, 2004) is forced to respond where before gentrification was not of much concern to it. In this section on our Turkish case, therefore, Cihangir will empirically anchor the discussion, without excluding (increasingly) interrelated Beyoğlu areas such as Tarlabası and Galata. However, the section is subdivided as follows. First, in Section 6.3.2, we look at how concerns are processed by current Istanbul planning practices, with special attention to legal exceptions and bureaucratic affects. Second, in Section 6.3.3, we see how these practices have met with a parallel development in civic politicization, or ‘practices of civility’, culminating in the Gezi protests.

6.3.2 Concerns of sovereignty, practices of anticipation

To know how concerns of gentrification arise in Cihangir we have to understand the ‘Schmittian assemblage’ of majoritarian urban planning and how it enacts its own exceptions and informalities. While for those political theorists recently revisiting Schmitt (Agamben, 1998, Mouffe, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2011, Nicholls and Uitermark, 2014) the *essence* of politics is found in the exceptional sovereign decision, we take it as one possible political assemblage among many. One that is, moreover, irreducible to a single foundational antagonism and instead embodies a proliferation of ‘antagonisms’, between governing and governed but also within the state (cf. Baptista, 2012). This more mundane, anti-Schmittian differentiation of ‘the political’ one finds for instance in Luhmann (2002, Thornhill, 2007). For the latter, a basic distinction or ‘code’ marks off the political from the non-political with every collectively binding decision. By autonomous self-reference rather than sovereign subjugation, the

¹⁵⁵As explained in Chapter 1, our fieldwork (2014–2017) was based in Beyoğlu/Cihangir, but of course political issues, networks and organizations were hardly contained there, especially during the Gezi uprising, when protests spread throughout the country.

political system differentiates itself from its environment, ie. other 'non-political' subsystems such as the economy and science. However, based as it is on the rather theoretical and teleological premise that a fully modern, self-referential political system has completely differentiated itself, it is questionable whether Luhmann's demystification of Schmitt's decisionism, such that *every* decision becomes 'very unexceptional' (Thornhill, 2007: 504), has much empirical validity.¹⁵⁶ It is probably more sensible to recognize that (un)exceptionality is distributed unevenly by actual practices of sovereignty. Ong (2006), for instance, speaks of 'graduated' or spatially 'variegated' sovereignty when describing economic zoning practices by authoritarian Asian states. To a degree Turkey's Free Trade Zones, growing in number since the introduction law no. 3218/1985, may be viewed in similar terms. Closer to the subject of gentrification, some neither monumental nor universal 'practices of exception' have also been observed in urban governance (Baptista, 2012). Baptista details how the Portuguese central government enacts many legal exceptions for local partnerships during its Polis Programme for inner-city regeneration, thus circumventing and antagonizing existing state structures. Closely linked to these practices of exception, moreover, is the theme of informality in urban planning. Both come together neatly in the work of Roy on Indian spatial planning and economic development:

"Here [in Calcutta] the state itself is a deeply informalized entity, one that actively utilizes informality as an instrument of both accumulation and authority. In a manner similar to the Schmittian logic of exception, the state, as the sovereign keeper of the law, is able to place itself outside the law in order to practice development." (Roy, 2009: 81)

When Roy writes about how the Indian state not so much marks and upholds itself as the boundary between the formal and informal, but rather selectively and flexibly employs informality, it should give us thought on how universal a feature this is of assemblages of sovereignty. Indeed, when describing current state efforts to gentrify parts of Beirut, Krijnen and Fawaz (2010: 117, Krijnen and De Beukelaar, 2015, Fawaz, 2017) note a strikingly similar exertion of legal exceptions resulting in an "*informalization* of public decision-making [with] regard to planning decisions, meaning more decisions taken by mutual agreement, on [an] *ad hoc* basis, at multiple levels of the public hierarchies." (emphasis in original)

What becomes clear from these empirical analyses is that many contemporary planning practices, even in Luhmann's modern Europe, are indeed rife with 'logics' of exception and informality. They emphasize the need to revisit our political ontology of sovereignty along the lines drawn out in the previous section. Just as matters of concern generate, subsist and insist throughout their politicization (cf. Deleuze, 1990a on 'sense'), informality generates and persists through formalization processes. As sociologists of form maintain, any interpretation imposes form on an only loosely coupled 'medium' or 'matter' (Luhmann, 1995a, Baecker, 1999,

¹⁵⁶ In a remarkably similar but exactly inverse interpretation of Schmitt, Latour claims the political is not limited to monumental crises but is a process 'exceptional at all points' (ie. curvy as opposed to scientific straight talk, 2013: 348). Yet, does that not make it as such unexceptional? Moreover, does that not contradict the earlier restriction of Schmittian politics to one of five phases (Latour, 2007)?

Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2013). For these radical constructivists, as much as for post-Marxists (eg. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), such a medium or matter remains an ontological unknown or ‘blind spot’, as observing the non-formal always requires the introduction of another interpretive form, such as the informal/formal distinction (Van Assche et al., 2012). With Latour’s notion of (the careers of) matters of concern and the Deleuzian conception of sense and affects, however, we can explore the rhizomatic pragmatics that generate and subsist through such distinct political forms (in the way problems generate, are then transformed by, but always subsist through, their solution, DeLanda, 2005). More than a self-referential proliferation of formal representations and collectively binding decisions, political practices come to be defined by their affects, that is, their capacities to affect and be affected by matters of concern. To understand how assemblages of sovereignty, antagonism and agonism work in bureaucratic, planning and civic practice, we need to descend down to this affective nether dimension of practice where sovereignty asserts itself first. In the following, this will proceed by first moving from formal to informal politics (6.3.2.1) and then to the many formal and informal affects of bureaucratic ‘anticipatory’ practices (6.3.2.2).

6.3.2.1 Bureaucratic exceptionalism: Hierarchy, particularism and informality

Despite its machismo political culture focused on charismatic ‘Big Men’ acting first and securing assent later (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011: 78, 92), simply calling the Turkish state despotic or a dictatorship would (still) very much miss the mark (Cengiz, 2020). Rather, from Ottoman times there is a long bureaucratic tradition showing surprising continuity throughout the Republican era, initially defined but not necessarily ruled over by Kemal Atatürk’s CHP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* or Republican People’s Party), and into today’s AKP-led ‘neoliberal’ regime (Heper and Berkman, 2009, Durgun and Yayman, 2005). As Lovering and Türkmen confirm:

“Attempts to force economic growth from above, via semiformal networks combining state power with various forms of cultural authority, and with little regard for those at the receiving end, have been evident in Istanbul for some 200 years. The new urban dynamics of Turkey manifest neo-liberal perceptions and goals, but within a political culture and State apparatus that might best be described as neo-Ottoman.” (2011: 79)

Bureaucracy is still a force to be reckoned with, despite the tendency of current critical observers “to say little about bureaucracy’s participation in contemporary urban governance as if it no longer mattered, or as if it had dissolved into some form of ‘entrepreneurial governance’” (Baptista, 2012: 3). Indeed in Turkey, as in many other cases, little could be further from the truth. So how to understand then, the role of bureaucracy in Turkish urban politics and planning? Historically, the Ottoman empire was instrumental in the development of modern bureaucratic practice (Feldman, 2008). Perhaps prototypically Islamic but really spread all over Eurasia’s early modern empires, a strict threshold architecture (think Topkapı Palace), attendance protocol and ceremonial choreography all functioned to sacralize and hide rulers from ruled. Thus a ‘politics of access’ was instituted that not only regulated the inside

and outside of the court systems, but also created the conditions for the development of a political ‘in-between’ zone by a proliferation of contiguous offices (eventually undermining and desacralizing absolute sovereignty, Ferguson, 2015). In today’s democratic times, this sultanless (and therefore no-longer-in-between-anything) zone where planners and other bureaucrats roam is defined by its own practices, laws and politics of scale and exception.¹⁵⁷ To understand how issues of gentrification or, euphemistically speaking, ‘urban transformation’ (*kentsel dönüşüm*) can and have been politicized in Turkey one needs to understand its legal and bureaucratic past, including its historical trajectory of state centralization and decentralization.

Many have noticed the distinctively centralized nature of the Turkish state before. Its legal practices may be seen as instrumental in securing this distribution of powers. From the Ottoman empire’s *Tanzimat* (Reorganization) period and during the second half of the 19th century and then throughout the nationalist Republican era after 1923, basic planning laws established and extended a state system of provincial and municipal administrations directed from the centre, first in Istanbul and then Ankara. However, from the 1980s some first attempts at breaking with governmental tradition were made (Kayasu and Yetiskul, 2014). For instance, the 1984 Metropolitan Municipality Law (no. 3030) introduced a two-tiered municipal structure that greatly enhanced the power of metropolitan mayors. Set in black letter, planning responsibilities (eg. Implementary Urban Development Plans) were allocated over jurisdictions (Municipalities and Greater Municipalities) in quantitatively precise scales (eg. 1/1000, 1/50000). Still, subsequent legislative changes curtailed it as well through some significant neoliberal exceptions. With the turn of the century though, following the Helsinki summit, the Turkish candidacy for EU accession became the reason for new, more serious decentralization efforts, compiling in 2004 a Local Administration Reform Package. In this context three laws were introduced (no. 5216/2004, 5393/2005 and 5302/2005), granting municipal and provincial councils more decision-making and financial autonomy while also provisioning for the active participation in planning of Turkish civil society, that is, neighborhood and other non-governmental organizations and professional chambers, including academics. Again, however, when the accession process ran into nationalist and Islamophobic sentiments in Europe and growing Euroscepticism among Turks (Öniş, 2015: 32-33), the strong tradition of centralized control forcefully reasserted itself through some textbook examples of sovereign exceptionalism (cf. Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2014: 126). Although government and planning in Turkey have always had their moments of rupture and states of exception, it is in this century that they are utilized not to

¹⁵⁷ The ‘politics of scale’ (Smith, 1992b, Uitermark, 2002) is rarely discussed as a *practice*, making descriptions of causes and consequences of processes of (re)scaling appear either tautologous (eg. “a political reorganization that transfers powers from the neighborhood council to the level of the city council has a disempowering effect”, Uitermark, 2002: 746) or obliquely naturalistic and economic (eg. “the [given, nationalist] Fordist spatial fix had major implications for the [...] nature of discussions around the distribution of wealth [ie. the issue of class]”, Uitermark, 2002: 752), despite constant disclaimers that scale is socially constructed. However, if one were to be true to the idea of ‘social construction’, scaling practices would have to be part and parcel of the actualization of concerns into plans and should not be assumed either spatially or institutionally given.

create modern public spaces (Henri Prost's *espace libre*, including Gezi Park) but to rapidly privatise the commons (making for another kind of (post-)Modernity, Brosens and Bedir, 2014). This also implies a change in planning practices. Different from earlier grand gestures of sovereign power (à la Haussman), today's exceptionalism, while certainly producing big structures like shopping malls, mostly exerts itself through a much less public *Realpolitik*, pushing through plans by all Machiavellian means available (Sanli and Townshend, 2018). In what follows, an attempt is made to understand how bureaucratic practice and this *Realpolitik* fit together to produce new hierarchies, particularisms and informalities. But first some empirical examples are given of the new political practice.

6.3.2.1.1 The new Turkish state(s) of exception: Some examples

Around Cihangir, various examples of this new practice of exception immediately jump out (see Image 6.6). For instance, in Tarlabası, a district to the North-West of Cihangir, right across Taksim Square, a rather peculiar interpretation of urban conservation legitimates the most radical interventions. There and in other places such as waterfront bazaar area Perşembe Pazarı, the old Conservation Law of 1983 (no. 2863), which is supposed to protect Tarlabası historic building stock, is repeatedly and arbitrarily bypassed, most significantly by the newer 'Law on Conservation by Renewal and Actively Using Historical Assets' (no. 5366/2005). Pushed by the district mayor of the time, the national law was designed *especially* for the area and therefore also dubbed the 'Beyoğlu law' or 'Tarlabası law' (Aksoy, 2012: 106, İslam and Sakızlıoğlu, 2015: 253). While the official name includes the word 'conservation' it should be noted that this is a rather deceptive predicate, as in practice this mostly comes down to entirely rebuilding the old properties but in a 'historic' Neo-Ottoman style (more on this below). However, law no. 5366 has been widely used to overturn existing conservation zoning regulations and has endowed municipal planning authorities with exceptional powers of land use change and eminent domain. *Within* the state, the law also sidelines the old regional Conservation Boards, which hitherto oversaw whether any intervention in conservation areas was in line with the larger master plans, in favor of a new municipal Renewal Boards, which allows for a much more arbitrary and fragmented spatial development. With good reason, many observers see the reconstructive 'conservation' as nothing more than neoliberal rent-seeking and state-led gentrification (eg. Aksoy, 2012, İslam and Sakızlıoğlu, 2015).

More recently, the above 'urban renovation' law (no. 5366) has been joined and overruled by the new Law on the Transformation of Areas with Disaster Risk (no. 6306), which passed in 2012 following the earthquakes a year earlier. While no one objects legislation is needed for earthquake-prone Turkey, critics point to how the new law gives rise to gentrification, or is even a conscious pretext for it, by emphasizing demolition and redevelopment (into unaffordable housing) over safety improvements of existing buildings in high risk areas (Adanalı, 2013, Elicin, 2014). Moreover, unlike the urban renewal law, which augments municipal powers, this new law *recentralizes* power, giving the Ministry of Environment and Urbanism in particular extraordinary powers to intervene *ad hoc* at a most local level in the name




Image 6.6. A map adapted from the Beyoğlu Conservation Plan (2011) with Cihangir demarcated in red (from Yetiskul et al., 2016, lining of Cihangir added here). Highlighted in yellow, five prominent ‘urban transformation’ projects in the area. It should be noted that these are the official administrative borders of the district, not the logistic aspects and ‘lived’ dimensions of the place, which are far less confined.

of a rather vague and blanket sense of emergency (cf. Kayasü and Yetiskul, 2014). It should come as no surprise then that invoking natural emergencies with law no. 6306 easily slips into, in the words of one planner of the latter ministry, ‘economic urgency’ (Interview no. 068), which can be called upon even in the service of tourism development. For instance, to give another example around Cihangir (Image 6.6), the Law for the Encouragement of Tourism (no. 2634/1982, 4957/2003) is used to bypass conservation regulation and enable the redevelopment of the areas of Galata Tower and Perşembe Pazarı (Yetiskul et al., 2016).

Another and final example of the current practice of (re)centralization and legal exception in the direct vicinity of Cihangir concerns the Galataport complex, located in the neighborhood’s coastal area, on its southern border. It deserves some detailed treatment for illustrative purposes, showing how national laws are changed to push through an exceptional real estate project. The Galataport story (cf. Çobanyılmaz Öztürk, 2018) is a particularly intense back and forth manoeuvring in between

government legislators, citizens and their civil society organizations (such as the Chamber of Urban Planners, more on which below) and the courts, where legal amendments and their contestation alternate to produce an accrued legal text that is both forbiddingly chaotic and opportunistically ambiguous. While the story is not over at the time of writing, three attempts at legalization preceding and during our fieldwork illustrate the legalistic practice of politicization well enough (the citizen's side of the Galataport case will be returned to in more detail in Section 6.3.3). As with so many legal conflicts over spatial planning in Beyoğlu today, this story can be said to start with the entire area being declared a conservation zone in 1993, under law no. 2863. This law demands that the few public areas of the district, most prominently the coastal areas, remain as such. Moreover, it also implies that any structures registered as heritage in the area only gain cultural functions, not commercial. A good example of such a cultural function would be the Istanbul Modern, which opened in 2004 in the Galataport area (Salıpazarı port), housed in a former maritime warehouse (which were all state property). However, the new plans for the Karaköy and Salıpazarı port areas, which started forming around 2002 conflicted with these demands, as they aimed to turn the area over to private developers and tourist functions. Reason enough for neoliberal minded AKP-allied legislators to devise the means to circumvent the obstacles. As it concerned waterfront development, this mainly pertained to new coastal planning legislation.

The first attempt, in 2004, was the introduction of a new 'Bylaw for the Implementation of the Coastal Law' (Resmi Gazete, 30-03-2004). Under pressure of the cruise line business, the function of cruise port (*krvaziyer liman*) would be redefined in the Coastal law no. 3621 (as established in 1990) to include more commercial purposes, such as shopping and hotels, but also banks and offices. After an alliance of professional Chambers objected, the courts ruled the amendment unconstitutional and in conflict with the core Coastal Law.¹⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the legally rejected amendment was repeated largely unchanged in a new proposal in 2005 that has survived up to today. As can be read in a current legal handbook for planners 'Planning and Reconstruction Legislation - VI' (Planlama ve İmar Mevzuatı VI, 2017: 158, my translation, emphases added) (more about which below), a tension is still clearly visible between the commands from the 1990 law ('Article 6') and its 2005 amendment ('5398/Art.13), between keeping the coast a public area and touristifying out of a supposed economic necessity (to 'bring to the highest level'):

¹⁵⁸ Unconstitutional because article 43 of the 1982 Turkish constitution states: "Coasts are under the rule and saving of the state. Public benefit is given priority in utilizing the coasts of the sea, lakes and streams and the coasts surrounding the seas and lakes." (cited in İMO, 2012: 24, my translation)

COASTAL LAW No. 3621
Law Number: 3621
Acceptance Date: 4.4.1990

[...]

**CHAPTER TWO Shore, Coastal Line, Coastline, Planning and Structuring
Coastal Protection, Building Ban and Structures to be Built on the Shore**

Article 6 - The coast is open to everyone to enjoy, in equality and freedom, and no building may be built there; no wall, fence, wire mesh, ditch, pile or similar obstacles may be put up.

[...]

If so decided and recorded in the shore's zoning plan, it may include;

[...]

c) (**Annex: 3/7/2005 - 5398/Art.13**) Port services (electricity, generator, water, telephone, internet and similar technical connection points and lines) in order to serve according to the technology of the day the passenger ships (*cruise ships*) carrying organized tours; cruise and yacht harbors with maritime structures suitable for berthing cruise ships and customs areas; *functions of tourism (food and beverage facilities, shopping centers, units for communication and transportation, information, banking and information services, accommodation units, office buildings) that will bring the image of the country to the highest level.*

Moreover and secondly, the same 2005 amendment (no. 5398) recentralizes the authority over the area by making coastal areas the province of the Privatization Administration (est. 1994, under law no. 4046), which is under the immediate direction (and thereby tied up with the prestige) of Prime Minister Erdoğan. The new law enables an easier transfer of public land to private companies. In typically comprehensive and contorted legalese, it states:

“For the lands and plots owned by organizations in the privatization program or that have been granted easement / use in favor of the organization, and that fall within the scope of the Coastal Law No. 3621 and the Tourism Incentive Law No. 2634, the Prime Ministerial Privatization Administration is authorized to make and approve zoning plans according to the general and special law provisions in these places, taking into account the opinions of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement [today, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization] and other authorized institutions (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs, municipal and provincial administrations). These relevant institutions cannot change the zoning of these lands for five years. Relevant institutions report their opinions within fifteen days.” (Resmi Gazete, 03-07-2005, my translation)

However, with the legal contradictions between conservation of public heritage and privatization for commercial purposes still standing, additional efforts are needed to force through the project. Five years later then, a third legislative move followed which eventually got things moving for the Galataport project, despite another judicial turndown. In 2010 a new rather shrewd amendment to coastal legislation was proposed. If existing shores were hard to privatize, new lands could provide the required detour. After land reclamation the Galataport area would increase from 100000 to 112000 square meters (Çobanyılmaz Öztürk, 2018: 186). And so, the new draft for the Coastal Law exempted land fills from conservation zoning (ie. from law no. 2863):

“Plan proposals submitted for *reclamation grounds* are approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, taking into account the opinions of relevant public institutions and organizations. [...] These lands are under the authority and disposition of the State. *The provisions of the Law No. 2863* on the Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage of the coastal and embankment areas and coastal strips regarding the development plans for protection purposes *shall not apply there.*” (Art.7 from 2010 draft of Law no. 3621, cited in a paper put out by the Chamber of Civil Engineers, İMO, 2012: 27, my translation, emphases added)

Thus, land reclaimed from the water could harbor new functions that the public shore lands could not, from car parks to shopping malls. However, the sagacity of the political move lay in how the distinction between both kinds of land would in practice become ambiguous, allowing commercial waterfront developments to still go ahead and cross the line. Again, after heavy contestation, the draft was rejected that same year. However, as legal contests were fought out through the years, the Galataport project went ahead anyway after the 2005 amendment (of law no. 5398). Current land users were evicted and architectural and construction tenders were written out. Eventually, the latter tenders were successfully contested as well, mostly on procedural grounds (eg. duration of land rights or participation requirements). After another such ruling in 2014, Prime Minister Erdoğan, being personally invested in its success, reacted by calling the presiding judiciary ‘corrupt’, wondering how it mustered the impertinence to cancel a project after so many millions of dollars were already invested (Diken, 24-11-2014). Of course he thereby conveniently left out how the project had ignored so many earlier signs of illegality.

As these examples show, in sum, urban planning in Beyoğlu is premised on a rather exceptional production and use of the Turkish statutory assemblage. What makes this exceptionalism possible in Turkish bureaucratic practice (supposedly orderly, universal and formal), are three interrelated aspects of planning practice: high *legal ambiguity* among planning laws (6.3.2.1.2), ‘neoliberal’ *legal particularism* (6.3.2.1.3) and an informal *politics of speed* (6.3.2.1.3) (cf. Buitelaar et al., 2011: 932 on the interaction of central planning legislation and local formal and informal institutions).

6.3.2.1.2 Statutory ambiguity in Beyoğlu

First, much of the area of Beyoğlu lends itself to exceptional measures of one kind or another because it represents a particularly intense intersection of planning laws and their amendments. Any particular project there may involve a simultaneous relevance of the Planning Law (no. 3194/1985) of course, the Metropolitan Municipality Law (no. 3030/1984 and no. 5216/2004), the Municipality Law (no. 5393/2005), the Conservation Law (no. 2863/1983), the general Coastal Law (no. 3621/1990), the special Bosphorus Law not mentioned yet (no. 2960/1983), the Renovation Law (no. 5366/2005), the Tourism Encouragement Law (no. 2634/1982-2003), the Privatization Law (no. 4046/1994-2005) and the Disaster Law (no. 6306/2012) – and this is probably still omitting a few other laws, such as the Law on Unauthorized Building (no. 3366/1987

and the Law on Mass Housing (no. 2985/1984).¹⁵⁹ All these laws grant decision-making authority to differently scaled and specialized bodies of government, often making each their own competing (types of) plans.¹⁶⁰ The result is that clauses, ambiguities and inconsistencies in the relations between laws and unclear jurisdiction lead to authority disputes and a surge of legal cases (Unsal and Turk, 2014: 16). This of course causes great *legal ambiguity* for anyone involved, including planners. Therefore, on the one hand, many of the Turkish cadre of planners can be heard maligning the lack of coherent spatial plans and legislation (ibid.). On the other, any involved authority or developer employs those same planners exactly to find those exceptional legal grounds for their plans. As such, the assemblage of laws can become a rich toolbox for any bureaucrat looking for any enabling loopholes (cf. Sanli and Townshend, 2018: 1247). As we will see below, this often condemns Turkish planners to some rather debilitating role conflicts. Not surprisingly, as Della Porta and Vannucci (2012: 79–80) explain, any increase of legal ambiguity, as pertaining to the allocation of property rights or jurisdictions, also expands politicians and bureaucrats' discretionary powers and opportunities for arbitrary selectivity, informality and ultimately corruption.¹⁶¹

6.3.2.1.3 Particularism legalized: Corruption and/or neoliberalism?

Secondly, the aforementioned period of decentralization, roughly after the 2001 national crisis, was accompanied by new rules supposed to curtail political intervention into economic affairs. Since then, however, the AKP government has steadily renewed the state's interventionism, only now through new legal means, which leads Ocaklı to aptly call it a regime of *legal particularism* (2018: 377). This particularism expresses itself both in the application and production of planning laws. Application of the law may be formally and technically correct yet informally highly selective (E Özbudun, 2015: 44), as when the AKP regime “resorts to a discretionary use of legal instruments – tax audits, debt collection operations, privatizations, court orders, public procurement, libel laws – to reward its supporters and punish its opponents” (Esen and Gumuscu, 2018: 351). In the more specific context of spatial planning, this particularist legal application takes the shape of, for instance, the way Law no. 5366 puts municipalities in an extraordinarily powerful position between current property owners and its favorite private partners in development. The

¹⁵⁹ Mentioned here are the initial numbers. With every amendment, numbers are added (eg. '2863–3386–5226', where 2863 is the initial Conservation Law of 1983 and 3386–5226 represents its 1987 and 2004 amendments respectively. See also Images 6.16–6.17).

¹⁶⁰ In their case study of Beyoğlu, Unsal and Turk (2014: 16) count 56 plan types from 18 different institutions (see also Erkut and Sezgin, 2014: 242).

¹⁶¹ As planning processes in Turkey are generally shrouded in secrecy (Lovering, 2009), it should come as no surprise that actual instances of discretion and corruption are extremely hard to witness directly or track empirically, especially on an individual level and in relation to smaller players. It would require insider access and then still it is difficult to prove (Sanli and Townshend, 2018: 1250, 1258n30). This also goes for the informal temporal tactics of procedural delay, foot dragging, withholding information etc. (to be discussed below). They mostly have to be derived from timelines of legal proceedings (eg. Çobanyılmaz Öztürk, 2018) or general statistics (eg. Gurakar, 2016).

latter business associates thus become involved early in the planning process and are (il)liberally aided with the desired land-use changes and expropriations (İslam and Sakızlıoğlu, 2015: 251). Amendments of lowest level implementation plans, in the crucial ‘plan notes’ (*hukumleri*), are central to this process (Interview no. 060, more on which below). The legal ambiguities and uncertainties mentioned in the previous paragraph only augment these practices (Demirtaş-Milz, 2013: 697–698).

But legal particularism also applies to the (centralized) production of basic planning legislation, usually through a series of amendments which are purportedly in the public interest but are really just tailor-made to service certain private interests and projects deemed exceptional. In particular, the ‘legislative frenzy’ in Turkish planning law has served the construction sector, the country’s foremost ‘growth engine’ (Buğra, 2014). One prominent example is the Public Procurement Law (no. 4735/2002) regulating tenders to (amongst others) developers and construction companies, which after its initial decree has been amended more than thirty times, including hundreds of modifications (such as excluding mass housing construction, ie. the aforementioned law no. 2985) (Gürakar, 2016). Thus the law has been instrumental for new AKP allied elites to redirect capital to their privileged entrepreneurs (Ercan and Oguz, 2006, Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, Taş, 2015: 785). It is the business side of a changing of the guard among governing elites, from the assertively secular bureaucratic-military ruling class of old to the new religiously and socially conservative elite (Yilmaz, 2009), one with a supposedly ‘neoliberal’ view on Turkish (post)modernization (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011).

Is this exceptional particularism a form of corruption or is it just ‘neoliberal’ planning? Both in theory and in practice, the two can be hard to distinguish. For instance, looking at American neoliberal theory, that is, the neoclassical ‘universalized particularism’ applied to the state, the whole idea of public service and planning seems inherently corrupt. Government, in this ‘public choice’ philosophy, is made up entirely out of self-interested bureaucrats and dangerously wrong-headed ‘zealots’ of the public good (Miller, 2015, Bedirhanoğlu, 2007). Indeed, with state intervention as the corrupt opposite of ‘free’ market exchanges, ‘neoliberal planning’ becomes something of an oxymoron (Baeten, 2012). However, when recognized as a kind of ‘necessary evil’, as done more explicitly by the continental ‘ordoliberals’,¹⁶² the state is (imagined) to be minimized to an ‘economic constitutional’ form, (instituted by a ‘one-off’ sovereign intervention, Slobodian, 2018). Thus, in the line of Schmitt’s disapproval of the ‘motorization of lawmaking’ in postwar democracies (Schmitt, 1990[1950]), neoliberal theorists such as Hayek (1960) complain about the zealous economic legislation (ie. *Gesetz*) by populist social-democrats, supposedly to the detriment of a basic constitutional ‘rule of law’ (*Recht*) (Scheuerman, 2004: 105–111, Slobodian, 2018: 205). In practice, however, *the* Law, in its basic, uncorrupted form, is a rather unattainable sublime object, as there never really is a starting from scratch or

¹⁶² Biebricher (2018: 163) compares the two, the public choice approach to neoliberal governance of James Buchanan differs from the ordoliberal theory of Franz Böhm and others in that it, more cynically, distances itself from the latter’s trust in the willingness of decision-makers to be informed by economic and legal expertise.

returning to it (not even after a reconstitutive coup!).¹⁶³ Any state rule over or through market assemblages has to be erected out of an existing set of political practices. And as *neo*-liberals know very well, markets do not simply emerge naturally once the state ‘retreats’. Instead they always have to be actively imposed on the citizenry.

So rather than a feature only of social-democratic regulation, or even a transitory phenomenon on the way to a state of neoliberal ‘rule of law’, authoritarian practices of politicization should be understood as an *inherent* part of the construction of markets (even in ‘social Europe’, see Bruff, 2016). In practice there can be no market assemblage without the imposition of rules, be it the regulation of property, monopoly or unionization. So-called ‘deregulation’ is only another ‘reregulation’ (Vogel, 1996, Aalbers, 2016). Markets supposedly ‘free’ from regulation, are in reality just (*re*) *arranged* to favor concerns of business over those of labor, environment and social housing (cf. Harvey, 2007: 76-79), which despite all neoliberal theory *always* proceeds in tailor-made and ad hoc fashion (cf. Panitch and Konings, 2009: 68-69). Now this reregulation might still be called ‘supply-side economics’, supposedly helping the public interest through a ‘trickling down’ of wealth from ‘job creators’ to working people: a tide that raises *all* boats.¹⁶⁴ In practice, however, the interests that are served often become quite particularized, if not individualized, and not least in the naturally monopolistic sectors that are privatized under neoliberal government or that involve high-stakes public procurements, such as construction. In other words, ‘institutional corruption’, serving particular capital class interests over the public at large (Miller, 2015), and ‘petty’ corruption, lining the pockets of individuals (groups, firms) often become quite indistinguishable in ‘neoliberal’ practice. Even legal arrangements *formally* general and universal, containing no references to particular persons, places or objects (as espoused in Hayek, 1960: 208), may *informally* serve quite particular and *ad hoc* concerns.

Contrary to neoliberal fantasy then, the public and the private are inextricably blurred in practice – and preeminently so in the legal particularism that characterizes Turkish politics and planning today. Consequently, those formally responsible for the rational distribution of development rights, the Turkish planners, are put in a bind, compromised both technically and ethically. All the *ad hoc*, on request plan modifications, such as increases in building rights, border extensions or land use changes, have a way of distorting initial intentions and the morphological integrity of their development plans (Ünlü, 2019a). Instead of drawing up longer-term visions, planners are pressured into legalizing other land uses or structures already built, by speculators, entrepreneurs and, most eminently, their political superiors (Kilinc et al.,

¹⁶³ Hayek and other neoliberal theorists essentially confirm this by saying “the old [classical liberal] formulae of laissez faire or non-intervention do not provide us with an adequate criterion for distinguishing between what is and what is not permissible in a free system” (Hayek, 1960: 231). As Biebricher (2018: 161) notes, it thus remains unclear (ie. theoretical) how strictly the generality of law must be interpreted.

¹⁶⁴ This ‘trickle down’ logic can also be found with local Turkish politicians deciding over real estate projects (often, not incidentally, having themselves a background in construction), when they welcome practically all developments because they supposedly “raise employment and taxes to be returned to the public benefit” (Sanli and Townshend, 2018: 1250, 1253).

2012: 55, Penpecioglu and Taşan-Kok, 2016). Having their work just about reduced to ‘rubber-stamping’ often questionable land-use changes, they are sidelined and made complicit, saddled with upholding some semblance of universal rule of law, rationality and public interest. A rather ungrateful task, as current political officeholders, which are often themselves (former) real estate developers or contractors, seem to cultivate a general disregard for the cavilling planning profession (Sanli and Townshend, 1251-2, 1260). Not surprisingly, these rather intimidating pressures and antagonisms put considerable psychic strain on planners and greatly reduce their general job satisfaction (Kilinç et al., 2012: 52). Understandably, many subjected to the ‘neoliberal’ regime feel like giving up or otherwise become ‘unconcerned’, indifferent to the public good (Taşan-Kok, 2012, Penpecioglu and Taşan-Kok, 2016). Still persistent, the overall situation deserves further (psycho)analysis, about which more below.

6.3.2.1.4 Informality as politics of speed

However, a third recurring theme accompanying the reconstitution of authority through legal exceptionalism is the implied *politics of speed*. In a temporal dimension, legal ambiguity and arbitrariness facilitate an informal politics defined by a complex power play of speed and slowness, urgency and inertia. Note that a liberal balance of powers is not just a matter of formal separation of institutions, but also implies a certain temporal order (Scheuerman, 2004, Glezos, 2012). Whereas executive power tends to focus on acting in the present and legislative practices deliberate and plan for desirable futures, the judiciary guards the ‘precedent’ past. Balance in this regard mostly means that all three keep each other in check, slowing down one another when needed. But from this it follows that when, as is happening in many countries since the turn of the century (ibid.), the executive becomes the dominant branch, with the submissive aid of majoritarian parliaments, keepers of the Law become a drag. With its recent recentralization of power, Turkey has seen a similar acceleration of planning processes and, in practice, increasing disregard for the rule of law. We can see this happen in, at least, four practices of speed.

The first is the speed of majoritarian politics. Parliamentary majoritarianism supercharges sovereignty, pushing through exceptional laws. Thus, under pressure of government-allied developers, the Law on Conservation by Renewal and Actively Using Historical Assets (no. 5366) could pass through parliament “with unseemly speed” (Aksoy, 2012: 104). Crucial in relation to the ‘Beyoğlu Law’ was the confident alignment and communication of the central government and the local municipality (evidenced by the latter’s survey activities in Tarlabası *before* the law was even passed, Islam and Sakizlioglu, 2015: 253, 260-261n4). Which is not to say, however, that this alignment can be taken for granted even when there is party alignment, and indeed at times lower-tier authorities and their incumbent bureaucrats can and will drag their feet (cf. Baptista, 2012), for instance when the central Mass Housing Development Administration (*TOKİ*) wants to build new housing estates on protected municipal lands (Interview no. 058).

The second practice of political speeding concerns the bypassing of the slowness of 'proper' planning. Planners' verification of plans against conservation regulation and existing development and land-use plans before granting a permit is a slow process, too slow for private developers and their political patrons. Thus 'conservation plans' under law no. 5366 offer fast-track solutions for Beyoğlu areas under rather unspecified criteria (Aksoy, 2012: 104). The flip side of this practice is a third tactic of speed which involves the relationship to the citizenry and those on the receiving end of efforts at redevelopment and gentrification. Besides rushing development processes, governments and their allied businesses can also *slow down* at times and hold projects in suspense for tactical reasons, leaving citizens in states of uncertain anticipation about their possible expropriation or displacement. In Beyoğlu's Tarlabaşı, for instance, residents subjected to the renewal efforts were left in an anxious limbo for prolonged, exhausting periods of time, only to then be surprised with panic-inducing and pacifying deadlines, effectively breaking any unified resistance (Sakızlıoğlu and Uitermark, 2015). Other tactics of exhaustion, only then by mayorally sanctioned police brutality, were used a decade earlier in the slowly driving out many of Cihangir's substantial population of queer tenants (generally referred to as 'transvestites'), which further cleared the way for a more respectable middle class to move in (Yetiskul and Demirel, 2018: 3345).

If at all present in these processes, political participation by those subjugated is only tokenistic and reduced to deliberately sparse and carefully timed release of information. The only option for resistance left then, is to 'pull the break' and appeal to judiciary powers, which partly explains the Turkish 'resort to the law and lawyers to an almost American degree' (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011: 84). However, this last resort practice of politicization is highly imperfect (but a practice of politicization nonetheless, on which more below), and it still gives little guarantees, even when put in the right in court. This is because a fourth and final practice of acceleration cunningly abuses the slowness of 'due process' that characterizes court proceedings. Each time citizens, their representatives (neighborhood associations, professional chambers, NGOs) or other jurisdictions file a case against development plans, new superficial modifications of the initial plans are generated and rapidly approved by pro-construction authorities (cf. Sanli and Townshend, 2018: 1255-1258). What plays out is a large asymmetry in temporal powers, having plaintiffs wait out tiring procedures for years and years while confidently well-connected and flush investors incessantly push through their plans and even just start construction work. And while this does sometimes lead to costly demolitions, when cases are susceptible to it (such as the removal of a few of the top floors of the Park Hotel, Image 6.6), it often becomes too absurd to demolish a whole new building (eg. shopping mall) for reasons of some *by then* minor-looking zoning violations. Thus the ontological malleability or obduracy of constructions shows itself a feature of temporal tactics in the 'planning' process (cf. Beauregard, 2015: 68).

In sum, as Turkish statecraft is recentralized, it does so through legal exceptionalism, situating it somewhere between antagonistic and agonistic on the continuum of practices of politicization (between a 'war of movement' and a 'war of position'). On the formal side of the state assemblage, discretionary space is opened



Images 6.7–6.8. On the left, the (former) headquarters of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanism in Ankara, Turkey. (source: Wikipedia.org, accessed 20-03-2016) On the right, president Erdoğan and some aides meet in Ankara with activists from Taksim Solidarity, the umbrella organization representing the Gezi insurgency (source: Turkeytribune.com, 12-06-2013, accessed 05-10-2020).

up for exceptionalism by the uncertain fragmentation of laws and jurisdictions. Thus a so-called ‘neoliberal’ regime of pseudo-universalized ‘legal’ particularism is enabled – half formal, half informal – which works to distribute rents and ensure loyalty from important party patrons and certain groups of citizens. Moreover, on the informal side of ‘planning’, beyond that seemingly static and universal grid of rights and authority of the Law, a temporal politics of speed and slowness unfolds that bends and escapes it as it further advances some concerns while corrupting the politicization of others, around livability, justice, participation and gentrification. Descending down then, from the fragmenting ‘system’ of planning laws, to the legal particularism (and conflict) it embodies, and then to the Machiavellian tactics of speed and timing that unreliably undergird and subvert it, our image of an orderly body politic gives way to a messy set of practices of (re)scaling, exception and informality. Instead of *one* Schmittian sovereign standing both inside and outside *the* Law, we find a kind of gradient of sovereignty emerging within a *mass* of politicians, bureaucrats, citizens and other legal persons all operating more or less ‘inside’ a legal assemblage of contradictory offices, regulations, plans, courts and constructions. However, as Deleuze and Guattari inform us in *A Thousand Plateaus*, there is another, even less obvious and visible form of informality at play in the affective underbelly of the above politics of access:

“It is not sufficient to define bureaucracy by a rigid segmentarity with compartmentalization of contiguous offices, an office manager in each segment, and the corresponding centralization at the end of the hall or on top of the tower. For at the same time there is a whole bureaucratic segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between offices, a *bureaucratic perversion*, a permanent inventiveness or *creativity practiced* even against administrative regulations.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 214, emphasis added)

6.3.2.2 *Affects of bureaucratic practice*

It is time to have a look into the practices and capacities by which ‘agency’ (mini-sovereignty) is enacted by slightly departing and betraying the bureaucratic ‘structure’. That is, the informal ‘perversions’ and ‘creativities’ that constitute the bureaucratic affects of Turkish planning. However, aside from limiting affects to human feelings (if not to emotions rather than employing the more posthuman notion of Deleuze, 1988a and others), accounts of affects of governance (eg. Newman, 2012, De Wilde, 2015) usually focus on those neoliberal and communitarian practices that evidently instrumentalize and manipulate emotions for political purposes and the manufacturing of consent to gentrification. While surely important work (more on this in the Dutch case below), what it tends to forget is that *any* practice of political authority, even the rational-legal or bureaucratic kind idealized by Max Weber (1978), enrolls and transforms its own particular assemblages of feelings, skills and other actants. To open then this political black box, theorists of desire and assemblage Deleuze and Guattari resort not to Weber but the writings of Franz Kafka, that other contemporary but less rationalistic chronicler of Western bureaucracy. Going with Lovering and Türkmen’s above-cited remark, this makes sense in the Turkish case as well, if only because of how much the Austrian novelist was inspired by a Habsburg state bureaucracy that co-evolved in close tandem with the competing Ottoman empire (Ferguson, 2015).¹⁶⁵ In Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari find a theory of the state’s implicate order, where “the barriers between offices cease to be ‘a definite dividing line’ and are immersed in a molecular medium (*milieu*) that dissolves them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into microfigures” (1987: 214). Now what kind of molecular ‘microfigures’ do we find implicated in the ‘milieu’ of Turkish planning offices? We may analytically divide them into *intersubjective* and *interobjective* affects.

6.3.2.2.1 *Face-to-face: Intersubjective affects of planning*

Looking at the history of the Turkish state, we certainly find some moments, such as the *coup d’etats* of 1960 or 1980, or reactions to coup attempts, as in July 2016, that seem to approach the sovereign interventions theorized by Hobbes, Schmitt and others and which violently suspend and stop all other politicizations in their tracks. However, in the state’s more daily, *longue durée* operation, what one finds instead is a true proliferation of events of ‘mini-transcendence’ exerted by many ‘mini-kings’ (cf. Latour, 2003, 2007, Harman, 2014: 30–31) who, one might say, are busy manoeuvring their own little bureaucratic wars and cultivating their own specific troop morale and violent mini-transgressions. Within this bureaucratic assemblage, as will be explained below, at least two antagonistic libidinal-subjective currents can be distinguished that corrupt the politicization of gentrification by perversely holding each other in place: *capitalist realism* and *modernist cynicism*. They compose the (inter)subjective support

¹⁶⁵ Indeed, reading Ismail Kadare’s rendition of Ottoman bureaucracy in *Palace of Dreams* (2008[1981]) (set in a deliberately imprecise past), one finds many parallels there with Kafka’s disturbing depictions of the state’s underbelly.

and enabler of the politics of access and gradated sovereignty described by the above constellation of legal ambiguity, particularism and speeding. To better understand this we have to again look closer at the notion of particularism, corruption and their relation to Modernist bureaucracy and spatial planning.

While the Kemalist and the succeeding AKP regimes have equally been called ‘crony capitalism’ for their corrupt state-business relations (Furman and Sungu, 2011, Cengiz, 2020), the nature of this corruption has undergone notable transformation, from occurring at “individual levels via abusing loopholes” in the pre-AKP era, to being “centralized [...] through making highly debated, notorious new laws and regulations” (Gürakar, 2016: 107-110). Less visible, this change required a significant reorganization of bureaucratic desires and transgressions. But to appreciate this, we have to look closer at the meanings of corruption and the different affects that accompany them. At an interpretive level, ‘corruption’ can be said to designate an antagonistic interplay of universalism and particularism. Advanced as one of the core ‘pattern variables’ of professional role culture and identity by what might be the most ‘bureaucratic’ and high-modernist sociology (Parsons, 1951), the opposition supposedly distinguishes traditional cultures, committed to particularism, from Modern society, premised on universalism, and in designating when the latter is tainted by the former, that is, corrupted. However, as we learn from a more postmodern, cross-cultural continuation of this sociological tradition, corruption can take on at least two, quite opposite cultural meanings, depending on whether one’s initial outlook is universalistic (‘Modern’) or particularistic toward policy exceptions: “Universalist, or rule-based [...] conduct has a tendency to resist exceptions that might weaken that rule. There is fear that once you start making exceptions for illegal conduct the system will collapse. Particularist judgements focus on the exceptional nature of the present circumstances. [...] *[Both] will tend to think of each other as corrupt.*” (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997: 31, emphasis added). This indeed points to a more complex implication of universalism and particularism, such as seen in the oxymoronic case of ‘legal particularism’: “universalism is rarely used to the exclusion of particularism [...] [Indeed] what if the law becomes a weapon in the hands of a corrupt elite? You can choose what you call corruption.” (ibid.: 34) And it is at this point that psycho-analysis can help make sense of how such logical, interpretive contradictions of ‘universalized particularism’ and ‘particularized universalism’ can endure, be tolerated and even enjoyed in bureaucratic practice.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ Parsons, by bringing in Freud, already points to how categories of corruption connect to (inter) subjective affects. As the preeminently bureaucratic sociologist recognized (and was compelled by his own four-function template form), ‘identity’ is only the cultural-symbolic pattern maintained amongst the vicissitudes of a largely subconscious economy of the id, ego and superego (Parsons, 1968). And this pattern-maintenance, of say, a universalist ego ideal, can also break down, bringing the personality system in serious disarray. For Parsons (1955: 250-257), pathologies in the ‘personality system’ such as paranoid schizophrenia, manic depression and compulsive neurosis emerge from a disproportionate consumption of energy in pattern maintenance (ie. identity management). In Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari or Žižek, these kinds of psychological ‘deviances’ become a normal or even constructive feature of any social-political formation.

From a Lacanian psycho-analytical perspective on politics (Žižek, 2008a, 2008b) and on spatial planning more specifically (Gunder and Hillier, 2009), one can distinguish four types of political subjectivity constituting discourse, each organizing their own kind of subconscious libidinal economies: a ‘master discourse’, a ‘university/bureaucracy’ discourse, a hysteric discourse and a critical-analytic discourse. As we will see, a specific conjunction of the first discourse, which enacts a contradictory *universalized particularism*, and the second, which enacts an equally corrupt *particularized universalism*, will describe quite well the antagonistic politics of Turkish urban planning and gentrification (the hysteric and critical-analytic discourses will return later in Section 6.3.3.3 on the Gezi revolts). This requires further explanation. Generally speaking, the ‘master discourse’, predicated on unquestioned authority and unjustified command, supplies pivotal ‘master signifiers’ around which discourse organizes itself, such as ‘the public interest’, ‘the Law/State’, ‘Global City Istanbul’ or ‘Great Turkey’. As also in Turkey, the commanding agents in this discourse are most often politically elected officials (Gunder and Hillier, 2009: 104). Spatial planners, on the other hand, are the agents in the ‘university/bureaucracy discourse’, which provides the system of signifiers we call knowledge. Mainly through education, fledgling planners are equipped with a set of master signifiers, such as the ‘public good’ or ‘economic growth’, by which they may construct their professional ego ideal (Gunder, 2003: 304). When master discourse dominates university/bureaucratic discourse, which, as seen from the foregoing, it often does in current Turkish planning, the latter serves primarily as a Machiavellian ‘realrationalität’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998, Gunder, 2003: 301). Yet, historically speaking, knowledge – a master signifier in itself – may also gain some discursive independence from the master’s authority, meaning that political-affective configurations can vary accordingly. This becomes clear when looking at their most totalitarian or ‘mad’ forms (thus distinguishing two political regimes that are most often simply lumped together as such, Žižek, 2008c, Sharpe and Boucher, 2010: 94–98). When taken to the extreme, the master discourse becomes *fascism*, which tries to reinstate a pre-modern kind of Master, or Leader, who will, without necessary reason, designate and defeat an externalized enemy, condoning in the process any unlawful violence inflicted on such enemy by its subjects. The university discourse, by contrast, can turn into *stalinism*, which erects a quasi-scientific knowledge of Universal History (eg. ‘dialectical materialism’) that internalizes and then terrorizes all subjects, or at least those that are not in a position to ‘know’ who or what is part of that history of Progress or not. Looking at Turkish practices of politicization, the distinction helps to make sense of the different subjective affects, fantasies and transgressions at play at the current moment when there is a new Master in town: Erdoğan. Consistently, the Leader of Turkey has been challenging a bureaucracy that entrenched itself in the wake of the previously asserted master, Mustafa Kemal.

On the one hand then, there is still the lingering bureaucratic/university discourse of Kemalism. While in his own time, Kemal Atatürk (‘Father of Turks’) certainly was a classic agent of Schmittian master discourse, establishing the Republic out of a state of exception (the Turco-Greek war of 1922) by sovereign decision (the six-day speech called *Nutuk*), he and his following were also, much like his contemporary Stalin, producers of university discourse. That is, the Kemalist revolution was very



Images 6.9–6.10. On the left, an officially released picture of president Erdoğan chairing a meeting at the new Presidential Palace in Ankara. Typically, as also seen in Image 6.8, a picture of ‘Father of Turks’ Kemal Atatürk hangs above the statesman, indicating the still obligatory lineage of power (source: *Foreignpolicy.com*, 20-06-2016, accessed 05-10-2020). On the right, the president and his aides in a telephone meeting with US president Trump. Interesting detail is the old Ottoman imperial flag in the back of the picture, indicating another lineage (source: Erdoğan’s official twitter feed, *Haberler.com*, 24-11-2017, accessed 05-10-2020).

much a project of modernization, couched in a Western meta-narrative of universal Enlightenment and emancipation (Alaranta, 2011).¹⁶⁷ The State, or the Law, thus obtained a kind of anonymous quality after its deliberately heirless father, Kemal, transferred his charisma onto the rational-legal bureaucracy (cf. Somay, 2019: 152). The latter then produced a class of laïcist planners and other professionals who became the official interpreters of what was Modern(ization) and what or who was not, thus in effect *particularizing the universal*. However, as political history actually progressed, the Modernist meta-narrative lost its plausibility as much as it did everywhere else in the world. And this already years before the rise of the AKP, as Oc and Tiesdell report right at that very moment:

“...planners in Istanbul give the strong impression that they, in the tradition of Ottoman bureaucrats, have an elitist and paternalistic approach to planning and seem to be alien to and alienated from the people they are to serve. The inhabitants in [...] Istanbul, reject the master plans as alien modernist documents which reflect the values and ideologies of the elite and not their needs.” (1994: 114)

Moreover, this civic incredulity was not restricted to regular Istanbulites but had also been pervading the bureaucracy. Indeed, writing during the AKP’s early successes in and around the Beyoğlu area, Navaro-Yashin (2002: 163) recounts how the Kemalist university/bureaucratic discourse, wherein statespeople are required “to render their executions and ideologies ‘rational’ from the point of view of ‘the people’”, had long turned cynical. She argues the cynicism “or doing as if one does not know, is a technique of contemporary Turkish state power... [It is] the condition on which

¹⁶⁷ “In providing legitimacy for the continued existence of the Kemalist regime, the Kemalist state-elite established a long-lasting narrative of a Turkish nation on a historical road to the enlightenment, perceived indeed as *an inexorable march of mankind*. The Kemalist enlightenment idea of history has been internalized in Turkey most of all by the secular middle classes.” (Alaranta, 2011: 253)

the Turkish state still maintains an existence despite having repeatedly reached the verge of a breakdown.” (ibid.) In reference to Sloterdijk’s (1987) famous remarks on the ‘chic bitterness’ of the contemporary European left, having been integrated into capitalist society while cynically retaining their emancipatory ideals, Navaro-Yashin (2002: 164) describes how in the late nineties a ‘cool resignation’ and ‘language of ridicule’ had taken over an erstwhile activist but now matured class of professionals, making bearable for them the continuing corruption of everyday state practice and its failure to fulfill its universalist promises.

Among urban planners today, mostly part of that same secular middle class, similar symptoms abound (and not just in Turkey, see Gunder, 2014). Quite understandably, a general cynicism characterizes their demeanor and behavior, as they are disempowered at every corner (Penpecioglu and Taşan-Kok, 2016). More specifically, and parallel to the legal ambiguity, particularism and speeding exposed above, planners and university educators we spoke to demonstrated their own kind of ‘bureaucratic libido’ (cf. Fisher, 2009: 49). For instance, when they gleefully revel in the legislative chaos (in Lacanian analysis, a typical element of lack, producing the planner’s *objet petit a* of lawful order) and the esoteric knowledge this uncertainty produces on all the jurisdictional contiguities and complications (Demirtaş-Milz, 2013: 698). Or by their infatuated enumerations of planning laws and their many amendments (‘Law no. 3194, 5393, 6306 and so on’) (Interviews 057, 068). A similar libido accompanies the legal particularism, as it evokes among planners a kind of kafkaesque affect of disavowal and deferred responsibility or ‘buck-passing’ (cf. Demirtaş-Milz, 2013: 703, strongly reminiscent of a mature Soviet bureaucracy, ‘it’s not me who makes the rules / decisions, it’s the Law / higher-ups’, cf. Fisher, 2009: 49). In short, Kemalist discourse lives on mostly as a negative and subservient *modernist cynicism*, where the disappointment of speedy *Realpolitik*, with its unbearable arbitrariness and uncertainty, is enjoyed in perverse ways, by constantly addressing it, complaining about it, ridiculing it, yet without changing it, even enjoying it and thus ultimately supporting it on an affective level (which, as we will see below, is also a hurdle to be overcome by current gentrification activists, many of whom come from the same professional middle class).⁴⁶⁸

On the other hand, however, there is the emergent AKP regime, which certainly has its classical fascist features, most notably the mobilization of violent Islamic and nationalist civic groups (Tuğal, 2016). Yet it also takes on a distinctly post-Modern quality. As the Enlightenment and its bureaucratic heirs tried to get rid of the premodern, religiously legitimated Master, today’s postmodern consumerism can be said to be its completion. Yet, as the (historicized, Lacanian) superego now runs wild, enjoying itself to death, a renewed call for a repressed authority can

⁴⁶⁸ See Fisher (2009: 55) on how precisely worker’s cynical subjective disinvestment enables them to continue to perform demoralizing tasks, such as doing pointless surveys or drawing up already obsolete development plans. As such, this modernist cynicism fulfills quite well the psycho-analytic definition of perversity proposed by Žižek: “The pervert [as opposed to the more defiant hysteric] is thus the ‘inherent transgressor’ par excellence [as he] practices the secret fantasies that sustain the predominant discourse” (2008b: 292). See also Gunder (2014: 10) on planners’ perverse ‘decaf cynicism’ and toothless workforce transgressions.

also be heard in the rise of neofascism and paranoid fantasies (cf. Žižek, 2008b: 442). In Turkey, this bipolar combination can also be found in its new shopping mall consumerism, religious support for Erdoğan and a thickening of conspiracy theories about a host of outside threats (promoted not least by the prime-minister himself, Akbaş, 2016). It is the disjunctive synthesis that scaffolds the ‘delirious’ construction mania (Tatar, 2012) which has also started to affect the old center of Istanbul in recent years. Under the neo-imperialist banner of ‘Great Turkey’, signifying the fantasy of finally (re)assuming a position of great power in the world (Mercan and Özşeker, 2015: 100), support is mustered for massive infrastructural investments, or by Erdoğan’s own word, ‘crazy projects’, of which Beyoğlu’s Galataport was only the first (Tatar, 2012: 65). A development that of course reserves a special place for the AKP-allied construction business (Madra, 2018: 288). On an affective level, however, Erdoğan and his Great Turkey proscribe a violent *jouissance* which is not immediately prescribed by the official AKP ideology of democracy, neoliberalism and Islamic conservatism. The party’s ‘crazy projects’ express a desire of forceful masterhood over nature (Tatar, 2012), but equally over its liberal conservationists or any other ‘uncivilized’ opposition gathered together at Gezi. Lumped together, the latter are felt to bar the supposedly ‘real’ Turkey from enjoying its newfound greatness (Mercan and Özşeker, 2015: 108). Thus, the neofascist joy of violence is nonetheless accompanied by a strong affect of victimhood, one typical of postmodern moral majoritarianism (Somy, 2019: 154).

As such then, the AKP’s ‘post-Kemalist’ politics and urbanism is postmodern and postsecular (Bozdoğan and Akcan, 2012), both in style, by departing from architectural functionalism, by planning for mixed-use, for consumption and by reasserting Islam, but also in its critique of the ‘corrupted’ elite universalism of Kemalist Modernism.¹⁶⁹ Thus it is accompanied by a kind of ‘affirmative’ cynicism we might call *capitalist realism* (a term coined by Fisher, 2009). It describes the *sentiment* of universalized particularism, the enjoyment of a Hobbesian ‘anti-mythical myth’ of ‘generalized criminality’ and a ‘supersaturation of corruption’ (ibid.: 10–11).¹⁷⁰ Indeed, through Erdoğan and his business clique, but perhaps seen in *optima forma* in the figure of Donald Trump, followers can interpassively enjoy a kind of ‘neoliberal’ pleasure of the savvy real estate entrepreneur openly gaming the rules, such as tax laws or building regulations, imposed by an essentially inimical state. Outsmarting the latter thus provides the biggest of pleasures for those who, as opposed to the other zealous

¹⁶⁹ “One should understand that particularism and universalism are two sides of a same coin: the postmodern/postcolonial theory accusing Kemalism of being undemocratic, elitist and authoritarian, is a way of speaking that also presupposes the universalization of European-originated principles of democracy, liberal rights, minority rights, and the freedom to express one’s faith. The particularist claims presuppose a universalist ‘higher order’ which justifies the critique of Kemalism on the grounds that it fails to appreciate these universal rights for various particularisms.” (Alaranta, 2011: 255)

¹⁷⁰ This concept of capitalist realism makes it a less all-encompassing ideological formation than Fisher eventually does (ie. as realism *tout court*). Moreover, while largely following Žižek’s political analysis, in his short essay Fisher does not make the distinction practiced here between the totalitarianisms of stalinism and fascism, thus lumping together under ‘market stalinism’ features which are better diagnosed as separate symptoms. Perhaps this would have been different had it been written ten years later in the post-Trump era.

dreamers, see their capitalist realism confirmed by how everyone is just out for their own interest in some form or another. Meanwhile, any allegation of corruption coming out of the university discourse (ie. of petty particularism), merely annoys AKP supporters and only strengthens them in their belief and enjoyment (Doğanay, 2019: 75).

In sum, any serious attempt to address the corruption of ‘neoliberal’ urban planning from within the Turkish state is thwarted by an affective short-circuit of universalistic cynicism and particularist violence. In the process, conformity to the law and defiance of authority often become hard to make out (cf. McGowan, 2004: 40). Still, the Gezi protests of 2013 showed Turkey a glimmer of hope out of this perverse union of fantasies. As we will see below, another hysterical and critical discourse was asserted there (Žižek, 2008b: 292-293), one that embodied a different, happy kind of cynicism (or ‘kynicism’, Sloterdijk, 1987, Navaro-Yashin, 2002, 2013). Indeed, also among Turkish planners, surveys show that not all respond with cynical resignation or profiteering realism, with some finding new hope for urban justice and joining the struggle (Penpecioglu and Taşan-Kok, 2016). However, while a crucial component, we should not think of subjective affects and fantasmatic structures of feeling, as they play out in meeting rooms and offices among planners and their superiors, as in any way a sufficient description of bureaucratic practices of politicization or their resistance. Poststructural psycho-analyses often wrongly assume there are



Image 6.11. A simple actor-network representation of Turkish planning practice, including four actants: the meeting, the plan, the site and the law book. Together they join and transform matters of concern into an anticipatory assemblage.

only people and their acts of interpretation involved.⁷¹ While it may be true that the sovereign master recedes in bureaucracy discourse, becoming an elusive and deferred ‘big Other’ (eg. ‘the State’, ‘the Law’), it does not recede into an immaterial nothingness (‘the Real’) but all the more into non-trivial interobjective relations, that is, into state practices of inscription, classification and procedure (Laszczkowski and Reeves, 2015). Indeed, as Navaro-Yashin (2007) has been investigating more recently in respect to state practices, Turkish subjects’ affects of panic, fear, hope, suspicion, apathy, familiarity, wit, irony and cynicism often concur and intertwine with the circulation of certain documents and other bureaucratic objects.

6.3.2.2.2 *Face-to-file: Interobjective affects of planning*

The state, bureaucracy and the law are not only constituted in intersubjective exchanges among people, but like any other machine also comprise ‘inter-objective’, human-to-nonhuman relations, be they of weaponized bodily violence or a softer touching (Woodward, 2014, Woodward and Bruzzone, 2015), subliminal ‘interpellation’ (Althusser, 2008: 48) or a subtle division of, mostly documentary, ‘interpretive labor’ (Graeber, 2015: 67). As already mentioned for the Ottoman era and onwards, there is of course the architecture of government buildings which embody a certain politics of access (Ferguson, 2015). But more importantly, next to the ‘face-to-face’ organization of planners and politicians, there is a ‘face-to-file’ infrastructure to planning practices: “written reports, post-it notes, files, folders, staples, digital programs, law books, case files, desks, chairs, computers...” (Van Oorschot, 2018). Such everyday actants of bureaucratic practice can seem too boring, familiar or trivial to even mention. Somewhat puzzled when asked to describe this boring environment, one young planner answers:

“I guess the average day of a planner is mostly at the desk to control the plans or draw the plans. However, when it is required, they join meetings to negotiate plan proposals or problems, and they [do] on-site activities to prepare land-use or analyze some field-based issues. [...] Among lots of documents and files, planners sit in front of the computer all day and sometimes they organize meetings to organize the plans.” (Interview no. 062)

Occasional face-to-face *meetings*, enveloped by the above elaborated intersubjective affects, punctuate the face-to-file work of drawing *plans* in accordance with *site* specifics and control of plans in relation to the *law* (see Image 6.11). In between meeting room and construction site then, stand ‘microfigures’ which we might understand as possible ‘obligatory passage points’ (cf. Callon, 1986): the plan and the

⁷¹ Even though Fisher is referring to the absence of a master in favor of a more abstract and absent ‘big Other’ in bureaucracy discourse, it still is not entirely true that there “are only officials, more or less hostile, engaged in acts of interpretation about what the big Other’s intentions [are]. And these acts of interpretation, these deferrals of responsibility, are all that the big Other is.” (2009: 49) One could instead say that the big Other increasingly recedes into an interobjective set of relations, or in the words of Deleuze and Guattari cited earlier: “a molecular medium that [...] makes the office manager proliferate into microfigures” (1987: 214)

law book. To understand their interobjective capacities for politicization, a further look into these two actants and their affects is warranted.

I. To future by plan

To politicize matters of concern is to transform them into anticipatory assemblages of one kind or another, and each of the actants involved (meetings, plans, law books) have a role to play in this fluid speciation of antagonistic, agonistic or technocratic planning practices. When spatial planning practices politicize urban issues, they channel power in various ways (cf. Rydin and Tate, 2016: 10). Or rather, they channel a plurality of powers to affect and be affected, into a particular anticipated direction. As explained in Chapter 3, types of actants can be classified by their powers to affect and be affected and how they perform time and space in material-semiotic practices. While ‘mutable immobiles’ temporalize space through phenomenological operations, ‘immutable mobiles’ spatialize time through (geo)metric practices. Although we can find both of these types of actants embodied in development plans, planning laws as well as planner’s meetings, their relative presence, stability and prominence varies significantly. For instance, while meetings are dominated by fiery order-words and fluid desires (notwithstanding all the minutes and Powerpoint presentations), plans carry more emphasis on linguistic and metric precision. These variations of practice make a big difference in whether planning politicizes in an antagonistic or communicative manner. In the previous section, the meeting of intersubjective affections in Turkish planning proved a powerful force of antagonism, albeit a largely sublimated one. What about the plan? Is it able to counteract this force? Indeed we may ask, what can a plan do? (cf. Rydin, 2014: 593).

For actor-network theorist Rydin (ibid.), a plan has the capacity to build a ‘bridge’ between the possible and the real. In a similar, but more concrete vein, MacCallum (2008) finds the plan’s function, as a semiotic ‘genre’, in the translation of ephemeral meetings (ie. thoughts, talk, jotted notes etc.) into a strategic plan and from there into an ‘immutable mobile’, including geometrically precise instructions that leave minimal room for interpretation at the site of construction. Considered within our broader range of practices (Image 6.3–6.4), the customary physical plan is an essentially technocratic device, but as such an inevitable necessity, at least on a project level. There, it is the last obligatory point of translation for any matter of concern to be subsumed into everyday governmental assemblages and have its anticipations routinized by technology and monitoring. However, two critical remarks should be made here. On the one hand, the rationality of development plans is of course not necessarily of the instrumental genre, but can also be more substantive or communicative in its semiotics. On the other hand, MacCallum’s conception of the plan probably suggests a more idealized efficacy and autonomy of plans than may be warranted. In practice, and certainly in Turkey, multiple plans or their components (ie. amendments) can be vying for a commanding position at any time and place. And they may be doing that, more or less successfully, in either antagonistic, communicative or technocratic modes of politicization. In other words, plans’ efficacy should be investigated in their contingent performativity. The ‘bridges’



Images 6.12–6.13. On the left, Henri Prost's 1937 master plans for the European side of Istanbul, including Beyoğlu. On the right, one of the photographs personally taken by Prost. It is aptly titled by Akpınar as "The making of public space: Physicalisation of secularisation, Taksim Gezi Park:" (Source: Akpınar, 2014: 82, 85)

of interpretations and metrics they build, reaching out to sites of development and construction, can very well turn out unstable, fragile or insufficient. Take for instance these coarse words from a self-described 'outsider' to Turkish planning:

"...planning in Istanbul is fiction. The authorities labour hard to produce beautiful detailed maps, but they mean almost nothing, because outside the planning studio developers and local politicians just get on with business as they like it." (Lovering, 2009: 3)


Accepting there is some truth to these harsh remarks, how should we understand the implied ritualism? In what ways can plans become 'meaningless'?

Ia. Plan-making as anticipatory practice

To begin to understand this impotence, a deeper look into the history of Turkish planning practice is necessary. Firstly, based on the above ontological premises, we should distinguish between the spacetimes *of* (Turkish) planning practices and the construction of time *by* (Turkish) planning. That is, between planning practices as an 'anticipatory assemblage' (cf. Groves, 2017, Driessche et al., 2017) and the substantive anticipatory interpretations of planning acting as expressive catalysts within that assemblage (signifiers like 'a sustainable future').¹⁷² Let us first have a look at this anticipatory practice *of* Turkish plan-making in order to see how it prefigures, enables and constrains the imagination of the future *by* planning. Just like any other practice, Turkish spatial planning involves a set of intersecting durations (cf. Hutchins, 1995: 372), all of which have passed in the preceding sections. First, there is the *longue durée* evolution of the practice over centuries or decades, which in Turkey has occurred within an elaborate state bureaucracy from Ottoman times onwards (cf. Beauregard, 2015, on New York planning). This includes the accrual of its irreversibly

¹⁷² Perhaps, within the realm of interpretation, constituting an 'anticipatory system', Rosen, 2012, Luhmann, 1995a, 1995b.

complicated statutory assemblage (which nevertheless can be said to be punctuated by the introduction of three defining planning laws: no. 2290 of 1933; no. 6785 of 1956/1972 and no. 3194 of 1985, see Ünlü, 2019a: 46–54). But, of course, it also slowly co-evolves with the age-old city as an eternally obdurate site of intervention. Second comes the development over the course of careers and generations of practitioners: the formation of Istanbul planners' skills, desires and habitus, including their own class position and living conditions. This of course affects their handling of the role conflicts elaborated above. In relation to the city and its neighborhoods, this duration can be said to sync up with the tide of uneven development. Lastly, however, there is the socio-technical conduct of plan making itself, which roughly has a duration of seconds to months. This timeframe, which will be the focus of the following paragraphs, is where the previous two durations actually have to prove their immediate influence in the form of concrete material-semiotic elements of practice, as not to remain impotent historical and sociological generalities. Within this operational time span, human plans constitute an attempt at *future* immobility and immutability of practices (ie. qualitative object permanence and metric fit of components and resources). Thus textual (hi)stories, maps, models, photographs and so on are enrolled to be brought into meetings in order to stabilize and control variations of future imagination, participation, construction and maintenance within areas of varying scale and horizons of varying chronology (cf. Beauregard, 2015: 60–69).



Images 6.14–6.15. On the left the cover of the 850 page Istanbul Master Plan (1/100000) (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 2009) and on the right the cover of the Galataport project development plan (1/5000) (ÖİB, 2012).

As in many other places today, urban planning in Turkey seems a mere shadow of what it was around the middle of the twentieth century. Early Republican era urbanism especially (roughly 1923–1960), was a relatively confident and effective kind of town planning, although perhaps more so in the new capital of Ankara than in old Istanbul. After the birth of the new nation, Atatürk’s utopian modernism found its oftentimes rather violent materialization through comprehensive plans, made by Western experts of urban design – and prominently so in Henri Prost’s transformation of Beyoğlu. Accordingly, the plans themselves followed the then common genre of ‘the master’s masterplan’: personally authored, comprehensive plans that provided detailed blueprints for a desired end-state (MacCallum and Hopkins, 2010: 493–495, see Akpınar, 2014: 78–88, on the seminal Prost Plan for Beyoğlu of 1937) (Images 6.12–6.13). That is, urban planning was still an architectural practice, in which “plans showed the exact design of the envisaged built environment, and the planners aimed to reach the resulting forms precisely as it was shown in the planning documents [by] physical plans depicting building blocks, plots and street details [...] supplemented by three-dimensional drawings.” (Ünlü, 2019a: 48). It is from this practice that a statutory planning system evolved and is still in effect today, which is premised on a principle of strict conformance of land-use plans and spatial development (Turk and Korthals Altes, 2010b: 185). On paper at least, it establishes a tight quantitative continuity from the national scale down to the individual plot of urban land. Thus Turkish land-use planning and development control are exercised through a hierarchical system of geometrically defined plans (as determined by Planning Law, no. 3194/1985), including a top tier of regional and metropolitan plans (1/100000 or 1/50000), and then a second, bottom tier of local land-use plans or ‘development plans’ (1/5000) and detailed local physical plans or ‘implementation plans’ (1/1000) (Unsal and Turk, 2014: 16–17, Turk and Korthals Altes, 2010a, 2010b) (Images 6.14–6.15). Conformance to upper tier plans is to determine building permits, which is supposed to work as the system’s ultimate legal mechanism of enforcement. This, however, has proven to be the anticipatory assemblage’s weak spot.

While early on this system could still count on its consistent (and often brutal) implementation, from the 1960s onwards detailed physical plans started lagging behind the dynamism of Istanbul’s rapid industrialization and urbanization (Ünlü, 2019a: 49). As a response, again quite common for the times (MacCallum and Hopkins, 2010: 495–497), comprehensive urban plans such as the 1980 Istanbul Master Plan changed genre. The new ‘structural plans’ – more general framework than detailed physical plan – were defined by a scientific style, instrumental rationality and statistical methods (Ünlü, 2019a: 48, 51). Accordingly, plan authorship became depersonalized and responsibility institutionalized in the Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Office. Moreover, planning became a university discipline (first at METU in 1961) and a state function on its own, a profession separated from architecture, better endowed to understand the rapidly growing city (ibid.: 53). Quite literally then, architectural master discourse gave way to a technocratic genre of university and bureaucracy (see Section 6.3.2.2.1). However, while both architectural and planning practices have changed much in practice since then, the strict division of labor still exists today, with planners concerning themselves with urban structure and land distribution and architects mostly focusing on the design of single, free standing

buildings. The most recent Istanbul Master Plan (2009, Image 6.14) still carries the same ‘structural’ flavor as its predecessors. While many other countries have over the last four decades changed their genre of city plans into coordinative and communicative directions (cf. MacCallum and Hopkins, 2010, Cornut et al., 2012), Turkish master plans remain traditionally abstract and physically oriented (Gencer, 2013). The most recent, 850–page Istanbul Master Plan (2009), for instance, couches its strategies in rather swollen academic exercises of ‘human ecology’. Similarly, the more specific master plans are thick books with obligatory elaborations on area history, social statistics and heritage studies. In practical use they have become quite disconnected to actual ground level developments, doomed to obsolescence almost as soon as they appear. Hence Loverings’ afore cited remarks.

In Turkey, as all over the world, the legal–certainty–oriented rigidity of traditional planning systems and its inability to keep up with development has spawned more or less formal practices that introduce more flexibility into planning. Carried by concepts of ‘strategic’ as opposed to comprehensive planning (Albrechts, 2004, Mäntysalo, 2013) and ‘performance’ as opposed to conformance as a criteria for plan evaluation (Mastop and Faludi, 1997, Rivolin, 2008), this theme has been high on the European Union’s agenda since the 1990s (eg. Commission of the European Communities, 1997, Rivolin, 2008). Although a rather loaded concept, strategic planning may be briefly defined as a proactive setting up of coordinating frameworks and communicative procedures for targeted yet integrated spatial and socio–economic development, working through the shared concerns of multiple stakeholders (Alexander, 1998, Albrechts, 2004). Accordingly, the criteria of performance have less to do with development projects conforming to zoning ordinances and more with how non–statutory strategic plans manage to influence coordinated decision–making among stakeholders (Mastop and Faludi, 1997). Turkey, when still bidding for an EU membership (at least up until about 2010), made similar but largely ineffective efforts to advance its own performing strategic planning (especially on the regional and metropolitan level, Erkut and Sezgin, 2014). Despite its legislative efforts forcing institutions to produce strategic plans, actual land–use planning has remained relatively conventional, including its ways of introducing flexibility. At best, one could say Turkey’s spatial planning is one driven by ‘strategic projects’ (Albrechts, 2006, Van den Broeck, 2011). In actuality however, it is less an integral strategy than impulse and particularistic state–business ties which drives the government’s ‘crazy projects’. And so, most flexibility still comes through more informal practices of plan amendment and legal exceptions (cf. Ozkan and Turk, 2016).

In the back and forth between planners, advisory commissions, boards, politicians and construction companies, plan amendments can be about general decisions of function and urban design (Image 6.16–6.17, pages 318–320) or more detailed, quantitative construction rights (building types, heights, setbacks etc.). Planners are supposedly responsible for this happening on solid technical and legal grounds and in the public interest (so it would hold up in court). But they are constantly undercut by political power play. It must be noted, however, that this sort of *ad hoc* and often *a posteriori* modification of land–use plans to the assertions of land owners (private or public) and developers, is an old and well–studied issue (not at all unique to




Image 6.17. Illustrative detail from the statutory plan notes of the Perşembe Pazarı Master Plan (1/5000). Municipal authorities have physically crossed out land-use decisions ('ARAZI KULLANIM KARARLARI') in the section on Trade-Service-Culture Areas ('Ticaret-Hizmet-Kültür Alanları'). This particular subsection (A.1. and A.2.) includes a list of mostly commercial and touristic functions that the area will facilitate. Literally crossed are requirements of historical conservation ('kültür ve tabiat varlıklarının orijinal kontur ve gabarileri korunmak') (A.1.) and urban design ('kentsel tasarım') (A.2.).

Turkey, see Alexander et al., 1983, Thomas et al., 1983). Ironically, it leads the most rigid and comprehensive planning system to become highly uncertain, fragmented and piecemeal in its local development (Alfasi, 2006: 562-563, Erkut and Sezgin, 2014: 242). Consequently, the land-use plan, as an impotent device of negative control,¹⁷³ becomes a mere patchwork of amendments *reflecting* rather than positively *guiding* development decisions (Alterman, 1980). In time, however, this dynamic can start to reverse and pervert the planning hierarchy (Alfasi, 2006: 566). Legal and legitimate as the amendments may be, ultimately they deliver the city to the discretion of particularist politicians and property developers. Making matters worse, after this reversal the particularism seems to crawl further 'up' the hierarchy and becomes 'centralized', as *ad hoc* amendments start affecting all scales of planning (cf. Alfasi,

¹⁷³ Alexander et al. (1983: 125) conceive of planning in cybernetic terms not all that different from those used at the start of this subsection: "The [...] statutory planning system may be viewed as a control system. Its purpose is to *channel demand into permitted actions*, by translating the goals of government and of private citizens into plans which serve as a guide for public and private development decisions." (emphasis added) The difference is of course, that the legal 'system' in reality is a rather uncontrollable bureaucratic assemblage of state (more on this below).

2006: 559), even, as in Turkey today, reaching the level of basic planning legislation itself. Thus, an informal logic of exception becomes hegemonic, as governments persistently seek to bypass the statutory system on legally questionable grounds.

Taken together, over and above the lack of (inter)subjective willingness to genuinely plan according to an integral strategy (still a crucial ingredient), there is already at the level of anticipatory practice (evolution of the planning system, the role of planners and daily operations) a severe reduction of degrees of freedom for spatial plans. While a shift from architectural master planning to a combination of academic bureaucracy and strategic informality certainly brings flexibility, it is quite out of control in anticipatory terms. Consequently, as will be explained next, concerns of spatial quality, historical preservation and social justice are marginalized.

Ib. Interpretive dimensions of the future (shrinking)

Thus configured, the Turkish anticipatory assemblage of planning and plans severely restricts in practice the anticipatory action by planning, that is, its *interpretation* of the future. While phenomenologically speaking any indication of meaning, including of the future, always retains a horizon of other possible interpretations, or futures, this horizon nonetheless ‘condenses’ and stabilizes into specific expectations (through operational time, Luhmann, 1995a, 1995b, 1976). In terms of actor–network theory (see Chapter 3), we could say some series or ‘bridges’ of mutable immobiles (signs) can become stronger and thicker with redundancy, forming stable centres of expression (subjects). According to Luhmann’s theory of anticipatory social systems,



Images 6.18–6.19. On the left, a land-use map on a page from the Beyoğlu Conservation Master Plan (2009: 66). Clearly visualized in the bottom of the map, in black-and-white, is the exception of the Galataport area from the conservation plans (assigned to the Privatization Administration on page 103). On the right, an early design for the Galata Project by Tabanlıoğlu Architects (2001, <http://www.tabanlıoğlu.com/project/galaport/>). It is not hard to see why some people would find the structures contrasting too sharply with the environment and object to the project out of concern for spatial quality (and probably even more when imagining high-towering cruise ships docking there).

this stabilization of expectations takes place along three basic dimensions of meaning: spatial, temporal and social.⁷⁴ How these discursive dimensions condense and relate to each other in the planning of Turkey's urban future may explain the loss of spatial integrity and professional alienation experienced by planners there. Indeed, it can be observed that in all dimensions, their horizons have contracted, their bridges narrowed, neglected or burned entirely.

First, in the spatial dimension of meaning, the phenomenology of parts, wholes and ordinal scales, current Turkish planning practice severely disappoints any expectation of what is often called 'spatial quality' (cf. Lynch, 1960, Khan et al., 2014). As explained above, Turkish spatial planning still has a heavy quantitative focus inherited from a time when a (geo)metric conformance of city-wide design and detailed local physical plans was still plausible. Today however, while planning is still focused on quantitative operations, its powers are largely rescaled to insignificance, confined to the scale of building rights and floor ratios. As Ünlü (2019a: 57) observes, including only the 'ephemeral and insubstantial representation' of quantitative ratios in the plan, while leaving out any broader morphological qualities, thus works to reduce the role of the planner to the distribution of rights on the basis of plots, leaving sites entirely to the narrow focus of "developers, who seek more profit through adapting standard layouts, and architects, who pursue the realization of individual designs" (ibid.: 54). While the old Modernist planning could still enforce its own morphological coherence across scales (albeit of a rather mechanistic and destructive kind), today's more fragmented and piecemeal planning has not been substituted by a more historically 'organic' connection between metropolitan and building scale (Ünlü, 2019b: 65).

In Beyoğlu, the 'strategic' projects of Galataport and Perşembe Pazarı, exempted as they are from regular land-use plans (Images 6.6, 6.18), have also been objected to for reasons of spatial quality. Critical experts and locals fear the new cruise port, envisioned in the plans as a structure isolated from its northern surroundings (Image 6.19), will spoil the view on the Bosphorus and disrupt the area's distinct silhouette. In its environment, moreover, land uses (and rents) have already been changing uncontrollably, of course requiring *ad hoc* rezoning (Erbaş, 2019). Similarly, in the plans for Perşembe Pazarı, the waterfront development is divorced from its 'organic' environment and abstracted from its current use (Erbaş, 2018). Interestingly, the latter is achieved in the plan by deliberately keeping its scale at 1/5000, so as to avoid having to detail and immediately deal with current users (businesses) and property relations (thus stifling opposition by disinformation, cf. Kuyucu, 2014: 617-618).

⁷⁴ Actually, Luhmann does not speak of a spatial dimension, but a 'factual' one. As others have noticed before, geographers most notably (cf. Gren and Zierhofer, 2003, Helmig and Kessler, 2007), space is consistently marginalized in Luhmann's writings. It seems to indicate for him an unwarranted metaphysical container for his radically constructivist systems of meaning. However, when we distinguish the operation or *practice* of interpretation (*doing* the imagining, futuring, planning) from the substantive *interpretations* of space, time and the social (eg. 'espace libre', 'monument', 'modern', 'participation' etc.), the qualitative indication of 'space' is also first a *temporalization* of spacetime on the operational level of practice (which through metrics may subsequently be *spatialized*, see Chapter 3). This way, there is no need to avoid 'space' as a basic (dimension of) interpretation and resort to the name 'factual', as this interpretation of space is no longer confused with the metaphysical substrate or container for meaning making that Luhmann rightfully aims to avoid.

Meanwhile, many of the existing buildings and open green spaces in the area are projected to make room for parking and other consumption functions. Monuments are preserved but become isolated museum pieces as the 'civil architecture' (*sivil mimarlık*) around it will be demolished (or 'conserved by renewal' as in Tarlabası, see below). Moreover, prior land-use decisions are retroactively changed to legalize tourism establishments and high-rise buildings (ie. higher than the ordained two-stories) that were built in spite of the plan. In sum, from a planner's perspective, the urban fabric loses much of its original dimensions, functional heterogeneity and characteristic irregular geometry. However, these spatial (dis)qualifications, of 'organic' figure-ground relations, cannot be divorced from history, that is, from questions of *temporal* integrity and anticipation of the future.

Second, in the temporal dimension of meaning, the quantitative treatment of spacetime in planning tends to narrow the horizon of possible futures, while allowing a *present-oriented* development to proceed unchecked. To see how this can happen we have to look at how time has come to function in Turkish planning. In its most basic form of meaning, time is a distinction of before and after (Luhmann, 1995a: 77-78), which for planning is all important, as it signifies its success or at least non-triviality (Beauregard, 2015: 153). In conceptual perspectives and horizons ('modernize', 'Global City', 'Great Turkey') as well as more precise chronometric phases and deadlines ('by the end of 2013...', 'Vision 2030'), the *before* is framed by plans as a problematic *past* (deprived, decaying, old, lost, spoiled, ugly, unjust) while the *after* becomes an avoidable or desired *future* (modern, prosperous, restored, beautiful, just). For Beyoğlu, this temporality is first of all a matter of conservation, with several 'pasts' (Ottoman, Modern, lived) vying for a place in the future (see below). However, the way planning tackles this issue depends primarily on how past, present and future are made to relate to each other.

In recent decades this temporal integrity has changed quite dramatically in Turkey, as it has elsewhere. In general futurological terms (cf. Adam and Groves, 2007), the rather contradictory Modernist combination (always professed by a particular class of experts) of an 'open' future, which reserves a place for people's agency to achieve some utopia of emancipation, and an 'abstract' future, which is nonetheless determined by universal laws of human rationality and progress, has given way to a strategic 'empty' future for which, in qualitative terms, only one future remains open: the further economic accumulation of futuring power. Thus political consensus on the best possible, yet substantively empty future is enforced through the technocratic (economic, financial) quantification of antagonism (now called 'competition'). The result, rather than producing a harmonious future by invisible hand, is its fragmentation among actors and their *present* interests (Adam and Groves, 2007: 73-75).

In Turkey, a similar paradigm shift has occurred, as the Kemalist marriage of utopian national Modernism, universalist abstractions of 'inexorable progress' (Alaranta, 2011) and geometric master plans fashioned by an elite stewardship, has slowly made room for more abstract and strategic futuring practices. Its utopian, malleable or 'open' future was already in retreat since the 1960s, leaving a structural




Image 6.20. A map of 'Cultural Industries, Culture and Tourism Strategies in Istanbul'; out of the English summary of the first version of the Istanbul Master Plan (2007: 33). Beyoğlu is the center of the red 'cultural industries triangle' which is expected to be 'alive 24 hours a day with cultural and tourism activities'.

'abstract' future (of population growth and ecological-economic resources) to passively understand and accommodate rather than actively mold according to an architectural blueprint (cf. Ünlü, 2019a: 53). From the 1990s onwards, however, this void has been increasingly filled with more strategic futuring in terms of economic growth and competitiveness, with more attention for how certain sectors (financial, commercial, culture, tourism etc.) and non-state actors can specifically contribute to it. While still open in a quantitative sense (ie. economic progress is not inevitable), the horizon of the future has thus been largely closed for qualitatively different categories of concern. Meanwhile, temporal fragmentation proliferates at the level of project planning. A further look at variously scaled plans in Istanbul illustrates this well. For instance, the explicitly 'strategic' Istanbul Master Plan of 2009 constructs its empty future through comparing the region with others in solely quantitative terms. Leaving no question as to whether the chosen indicators for 'world cities' (banking/finance, advertising, tourism etc.) are the right ones to aspire to 'attracting', Istanbul's 'economic power' is ranked with New York, London, Tokyo and many others, both in general terms and per sector (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 2009: 37-43, in reference to Beaverstock at al., 1999). In words, the future is just as explicitly 'empty':



Şekil 3-61 Tarlabası Kentsel Yenileme Projesi Önerilen Sokak Sitüatleri




Şekil 3-66 Tarlabası Kentsel Yenileme Projesi Örnek Ada Çözümü Cephe Erişü



Kaynak : Beyoğlu Belediye Başkanlığı- 2009



Şekil 3-62 Tarlabası Kentsel Yenileme Projesi Önerilen Ada İç Cephe Sitüatleri



Şekil 3-64 Tarlabası Kentsel Yenileme Projesi Örnek Ada Çözümü Planı



Kaynak : Beyoğlu Belediye Başkanlığı- 2009

Images 6.21–6.24. Four images from the flagship Tarlabası renewal project, as part of the selection in the Beyoğlu Conservation Plan (2011: 233–236) (all of the images can be found on the district municipality and project websites (www.beyoglu.bel.tr, www.tarlabasi360.com, accessed 10–06–2020). They illustrate very well the ‘conservation by renewal’ strategy of the AKP and their business allies, and that is meant to be facilitated by Renovation Law no. 5366. Above, one can see both the supposedly ‘renovated’ facades (left) and the extra stories added on top (right). Below, an impression of the modern backside of the buildings (left) and a map clearly showing the gated courtyard to be (right).

“In today’s global economy, cities compete with each other in order to attract passing capital and investments, highly qualified mobile labour and wealthy tourists. In this rather fierce climate of competition, cities develop strategies to re-structure their economies in which cultural industries or creative sectors are given a prominent role. In other words, cultural strategies play a significant role in the economic development and regeneration of cities and regions.” (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 2007: 26).

Accordingly, Beyoğlu and the larger ‘cultural triangle’ it ties together (see Image 6.20) mostly have a strategic role to play in the plan, in service of the cultural industry and tourism sector (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 2007: 27, 2009: 472).

Not surprisingly then, the more specific Conservation Master Plan for Beyoğlu (2009), finalized not much later after being in the making for 18 years, fits the same strategic kind of futuring. Yet, as it is more spatially detailed than the metropolitan master plan, it also becomes clear how it actually follows rather than sets the terms for

the future ‘past’ that is realized on site. The prime example in the report is the flagship project of Tarlabası’s reconstruction (see Image 6.6), which fits rather awkwardly into the more comprehensive strategy. After some fairly extensive paragraphs prescribing rather conservative and careful guidelines for holistic urban design (ibid.: 162–166), the project seems fairly out of place. As the most developed of a group of five Beyoğlu ‘renewal areas’ (*yenileme alanları*), the Tarlabası project gives a proper impression of what ‘conservation by renewal’ (*yenileyerek koruma*) looks like under Renovation Law no. 5366 (ibid. 225–236). As Images 6.21–6.24 out of the plan demonstrate, only a very specific past is actually ‘conserved’ into the future. Both the renewed design and its advertising bolster a postmodern, Neo–Ottoman building style and a reimagined cosmopolitan past, thereby decrying the neighborhood’s more recent past, that is, its pre-renewal physical state, look and population (Crummey, 2016). In parallel, the ever aspired to Europeanness experiences a subtle shift of meaning, from secularly Modern to postsecularly ‘cosmopolitan’. What the conservation plans for Tarlabası propose is actually a complete demolition and reconstruction of only the facades, in pale colors that seem to derive from old black-and-white photos. It has led commentators to speak of the new fronts as mere ‘simulacra’ and of the so-called conservation as empty ‘facadism’ for purposes of tourism and commerce (Aksoy and Robins, 2011, Aksoy, 2012: 106, Crummey, 2016). The strategic, economic future of Tarlabası thus clashes with and displaces the past, present and future of the place as it was *lived* by the residents in the fifty years before renewal.

Besides the Tarlabası plans, just about every other ‘urban transformation’ project included in the Beyoğlu Conservation Plan, or conveniently exempted from it, generates conflicts of identity and economic interests (Erbaş, 2019: 652–654). Indeed, the tension between different pasts and futures found in Tarlabası recurs in all of them, albeit in different configurations. The new plans for Perşembe Pazarı, which is after all an old bazaar, manages to pit against one another the living commercial history, presently embodied by its mass of small businesses (eg. tool shops), against future tourist industry and slick shopping centers (Erbaş, 2018). Cihangir’s long-time ‘first-wave’ gentrifiers, fear the effects of touristification (more traffic, new hotels etc.) brought about by the new Galata cruise port (Yetiskul and Demirel, 2018: 3346). And then of course there is the clash of many temporalities at Taksim Square and Gezi Park, Beyoğlu’s most prominent landmark of Kemalist modernism and secularism (if not Turkey’s). In every case the current users, be they residents or businesses, see their past discounted and future emptied in favor of a Beyoğlu that is sanitized, commercialized, touristified and musealized in service of the new, international economy envisioned for ‘world metropolis’ Istanbul. Meanwhile, urban development is really led and fragmented by immediate profits and impulsive projects. In short, just as planning practice is curtailed morphologically in the spatial dimension, its temporal horizon is ‘emptied’ on a macroscale and, on the scale of actual construction projects, not allowed to reach beyond the present for either utopian or lived futures.

Looking at the temporalities expressed in spatial plans thus reveals more of their consensual or antagonistic mode of politicization. However, a plan’s temporal integrity is not just about the substantive relation of past, present and future, but also, in a more procedural sense, the kind of ‘rationality’ linking problematic past and desired

future in terms of action and steering. That is, the way in which a plan establishes what present means should be employed to reach which desired public ends (eg. economic power, democracy, equality). Roughly in parallel to the distinction of abstract, empty, open and lived futures, plans can embody instrumental, coordinative, communicative and substantive (or ‘phronetic’) rationalities of planning (Weber, 1978, Alexander, 1998, Flyvbjerg, 2001). Much of this comes down to the way that citizens are made part of plans, how they ‘participate’ in the anticipatory assemblage through demographics, surveys, meetings and so on. As such, this more reflective temporality immediately connects with the ‘social’ dimension of meaning, which establishes consensus and dissensus (Luhmann, 1995a: 80–82). However, here we have to reinterpret this dimension as one of *political* expression.¹⁷⁵ It is about a plan’s discursive actions (through words, signs, symbols, categories, ideologies, theories etc.) of antagonistic dissent, agonism, deliberative consensus or metric determination of public interests. In this regard, looking at plans of various scales and chronological horizons in Istanbul (eg. Istanbul Master Plan, Beyoğlu Conservation Master Plan, Galataport project plan), there are often suggestions of strategic coordination and participation of civil actors. However, already by the way plans are textually structured, these suggestions seem highly improbable. As MacCallum (2008) observes, the kind of rationality that a plan can bring into practice may already be prefigured by its genre’s affects and, as such, can be a formidable obstacle to civil participation actually ending up in the final plan. And this certainly seems the case for Istanbul plans, which are not exactly meant to be open inventories of concerns. On the contrary, the plans’ indexes and layouts already lay down a rigid means–end rationality appropriate to the technocratic genre (ie. issues/aims → objectives → strategies → recommendations) (MacCallum, 2008: 329). As such, nonetheless, they are also rather ritualistic in character (if not cynical exercises): heavy encyclopedic documents including extensive research on history, statistics and urban design that seems to have little traction with actual, project-led developments.

The technocratic *image* of strategic rationality that the planning documents still convey, only hides the fact that they are part of a self-undermining politics of speed. Indeed, within the actor–network of state and business meetings, law books and on-site developments, plans in Turkey mainly work as tools of antagonistic *Realpolitik*, recording and legitimating an opportunistic flow of plan amendments,

¹⁷⁵ Luhmann rather gratuitously adds the ‘social’ dimension of meaning/communication, so that a reflective distinction can be made within (post-animistic) social systems between mere objects/facts and (between consensual or dissensual) subjects/observers. Bearing in mind that such a removal of ‘the social’ from ‘the objective’ is rather unwarranted from a posthuman perspective (eg. Latour, 2005a), even within Luhmannian systems theory (see Bryant, 2011), we may wonder what the third dimension really has to add here. That Luhmann admittedly has no justification for the central distinction of factual/objective, temporal and social dimensions of meaning (2012: 173), gives us good reason to revisit it in two ways. First, the ‘social’ should be rooted in practice (literally a ‘blind spot’ for Luhmann) and in practices of *politicization* specifically. As expressions of concern, dissensus and consensus are not primarily decided by the content of communications but their mode of practice. Second, Luhmann’s three dimensions of meaning can be genetically grounded in the non-representational concepts developed in previous chapters: singularities (*interpreted* as natural/social ‘facts’, parts and wholes) and affects (*interpreted* as occasions for change, agency and structure) and concerns (*interpreted* as ‘interests’, ‘consensus’ etc.).

information about which is actively withheld from the public most of the time. Indeed, the actual means of urban transformation, the ‘strategic’ projects, are mostly shrouded in secrecy, heavy as they are with the political and financial capital (and desire) invested in them. Yet if speaking of properly rational ‘strategic’ projects means to enter into civic dialogue about spatial quality and lived history (Goethals and Schreurs, 2010), then there is little to be found in Istanbul. Whether by exclusive circulation or selective information and ambiguity in the plans themselves, future stages of projects are perpetually vague and clouded, effectively leaving those affected most without a future, condemned to a present of waiting in uncertainty and fear (Kuyucu, 2014). In sum, urban planning seems surrendered to whatever antagonistic concerns prevail in the present. With their anticipatory horizons and rationalities of public interest compromised by technocratic ritualism and presentist antagonism, plans might appear entirely obsolete and trivialized. This conclusion, however, would be misguided. Despite the impotence of their visions of the future and their instrumentalisation in power plays, Turkish spatial plans still retain a key anticipatory function, only then in a different temporal register. This brings into play that third central actor in Turkish planning: the law book.

II. *To control by law*

As horizons of spatial, temporal and social meaning narrow and vanish, both planners and civic opponents take to the Law, the one mediator that appears to bring some stability of expectations in the alienating present. Turkish plans are consistently written in search of and evaluated according to compliance with planning laws, in terms of what they should include and address (eg. Erbas, 2019: 657). From an anticipatory systems theory perspective, this makes sense. As Luhmann argues, the operational function of the ‘legal system’ can be seen as a *normative* stabilization of expectations in the face of constant *cognitive* disappointment (Luhmann, 1995b, 2004). In other words, the Law is something to hold on to despite the disintegration of spatial and temporal (large scale, long-term future) meaning. In a way, traditional conformist planning has always included this function, as “long-term statutory land-use maps intend to stabilize the existing built environment *while* [taking the time for] creating a detailed vision of its future.” (Alfasi, 2006: 558). As we have seen in Turkish practice, the latter cognitive visioning part, including morphological, historical and statistical research and deliberation, is disappointingly compromised and dismissed by developers and politicians who grant it neither their interest nor patience. What nonetheless remains is an anticipatory assemblage that still has some conservative powers (in the operational, not substantive sense of historiographic integrity). As such, the Law can become a last bastion of legitimacy for developments, plans and opposition, stopping a complete descent into utter *Realpolitik*. As noted above, being a force of negative control, judiciary power can ‘pull the break’ on political speeding in the name of justice.

Yet more than that, as it stands in between Machiavellian antagonism and technocratic efficiency, the Law can become a forum of agonistic politicization of its





Image 6.25. Implementation plan, scale 1/1000, for the Galataport Project, including the plan notes. The added cut-out zooms in on the last two paragraphs comprising a legal addendum. Listed there are all the laws mentioned before in relation to the project. The first paragraph distributes authority (Environmental Law no. 2872 and its 2006 amendment no. 5491). The second paragraph gives us the relevant planning laws, starting with the Planning Law (no. 3194) and then continuing with the Tourism Encouragement Law (no. 2634), the Coastal Law (no. 3621), the Conservation Law (no. 2863) and the here irrelevant Fishery Law (no. 1380).

own.¹⁷⁶ This, however, implies that any planning practice is compelled to enroll its own legal capacities, in order to legitimize, disavow responsibility for, or anticipate the contestation of development plans. And this is where the legal handbook comes in as an actant, as the literal representation of the Law. While many planning scholars

¹⁷⁶ As comparative studies of national legal practices demonstrate, the continuum of practices of politicization (of Image 6.3–6.4) tends to reproduce itself within and among legal institutions, albeit within agonistic premises of universal access to justice. For instance, Hawkins (1989: 674) finds two contrasting cultural models of law: the ‘law as authoritative ideal’, represented by the British tradition, in which judges and administrators are trusted, as a last resort, to impartially apply widely accepted norms or policies; and the ‘law as political instrument’, represented by American practice, where law is viewed as an instrument manipulated for political and economic advantage between struggling groups. Another way to roughly describe the difference is to contrast ‘inquisitorial’ and ‘adversarial’ legal systems (Colaguori, 2017: 5). Turkey, however, surely represents a hybrid of these, and can be said to have become a more adversarial forum despite its inquisitorial procedures. As Hawkins also notes (1989: 672), in a more adversarial mode, the law can come to be “conceived of as a way of dealing with objections to the legitimacy of administrative decisionmaking”. (Conversely, the more bureaucratic, inquisitorial practice “reduces opportunities for issues to become public and political matters”.) Thus, apart from (or simultaneously with) its adjudication on substantive matters of concern, the court takes on an expressive function (cf. Connolly’s conception of agonism, Schaap, 2009). It becomes an agonistic practice of politicization, which can also give voice to more reflective concerns about the undemocratic operation and production of laws *from within those same rules*. There is, however, always the risk of this practice of fair play to descend into antagonism, when rule-breaking or stepping *outside* of judiciary rules comes to be seen as part of the game (and even enjoyed, parallel to the aforementioned *jouissance* of capitalist realism and Modernist cynicism) (cf. Colaguori, 2017: 6).



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Images 6.26–6.27. The legal handbook ‘Planlama ve İmar Mevzuatı VI’ (Planning and Reconstruction Legislation – VI, fourth edition, 01–2015) and, on the right, the first page of its table of contents (of the later, 6th edition, 10–2017), starting with the constitutional Building Law no. 3194. It includes articles on all the relevant laws mentioned in this chapter: the Coastal Law no. 3261, Bosphorus Law no. 2960, Conservation Law no. 2863, Renovation Law no. 5366 and, on the second page not visible here, the Tourism Encouragement Law no. 2634 and Disaster Law no. 6306, closing with the three laws constituting the aforementioned 2004/2005 Local Administration Reform Package (no. 5302, 5393 and 5216). As depicted in the fragment from the book on page 277, chapters include all relevant amendments, such as 5398/2005 on Coastal Law no.3261, and references to auxiliary laws, such as Privatization Law no. 4046.

have noted before that “the formal [statutory planning] system exists largely in *law books*, and the informal system makes it workable” (Cullingworth in Alfasi, 2006: 558, emphasis added), this does not necessarily mean those ‘formal’ books become trivial mediators of a smooth and implacable exertion of real ‘informal’ power. On the contrary, as part of an agonistic politics, it helps planners to not just build the envisioned bridges of scientific and architectural metrics (‘immutable mobiles’) from meeting to construction site, but have them accompanied at all time by the required bridges of legal texts (‘mutable immobles’) (Image 6.25). For this textual construction to work, a complexity reducing handbook is essential. For if modern law is anything, it is complex.

The sublime object of ‘the Law’, nowhere to be found *in itself*, as Kafka portrays so well in *The Trial*, confronts us in practice as a rather impenetrable, incalculable and slow-moving complex. Of course in a metaphorical way, laws are often described as legislative or legal ‘tools’ (eg. Kolodney, 1990: 518, Aksoy, 2012: 104), but this probably

suggests too much of a subject-object instrumentalism. Much like bureaucracies in general, the Law is no ordinary object, to be wielded like a tool, but certainly qualifies for the status of a ‘hyperobject’ (Morton, 2013). As such, it problematizes its traditional understanding by way of Weberian ideal types of bureaucracy (Ten Bos, 2016, Van Oorschot, 2018). Morton (2013), writing about anthropogenic climate change, defines hyperobjects such as our climate as things massively distributed in – or rather distributing – time and space relative to and including humans, such that upholding a Kantian (or Weberian) division between rational human subject and empirical object becomes untenable. Neither for ordinary citizens, nor professionals, indeed not even for scientists is there a distant, outside point of view available that allows observing more than a slice of the hyperobject, be it our climate or bureaucracy. If not corrupted or violated by antagonistic practices (which have their own nonlinearities), any navigation through the object that is the Law implies an irreducible level of performativity, chaos and uncertainty, requiring more than the algorithmic skill of operating a trivial ‘control system’ (see note 173). This is because, on the level of practices and affects, planners “are never quite ‘in’ or ‘outside’ ‘the Law’” (Van Oorschot, 2018: 242). Mired in bureaucratic labyrinths like the rest of us, but more competently, they are both placeholders (*lieu-tenants*) of the Law and creative ‘legal bricoleurs’ (cf. Kolodney, 1990) tasked to ‘find concrete passages, paths and burrows’ that hold up in court. When it comes to Turkish planning practice, any ‘action at a distance’ through a spatial development plan has to carve out its legal ‘passage’ (practitioners would say ‘find’ legal ‘grounds’). In other words, as (possible) indictments and courts will make sure, no Turkish blueprint may reach a construction site without the supporting attachment of an authoritative bundle of legal statutes.

In anticipation of a ‘final’ decision, where planning is ‘found’ to be just, planning thus tasks itself to build its own fragile bridge of decisions between site, plan and law (cf. Latour, 2010d, Van Oorschot, 2018).¹⁷⁷ However, for Turkish planners to achieve this they are assisted by an object that takes center stage as a kind of legal sextant to navigate the bureaucratic hyperobject that is the Law. The handbook titled ‘Planning and Reconstruction legislation VI’ (cited earlier, Image 6.26) aids planners in making sense of the uncertain and fragmented legal framework in which they work to make arguments traceable and plans stand up. Observing in the Introduction that “planning and development legislation [...] is becoming more complicated with all the additions and changes made from time to time” thus making it “more extensive and detailed than necessary”, the volume compiles all relevant laws into a “reference book in order to be able to remedy the disintegration of the legislation [...] so as to be able to quickly reach the current legislation of all mandated institutions related to planning.” (Planlama ve İmar Mevzuatı VI, 2017, my translation) As can be read off its table of contents (Image 6.27), the 500-page omnibus includes all the laws mentioned before in relation to Beyoğlu (no. 3194, 3030, 5216, 5393, 2863, 3386, 3621,

¹⁷⁷ Van Oorschot builds upon Latour’s idea of legal practice as the construction of textual bridges between case files and the text of the Law (law books), but also criticizes it for leaving out another bridge crucial in criminal law, between “the here-and-now of the [courtroom] decision and the there-and-then of the offense” (2018: 80–81). Her description of the actor-network of criminal law practice, including the courtroom, law book, case file and past offense, has inspired the meeting-plan-lawbook-site assemblage described in this chapter.

2960, 5366, 2634, 4046, 6306, 3366, 2985), including all relevant articles, provisions and amendments (as depicted by the fragment from the book on page 296). Brought together as such, the book helps planners creatively look for ‘hints in the law’ that may support whatever they are drawing plans for (“When you examine the law... for example... there is a need for urgent investment.. [...] then you can see the hints of how can we bypass the local participation and shorten the process”, Interview no. 069).¹⁷⁸ Thus, the law book aids in the legalization of what has already materialized or in bypassing requirements of participation by local government, citizens or civic associations. Which of course happens also in anticipation of popular contestation (more on which below). Moreover, as another former planner, now planning scholar, explained, extensive use of the law book may also help to avoid bureaucratic liability (“planners may not want to take responsibility for the plan by indicating the laws”, Interview no. 058). Indeed, the incessant reference to laws and legal statutes can be seen as a kind of anticipatory ‘structure of disavowal’ mentioned earlier in relation to modern bureaucratic cynicism (cf. Fisher, 2009: 49).

In practice, the handbook simultaneously allows for legal complexity to increase and to pragmatically reduce it for its lieutenant bricoleurs. From a systems perspective, this is how judicial power gains its modern independence. In early systems thinking, the Law, or more specifically, the planning system (eg. Alexander et al., 1983, Law-Yone, 1978), has often been idealized as a rational cybernetic system that algorithmically processes and guides cases, or plans, through an accessible system of statutory decisions, efficiently guaranteeing equal treatment and therefore an end to illegal building and corruption. However, from a more reflective, ‘second-order’ cybernetics perspective, its structure and function is defined much more self-referentially (Luhmann, 1989). Looking at law as a self-referential communication system, it historically achieves its operative autonomy from executive and legislative powers by building up formal complexity. In other words, from a strictly (and rather tautologous) functional structuralism, legal complexity is a price paid for the separation of powers and an end to corruption (in which case political might is right). The historically more probable state of informal chaos, corruption and arbitrary decision can only be reduced by producing a formal complexity that does not trivially mirror or follow that antagonism. However, neither cybernetic rationalism nor ‘romantic’ structuralism knows how to recognize as constitutive for legal practice (rather than corrupt, illegal, non-legal) the more ‘baroque’ complexity of bureaucratic hyperobjects,¹⁷⁹ which may be the congenial battleground for agonistic politics and

¹⁷⁸ This approach to the law rhymes well with a semiotic (rather than positivist) view of the law as a ‘system of signs’ (Kelson, 1988). Rather than simple, determinist commands, laws appear as pragmatic signs of possibility (‘hints’) to those who engage with it methodically.

¹⁷⁹ As Hillier (2012: 56–58, 63, after Kwa, 2002) explains, there are two conceptions of complexity that may apply to state planning (both can be distinguished from mechanical, microreductionist ‘simplicity’ thinking). The romantic notion of complexity, found with most city planners and social theorists (including, still, Luhmann), is holistic and ‘looks upwards’. The city or society is conceived as an organic or cybernetic system and its parts are subordinated to the whole in structural and/or functionalist terms. In contrast, baroque complexity ‘looks downwards’ to (see the state as) a heterogeneous, fragmented and infinitely fractal assemblage of connections and uncertain movements. Scales and levels of organization are not pre-established but the

their slow-moving ‘long marches’. In agonistic practice, the hyper-object of the Law, with all its blurry boundaries, overlaps and formal/informal exceptions is made navigable slice by slice, bridge by bridge, legal argument by legal argument, with handbook in hand. Indeed, Planning and Reconstruction Legislation – VI provides Turkish spatial planning with its own specific slice and its own bridge-building blocks and legal arguments. Thus it politicizes matters of concern neither because of some functional prerequisite (rational or self-referential) nor as a trivial instrument of antagonistic power, but as a messy and imperfect means of agonistic deliberation, working to legalize developments; anticipate, discourage or initiate contestation; and cynically disavow responsibility.

6.3.2.3 *Hyperobjective planning in Istanbul*

Concluding this section on Istanbul’s urban planning regime, we have described it as the result of an antagonistic state assemblage, which nonetheless crucially retains some agonistic elements that withhold it from complete majoritarian domination. Not localized at any *one* sultanate seat of power, sovereignty is a gradient in the Schmittian assemblage of the Turkish state. This gradient is shaped by a fragmenting planning hierarchy, producing legal ambiguity; practices of exception, legalizing particularism; and an informal politics of speed, bypassing and subverting the whole statutory assemblage of planning and adjudication. Describing this Turkish state assemblage as ‘neoliberal’, as is invariably done in the gentrification and planning literature, so much betrays the theories of state professed by actual neoliberals (both in an empirical and moral sense), that we should ask whether using that moniker still makes sense. Over and beyond representations of neoliberal urbanism, Turkish planning practice is characterized by a complex conjunction of specific desires, plans and laws. Instead of neoliberalism, as an *ideal* condition of possibility, this bureaucratic assemblage should be regarded as the *real*, unwieldy condition of existence of Istanbul city planning and the true source of its often perplexing powers. Rather than planning practices being an expression of the (neoliberal) State or Law, plans, laws and their operative sovereignty *emerge* from such practices. With modern democracy practiced “within a densely ramified bureaucratic executive” (Thornhill, 2007: 507), its form of sovereignty is constituted by practices of exception which incessantly (re)produce formalities (plans, laws, offices) and informalities, with the latter including illegalities or workarounds operating against the former, but also the withdrawn bureaucratic affects that indeed force the distinction. If the discursive blind spot that is sovereignty could still (or ever) be located, it would be in the interstitial movements of the formal machine, in its carefully explored and exploited cracks.

For a large part, in Turkey, the ‘war’ of urban development and gentrification rages within and in between its planning laws, making it still more of an agonistic ‘war of

performative, agonistic product of planning practice and theory. As such, an ontology of baroque complexity (of state planning and bureaucracy) involves epistemological difficulties very similar to those surrounding hyperobjects, which allow no subjectivity to form outside their spatiotemporal performance (Morton, 2013, Van Oorschot, 2018, cf. Kwa, 2002: 47).

position' than of antagonistic 'movement' (yet the border is always fragile). Facing the bureaucratic hyperobject that is the Turkish constitutional State, everyone and everything becomes its complicit placeholders (*lieu-tenant*) yet without any embodying it in its pure, sovereign form (cf. Van Oorschot, 2018). Particular offices, laws and plans are the non-trivial cogs in the State machine, with a certain bureaucratic libido serving as the grease. Together they produce a slow-moving series of plan decisions and legal mutations having a distinctive thrust of their own that anyone dealing with the state has to more or less subject to and work with. And this, of course, as already suggested here and there, also goes for citizens and civil society organizations who want to stake their claim in this drawn-out 'gentrification war'.

6.3.3 Gradients of resistance, practices of (in)civility

Just as sovereignty comes in degrees, in between Schmittian exception and Luhmannian unexceptionality, so does resistance to it. More specifically, as Annunziata and Rivas-Alonso (2018: 397-404) take stock, resistance against gentrification can take on various degrees too, from institutionalized measures of prevention, such as public housing policies and tenants protection, to mitigation and delaying, by compensation practices and legal bricolage, to building alternatives, including occupations, protests and urban commons. In this second part of the section on Beyoğlu-Cihangir, a somewhat different distinction of resistance practices arises. As institutionalized measures of prevention are absent and not exactly within reach (with the government actively involved in gentrifying the area), practices of resistance are restricted to networking for influence, mitigation tactics and building alternatives. In what follows these ways of rallying around and thereby actualizing issues of gentrification, will be described throughout recent history, leading up to the Gezi uprising. This exercise does not pretend to empirically add much to the already massive fund of commentaries on Gezi. Rather, it aims to demonstrate again the usefulness of the diagram of Image 6.3 for synoptically framing and understanding political dynamics in a pragmatic, non-essentialist and issue-centered way. More specifically, this then allows us to situate various *agonistic* practices, or *practices of civility*, in a contrast with other modes of politicization.

As the Right seems to have become the prime source of political incivilities in recent years, from Berlusconi's 'bunga bunga parties' to Trump's 'shithole countries', some prominent political theorists have suggested the appropriation of civility as a new project for the Left (eg. Žižek, 2011, Sennett, 2012, Balibar, 2015). While an interesting suggestion, ethically it is far from an unambiguous one. Indeed, many critical analysts have indicated the elusive, contested and often exclusionary nature of the concept of civility and its immediate cousin civil society. Understood as the formality of well-mannered and apparently 'reasonable' comportment, *civility* is often found to obstruct more than facilitate the politicization of discrimination and inequality (Mayo, 2001). In a similar vein, the Western concept of *civilization* has been deployed throughout history to keep down and out the poor and the colonized (Boyd, 2006: 873). In this regard, as we will see below in the context of Turkey, the category of *civil society* also carries its own performative overtones of bourgeois, Eurocentric

developmentalism. Not surprisingly, the orthodox, Marxist Left is quite skeptical of the notion. Separating the state (political) and civil society (economy) it considers an essential ideological operation of the capitalist system (Wood, 1990, Goonewardena and Rankin, 2004). Alternatively, but with similar critical results, a post-Marxist and Foucauldian Left perspective sees civil society as a ‘post-political’ *extension* of an advanced neoliberal state ‘governing at a distance’. For different reasons, civil society cannot be a ‘truly’ political entity in this view, as it is part of the late capitalist urban ‘police’ order (Swyngedouw, 2007, 2016, Uitermark and Nicholls, 2014: 976). As will be shown below, however, none of these critiques of civility and civil society do much justice to the practices of politicization found with Beyoğlu’s neighborhood associations, litigation practices and protest actions. There, practices of civility enacted a crucial form of resistance both before and during the ‘properly’ political Gezi revolts.¹⁸⁰

To empirically reclaim *civility* as neither a feature of rationalist consensus nor of (covert) class or cultural antagonism, but primarily as a quality of pluralist, *agonistic* practices of politicization, we have to first rid ourselves of its descriptive and normative essentialisms. In a *descriptive* sense, ‘civil’ is a predicate often uncritically awarded to anything recognizably ‘non-governmental’: entrepreneurial, religious, neighborhood-based etc. associations. Yet this would make the most violent terrorist or mafia organization also part of *civil* society. Usually therefore, there are more or less explicit qualifiers added to describe civil society, having it consist of non-violent, well-mannered, tolerant, lawful, pluralist, individualistic, non-hierarchical – in short – ‘civilized’ citizens and their associations (eg. Shils, 1991, Şimşek, 2004). However, as noted, this description introduces all kinds of *normative* class, cultural and developmentalist distinctions, making the description more of a political *prescription* (of the liberal, universalist kind). From this, many conclude critically that the meanings of ‘civility’ and of ‘civil society’ are only ever relative to the discursive strategies of political groupings competing for hegemony (eg. Mouffe, 2011, Navaro-Yashin, 1998). However, while not entirely wrong, what is lost by such an anti-essentialist yet ultimately relativist approach to civility, is a solid enough material and institutional touchstone for distinguishing good (agonistic) from bad (antagonistic) practices of democracy.¹⁸¹ Civility becomes but a floating signifier hijacked by whatever arbitrary hegemon comes along.

In what follows, therefore, a new approach to what may be dubbed *practices of civility*, attempts to move beyond both the universalist pretenses of (Western) liberal prescriptions and their relativist critiques, in such a way that both descriptive and

¹⁸⁰ Across the prominent Left commentariat, the Gezi protests have been either hailed as a ‘proper’ political event or as insufficient to qualify as such (eg. Badiou, 2013, Žižek, 2014, Swyngedouw, 2014, Dikeç, 2013). However, it is hard to detect reliable criteria for their judgements other than their intellectual authority.

¹⁸¹ A concrete expression of this problem of political relativism one encounters, for instance, in the difficulty of finding any specific institutional practices of agonistic democracy in the work of its main proponent, Chantal Mouffe (cf. Michelsen, 2019: 9–10). In a way, as Michelsen also notes, this is inherent to Mouffe’s anti-fundamentalist theory and ‘ethos’, according to which any substantive or procedural tenet should be up for political discussion.

normative dimensions come together in a practice theory that does have attention for those concrete touchstones. In this Deleuzian-inspired theory, the 'substance' of civility and its agonistic ethics become empirically inseparable and compounded in a general 'ethology' of civility (cf. Deleuze, 1988a). Beyond essentialism, civil society, civil dispute and civil manners are understood within a general, *ontological* kind of 'mannerism' (Deleuze, 1993),¹⁸² which finds civility in material-semiotic practices (of organization, litigation, demonstration etc.) that manage to avoid the universalist rationalism of liberal theories (eg. Rawls, Habermas), steer clear of the ultimate relativism of post-Marxism (eg. Mouffe, Rancière), but also defy the lure of antagonistic populism and authoritarianism. Bear in mind, however, that this is not to claim that these practices somehow embody 'true' and 'proper' politics while the others are ruled out *tout court* (as either 'discursively impossible', in the case of consensus, or morally reprehensible, in the case of antagonism). Rather, the point is to show how certain *issues* or *matters of concern* such as gentrification are handled and then served better or worse by such an agonistic practice.

In this final subsection on the Turkish case, we take a look at three such practices of civility as we find them within and around Cihangir, leading up to and during the Gezi uprisings. The following paragraphs account three practices of politicization, each representing a frequent connotation of the word 'civil' (cf. Bromell, 2018: 39): organisational networking outside state and market (as in 'civil society'), citizens appeal to the law (as in 'civil wrong') and gracious comportment (as in 'civil manners'), respectively. Together they tell the story of how, from a situation of (rather clientelist) consensus, a slower moving 'gentrification war of position' prepared and culminated into an explosive 'gentrification war of manoeuvre' at Gezi Park.

6.3.3.1 *Civil society reconfigured*

The first practice to look at pertains to the 'society' aspect of civility.¹⁸³ This implies taking (civil) society not as a reified generality that individuals are somehow part of, whether by simply being born human, possessing a Turkish passport or being a member of a bowling club, but as a *practice* of association (cf. Latour, 2005a). In

¹⁸² Deleuze (1993) extracts a non-essentialist 'mannerism' from the work of 'diplomat-philosopher' Leibniz (see also Stengers, 1997, 2011a, and Chapter 1). Reasoning from a neo-Leibnizian notion of baroque complexity (Kwa, 2002, see note 179), bringing assemblages of practices into (civil) harmony allows no shortcut by supposedly 'neutral' universals (God, essence, system etc.) but requires slow-moving diplomatic manners.

¹⁸³ It might have been better to speak about 'civil polity' as it refers here to a nominalist result of practices of *politicization* (rather than socialization, as discussed in Chapter 4). Both civil society and civil polity are used interchangeably in the literature, even though the former is much more prominent. However, since the unavoidable but inadequate category of civil society here will be absorbed by the notion of practices of civility as the argument proceeds, it will ultimately be dispensed with anyway. This also means that those prominent definitions that ideal typologically separate civil society from political society, such as Gramsci's (1971) or Putnam's (1993), will not be followed in this regard (cf. Foley and Edwards, 1996). When we do not equate politicization with polarization (ie. antagonism), as for instance Putnam does, practices of civility do not have to be 'apolitical' to 'bridge' associational divisions, but can do this through many different practices of politicization (agonistic, deliberative, aggregative etc.).

other words, instead of asking the essentializing question ‘What is civil society?’, we should ask, who practices it where, when and how (cf. Deleuze, 2004 and see Chapter 1)? If the ‘where’ is Istanbul-Beyoğlu-Cihangir,¹⁸⁴ the question of ‘when’ brings us to the effective (re)birth of civil society after the 1980 military coup. Already in the last decades of the Ottoman era a rift appeared between the center and periphery, or upper-class bureaucratic and folk culture, which left little room for an influential civil sphere, based on Islamic association for instance (Mardin, 1995, Özler and Obach, 2018: 312–313). And with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, responsibility for its democracy’s keeping came to lie entirely with the central state bureaucracy and military. Not with civil society. Reinstated three times by military intervention,¹⁸⁵ the secularist state always kept a tight control on the type of organizations that were allowed to take part in political life, especially Leftist, Kurdish and religious associations. Often this meant the latter affinities found their expression through associational forms that were not prohibited, such as professional or neighborhood organizations (ibid.: 313). Moreover, the middle classes, actually able to organize outside the state, were for a long time mostly synonymous with state bureaucracy and so had little reason to do so. With their urban housing needs catered by the government they were made part of a more general ‘clientelistic consensus’ (Öncü, 1988). A consensus that included, up until the 1970s, the class of technocrats that planned Turkey’s cities. While this group organized in professional associations, most prominently the Chamber of Architects (est. 1954), it was only after the coup of 1971 that they started to evolve into an important civil counterbalance to state power (although never explicitly radicalized to avoid aforementioned state prosecution) (Batuman, 2008).

However, the military coup of 1980 brought a definite change in this situation. By producing a new constitutional framework (1982) and Association Law (no. 2908, 1983) the liberal (anti-Leftist) conditions were set for the eventual emergence of a large number of new civil (non-militant) organizations, most of them from the 1990s onwards (Şimşek, 2004, Schwegmann, 2013, Sarfati, 2017). The 1999 İzmit earthquake and Turkey’s EU accession process, initiated a few months later at the European Commission’s Helsinki summit, only accelerated this trend. Also contributing to the growth were the EU’s financial support for civil society organizations and its directives of power decentralization and participation (inspiring the aforementioned Municipality Law no. 5393, Öner, 2014, Üstüner and Yavuz, 2018: 822). However, prominent among the newly emerging agents of civil society were the neighborhood associations we find in Istanbul today. Among the first there was the Beyoğlu Beautification Association (*Beyoğlu Güzelleştirme Derneği*), established in 1985, which

¹⁸⁴ In what follows, as it was for our field work, the Cihangir Neighborhood Association is the central focus of our investigation into civil society practices in Beyoğlu. Being in existence long before 2013 and being located adjacent to Taksim Square, it presents an exemplary case to study civil developments leading up to the Gezi protests. This, however, is not to suggest that this particular association was more than any other essential or pivotal to the latter happening.

¹⁸⁵ These were the interventions 1960, 1971 and 1980. The last one was a response to escalating violence between ultranationalists (ia. the Grey Wolves) and Leninist/Maoist groups (ia. Revolutionary Path) during the late 1970s. One of the most tragic moments of this precoup era was the Taksim Square Massacre on Labor Day 1977, when right-wing extremists opened fire on leftist demonstrators, killing at least 34 and injuring hundreds more.

primarily organized local big business and authorities to enhance or 'beautify' shopping and tourism areas (Erman and Coşkun-Yıldar, 2007: 2552-2553). As such, it stood in an already decades-long tradition of clientelistic, 'vertically' networked beautification societies (Batuman, 2008: 1933). However, it was in reaction to the new commercial efforts, but also to the municipal electoral victory of the Islamist RP in 1994, that some of the better-off, secularist Cihangirans came together in 1995 to form their own beautification association. In particular, it was after an incident where one resident clashed with municipal workers who in celebration of the Islamic victory were painting the neighborhood's sidewalk green, they first assembled against plans to turn Cihangir Park into a parking lot (Interview no. 067). Nevertheless, certainly at that time, they did not see themselves as an oppositional organization *per se* (partly motivated to avoid state persecution). Neither were (or are) they opposed to the 'classic' kind of gentrification that they themselves took part in since the 1980s (Uzun, 2001). The association's main goal has been to improve the neighborhood's physical living environment and together with its close professional allies it has become one of the main civic actors in Beyoğlu politics.

While it might have been steeped in polarized symbolics from its inception then, in terms of networking the Cihangir association developed many of the type of dense, cross-partisan links often associated with pluralist civil society (Putnam, 1993, Diamond, 1994, Foley and Edwards, 1996). For a start, while secularist in character, the association had quite a few members that were voters or even district councilors of the AKP (cf. Lovering and Türkmen, 2011: 86). Through pivotal, often charismatic individuals (cf. Schwegman, 2013: 304), warm relations were still nourished with deciding politicians and bureaucrats (eg. of the Conservation Council) (see also Erman and Coşkun-Yıldar, 2007: 2555-2556). For instance, in 1995, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself, who in 1984 started his political career in Beyoğlu and then later became mayor of Istanbul for the RP (1994-1998), was invited to open the redeveloped Cihangir Park (the first big project of the association) and have a sit down with the initiators (Yetiskul and Demirel, 2018: 3345). After Erdoğan, the association tells us (Interviews no. 064, 067), relations with AKP's Kadir Topbaş, architect and art historian by training, former district mayor of Beyoğlu (1999-2004) and mayor of Istanbul (2004-2017), were also warm at first, closely maintained through regular lunch meetings. Breaking bread in a spirit of consensus allowed for diplomacy to bridge deep-seated differences of habit and lifestyle between the new incumbents and the Cihangir residents (see for examples Erman and Coşkun-Yıldar, 2007: 2564n11, 12). For at least its first decade of existence then, the association was still thick and well on speaking terms with its supposed political adversaries in power. Hence it had little reason yet for lining up 'horizontally' with other neighborhood organizations (Erman and Coşkun-Yıldar, 2007: 2556).

As the AKP's political confidence steadily grew, however, its recentralization of power by legal exception and informal corruption, its moving away from EU directives and its increasingly unilateral planning style began to antagonize local association practices as well. In the decade running up to and certainly after the Gezi revolts, relations between local government and the Cihangir Neighborhood Association changed quite drastically in a negative direction (Interviews no. 064, 065).

Immediately after Gezi erupted the organization was even placed under suspicion and subjected to police inspections (Interview no. 066). But as ties to government officials and other AKP affiliates withered and soured over those years, relations with its Beyoğlu companions simultaneously increased and strengthened (Yetiskul and Demirel, 2018: 3346–3347). The district's 2011 Conservation Plan (Section 6.3.2.1.1) was the occasion for Cihangir to come together with neighboring Ayaspaşa and Galata to form the larger Beyoğlu Neighborhood Association Platform, from then on teaming up, organizing joint strategy meetings, events and demonstrations (more on which below) (Yetiskul et al., 2016). However, this new local coalition did not just stand on its own, but was connected to a broader civil movement that had been assembling itself since around the turn of the century. Alongside the ever present activism of professional organizations, such as the Chamber of Architects (more about these below), other cross-associational platforms emerged, beginning with the Beyoğlu-based Human Settlements Association (est. 1996, around the UN Habitat Summit in Istanbul) and later joined by others, such as Solidarity Atelier (*Dayanışmacı Atölye*, est. 2004) and IMECE (est. 2006) (Schwegmann, 2012: 131–145). In 2010, these civic networks, run mostly by progressive urban professionals (academics, planners etc.), together organized the Istanbul Urban Movements Forum (as part of the alter-globalization European Social Forum). This event, bringing many concerns together under a 'right to the city' banner, turned out to be a key pre-Gezi moment (Lelandais, 2016).

To sum up, in tandem with the decentralization and centralization of planning authorities, the years before and after the Gezi revolts show a gradual reconfiguration of association practices, from 'vertical' (clientelist) to 'diagonal' (cross-partisan) to more 'horizontal' networking (cross-association). At first then, Turkey's story seemed to fit in well with a Gramscian account of the role of civil society in struggles over political domination. In contrast to the more orthodox Marxist view, Gramsci (1971: 12, 232–239) conceived of civil society as not essentially serving bourgeois interests but as a field of 'private organisms' that has to be gradually won over for political hegemony. In the presence of civil society in Western nation states, and its absence in Eastern countries such as pre-revolutionary Russia, he thus found the developmental imperative for Left politics to prepare for a transition from fast, confrontational and violent 'wars of manoeuvre' exemplified by the Russian Revolution to more 'organic' slow-moving 'wars of position' for Left hegemony (cf. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Civil society thus acts as a formidable buffer for anyone aiming to stage a fast takeover. However, while much of the Turkish political history just described seems to comply with this theory of modernization, its recent 'reversion' to antagonistic politics is rather puzzling (cf. Sarfati, 2017). Yet if we leave the totalizing, teleological and Eurocentric modernization narrative aside and instead look at this history through a diagram of non-linear shifting of practices of politicizing issues, what we see is simply a shift of political gears around some (sets of) concerns. Instead of an inevitable, across the board development toward civility, practices of association can just as well switch 'back' to antagonistic alignments, to such an extent that their Gramscian buffer function is hollowed out and 'political speed', as previously described, can pick up again. Whether this acceleration pushes through in the coming years remains to be seen, but the failed coup of 15th July 2016 and its aftermath (including institutional

purges) certainly seems to point in that direction.

Still, there are other civil resources present in Turkey that may dampen and put a break on speedy authoritarianism. In particular, as mentioned before, judicial powers. As Lovering and Evren write:

“On the one hand, an ascendant neo-liberal, neo-Ottoman, market-oriented clientelist State, in which the most powerful individuals have a personal stake in development and are closely networked with development interests, generates or transmits a flood of development proposals and advocates. On the other, the *legalistic apparatus* inherited from earlier stages in the development of the Turkish Republic, plus a tradition of democratic practice and beliefs, embodied in an *educated middle class* (in which many planners and architects are notably more conscious of the progressive social-reformist traditions of their disciplines than in many European countries), acts as a *bulwark against hasty development*.” (Lovering and Evren, 2011: 2)

Surprisingly, Lovering and Evren find sources of resistance in the same ancient legal apparatus that was described in Section 6.3.2.1 as serving that “ascendant neo-liberal, neo-Ottoman, market-oriented clientelist State”. Furthermore, they imply how the support of a knowledgeable class of professionals is crucial to capitalize on such political resources. Such, in Gramscian parlance, ‘organic intellectuals’,¹⁸⁶ are indeed the designated civil society lieutenants to wage the drawn-out bureaucratic ‘wars of position’ Turkish spatial planning brings forth (cf. Cox, 1999: 16). Luckily for Beyoğlu, it is swarming with such intellectuals, ready to activate popular consciousness and litigate on pressing matters of urban concern. Specifically, the Cihangir Neighborhood Association, not incidentally established by three lawyers and a few architects (Yetiskul and Demirel, 2018: 3345), is a veritable powerhouse of planning expertise and organizing capacities (cf. Erman and Coşkun-Yıldar, 2007: 2555). And in terms of acting as a ‘bulwark against hasty development’, it makes quite a significant difference (compared to other places lacking such inhouse competence, Lovering and Türkmen, 2011: 84). However, implicated with its spatial planning practices, Istanbul politics reserves a special place for legal competences. Especially when civic diplomacy no longer suffices to put matters of concern on the agenda, practices and skills of litigation become essential. As one Cihangir association member explains in relation to their most ambitious case filing against the Beyoğlu Conservation Plan:

“[Do you have any official veto?] No, not officially, but we have some rights [to object] and we can go to the [Conservation] Committee and explain what is [in] the law and what are the rights. Then they accept that, because we have a lot of architects in our association, and they know everything. [So you have credibility..?] Yes [...] like doctors in medicine, like an architect, like science. But if you don’t have any people you cannot do anything, but we have some good teachers, professors from the university working very hard [...] on the Beyoğlu [Conservation] plan. [...] About ten working on this, writing a report to send to the

¹⁸⁶ For Gramsci, the ‘organicity’ of intellectuals was to be found in their relation to the working class. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 59, 120–124) criticize this remnant of orthodox Marxism in Gramsci, claiming that the organic link need not be class based. Similarly, Batuman (2008: 1927–1928) finds the organicity of Turkish urban professionals in their connection to spatial politics rather than class.

government and everywhere else. [...] also the university, where they have a lot of public *bilirkişi* [legal experts] who are consulted by the courts.” (Interview no. 067)

6.3.3.2 *Civil wrongs, expressive litigation*

Thus we arrive at the second important connotation of ‘civility’, which belongs to the legal sphere of civil wrongs, rights and disputes. For legal scholar Jeremy Waldron (2013: 14), for instance, the courtroom sets the ultimate example for how to practice civility, defined as the capacity to ‘stay present’ with one’s political adversaries. However, here we want to stay away from the commonly made distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘public’ law, focusing instead on how law in general attempts to process wrongs in a civil way, *especially* those ‘public’ wrongs involving the state as a party (conversely, the same broad interpretation would go for the ‘civil’ in civil rights, which usually apply exclusively to state practices). Most contemporary political theory, for different but mirroring reasons, sees law as a domain distinct from politics. Luhmann (1997, 2002, 2004), for instance, considers both to be relatively autonomous ‘systems’ with their own basic operative ‘codes’ (resp. legal/illegal and government/opposition). From a more dialectic angle, post-Marxist thinkers see the institution of the law, ‘the juridical’, as just about the ultimate antithesis of the liminal category of ‘the political’ (Brown, 2008: 255). In an increasingly ‘post-political’ world, so they theorize, the legal system algorithmically enforces its rationalist consensus onto a thereby repressed political dissensus. Yet, as remarked earlier (see note 176), these rather essentialist demarcations of law and politics blur significantly when we turn to actual practices of politicization. In practice, litigation can take on functions of agonistic expression and tactical political deceleration. However, this does not mean we cannot reappropriate some valuable categories from the above mentioned theoretical perspectives in the service of empirical investigation. In the next few paragraphs, therefore, some of Rancière’s and then Luhmann’s conceptions will be reinterpreted to understand and specify litigation as a particular practice of civil politicization.

While Rancière’s writings (2010) might be most emblematic of the essentialist stance, staying as far away as possible from pragmatic questions of when, where and how politics should happen (Tambakaki, 2009), his extensive use of juridical vocabulary ironically does intimate an understanding of litigation practices as a means of politicizing. Supposedly outside or at most supplementary to the order of institutionalized law (ie. ‘police’), Rancière’s properly political moment comes into existence only as a dispute (*litige*) over an emergent ‘wrong’, that is, a lack of equality not addressed by the current order of legal or human rights (Rancière, 2010). The political is thus thought to be essentially ‘litigious’, but somehow only outside the established legal system. But why not at this point leave the *a priori* logical distinctions of politics and law and see if we can find any kind of politicization in actual litigation practices? In what ways and how well are wrongs (ie. issues, matters of concern) addressed?

Looking at the activities of neighborhood associations in Istanbul, litigation is absolutely central to their practice of resistance. In this regard it of course mirrors

and has co-evolved with the legalistic planning practices described above. Pressing charges against just about *all* plans they get wind of (an observation shared by Schwegmann, 2012: 147), the associations engulf the state with an unrelenting barrage of lawsuits. Just to sum up a few of the cases that came to our attention during interviews (Interview no. 067), these ranged from litigating against relatively small scale plans, such as the change of individual building rights to turn flats into aparthotels, a rezoning in front of the Cihangir Mosque or plans for a new ‘skyscraper’ on the grounds of an old Russian consulate (Narmanlı Han); to medium-size redevelopments, such as the Roman Garden or the Taksim Emergency Hospital; to large-scale urban transformation projects such as the Galataport complex or indeed the entire Beyoğlu Conservation Plan. Their success varies, in the conventional sense of winning the cases. Getting the Conservation Plan cancelled in 2013 (and then again in the higher state court in 2017) was of course a big win for the Beyoğlu association platform (Interview no. 059, Yetiskul and Demirel, 2018: 3347–3348). However, even successes are embedded in a longer, more informal politics of speed, for which a plan canceled is just a plan postponed (“They [developers and municipality] let it rest for ten years and then, at a convenient time, the project is reopened with bribes and political action.”, Interview no. 067).

Where does this particular focus on litigation come from? After the coup of 1971 a growing part of the cadre of Turkish planners known as the ‘generation of ‘60’, which had already taken some distance from the technocratic heritage of earlier decades (and of foreign experts such as Prost), became increasingly estranged from the state, bereft of power and income, and gradually started recalibrating its practice into more grassroots-oriented and activist directions (especially in relation to the *gecekondu*, Batuman, 2008). The Chambers of Architects again played a pivotal role in this shift, which gradually broadened its attention from monitoring only technical quality to also including social concerns. All the while being careful not to become ‘too political’. However, following the American tradition of advocacy planning (Hall, 2014: 399) the new practice took on a rather institutionalized, legalistic character. It is this praxis of legal advocacy that today still strongly informs the activism of Turkish planners and their professional organizations (cf. Kimyon, 2016: 639). Either they assist neighborhoods in taking legal action or they file cases entirely on their own initiative (Schwegmann, 2012: 147–148). In the case of Beyoğlu-Cihangir, with so much planning and legal expertise in their own ranks, they litigate in their own name.

What is striking then, about the resistance of the Cihangir Neighborhood Association and the civil platforms it takes part of, is their litigiousness ‘to an almost American degree’ (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011: 84). In legal commentaries, indeed most often American, litigiousness is usually understood as a sign of *incivility* (eg. Orwin, 1991: 563, Barksdale, 1998: 573, cf. Greenhouse, 1989). That is, it seems to indicate a general lack of social trust or other means of conflict resolution. However, this characterization depends entirely on the political norm this litigiousness is assumed to deviate from. Following a supposedly more peaceful culture of consensus (so often a nostalgic imaginary), litigiousness is bad. Yet, in facing a severely antagonistic situation it might just as well be a good practice, a last bastion of civility. In the specific Beyoğlu conjuncture, the latter seems to be the right evaluation (again, there are no shifts of

practice good or bad *in general*). Yes, part of the litigation storm unleashed by the associations has the character of a thoroughly Machiavellian ‘legal guerilla warfare’ (cf. Kolodney, 1990: 518), fighting fire with fire using any means necessary, but it also does this for more agonistic, expressive reasons. The extreme litigiousness can also be interpreted as a special practice of civil disobedience in itself, as an ‘infidelity’ to the institution of the law, using or rather working with the bureaucratic hyperobject in ways that go beyond its ‘proper’ function. The obvious ritualism of the association’s litigation practices indeed betrays that they are about more than actually stopping or even slowing down particular construction projects. More than instrumental, their litigations are a practice of politicization in lieu of ‘proper’ opportunities of deliberative participation. As Sanli and Townshend (2018) observe, this is exactly what ‘participation’ means within the *Realrationalität* of Turkish developers, politicians and cynically acquiescent planners: nothing more than acceptance or contestation in court. For them, therefore, it can only mean ritualized and retroactive stubbornness, merely done to be obstinate and a nuisance to be ignored (“they [the chambers] are against all the projects... I can’t do anything [...] Because they are against everything”, Interview 068).

However, going along with this frame of interpretation and merely calling the civil litigation practices ‘pseudo-participation’ (eg. Kuyucu and Unsal, 2010: 12, Sanli and Townshend, 2018: 1251) would be selling it short. Perhaps it would be better to call it a non-consensual, agonistic kind of participation against a rather corrupt (‘neoliberal’) politics of exception, sucking plans into the slow-moving legal system to get them deliberated on in public, however imperfectly and proceduralized. But to allow for such a description we have to depart from both post-Marxist distinctions of ‘politics’ and ‘police’ (including legal procedures) *and* liberal separations of legal and political powers, such as found in Luhmann’s systems theory (1997, 2002, 2004). That is not to say, however, that the latter cannot provide us with a framework for understanding the very specific way in which judicial practice can nonetheless become an avenue for politicizing concerns. As Nobles and Schiff explain in their introduction to Luhmann’s ‘Law as a social system’ (2004: 39): “While the [legal] arguments, which are coded opposition, can condense and link to each other, the rejected alternatives of law remain scattered and dependent on individual cases and rules, and they cannot form a consolidated opposition.” However, from a less principled, more pragmatist and expressive perspective, legal practices (‘systems’) may very well be reconceived as a channel for the politicization of certain issues. Instead of an argument for the autonomy of the ‘societal subsystem’ of the law, the above quotation could also be read as a description of the law as proceduralizing agonistic politicization and as a medium of expression which, *in time*, allows for an ‘opposition formation’ beyond a mere scattering of concerns (which changes little of the relative operative autonomy of judicial-bureaucratic practices vis-a-vis legislative practices). Again, this practice shares traits with traditional practices of civil disobedience, that is, entering into trials with the law in order to foster public outrage and mobilize opposition (cf. Celikates, 2016).

In sum, an effective politicization of gentrification in Beyoğlu hinges for a large part on the legal capacities of its associations (skills, funding, time, energy). Their



Image 6.28. A group called Istanbul/Beyoğlu Urban Defense (Kent Savunması), allied with the neighborhood associations of Beyoğlu, protests against the Galataport plans, with the sign reading: 'NO PASS FOR GALATAPORT!'. Specifically, this demonstration was held at a meeting on the Environmental Impact Assessment of the project. The protesters claimed the meeting and the assessment were a sham (source: *Hürriyet.com.tr*, 19-08-2014, accessed 05-10-2020).

Organized and mobilized under the banner of Urban Movements against all these violations, we henceforth claim our Right to the City, that is, our right to construct and transform the city according to our own desires and needs.

THE STAGE IS YOURS ISTANBUL/ SPEAK UP FOR THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

JOIN US:

JANUARY 29, 2012 SUNDAY, 11:00 am

GEZI PARK (where all the trees are red crossed to be cut for a mall project) TAKSİM SQUARE

THE PROGRAMME:

Jan.28th Saturday:

Image 6.29. Part of the back of a leaflet titled "NEIGHBOURHOODS GET TOGETHER" and ISTANBUL CLAIMS ITS RIGHT TO THE CITY", stating the commitments and mission of Istanbul Urban Movements (Istanbul Kent Hareketleri). A year and a half before the famous revolts of 2013, it announced a demonstration event at Gezi Park, then already marked for demolition, which did not spiral into mass rebellion (source: *Schwegmann*, 2012: 369-370).

lawyers, architects, planners and academics are skilled to affect and be affected by the interobjective affects of the maps, plans and legal documents described earlier. In assemblage, they bring the skills and knowledge for exploiting legal counterstrategies, finding procedural points of objection (eg. contract durations or authority definitions) and preparing texts that 'speak to' other court-appointed experts (Interview no. 059). As such they embody a formidable force of 'legal bricolage in the fight against displacement' (Kolodney, 1990: 507), ready to deconstruct or reconstruct those legal 'paper bridges' still scaffolding every Turkish development plan.

However, this legal competence also points to the more general informational powers of Beyoğlu associations. And with that, also to another set of organizing and resistance practices. Alongside and strongly interrelated with the powers of obtaining and engaging with the many plans, drafts, maps, or whatever other bureaucratic scripts involved in spatial planning, there is the capacity for widely publicizing and producing political information and opinions. Also on this front, Beyoğlu and Cihangir in particular exert extraordinary media and opinion powers. Besides still having relatively strong bureaucratic connections, crucial for obtaining information on plans and proceedings generally shrouded in secrecy (Kuyuce and Unsal, 2010: 12, Demirtaş-Milz, 2013: 712), the associations maintain many channels to spread this information and their message. While the national media landscape has changed rather dramatically in the last thirty years, with an initial opening up in the 1990s followed by a new monopolization of the mass media by AKP allies (Sarfati, 2017, more on this below), Cihangir has kept up a relatively strong representation in mainstream media. The well-known neighborhood, even the setting for a national TV soap opera, harbors many artists, writers and other mediagenic and media savvy personalities. As is true anywhere else, the many journalists living in the area prefer to write about their own environment. However, more locally and centered more specifically around its urban matters of political concern, it has also built a strong information and campaigning infrastructure throughout the years. The neighborhood association has always had its own monthly newspaper (Cihangir Postani), publishing information on government plans, lawsuits and protest action, but also engages in leaflet campaigns, phone chains and door-to-door dissemination practices (Interview no. 064). In the last decade this has been complemented with email groups, a Facebook page and Twitter account (Interview no. 063). During the Gezi uprising these channels got amplified to add to the chorus of critical voices, to mobilize city dwellers and to assist in protest logistics (Sarfati, 2015) (more on which below).

Beyoğlu's informational powers, moreover, are matched by its street-level campaigning. Here we see some historical shifting of focus from organizing 'non-oppositional' events to more oppositional demonstrations, roughly parallel to the change from vertical/diagonal to horizontal association. While it has always been actively petitioning against municipal plans and policies (Yetiskul and Demirel, 2018: 3347), the Cihangir association mostly kept itself busy with exhibitions, festivals and fundraisers in its first ten years. After 2010, in tandem with its more cross-associational networking, in Beyoğlu and beyond, its events have become more oppositional (Interview no. 067). Here we can think of the longstanding protest against the redevelopment of a small but significant green space on the southern border

of Cihangir, called the Roman Garden (Erman and Coşkun-Yıldar, 2007: 2564n10, Ilerihaber.org, 04-11-16), or demonstrations against the Galataport project (see Image 6.28). For Beyoğlu *locals* then, even though the *national* symbolic significance of Gezi Park and Taksim Square was much greater, their redevelopment was just another in a series, including the Galataport and Tarlabası transformation projects described above (Lelandais, 2016: 287-288). Likewise, the protests in May 2013 were going to be just another such event, and indeed they were at first impression. Already in January 2012, umbrella organization Istanbul Kent Hareketleri (Istanbul Social Movements) organized a demonstration at Gezi Park similar to the one in May 2013 but that did not spark a national uprising (Image 6.29). And neither did the demonstration only a month before on İstiklâl Street against the redevelopment of Emek Emek Sineması, even though it met with considerable police violence (Hürriyet, 07-04-2013, Lelandais, 2016: 301). In short, even though a fund of capacities for action had thus been growing for a long time, what was ‘necessary’ for a Gezi to occur was a sufficient superposition of potentials to spark and attract a larger crowd.

Although the eventual occurrence of Gezi does not surprise at this point in the story, that is, after all the changes in networking practices and the proliferation of litigations, it is still in retrospect with great prescience how Schwegmann wrote in 2012:

“A new narrative is needed that is strong enough to unite the different groups affected by urban transformation: a narrative that is to some extent post-ideological and yet political enough to provide the anti-urban transformation movement with a meta message that is able to unite the different mobilisations, struggles and actions in the different neighbourhoods at a city-wide if not wider level. As pointed out above, there are two directions that are visible at the moment: either the connection towards movements around subjects with city-wide importance, such as the Third Bridge or Taksim Square, or the formation of a ‘right to the city’ movement that has just started.” (2012: 321)

Thus we see the gradual construction of a new political discourse. As marginalized matters of concern accumulate, they start to condense and link up to form a kind of antagonistic frontier that comes to a dramatic expression at Gezi Park. This way, it follows quite neatly the ‘logic of articulation’ that for Laclau (1996, 2006) signifies the formation of ‘populist’ or simply ‘political’ subjectivity.¹⁸⁷ For Laclau, politics happens when a mass of popular demands (not subjects or groups) is not satisfied by those in power, leading them to align in ‘chains of equivalence’ and come together under a shared ‘empty signifier’ (able to house them all). Usually, the latter is one *particular* demand out of many, which then comes to stand in for all of them, as a *universal* (Laclau, 2006: 108). This can be immediately recognized in the events of June 2013 in Turkey. The gentrification of Gezi Park (or as Schwegmann rightly foresaw, ‘Taksim Square’) was the particular issue that came to stand in for the whole gamut of marginalized concerns (gentrification, environmental destruction, precarity, paternalism etc.) for which eventually even ‘the right to the city’ proved inadequately

¹⁸⁷ In this regard, Laclau’s (2006) political logic agrees entirely with Rancière’s (2010): politics (‘the political’) we find outside the institutions (‘police’).

universal. What we see instead, is that ‘Gezi’ itself became the ‘empty signifier’ that momentarily managed to unite the totality of popular grievances (Özen, 2015).

However, notwithstanding its merits to explain its basic discursive logic, Laclau’s political ontology is still too reductionist and dichotomous to fully understand the special nature of Gezi as an *agonistic* conjuncture. Within the spectrum of practices of politicization schematized by Images 6.3–6.4, antagonistic practices are flanked by molecular publics on the left and agonistic, consensus, aggregative and governmentality practices on the right. In contrast, Laclau’s *logic* of populism discounts the molecular, Le Bonian ‘crowd’ and the purely ‘administrative’ governmentality as political impossibilities (2006:112).¹⁸⁸ And agonistic (pluralist), consensus and aggregative ‘institutions’ are heaped together as formations of ‘democratic subjectivity’ that work not according to a ‘logic of equivalence’ but a ‘logic of difference’. Furthermore, despite telling us that populism (ie. politics) is not binary but may come in degrees, this gradient is left blank by Laclau, therefore effectively leaving the binary intact. Now should we instead take this proposition of gradation seriously, then we have to distinguish those gradients, in practice and in discourse. In *practice*, a first step would be to allow for the other, non-antagonistic practices set out in the political spectrum of Images 6.3.–6.4. In *discourse*, moreover, it would be wise to reserve the ‘empty signifier’ for that side of an antagonism that is kept open entirely by wholesale negation (ie. negation either of opposition or government).¹⁸⁹ The term ‘master signifier’ might then be used to describe a populist discourse of a more positive and determinate majoritarian streak. This way, we can distinguish on a discursive level between the populist master signifiers of the more familiar socialist, liberal or fascist movements (eg. ‘proletariat / entrepreneurs / Anatolian Turks are the real people of Turkey’) and the kind we have seen practiced at Gezi, where there simply were little to no attempts to substitute one master signifier (‘precariat’ or ‘Kemalism’) for another, seize state power for a certain group (eg. main opposition party, CHP), or instate some other specific leader for Erdoğan (some new Atatürk perhaps). Indeed, at Gezi most of the familiar party politics were actively kept out by

¹⁸⁸ Laclau (2006: 112) explicitly states that his distinctions are formal in kind, logical rather than empirical. Despite his insistence that his is a theory of populist *practices* rather than movements, ideologies, subjects or groups (which are derivative of and constituted by practices, *ibid.*: 103–104), those supposed practices are only ever conceived as abstract *logics* of discourse. This, however, need not detract from the usefulness of his theory of antagonistic politics as disposed to creatively condense a variety of concerns into one political frontier.

¹⁸⁹ Indeed, even on the interpretive plane of ‘logics of articulation’, Laclau (2006) gives us a too simple and dichotomous distinction of the logics of difference and equivalence and, as a consequence, tells us only half the story. The asymptotic emptying of the political (master) signifier of the general will (‘the people’) through relations of equivalence goes *both ways* of the opposition/government distinction. It is not just that equivalence unites marginalized concerns (‘demands’) by negation of the government (‘administration’), it also operates in the other ‘institutional’ direction, emptying (ie. proceduralizing) the government by relatively empty master signifiers of ‘law’, ‘state’ and ‘democracy’ as it tries to include all concerns around an issue. This indeed ‘scatters’ opposition (as noted in relation to the law, Luhmann, 2004: 39) by a logic of differentiation that particularizes concerns, but also forces equivalence (consensus) through the empty signifier of ‘the (voting) people’ and the ensuing electoral and technocratic quantifications thereof (again, see Image 6.3). Conversely, there is also a ‘scattering’ of government as it loses grip on an increasing mass of matters of concern (and may become a so-called ‘failed state’).



Image 6.30. A 3D rendition of the controversial 2012 plan for Gezi Park and Taksim Square. It clearly shows how the Halil Pasha Artillery Barracks replica is planned to entirely replace Gezi Park (source: Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, retrieved Archive.nytimes.com, accessed 05-10-2020)

force or ridicule (Sarfati, 2015: 27, Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014: 125). Notice then, how the interpretive content of a political *discourse* can thus be conceived as intimately (non-arbitrarily) related to the kind of political *practices* of which it is part. What we saw at Gezi, was the formation of a ‘crowd’ kept together by an antagonistic signifier of the people that was *actively kept empty* by the insurgents (while *not* by the government and its police force). And this was done *in order to* maintain the practice of civility (against violent police forces). So whereas Laclau’s populism of master signifiers can be said to embody majoritarian strategies, Gezi also developed something quite different: a minotarian practice of (in)civility.

6.3.3.3 (In)civility at Gezi Park

This brings us to the third and last connotation of civility: good manners and *politesse*. Which also brings up the question of the place of physical violence in politics, especially once it switches to antagonistic ‘wars of manoeuvre’. As we know, the protesters of Gezi certainly got their fair share of police brutality. But first, what happened immediately before the mass uprising? For a while already, the AKP government and Erdogan personally had set their eyes on Gezi Park and Taksim Square, both symbols of the Republic and places of pride for Istanbul’s secular and cultured classes. As with the other transformation projects of Beyoğlu, their aim was to privatize, commercialize and gentrify the area. Having first replaced the Ottoman-era Halil Pasha Artillery Barracks under Prost in 1940, Gezi Park was now to make way again, in its entirety, for the garrison’s neo-Ottoman replica (Image 6.30). Like the others, the 2011 redevelopment plan became the subject of intense politicking in between planning departments, conservation boards and courts on different state levels (Independent Türkçe, 25-01-2019). Even though its function would radically change to shopping and luxury living, the replica barracks were sold, much like the Tarlaabaşı project, as an act of ‘conservation’. Not as a replacement of public space and rewriting of national history. It was these issues of gentrification and conservation that, combined with environmental concerns, had an initial group of about fifty activists from a group called Taksim Solidarity spring into action to defend Gezi Park, one of the last substantial patches of green in the Beyoğlu district.¹⁹⁰ When on the 27th of May 2013 bulldozers were rumored to have arrived to uproot a row of trees at the North side of the park, direct action was taken to block them from doing so. After the initial sit-in grew into an occupation over the next three days, police forces came down heavily on the activists on May 31, torching their tents and dispersing them with water cannons, pepper spray and tear gas. The evacuation, however, ignited “nothing short of a war over space” (Kuymulu, 2013: 275). As protesters regrouped on the adjacent Taksim Square, images of disproportionate police violence began circulating on social media, attracting thousands more to the scene. Meanwhile, other cities joined in solidarity and staged their own Gezi protests (an estimated 3,5 million participated nationwide). After some more manoeuvring and fighting at Taksim Square, riot troops finally retreated on June 1. Barricades were erected and the whole area was declared occupied territory: the Gezi Commune was born. For two more weeks, until the police finally took back the ‘Gezi Empire’ on June 11 and 15, the whole area of Gezi Park, Taksim Square and parts of İstiklâl Street became the dramatic stage for an extraordinary assemblage of political groups and practices of politicization (Postvirtual.wordpress.com, 2013).


Most Gezi participants were recruited from the professional middle classes (Tuğal, 2013: 156) and the supposedly apolitical millennial generation (born 1980-2000, a

¹⁹⁰ Taksim Solidarity was established in 2012 by a group of urban planners, architects and other professionals active in environmental and human rights organizations, in reaction to the ratification of municipal plans to redesign the Taksim area. During the Gezi occupation, they acted as an open umbrella organization, to represent the collective toward the government and media, while also actively keeping any other specific group from assuming that role.

Anarchist
 Communist
 Socialist
 Nationalist
 LGBT
 Green
 Muslem
 Kurdish
 Football




Image 6.31. A map (oriented upside down) of the 'Gezi Republic' during the park's occupation in June 2013, showing practices and, in color, the different groups present there. The blogger who compiled the Gezi atlas writes how difficult it was to make out the "complicated divisions and subdivisions of the Turkish left. [...] which are the major and minor parties and how they relate to each other, [...] it's a mess. You don't just have communists and socialists, you have marxists, leninists, maoists, stalinists, trotskyists etc. And that's not even it. [...] They used to hate each other more than anything else, but they were all together represented at Gezi Park. There's no point in trying to classify them



Images 6.32–6.33. Above, Beyoğlu’s ‘Gezi forum’ at Cihangir Park. After the breakup of the commune at Gezi Park the movement was continued by forums in districts all around Istanbul (source: *Başka Haber*, 25-06-2013). Below, a visualization, spread through social media, of the gestures used to express one’s opinion on statements made by forum speakers (source: *İnceoğlu*, 2013).

category that actually makes a lot of sense here, as the coup of 1980 expressly aimed to ‘depoliticize’ a nation considered to be in chaos (Patton, 2013, Gümüş and Yılmaz, 2016). Nonetheless, it attracted an extraordinary multitude of participants in terms of class, ranging from middle class professionals to precariously employed youth to the gecekondu dwelling proletariat. And also in terms of ideological persuasions and activist affiliations it displayed an impressive heterogeneity, gathering everyone from communists to nationalists to Kurds to LGBTQ+ to (politicized) football fans to anticapitalist muslims (see Image 6.31), all expressing more or less overlapping concerns, but united against the AKP (Aksoy, 2017: 30). The Gezi Commune, much like the other Occupy movements, became a short-lived but powerful exercise in ‘prefigurative’ politics, that is, an attempt to ‘act as if one is already free’ and immediately create the democratic society one wants to live in (cf. Graeber, 2009). As a self-consciously agonistic practice (İnceoğlu, 2013, 2014: 26), this meant creating



Images 6.34–6.35. Graffiti depicting the Gezi movement’s penguin mascot, an ironic criticism of AKP media monopolization. On the left, it wears a gas mask, implying another humorous appropriation of the disappropriate use of tear gas on the protesters. On the right, an army of penguins gives prime minister Erdoğan a headache (source: Aestheticsofcrisis.org, accessed 05-10-2020).

several Gezi forums by hosting an open mic for the expression of anyone’s grievances, plans and visions. They became a mass exercise in civility, ‘staying present’ and listening without prejudice to each other’s concerns. But besides these forums, like in any other ‘real’ society, there was the necessary material support: a residential area (tents), community garden (where the trees were torn out), kitchen, yoga class, library, hospital, memorial, ‘revolution museum’, radio and television studio, a ‘Çapulcu Cafe’ and a stage for musical performance and speeches (managed by Taksim Solidarity) (Image 6.31).

The Gezi forums were a way of extending the event after it was brutally broken up. Right before that happened, Erdoğan and some cabinet members had met with a group of city planners, union leaders and artists from Taksim Solidarity (Image 6.7, *The Guardian*, 14-06-2013). The prime minister vowed to uphold whatever the pending court filing on the plans would command and to hold a referendum if it ruled in his favor. It was the occasion for the Gezi Commune to split up into six forums to democratically discuss what to do in response. However, discussions were not allowed to finish before the evacuation. This motivated the erection of some fifty odd popular forums in Istanbul and many more across the country. Apart from carrying on discussions, they also became the occasion to keep alive the festive ‘spirit of Gezi’ (*Gezi ruhu*) through music, dancing and food (Bianchi, 2018). For Beyoğlu, the designated place for its spin-off forum was Cihangir Park (Image 6.32, *Başka Haber*, 25-06-2013). And so, on the evening of June 24, after a march for a fallen comrade, accompanied by loud pots and pans cheering from the neighborhood, hundreds of people flocked to the park to discuss their common fate. That night and those that followed, every speaker got two minutes to tell their story and voice proposals on whatever political, social, economic or cultural matter of concern. Everyone agreed

that the Gezi spirit was to be kept alive and that this required political organization. Thus several working groups were formed. The proposal to work with established parties, however, got a resounding ‘disagree’ sign (Image 6.33).

During all these developments, the media played a catalyzing role. Social media, on a tactical and logistical level, were crucial in disseminating intel about police manoeuvres and phone numbers of volunteering doctors and lawyers (Patton, 2013: 34, 36). Similarly, under the hashtag #parklarbizim (‘parks are ours’) they served to inform about and connect the subsequent park forums. But they mostly served expressive ends, where the mainstream media failed to give the protests a stage. Indeed, #Occupygezi was not so much about austerity, as was central to Western occupy movements, but against (legalized) corruption and authoritarian culture (Kaya, 2017: 202). A big part of this was a metacommentary against the AKP’s media monopolization, which is directly connected to the aforementioned cronyism in the construction sector (with big, AKP-allied developers also owning the largest media networks, Corke et al., 2014, Esen and Gumuscu, 2018). The monopoly bias came to a ridiculous low point when during the height of the Gezi insurgency CNN Türk (owned by the AKP-allied industry giant Doğan Group) gave priority to a documentary on penguins over reporting on whatever was happening in Beyoğlu. Characteristic of the Gezi movement’s ironic and carnivalesque humor, it immediately became the occasion to appropriate the innocuous penguin as its nonviolent mascot, while simultaneously critiquing the bias of established media (Images 6.34–6.35). Meanwhile, Erdoğan, his party and its punditry were given free reign by those media to spew their wild accusations of terrorism, heresy and conspiracy over the protesting ‘marauders’ (*çapulcu*) (Sarfati, 2015: 37–38, S Özbudun, 2015). It was the antagonizing messaging that was needed to legitimize and embolden police enforcement to end up chasing women and children into shops and hotel lobbies and even entering hospitals to arrest medical staff treating protesters (Patton, 2013: 268).

When Gezi came to an end, at least 11 people were dead, over 8000 wounded and over 3000 citizens arrested nationwide. The question that comes up is, how did people maintain civility in the face of such substantial state violence? Up to this point, the practices of civility, of diplomatic association and litigation, have fallen well within the range of what Balibar (2015: 107) calls ‘hegemonic’ strategies of civility, with reference to Gramsci’s ‘war of position’ but also to the Hegelian notion of *Sittlichkeit*. They attempt to keep at bay antagonistic violence by productively curbing or converting it through educational institutions and relations of governance (cf. Hegel, 1996). But this disciplinary strategy of institutionalized civility of course implies strong forces of normalization (‘civilization’) and, as such, more subtle forms of exclusion and violence (as so well exposed by Elias, Foucault and Bourdieu, Balibar, 2015: 34, 113). However, when ‘hegemonic’ strategies of civility, slowly effecting change from within the institutions, become depleted or fatally undermined, other practices are called for. Žižek, in his plea for civility as a Left project, suggests a similar problematic:

“...it is perhaps the task (or one of the tasks) of the Left to restore some simple good manners. [...] The task is to restore civility, not a new ethical substance. Civility is not the same as custom (in the strong sense of *Sittlichkeit*, ‘mores,’ [...] civility, on the contrary,

and to put it in somewhat simplified terms, *supplements the lack or collapse of the substance of mores*. Civility stands for custom (or, rather, what remains of custom) after the fall of the big Other [ie. an assumed universal moral authority]: it assumes the key role when subjects encounter a lack of substantial ethics [...]. In such situations, one has to improvise and invent new rules ad hoc...” (2011: 324)

Žižek’s (ibid.: 326) rather vague intimations of what this de-substantialized civility might consist of in practice resort to psycho-analytic distinctions of ‘acting out’ (which cynically leaves hegemony in tact) and *passage à l’acte*, which entails *either* a hysterically violent *or* a creative (‘ad hoc’) and symbolic, that is, non-violent destruction of hegemony. The latter would of course be the more civil act of revolution. However, coming back to these categories later, let us first notice how they align quite well with Balibar’s (2015) somewhat less incomplete suggestions of Left possibilities for civility: the majoritarian and the minoritarian ‘strategies of civility’. Both counteract the implicit hierarchical or ‘top-down’ forces of morality and normalization inherent to hegemonic strategies (that is, for us, practices of vertical/diagonal networking and legal-procedural compliance). This feature, as we will see below, makes the normalizing force of the civility/incivility distinction highly uncertain but all the more productive.

First then, the majoritarian strategy of civility is represented in the aforementioned post-Marxist tradition of Laclau and Mouffe (Balibar, 2015: 117–118). However, it remains unclear in Balibar what this strategy’s *civility* is to consist of other than an empty ‘opening up the space of political freedom’. So this position is not without its problems. If the majoritarian practice does obtain a specific positive content (by double negation, eg. the Communist Party, Muslim Brotherhood), it easily slips back into the saddest conjunctions of incivility and violence.¹⁰¹ Alternatively, with proper restraint, the majoritarian empty signifier might be kept empty. Yet the required ascetic passivity (which, as we will see below, can nonetheless be a very powerful practice of civil disobedience) on its own lacks the power to actively invent *new* ways of addressing and composing matters of concern. For this, a minoritarian strategy of civility is also needed. Some rather faint clues for what this strategy could entail Balibar (2015: 118–123) finds in the work of Deleuze and Foucault. Together with Guattari (1987), Deleuze famously proposed a ‘micropolitics of desire’ which advanced a strategy of ‘becoming-minority’ (eg. ‘becoming-woman’, ‘becoming-black’). In this philosophy, minorities present us with ‘lines of flight’ from majoritarian, hegemonic normalization. Collective emancipation then comes to mean a transformative ‘becoming-the-other’ rather than an economic coming up to par of minority groups with the supposedly rational, male, white, Christian and middle class norm (ie. the *qualitative* majority). As Balibar notes, this goal of immanent rather than revolutionary transformation chimes rather well with the ‘aesthetics of existence’ described in Foucault’s later work (eg. 2010b, 2011). While more individual in its focus, Foucault’s

¹⁰¹ This is what purportedly happened in Egypt after the Tahrir Square uprisings two years earlier, during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. With a secular Left unable to firmly direct people’s concerns and unite disparate groups, the protestors there, having first toppled Mubarak, eventually returned, by ‘a double disavowal’, to another master, the army, to free themselves of the newly installed Islamist authoritarianism of Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood (Kapoor, 2018: 277).

notion of 'self-care', taken from the ancient Greeks, involves an immediate implication of a disciplined self-stylization and a political truth-telling (*parrhesia*) through ascetic practices. As we will see below, this notion helps us distinguish different strategies of civility in historical practices of people such as Gandhi or Diogenes of Sinope, but also in the contemporary Gezi movement. However, ultimately Balibar seems to propose a dialectic combination of majoritarian and minoritarian strategies of civility for the Left. Beyond hegemony and normalization lies a Nietzschean 'play of identities' or 'proliferation of masks' (2015: 126).

When we look at the Gezi insurgency this is quite literally the combination and 'play' of civilities we see. And this, in more or less explicit and deliberate contradistinction to earlier, less civil majoritarianisms in Turkey. In *practice*, this complex strategy of civil resistance requires two kinds of capacities, which we can find neatly juxtaposed in the work of anthropologist James C. Scott. Writing on the *longue durée* history of 'the arts of resistance' and 'work of negation' done by subordinate social groups, he remarks:

"If subordinate groups have typically won a reputation for subtlety – a subtlety their superiors often regard as cunning and deception – this is surely because their vulnerability has rarely permitted them the luxury of direct confrontation. The *self-control* and *indirection* required of the powerless thus contrast sharply with the less inhibited directness of the powerful." (1990: 136, emphasis added).

Recent history seems to corroborate this. When it was on the rise in the second half of the twentieth century, culminating in the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, both the proletarian and libertine Left were often considered the epitome of incivility, while today, as mentioned, the Right has taken over that all too confident position. However, it is the two elements of subaltern resistance that Scott here indicates, self-control, or *restraint*, and *indirection*, that can be used to further specify the kind of practices of (in)civility that the Istanbulites under study have had to resort to when police forces cornered them at Gezi Park and Taksim Square.

6.3.3.3.1 *The restraints and suffering of disobedience*

Self-control and *restraint* from reactive violence has traditionally been well understood to be an intricate art of resistance for the less powerful. Non-violent resistance entertains a complex, dialectical relation with violence, working to create moral outrage only in expressive (public) contrast to state violence and corruption. In practice, as a consequence, it also implies a capacity for ascetic suffering. At Gezi and Taksim, where the general commitment to non-violence was felt strongly among its disobedient occupants (Sarfati, 2015: 27), the latter's capacity for suffering was severely tested by the supposedly non-lethal police weapons deployed to evacuate the space: sticks, rubber bullets, pepper spray, water cannons, the arsoning of tents and, most prominently, tear gas. As Gezi ethnographer D'Orsi (2015) recounts, it was the gas especially that, paradoxically, had a bonding function among its victims, who affectionately (and ironically) referred to the protests as the 'gas festival'. Externally

then, mostly through social media,¹⁹² the suffering manifested the state's capacities for brutality and incivility, while internally it became an affective correlate of a solitary 'spirit of Gezi' (*Gezi ruhu*). Interestingly, a particular kind of music also had a role to play in mustering this capacity for suffering. As Bianchi (2018: 223–225) explains, one of the most popular songs of the movement was titled *Eyvallah* ('Bring it on'), which is a kind of manifesto of resistance against gas and batons. Besides the ubiquitous drums it proved an effective attendant to the 'passive resistance' against the police. In a more solemn way, German pianist Davide Martello made the sit-in experience more pleasant and meditative with up to fourteen hour long recitals on Taksim Square (The Guardian, 17–06–2013). Another more solemn practice of civil disobedience famously emerged on June 17 when performance artist Erdem Gündüz 'just' stood still for eight hours in one spot on Taksim Square, with many joining him (Image 6.36). Reminiscent of the Tiananmen Square Tank Man, the 'standing man' (*duran adam*) actions, of which many others followed, left bewildered a police force that was used to battle more active and militant opponents (Sarfati, 2015: 27). The same kind of technique of disarmament was also used early in the protest by reading books right in front of the riot police (using *orantısız zeka* or 'disproportionate intelligence', cf. Gurel, 2015). What the practice does is demonstrate and politicize the state's incapacity for civility, that is, for 'staying present' with one's adversaries.

Generally speaking, there are obvious historical precedents for these kinds of civil disobedience and defiant suffering, but they also show clearly how Gezi was much more than that. Most famously of course, there are non-violent actions of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, jr. For the latter, non-violent but taunting actions primarily served an expressive function of 'dramatizing' issues so they can no longer be ignored (Celikates, 2016: 43). Similarly for Gandhi, his practice of non-violence (*ahimsa*) was part of a prolonged struggle to manifest the moral truth (*satya*) of colonial oppression and work toward Indian self-rule (*swaraj*). Central to this was the yogic cultivation of ascetic capacities of dietary self-restraint, bodily endurance and fearless (self-)suffering in the face of violence (Steger, 2006, Godrej, 2017), the most extreme expression of which was of course Gandhi's own hunger strike in 1932. As such, Gandhi's somatic practices of *self-negating* detachment (an 'art of dying', Gandhi, 1969: 85), were well in accordance with the old Indian tradition of non-dualist thinking (*advaita vedanta*), which quite consciously overflows with empty signifiers. More than Western liberalism (Bilgrami, 2003), it was this kind of philosophy and its religious perennialism that also informed his plea for tolerance, about which he was not unambiguously enthusiastic but which he neither could conceive an alternative for (Gandhi, 1955: 63). However, in the 'passive resistance' of his Indian contemporary, Gramsci (1971: 229, see also Balibar, 2012: 13) saw a prime example of a patient war of position, which we can contrast to the actively violent manoeuvres of that other anticolonial coeval, Mao Zedong (who indeed bore approval of Carl Schmitt as the

¹⁹² Some civil rights of free speech and the actual presence of free media – digital social media in the case of the Gezi revolts – are of course crucial to make any act of civil disobedience work. This was, as George Orwell observed with great pertinence, already the case in Gandhi's era (cf. Alinsky, 1989: 41, Celikates, 2016). The manifestation of state violence has to somehow reach a large audience for it to incite any public outrage.



Image 6.36. A 'standing man' (duran adam) protest on Taksim Square. In the front, Erdem Gündüz, the professional dancer who started the practice of civil disobedience whereby participants simply stood still for hours on end in the public square (and elsewhere), which apparently was in itself already a highly subversive practice. (source: t24.com.tr, 19-06-2013, accessed 05-10-2020)

'new Clausewitz', Caygill, 2013: 70-71, 105). What both Gandhi and Mao share, however, is a certain ascetic philosophy of resistance, which seems to be inherent to so much 'work of negation'. Both are also clearly majoritarian strategies (cf. Caygill, 2013: 69-72). Mao's strategy was more (re)constructive (by double negation, ie. Chinese Communism), but also marked by escalating violence and incivility, especially when it morphed into the Cultural Revolution. Gandhi's strategy, in contrast, was more civil, mostly predicated on a slow but immediate evolution from individual yogic self-rule to mass national detachment from (negation of) Western colonial capitalism and its seductions (Godrej, 2017).

In some of the resistance practices at Gezi we thus recognize the Gandhian approach: a non-violent practice of self-restraint and joint suffering and a discourse of tolerance, with all societal groups side-by-side in solidarity as the negated majority (as depicted in Image 6.31). But this is only part of the story. Indeed, many other agonistic practices at Gezi went well beyond ascetic self-negation and enacted another, minoritarian form of civility. To arrive there, we may return first to Žižek's earlier remarks on civility, as the occasion for a hysterical or symbolically disruptive act (*passage à l'act*). Returning to the four Lacanian discourses referred to earlier in relation to the (inter)subjective affects of Turkish planning practices, the Gezi protests can be read as expressions of 'hysterical' if not 'analytical' discourses (cf. Kapoor, 2018). Whereas the hysteric's discourse is characterized by an incessant questioning and outrage against an ideological environment (ie. negation and postponement of signification),¹⁹³ the analyst's discourse is said to also move beyond radical doubt by somehow 'traversing' the fantasy thus made conscious. Becoming aware of the particular perversions at play and thus gaining some kind of distance then allows for

¹⁹³ While hysteria has historically carried a strongly negative and misogynist meaning, in Lacanian-Žižekian (post-Freudian) psycho-analysis it is appreciated as a specific non-gendered affective relationship to social authority (the Law or 'big Other').

new, more progressive structures of signification to emerge (Gunder, 2003: 302–303, Gunder and Hillier, 2009: 124–126).¹⁹⁴

In Turkey, the two discourses stand opposed not only to the AKP government's 'master discourse' of capitalist realism, but also, as more of an internal enemy, to the long prevalent but increasingly untenable 'university/bureaucracy discourse' of Kemalist cynicism. Indeed, probably more than any other group, Gezi confronted new and older generations of 'organic intellectuals' (including planners) with an emotionally hard choice, of either taking the realist, entrepreneurial path and dropping any idea of the public interest; keep wallowing in cynicism (also over Gezi's results), continuing to feel alienated, hopeless and 'lost'; or take up the mantle of struggle and activism (as an increasing number of post-Gezi graduates do, Penpecioglu and Taşan-Kok, 2016). However, looking at the Gezi protests, while they may have been devotedly *non-violent*, it was in many regards a 'hysterical' event that in various ways radically questioned power. Somatic dramatizations of civil disobedience such as Taksim's *duran adam* effectively brought out the repressed (threat of) violence of the modern Turkish state. And probably more effectively than any intellectual commentary could at that moment. But as said, Gezi did more than create hysteria. The question is, however, whether we can understand that 'something more' through the rather distant and theoretical category of the 'analytical'. Here we run into the limits of the Lacanian-Žižekian analysis, tarrying as it does, only with the negative. Ultimately, 'traversing the fantasy' through the 'authentic ethical act proper' only brings us back to the *practically* void, 'miraculous' kind of 'transvaluation of all values' (Žižek, 2008b: 317n24) that we are familiar with from the post-Marxists: an event of pure negation that is logically unrecognizable before the fact and after only by arbitrary intellectual authority (of someone like Žižek).¹⁹⁵

6.3.3.3.2 Pleasures of political indirection

However, when set free of their necessary but impossible epicness, which only dichotomizes and clouds our evaluation of them, a psycho-analytic take on practices of civility and agonistics does point to the value of the second capacity of practices of civil resistance, besides restraint: *indirection*. Just as the clinical treatment of psychic sorrows often requires a certain indirect drawing out of 'repressed' affects into the open conversation (to then actively negate them), subaltern politicization practices

¹⁹⁴ For Žižek (2008b: 309–318) there is no complete suspension possible of the unconscious 'passionate attachments' that constitute the 'fundamental fantasy' of our political existence (any attempt would only mean displacement). Therefore, he suggests with Lacan that we try 'traversing (the fundamental) fantasy', which in his theoretical description looks suspiciously like the tenets of Gandhian resistance practice: a 'staging' of 'some kind of death' through 'passive suffering'.

¹⁹⁵ It remains rather ironic how poststructural commentators (Žižek, Badiou, Swyngedouw, Dikec etc.) tend to circumlocutorily police the meaning of the political. It seems to rest mostly on intellectual authority and political position whether an event such as Gezi is (always and necessarily retrospectively) deemed 'properly' political. Ultimately, these reflections are themselves only part of an antagonistic practice of politicization (which, as will be argued at the end of this chapter, may or may not be diplomatically or 'mesopolitically' efficacious according to the situation).

are confronted with the question of how to insert into the 'public transcript' of political discourse, by which Turkey is a liberal democracy (or at least solidly on its way there), the street-level 'hidden transcript' of marginalized concern, grievance, despair and anger (cf. Scott, 1990). Or rather, the question is how to produce and compose new, more inclusive relations and insubordinate identities that do not antagonize, or avoid being the source of antagonism even in the face of police violence? Here we may resort to the powers of indirection found in practices of courteous diplomacy and clownish provocation. Literally, this is the fun part of resistance and civility. But because of that, it has not been taken very seriously in a Western tradition of the study of power (Hobbes, Marx, Foucault) that somehow invariably finds its legitimacy and weight in a rather violent and utilitarian ontology (resp. state of nature, alienation, normalization, cf. Steger, 2006). Likewise, in the rather Protestant accounts of civility



Image 6.37. The "Tables of the Earth" (Yeryüzü Sofraları) occupation of İstiklâl Street, organized by Anticapitalist Muslims as part of the Gezi Movement (source: Everywheretaksim.net, 12-07-2013, accessed 05-10-2020).

of Freud, Elias and Foucault, ‘civilization’ is the name for power, both repressive and productive, that works through self-restraint, shame and guilt. As Sennett (2012: 118–119) keenly observes, it is this puritanical picture of power that seriously downplays the pleasurable aspects of civility (even in Foucault, where pleasure is foremost a function of power).

I. *An earthly everyday diplomacy*

For Sennett (2012), the craftsmanship of pleasurable political conversation is first found in early modern courtship and diplomacy. From there it spread to the bourgeois salon. Linguistically speaking, the diplomatic indirection practiced in these historical settings were characterized by a subjunctive mood, generously inserting words like ‘possibly’, ‘perhaps’, ‘I would have thought’. Indicating only propositions and dispositions, they have the power to open up a space for experiment, unforced change and joy: “By practicing indirection, speaking to one another in the subjunctive mood, we can experience a certain kind of sociable pleasure: being with other people, focusing on and learning about them, without forcing ourselves into the mould of being like them.” (ibid.: 22). Today’s challenge for urban politics is of course to further democratize this ‘mood’ of subjunction. And in this regard the Gezi Forums, as described above, can certainly be seen as an experiment of diplomacy for the multitude.

Quite in line with Sennett’s suggestions, Stengers (2005b) and Latour (2004a) similarly laud the constructive aspects of diplomatic practices, but in a more philosophical sense, welcoming nonhumans into the multitude.¹⁹⁶ Diplomacy then becomes the name for a more extensive, material-semiotic ‘composition of common world’ (or ‘cosmopolitics’) that can follow the hysteria of radical doubt (for Stengers, in a positive sense, the refusal of the ‘idiot’). Taking its time for ‘due process’ to occur, diplomacy is a practice of politicization that is unbearably *sloow* for those who like to short-circuit it through universal ‘reason’ or arbitrary ‘interests’. For technocratic experts, who like to measure the ‘general interest’, it annoyingly hesitates where there is already common sense over the public good. For antagonistic politicians and critical scholars, diplomacy only compromises and betrays set interests and comes across as ‘too procedural’ and ultimately impotent (which was indeed a general critique on the ‘horizontalist’ Occupy movements, supposedly lacking a grand, alternative vision of the world). However, a great example of the ‘more material’, cosmopolitical form of diplomacy practiced in the Gezi movement centered around food. Apart from the park’s communal kitchen and the many food donations keeping protesters well-fed, the movement’s Anticapitalist Muslims organized some highly subversive ‘counter-iftar’ events called ‘Tables of the Earth’ (*Yeryüzü Sofraları*). On

¹⁹⁶ It must be noted that Sennett does describe some nonhuman components of international diplomacy, which makes its description as ‘craftsmanship’ less metaphorical. For instance, the practice of the *bout de papier*, in which quite literally a circulating ‘piece of paper’ records unauthorized propositions to create ‘a space of deference’ from established interests and get diplomatic processes going (Sennett, 2012: 238–240).

the first day of Ramadan (July 9), a month after the evacuation of the Commune and in deliberate contrast to the luxurious fast-breaking events hosted by Beyoğlu's five-star hotels, the group organized an *iftar* event along İstiklâl Street. Occupying the busy shopping street's tram rails, turning it into a very long 'table' (Image 6.37), they simultaneously complicated the government's depiction of the Gezi activists as godless hoodlums (and therefore police intervention), criticized the AKP's form of ostentatious 'neoliberal' Islamism, and managed to bridge deep-seated cleavages within the movement through shared food (cf. Haksöz, 2015: 66–68). Similar events were organized at the Gezi forums. Thus the counter-*iftar* created a multiplicity of 'liminal zones' where old politics could make way for a friendly, low-key material-semiotics of 'everyday diplomacy' (cf. Sennett, 2012: 238). As such it is a particularly succinct example of the more general efficacy of the ubiquitous presence of food, music and dance at Occupy Gezi and many of its successive forums (cf. Bianchi, 2018).

II. *The provocative (in)civility of the carnivalesque*

However, as the above mentioned suspicions of antagonists and technocrats suggest, there is another risky and provocative aspect to the slowly 'scheming' figure of the diplomat. Against the *esprit de sérieux* prevailing among its critics, diplomatic conversationalists manage to make a subjunctive atmosphere pleasurable through "self-deprecating modesty [...] irony and paradox" (Sennett, 2012: 125). This skill of civility takes a capacity for a certain companionable lightness and nonchalance in gesture and speech, or in old courtly lingo, *sprezzatura* (ibid.: 117, 211). However, although Sennett thus recognizes the effective, non-puritanical role pleasure can take on in political conversation, what he still underplays is the transgressive *jouissance* that may accompany some productive forms of – to express it somewhat paradoxically – agonistic *incivility* (cf. Katiambo, 2019). Within its liminal zone, communicative *sprezzatura* can be a cheeky, teasing and therefore risky affair, balancing on the border of incivility. But precisely for having that quality, it contains special political bridging powers. Civility cannot just mean cosy conviviality, which would amount to a kind of communitarian depoliticization. As De Wilde (2015) demonstrates in the case of Amsterdam urban policy, it is then bound to be part of a governmentality that manipulates political difference away through music, dance, food and other cosy affects (more on which in Section 6.4.4.1 on the Dutch case). Therefore, agonistics also require 'provocative spheres' of civility (ibid.: 200–201).

This then points to a last dimension of the Gezi protests that many observers saw as a novelty for Turkish politics: its many expressions of carnivalesque cheekiness and subversive humour. Indeed, in her immediate commentary on the event, Navarro-Yashin (2013) characterized the Gezi occupation as a "turning of every governmental pronouncement topsy-turvy in carnivalesque fashion", a phrase she had used ten years earlier to describe what a social movement might look like that could break the spell of political cynicism pervading the Turkish nation (2002: 164–165). Her suggestion then referred to Sloterdijk's (1987) proposed remedy against the 'enlightened cynicism' of educated, Western baby boomers. As mentioned briefly, Sloterdijk contrasts the modern cynic with the ancient Greek 'kynic'. Diogenes of Sinope in particular, is



Images 6.38–6.39. On the left, a whirling dervish wearing a gas mask at the Gezi protests (source: Pinterest.com, accessed 05-10-2020). On the Right, a tweet containing the photo of a woman wearing a Guy Fawkes mask from the graphic novel *V for Vendetta*, later appropriated by hackers collective Anonymous and ubiquitously present at protests around the world since Occupy Wall Street (2011). During the Gezi occupation (2 June) it was shared with the caption ‘V for Teyzetta’, an example of ‘auntie humor’ (teyze meaning aunt in Turkish, Gurel, 2015, Dağtaş, 2016) (source: Twitter.com, accessed 05-10-2020)

for him the ultimate exponent of alternative, ‘uncivil enlightenment’ (ibid.: 102). By notoriously urinating and masturbating in public, the old ‘dog philosopher’ (kynicism comes from the Greek word for dog, *kyon*) enacted an ‘existential materialism’ that rejected Platonic idealism through somatic arguments. Just as Gandhi did, but in a very different way, Diogenes thus pursued and spoke truth through practical gestures as much as words (ie. in a Foucauldian practice of *parrhesia*, Flachbartová, 2018).¹⁹⁷ His cheeky truth-telling through clownish self-deprecation can be seen continued by the Medieval figures of court jesters and cunning ‘tricksters’ such as Till Eulenspiegel. Not exactly ascetic or diplomatic, these personas made an art out of tricking and luring people, especially power-holders, out of arrogant and belligerent tempers and into generosity and inclusivity.


Just as ascetic or diplomatic modes of civility can be translated to practices of the multitude, so can the persona of the kynical trickster be ‘democratized’ in the carnivalesque (cf. Sloterdijk, 1987: 117).¹⁹⁸ As famously recorded by Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakhtin (1984: 10), the Medieval European carnival “celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order” marking a “suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions” and enabling “in the town square, a special form of free and familiar contact [...] among people who were usually divided by the barriers of caste, property, profession, and age”. Fundamentally a “feast of becoming, change, and renewal”, the carnival thus also

¹⁹⁷ Of course ascetic restraint and cheeky indirection are not mutually exclusive and can to a certain degree go hand in hand. Gandhi was famously funny and Diogenes lived on scraps in a barrel. Similarly, the Gezi ‘gas festival’ is a rather hilarious appropriation. Nonetheless, both capacities of civility can be enacted independently, put to different uses and therefore analyzed separately.

¹⁹⁸ Conversely, it was the Medieval court fool or clown who represented the carnival spirit in everyday life outside the popular carnival season, “representing a certain form of life [...] on the borderline between life and art” (Bakhtin, 1984: 8).



GEZİ WARS



Images 6.40–6.41. Carnavalesque references on the street and in social media to the Star Wars movies. On the left, someone in a Darth Vader costume, the iconic bad guy of the franchise (source: Youtube.com, accessed 05-10-2020). On the right, a meme humorously translating the many political groupings of Gezi into the good and bad characters of (with Erdoğan depicted as Darth Vader, the police as his ‘stormtroopers’, hitman Boba Fett as the judiciary and crime lord and trader Jabba the Hutt as their crony business ‘fat cats’) (source: gaysofturkey.wordpress.com, accessed 05-10-2020).

made possible, in a playful and cheeky yet politically potent way, a kind of popular *parrhesia*: “speech and gesture, frank and free [...] liberating from norms of etiquette and decency” (ibid.). From this perspective, Gezi can be regarded as a true explosion of cheekiness and many have indeed interpreted it in terms of the carnivalesque (eg. Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014, D’Orsi, 2015, Dağtaş, 2016, Aksan, 2017). Now it must be said that Turkey has a long tradition of cheeky political critique, especially through newspaper cartoons and humor magazines. Its first such magazine (est. 1869), in the business of satirizing the Ottoman regime, was in fact named after Diogenes (*Diyojen*, Van het Hof, 2015: 32). However, in its Modern, pre-Gezi history, Turkey’s printed media humor was dominated by polarising binaries of secularist/Islamist, urban/rural, modern/backward or left/right (Dağtaş, 2016: 16–18). Not surprisingly then, a more premodern ‘naive but cunning’ subject made room for a ‘sarcastic and cynical citizen’ over the years (Van het Hof, 2015: 32).

Today, however, it seems the more carnivalesque ‘naive but cunning subject’ has returned and taken to the street (cf. Dağtaş, 2016: 19). The most immediate and bodily expression of this at the Gezi demonstrations was the extravagant attire of some of its participants. Besides the many Guy Fawkes masks (Image 6.39) and penguin outfits, some protesters wore ‘funnel helmets’, self-deprecatingly indicating deviance (‘madness’), which had taped off ‘id numbers’ on them, referring to some of the riot police covering up their identity to avoid persecution for their brutality (Dağtaş, 2016: 19, 2018). But also, among many others, someone was seen in full Darth Vader costume, possibly representing Erdoğan (Image 6.40). Another donned traditional whirling dervish attire and gas mask (Image 6.38), ironically setting off the Sufi meditation practice with the toxic tear-gassed environment. Other expressions of the carnivalesque were found in the countless slogans, signs, graffiti and internet memes. Immersed in popular references (sayings, songs, movies, TV series etc.), they were a mix of expressions of solidarity among groups, criticism of the government

and metapolitical messages. Examples are simply too many to treat exhaustively, but (inter)group solidarity was expressed by catchphrases such as ‘We are soldiers of Mustafa Keser’, substituting a kitschy folk singer for Mustafa Kemal (ie. an exclusive and very serious signifier of secular nationalism), or slogans in reference to the shared experience of facing the tear gas: “Were we afraid of gas, we wouldn’t fart” or “Do you also have strawberry [flavored gas]?” Of course the penguin was also ubiquitously present as the binding mascot, in puppet form, on signs, in memes and in the abundant graffiti around Taksim Square and İstiklâl Street (Images 6.34–6.35). Cheeky criticism came, for instance, in plays on Erdoğan’s expression ‘take your mother and go’, which he once famously slung at a farmer who said his agricultural policies ‘made his mother cry’ (a common Turkish expression of disapproval, Yanik, 2015: 164). Thus signs and graffiti read similarly worded phrases like “Take your shopping center and go” or “Your mother was at the barricade too”. Furthermore, both to create a shared identity and in criticism of the government, the prime minister’s labeling of protesters as *çapulcu* led to countless creative appropriations, such as signs saying “I’m neither Leftist nor Rightist, I am *çapulcu*” or graffiti reading “everyday I’m *çapulcu*” (*sic*, a version of the hip hop line ‘everyday I’m hustlin’). Both in-group and out-group construction came together with internet memes such as the widely circulating image of the ‘Gezi Wars’ (Image 6.41), again a reference to the Star Wars movie franchise. In a lighthearted way it attributes every major player in Turkish politics to a movie character. The last more reflexive metapolitical category included signs such as “Down with some things!”, indicating an agonistic, self-mocking modesty as opposed to revolutionary antagonism. A similar reflexive, self-ridiculing spirit could be detected in the slogan of an anarchist football supporter group: “[Beşiktaş Ultra Club] Çarşı is against everything, even against itself” (Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014: 130).

As Bakhtin (1984: 11–12) observes, carnivalesque provocation and anarchic ‘incivility’ are inherently and necessarily politically ambiguous. Unlike modern satire, he remarks, its anarchic laughter is not negative, oppositional or self-inflating (‘bare negation’ is entirely alien to it). It is fundamentally “ambivalent: it is gay, triumphant, and at the same time deriding [and] also directed at those who laugh”. However, it is exactly this quality that gives it some powerful egalitarian capacities on a practice level. At least three can be discerned here. First, in a very immediate, affective dimension, making fun of the authorities levels the battlefield by reducing fear among protesters toward police violence (Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014: 131, Dağtaş, 2016). Secondly, as Karakayalı and Yaka (2014: 130) also note, humor supports a certain ‘civility’ by virtue of its ‘peculiar indeterminacy’ of political meaning. Instead of directly appointing friends and enemies it keeps the political field ‘fluid’ and ‘open’. Here we may be reminded of Radcliffe-Brown’s (1940: 195–196) classic anthropology of the permissively disrespectful ‘joking relationship’: “a peculiar combination of friendliness and antagonism” which requires parties to not take offense too quickly to each other’s apparently ‘uncivil’ teases.

However, thirdly, fluid as it may be, humor does more than keep signification open by ‘refusing to other’ (empty *opposition*). As a truly minoritarian force of civility, of the aforementioned Deleuzian kind, it also provides opportunities for genuine political (*re*)*composition*, a ‘becoming-the-other’. This happens first of all

in creative recombinations that manage to make concerns and political identities that may emerge from them more inclusive in relation to each other. At Gezi, this happened in the co-evolution of slogans and signs. For instance, by virtue of their contact with others at Gezi, some groups such as football fans or nationalists removed sexist, homophobic or otherwise xenophobic slurs from their repertoire of slogans. Conversely, groups self-applied those same kinds of incivilities to make a point: “Faggots are here, where is Tayyip?” (referring to the absence of the prime minister, who was not in Turkey at that moment, Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014: 125). Thus this productive ambiguity did not necessarily stop at the Commune’s borders and could even extend to the ‘other side’ of the thereby dodged antagonism (one might say, it simply cannot be contained in principle). As Van het Hof (2015: 40, 45n9) keenly observes, many humoristic statements on Erdoğan expressed a kind of love-hate relationship with the prime minister, or the intention to ‘stay present’ at least with his more inclusive concerns. Persistently addressing the politician by his middle name *Táyyip*, even if playful (eg. ‘Gayyip’, meaning ‘lost’, Yanik, 2015: 160–164), also conveyed a kind of friendly familiarity (a practice which, of course, can also become problematic when serious journalists start doing it, as recently with British prime minister ‘Boris’). As such, we may say there can be something generous and abundant to the right kind of laughter. Not just scathing the opposition then, there was an element of outreach to the Gezi humor as well, a kind of diplomatic proposition. As Van het Hof (2015: 35–37) also notes, humor and irony can, by virtue of their ambiguity of structure and simultaneity of said and unsaid meaning, have the power to lure people into or out of certain political positions or practices (eg. electoral politics), or one might say, to ‘become-other’. This unexpectedly connects to the generally anarchistic spirit of the Gezi event. Much like the practices of its Commune were a form of prefigurative politics, immediately materializing the world one wants to live in, its nonviolent, carnivalesque spirit had a strong prefigurative element to it. Ultimately, any kind of cheeky ‘incivility’ it might have manifested was only superficial. Its deeper capacity for civility lay in how it managed to anticipate a joy of equality that the antagonistic situation all but tried to deny. As such its humorous practices can be read as a kind of ‘prefigurative irony’: the carnivalesque acting as if one were already equal brings out the (extremely seductive) tragicomic absurdity of that not being the case yet. More than showing another common world is possible, it takes a first step toward composing it.

Now as a strategy of minoritarian civility, the trick for the Left would of course be to lure people into politicizing more (inclusive) concerns, just as the Right seduces people into exclusivity (whereby the focus should be on concerns not identities, as trying to trick groups into a more inclusive attitude toward adversarial identities often only reinforces antagonism).¹⁹⁹ In the practice theory set out at the start of this chapter,

¹⁹⁹ As Žižek (1995: 926) rightly notes, there is a possibility that the transgressions of carnival take a violent, fascist turn, and in actual (Northern European) practice, it often does have such tendencies, even if of the ‘micro-fascist’ kind. However, the proof of whether carnivalesque practices can be said to be truly anti-hierarchical and antifascist (ie. Leftist) lies with whether their *jouissance* stems from tricking the powerful into inclusivity or not. For Žižek, it seems, carnival or any other actually existing, less than revolutionary egalitarian practice can never be anything but a disguise or displacement of domination and antagonism.

this would be the point where we find the criterion for distinguishing genuinely progressive humor from its conservative and antagonist others. The difference hinges not primarily on its distinct inclusion or exclusion of certain identities (eg. Jews, blacks etc.), but the anexact yet rigorous inclusivity or exclusivity towards (Jewish, black etc.) matters of concern, which of course include concerns over discriminatory expressions.²⁰⁰ A prime example here would be the so-called ‘auntie humor’ found at Gezi (Gurel, 2015). After the patronizing calls by AKP politicians for parents to take their children off the streets and into safety, many mothers responded by joining the protest (even forming a protective ring around the young protesters at one point). It was the occasion for many ‘auntie’ (*teyze*) jokes which exploited the funny incongruity of motherly figures (feminine, domestic, provincial) placing themselves in a situation where usually only young, masculine and cosmopolitan identities rule the scene (Image 6.39). The aunties were humorously portrayed as exerting ‘excessive force’ by throwing slippers or as ‘outside agitators’, a label used by AKP officials to designate the activists as part of some foreign conspiracy. Since then, questions have been raised whether such jokes are still helpful to the Left cause or only putting the aunties on the receiving end of a sexist and classist ‘symbolic violence’ (Gurel, 2015, Dağtaş, 2016, 2018). What generally informs such questions however, is a too hasty separation of the structured object (‘auntie’) and the agential subject the joke (the comedian, troll, trickster), which denies the former any participation or ingenuity. As if, for instance, the woman in Image 6.39 was not aware and did not think the discrepancy between her identity and the mask was funny and creative in a compositional sense.

A more generous, less serious, but perhaps more risky approach, would slow down and take its time to evaluate an auntie joke by how inclusive it is of her/their concerns in practice (eg. AKP paternalism), which also allows for different understandings, uses and modes of participation in the by nature ambiguous joke. The auntie may then come to compose an anti-stereotypical intersection of concerns that does not fit and therefore troubles and subverts the dominant antagonism (much like the Anti-capitalist Muslims). Likewise, cultural appropriation (very common in carnival) can be progressive as long as it orients itself toward genuine inclusion, meaning how inviting it is in terms of the (genealogically structured) multiplicity of concerns, skills and feelings provoked by the words and symbols thus appropriated. However, by its very ambiguous nature this cannot be an exact, deterministic science (the whole point of jokes is that they play with common sense logic, Virno, 2007). Thus a slide into antagonistic identity politics, whether through liberal political correctness or conservative bullying, will always remain an inherent risk. The art of (in)civility,

²⁰⁰ This approach would differ from a dialectical, psycho-analytic or discourse theoretical apprehension of the politics of comedy. For the latter (eg. McGowan, 2017: 161-177), humor is unavoidably exclusive as well as inclusive. Egalitarian humor would be exclusive toward authority, which, in order to leave nothing unscathed, always includes an element of self-subversion (‘self-exclusion’). While this might be so, however, this is also a typical way of saying that it is quite impossible, since on a performative level, the comedian always claims political agency, even as she supposedly undermines it. Therefore, in order to evaluate its masochistic (‘egalitarian’) rather than sadistic affects, it has to be tied to the inherently underdetermined distribution (and marginalization) of concerns in the context of a singular event (such as Gezi). Humor (as opposed to irony perhaps, Deleuze, 1989, 1990a, Ford, 2016) requires a generosity, tolerance for nonsense and deference of judgement that dialectical critique rarely allows.

however, lies with creating the always ephemeral and liminal place and time where generous joking relationships can flourish and identities can recompose to include more (inclusive) concerns than they presently do.

6.3.3.4 The legacy of Gezi: A new civility?

What the ultimate legacy of Legacy of Gezi will be remains to be seen. On the one hand, while some forums have survived, all of which outside Istanbul, they soon were left aside again when the municipal elections of March 2014 came around and old habits of aggregative practices forcefully reasserted themselves. Despite the Gezi revolts and another high-level corruption scandal in December 2013 the AKP did not suffer any significant losses. Neither did the European Union's delaying of accession talks after the crackdown on Gezi protesters. Thus AKP hegemony has not significantly weakened (Bozkurt, 2015), although it becomes questionable whether that Gramscian term is still applicable. The failed military coup of 15 July 2016 did in many regards push Turkish politics into the uncivil practices and authoritarian violence one expects from a Schmittian war machine in a state of exception (institutional purges, persecution of journalists etc.). On the other hand, however, Gezi was also highly innovative, producing new oppositional (majoritarian restraint and openness) and compositional capacities (minoritarian indirection, diplomacy and cynicism) that will transpire and inspire a whole new generation of politicized youth. While performatively warding off Erdoğan's efforts at polarization, its practices of civility have brought down long-standing boundaries of identity and place among groups and associations antagonized by the government. More than a great 'molecularization', breaking barriers and fusing a variety of concerns, Gezi has also been reshaping 'molar' politics and alliances. For instance, within the main opposition party, CHP, young members organized #OccupyCHP to transform the party in a more progressive direction after the disappointing 2014 elections (İnceoğlu, 2014, Draege et al., 2017). Likewise, the socialist HDP (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi* or Peoples' Democratic Party, est. 2012), as the party of Kurdish and other marginalized concerns such as LGBTQ rights, has appropriated many of the Gezi images and language in its campaigning and communication, including its newly found style of humor (Aksan, 2017). In sum, a whole assemblage of agonistic politicization including horizontal networking, expressive litigation and direct action has evolved during Beyoğlu's war of position over urban space. What it should demonstrate, as such, is how much resources (organizing efforts, skills, media etc.) have to be brought together to actually build a half decent resistance. As spontaneous and miraculous a square gathering like Gezi may seem, it is only the monumental tip of an iceberg of other practices of politicization.

6.3.4 Gentrification's career in Beyoğlu/Cihangir

Returning to the overall story of this section, we can now see how politicization occurs in between fragmentations and continuities of bureaucracy and civil society, planning and resistance. Rather than simple antagonisms and grand exceptions, it

usually comes in degrees and intensities. An interesting thread in this regard is how variations of the ‘anticipatory assemblage’ of state planning, as discussed in Section 6.3.2, evoke different temporalities or ‘speeds’ of resistance against gentrification (cf. Annunziata and Rivas-Alonso, 2018: 405–406). We can now see how the politics of speed of Turkish statecraft and resistance have co-evolved (‘intra-actively’) over decades. On an operational level, anticipatory practices of spatial planning (futuring) and legal control (stabilization) have increasingly been subverted by present-oriented practices of exception. Parallel to this, temporalities of resistance against gentrification have also shifted in Beyoğlu, from the more ‘hegemonic’, long-march networking, litigation and protest practices, to the prefigurative ‘direct action’ seen at Gezi. When the government becomes increasingly deaf toward protests and demands for participation, this switch to direct action is only a logical step. Graeber (2009) defines direct action, historically rooted in American Quaker anarchism and the antinuclear movement of the 1970s, as a practice that confronts issues directly and autonomously, without mediation of politicians or state bureaucrats. As such, it distinguishes itself from the permitted protests and petitions aimed merely at persuading representatives to change their behaviour outside of election season. Instead, by immediately materializing the society desired, it prefigures in the here and now, another, more direct democracy and a less violent, corrupt and polluting political economy. Nonetheless, as Graeber (ibid.: 433) observes by closer inspection, this distinction also comes in degrees: there is often an element of protest in direct actions and even permitted protests can contain ‘tiny prefigurative elements’ in practice. This mixture was certainly present at Occupy Gezi, where besides attempts to change the AKP’s behavior, the Gezi forums, Commune and humor instantiated a direct egalitarian alternative to the roundly disappointing electoral and bureaucratic practices of politicization. Conversely, however, we may also discover ‘tiny prefigurative elements’ in the preceding ‘hegemonic’ practices of association and litigation and in the ‘majoritarian’ protests (‘associate as if one were already autonomous’, ‘sue as if the law were already fair’, ‘voice as if one is already represented’ etc.). Reinterpreted this way, the prefigurative could be said to be the ‘minoritarian’ element or line of flight that persists (or should do so) in all Leftist practices of civility. From an unequal and unfair situation characterized by strong forces of antagonism the anarchistic element joyously prefigures an equality, a justice and ‘a people’ to come (indefinitely).

This leads us back to the pragmatic evaluation promised at the start of this chapter. That is, to the ‘mesopolitical’ question (more on which in the general conclusion of this chapter) of how the issue of gentrification can and should be politicized in Istanbul-Beyoğlu-Cihangir. How are antagonistic, agonistic or deliberative options for politicization endowed to affect and be affected by matters of gentrification *in this singular spatiotemporal conjuncture*? It is obvious that concerns of gentrification are not seriously addressed by the corrupt, dirty playing and violent antagonism of the current Right-wing government. Consequently, it is up to the Left to do it one way or another. In the Gezi movement, gentrification in Beyoğlu has been subsumed by a logic of equivalence (Laclau, 2006, Özen, 2015) under a whole mass of concerns, defined mostly in national rather than local terms. Reasoning from the spectrum of practices of politicization presented in Images 6.3–6.4, the challenge is now to

move in the right direction. Taking the direction to the left of our spectrum implies a radicalized antagonism, which would only reinforce the national as the defining scale: either another military coup, à la al-Sisi after the Tahrir Square uprisings, or a revival of the Maoist ambitions of the 1970s, which is most likely to again evoke a similarly violent reaction from ultranationalists now siding with the AKP (as seen already even against the forums, İnceoğlu, 2013). Both options are considered highly undesirable by the great majority of the population and certainly in Beyoğlu, as evidenced by the broad opposition to the 2016 coup attempt. Moreover, both options are also highly unlikely to make any difference in relation to the issue of gentrification and the right to the city. Moving in the other, right direction therefore makes sense. This presents us with the two, non-mutually exclusive options of participatory consensus building and, as the lesser choice, (local) electoral success. As mentioned above, the more habitual electoral option is tried, also on an urban scale, by the younger membership of the CHP and by the more marginal HDP. However, the first, more interesting option in terms of getting local gentrification concerns on the agenda, would imply manoeuvring the agonistic, prefigurative Gezi forums into actually decision-making state institutions (which is very hard to do in the ‘semi-authoritarian’ context of Turkey, Ugur-Cinar and Gunduz-Arabaci, 2020). To keep the Gezi spirit alive, this of course should be done with a minimal loss to the forum’s joyful egalitarian ethos (as an antidote to all too serious, boring and often exclusionary rationalism of technocratic and patriarchal deliberation). While such an institutionalization of the forums would require a huge and sustained effort, it could be done directly in any locale, to then work from the bottom up, as was already done in the months after the Gezi insurgency but then nipped in the bud by the elections. The associational infrastructure and organizational capacity for it are already present, certainly in Beyoğlu.

6.4 An Arnhem-Klarendal to (de)politicize

6.4.1 Introduction: The unusual suspicion of unexceptionality

In contrast to our Turkish case, and in step with the law’s secondary importance to Foucauldian governmentality (Foucault, 1991: 95), Dutch planners make little mention of it as a subject and tool of politicization. Being the rule rather than the exception, exemptions to land-use plans become quite unexceptional and have been institutionalized (Buitelaar et al., 2011). In a general practice of consensus around housing policy and any land-use changes in its service, the kind of brash practices of exception described above are rare. However, from some of the literature one might get a different impression. In general, Dutch analyses of urban politics can be somewhat overly dramatic and selective, often concentrating on extreme cases to be able to make strong critical (theoretical) points. Thus Rotterdam is chosen for its brazenly explicit promotion of *gentrificatie* (Doucet et al., 2011), for its overtly revanchist or exclusionary political rhetoric (Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008, Van Eijk, 2010), or because of its shady ‘behind the front door’ interventions, leaving targeted subjects legally denuded (Schinkel and van den Berg, 2011, Uitermark et al., 2017). Alternatively, the focus is on an economically high-pressured and alarmingly

(neo)liberalizing Amsterdam (Van Gent, 2013, Uitermark and Bosker, 2014), which was once such a shining and rare example of a truly ‘just city’ (Uitermark, 2009). However, to instead flesh out the more regular, unexceptional workings of advanced liberal governmentality and its possible relations with gentrification, our focus is on a more ordinary, less economically pressured Dutch town, Arnhem. There, social mix and gentrification policies resemble those of the aforementioned Hoogvliet case – or at least at first sight. Like Hoogvliet and in contrast to the more classical, less state-led case of gentrification in Arnhem’s Spijkerkwartier (Smets and Van Weesep, 1995), postwar Klarendal knew neither real estate nor consumer interest. Eventually, it was a political alliance of resident associations, municipality and housing corporations that enabled the whole package of interventions that also included social mixing and commercial gentrification efforts (without much legal controversy).

In what follows, three of the aforementioned ‘technologies of integration’ (Uitermark, 2014, see Section 6.2.2) that were instrumental in this process, as part of the assemblage, will be described and complicated respectively: *integral* area-based policy-making as a historical outcome (Section 6.4.2); *statistical monitoring* as an attempt to govern Klarendal from a distance (Section 6.4.3), and *decentralization* of decision-making, not just from the national to municipal, but further to the neighborhood level (Section 6.4.4). Together, these accounts shed light on the opportunities and challenges for politicizing gentrification inside and outside a highly institutionalized and ‘unexceptional’ policy assemblage.

6.4.2 *Toward an integral area-based urban policy*

Concerns of residential, commercial and socio-political displacement have circulated in Klarendal throughout its nonlinear postwar history. Indeed, largely forgotten among its current inhabitants, Klarendal was the target of comprehensive gentrification efforts before. During the 1960s the city of Arnhem let Klarendal deteriorate, shutting down and demolishing dwellings with little logic to it, leaving those staying put in desolate living conditions. When this provokes violent insurrections such as the arsoning of boarded up buildings and fights with the police, the municipality doubles down and announces the accelerated demolition of the entire neighborhood to make way for new low-rise residences. The local old-timers who do, recall this as an attempt to turn the area into a ‘villa neighborhood’ for the rich (Interview no. 036), which to their standards it certainly was. However, sustained opposition from working class Klarendallers, ranging from more violent confrontations to mass protests at city hall to more carnivalesque actions (Images 4.42–4.43), eventually lead to a change of political practice. A new ‘working group Klarendal’ (*Werkgroep Klarendal*) working under the motto ‘fight and talk’ (*knokken en praten*) facilitates and explicitly aims at a gradual transition from a molecular and antagonistic situation to an agonistic practice of negotiation and peaceful collaboration.

Meanwhile, new political channels open up for other matters of concern. As a 1987 publication celebrating the working group’s fifteenth anniversary indicates:



Images 4.42-4.43. On the left, an aerial photo showing the large-scale demolition (above) and new social housing (below) in the 1970s. Thanks to Klarendal's protests and the actions of the Working Group, gentrification was averted and new 'good and cheap' housing replaced most of the severely dilapidated housing stock. On the right, Working Group Klarendal protests 'even during Carnival' (ca. 1974). Here, a woman is sitting in her 'living room' atop a parade wagon. The placards on the vehicle read: 'Klarendal Duurdal' (something like 'Klarendal pricey-ville') and 'gas unaffordable', both referring to increasing living costs. 'Good and cheap' was not always true and bad insulation had gas expenditures exploding (source: Werkgroep Klarendal, 1997).

“While the urban renewal is not finished yet, attention now focuses on the maintenance and management of the improved neighborhood. Because new problems are on the rise, or were always there. There is severe impoverishment in some parts of the neighborhood, the drug trade causes a lot of misery, the pollution problem is extensive. People are leaving the neighborhood, with consequences for social cohesion. We need to prevent that Klarendal will again be in need of urban renewal in twenty years. Neighborhood management (wijkbeheer) is a way to prevent that ” (Werkgroep Klarendal, 1987: 10, my translation)

Although the document showed some first mentions of ‘social safety’ (*sociale veiligheid*) and ‘livability’ (*leefbaarheid*) – words which would come to dominate political discourse in the coming decades – it took a long time for the city government to pick up these emerging concerns. So despite all the working groups’ efforts, the neighborhood exploded and shifted back into molecular mode again just two years later. In the late summer of 1989 riots broke out making international news. Feeling generally abandoned by municipal politicians, who had made the concentration of soft-drug vendors in Klarendal official city policy (as mentioned, a half-criminal business by design), Klarendallers took to the streets with violent vigilante actions against drug dealers, wandering addicts, drug tourists and their German-plated vehicles. Although the riots were to usher in a new era for Klarendal, as politicians were quick to promise afterwards, progress still proved very slow. It was the start of a municipal Livability Policy Plan (*Beleidsplan Leefbaarheid*) which comprised the then new concept of the ‘neighborhood post’ (*wijkpost*) where police, social workers and neighborhood managers were concentrated in order to deal immediately and in concert with emergent concerns. While during the 1990s the neighborhood’s

livability issues improved and relapsed periodically it became clear that an integral neighborhood post was not sufficient (as evidenced in the Neighborhood Plan for 1998–2002) and that a more comprehensive policy package was needed.

With political support from a charismatic city mayor in search of a last good deed before leaving office, the new century therefore came with a new policy covenant called ‘Klarendal Come On!’ (*Klarendal Kom Op!*, 2001). During the years 2001–2002, encompassing many platform meetings and wider neighborhood conventions, the covenant consolidated into an integral ‘neighborhood vision’ entitled ‘Klarendal, color and character’ (*Klarendal Kleur en Karakter*, 2003). Important in this process was for the municipality and residents, but also local businesses and housing associations, to truly join hands and develop a more cooperative attitude. A literally round table, then located at the platform’s neighborhood center (*wijkwinkel*), served, and still does, as an important mediator to achieve this. With no one at the head of the table everybody is equal (Interview no. 002) (Image 6.44).

The table moreover inspired a particular translation of the social, economic and physical ‘pillars’ of the national Big City Policy (*Grotestedenbeleid II*, 1999–2004) into three local variants (Interview no. 001). While the neighborhood platform went on as the social table, newly added were an economic table, including business owners and their associations, and a ‘physical’ table, concerned with safety and livability of public space. Taking a seat at all three tables, one particular stakeholder took on a leading role in the years to come. This was People’s Housing (described in detail in the previous chapter), which like many other Dutch housing associations had



Image 6.44. The round table in 2017, literally and deliberately so (still). This photograph is taken during the ‘open part’ of a Neighborhood Council meeting (to be discussed below), which apart from the ca. 10 residents includes neighborhood professionals of the municipality, social work and housing corporation.

grown significantly in size through mergers and also financially after its (semi-) privatization in 1995 and the continual rise of real estate values in general. Rich in resources and still owning about half of Klarendal real estate, the organization was able to take the lead in Klarendal's transformation, which included efforts at housing differentiation and social mixing. In accordance with the common sense among policy-makers, *Klarendal Kleur en Karakter* included plans for bringing down the share of social housing in the neighborhood to 'bring it to balance'. This has led to a sustained but still mild decrease in social housing in the neighborhood. Much more far-reaching, and heavily instigated through the economic table, was the gradual roll out of a 'Fashion Quarter', a cluster of creative businesses installed by the housing corporation to revitalize the two deteriorated main streets of Klarendal. Taking off with a few erstwhile invisible craftsmen already living in the neighborhood, Volkshuisvesting started acquiring a large part of the real estate along its commercial axes and through heavy branching filled it with fashion designers, hip boutiques, restaurants and even a hotel. It substantially changed the image of the neighborhood and the safety perception of its public areas. By lucky coincidence, these policy efforts gained momentum just when the national Vogelaar neighborhood program (Vogelaar, 2007) came around to give it an additional boost of funds and legitimacy (about which more below). It consolidated earlier achievements and helped institutionalize the routine drafting of 'neighborhood action plans' (*wijkactieplannen*) similar to but less comprehensive than *Klarendal Kleur en Karakter*.

Meanwhile, social mixing policies could count on local support of, or at least indifference among, working class natives. This, we witnessed ourselves as well at two open and well visited evenings in late 2015 when the new neighborhood action plan for 2016–2017 was discussed.²⁰¹ A fair sample of residents, including many 'old Klarendallers', could bring in any matter of concern, which would be grouped by theme on six flip-overs. At the second evening meeting the list of issues would then

²⁰¹ The Neighborhood Action Plans come into being through an elaborate participatory process, which the 'district director' manages and which is communicated through the neighborhood paper and the internet in order to reach as many people as possible (Interview no. 027). Initially, the director talks to residents and professionals. Input has to come 'bottom-up'. So first there is a neighborhood dialogue with a (as much as possible) representative sample of around 35 to 40 people. This works better than inviting 500 and then hearing only five of the usual suspects. This input the director combines with her own thoughts on the neighborhood she gets from the figures on a number of parameters (demography, unemployment and so on) to be found in the neighborhood profiles coming from Research and Statistics. A plan comes out of this collaboration in the form of an excel sheet, which is then posted on the web to give the whole neighborhood a chance to respond. From this, a concept plan is induced that is brought before the Neighborhood Council (eight to ten members, yet meetings are open to all, so usually around thirty attendees). (Although not written in stone and many times simply not feasible with the people that sign up for the task, representativity in the Neighborhood Council is definitely strived for. Sometimes it is hard to find people able to participate from the migrant communities because of language barriers.) In the Neighborhood Council the plan is boiled down to ten top priorities (sometimes using democratic voting techniques, as in Images 6.45–6.46). After having come to a final Neighborhood Action Plan it is formally and festively launched by the collective signing of all the plans of all the neighborhoods by the alderman for Neighborhood oriented policy. After this the director goes to work, connecting 'spearheads' with an allocation of financial resources. Afterwards, the process is reflected upon in an after-evaluation in the form of a survey (developed by Research), which is distributed among people attending the Neighborhood Council.

WONEN / WOONOMGEVING

- GROFVUIL WORDT WEER GRATIS MET DE VUILNISWAGEN OPGEHAALD
- ER BLYVEN VOLDOENDE HUURWONINGEN BESCHIKBAAR VOOR MENSEN MET EEN LAAGERE INKOMEN
- LEEFBAARHEID EN VEILIGHEID
 - BEWONERS NEMEN MEER VERANTWOORDELIJKHEID VOOR HUN EIGEN LEEFOMGEVING. Bijvoorbeeld schoonheid eigen buurt en betrokken bij verschillende -groenprojecten: (boomspiegels, helpen bij klaretwijn)
 - PARKKEER PROBLEMEN AAN DE KARENDALSEWEG BIJ HET WINKELCENTRUM WORDEN AANGEPAKT.
 - ER WORDT NIET MEER GEFITST OF GESKATED OP DE PASSAGE IN HET WINKELCENTRUM.
 - PARKEREN IN DE WYK WORDT PROJECT MATIG AANGEPAKT.

• DE VERKEERSDREMPELS AAN DE HOFLAAN/ROSENDAAL SE STRAAT WORDEN VERUANGEN.

• ANNEG NIEUWE Legamaster DREMPELS WORDT BESPROKEN

MAGIE-CHART

ONDERWIJS

- PEUTERWERK, VOOR EN NASCHOOLESE OPVANG EN DE BASISCHOOL WERKEN NAUW SAMEN VOLGENS DE METHODIEK VAN HET INTEGRAL Kind Centrum.
- KINDEREN IN GROEP 8 KRIJGEN ALS VOORBEREIDING OP MIDDELBAAR ONDERWIJS "BRUGKLASTRaining."
- WINKELS EN MODEKWARTIER
 - ER IS MEER DIVERSITEIT IN HET AANBOD VAN WINKELS MET LANGERE OPENINGSTIJDEN Maandag wordt een breder winkelpubliek aangetrokken
 - GOEDE PROMOTIE VAN ALLE WINKELS IN KARENDAL
 - BEWONERS HEBBEN INSpraak BIJ DE BRANCHERING VAN HET WINKELGEBIED.
 - ER IS GOED CONTACT TUSSEN BEWONERS EN ONDERNEMERS
 - TIJDENS EVENEMENTEN WORDT ER WAAR MOGELIJK SAMENGEWERKT WAARDOOR IEDEREEN ZICH BETROKKEN EN WELKOM VOELT.

Images 6.45–6.46 on opposite page. Voting by stickers (any form or color) on issues to be included in the neighborhood action plan of 2016 (28-10-2015) (source: own photo). The upper theme on Image 6.45 reads “Housing and environment” which includes the issues “Bulky waste pickup should be free of charge again” (5 votes) and “There should remain enough housing for people with low incomes” (4 votes). The lower theme reads “Livability and safety” which has no votes on “People should take responsibility for keeping their own environment clean” while the last two themes, on renewing (3 votes) or introducing speed bumps (4 votes), do get some votes. The second theme on Image 6.46, which is relevant here, “Shops and Fashion Quarter”, has four votes, roughly covering the first four, interrelated issues: “There should be more diversity in shops, with longer opening hours” (and in small letters: “this would attract a more broad range of shoppers”); “Good promotion of all shops in Klarendal”; “Residents get a voice in branching policy”; “there should be good contacts between residents and businesses.”

be prioritized through voting by placing stickers on the flip-over sheets. The issue of gentrification, both residential (Image 6.45) and commercial (Image 6.46), although certainly addressed, did not get much priority. After at least ten years of sustained gentrification efforts, ‘keeping available enough rental homes’ and ‘diversifying the Fashion Quarter’ got a mere four votes each, which paled compared to the demand of a new community center (*koffiehuis*) (12), the return of a traditional neighborhood market and yearly event (*winkelweek*) (12), the accessibility of underground dumpsters (9), or the need for playground objects (8). These priorities of concerns are indicative of the accommodative political practice that grew out of *Klarendal Kom Op* from 2001 onwards. A certain amount of gentrification was taken as part of the deal as long as other concerns such as clean streets and care for community spaces were properly addressed.

It must be said, however, that for this cooperative spirit of negotiation to exist a prior ‘cultural transition’ was required (Interview no. 008), enlisting a relatively fresh generation of ‘old Klarendal’ community leaders (ie. autochthonous, working class). This of course did not go down easily with some of the old guard, one of whom at some point even tried to establish an alternative neighborhood platform, *Kan niet anders!* (‘Can’t resist!’; 2009, Interview no. 037). It was to no avail, as the platform and its erstwhile charismatic initiator soon appeared to others as out of sync with the new times, if not ridiculous. Slowly but surely then, the style of deliberation of the old neighborhood platform, where, in the words of the then active community worker, ‘whoever screamed the loudest got heard’ (Interview no. 004), was replaced by a more careful and ‘decent’ consensus building, practiced within a new consultation council (*bewonersoverleg*). Nonetheless, to keep minds sharp in Klarendal, today’s ‘new’ generation of charismatic prominents also know to make clear their compliance is not unconditional. Referring to the 1960s anti-gentrification protests, which included the then ‘mayor of Klarendal’ famously dumping horse dung on the steps of city hall, one present community leader explains “we have become more decent [*fatsoenlijker*] in our protests. Unless of course they [the government] say ‘we are going to close the playground and you will be no longer subsidized’. Well then we will have a thousand people at city hall, [from] the whole of Arnhem, that I can tell you.” (Interview no. 008) Similar statements are uttered in reference to the riots, where it is claimed that the new ‘fashion people’ (*modemensen*) should know themselves ‘visitors’ still, and

can just as easily be thrown out like the drug tourists back in 1989. While both very unlikely, what we find represented here as possible scenarios is a very real virtual presence of the capacity for the public to molecularize and become explosive again in any way, shape or form. Below, we will show how this switch of political practice indeed occurs now and then but on a much more restricted scale, within and around the Neighborhood Council.

With this historical trajectory in mind the following two subsections will interpret current practices of politicization in and around Klarendal as answers to problems of governmentality and ‘advanced liberalism’ (Rose, 1999). Like many other liberal democracies experience today, the Dutch electoral system, as the traditional channel for liberal governance, seems to short-circuit. As mass media and the polling companies they enroll incessantly express the people’s will to itself, they spawn an increasingly self-referential political system defined by a fragmented but converging electoral equilibrium (cf. Schinkel, 2012). In the Netherlands this also translates through to city councils, as municipal elections are dominated by those same national media and party politics, leaving little margins for local campaigning (Interviews no. 028, 029). Left then with an ideologically rudderless system, national and local government actors and their academic allies invent other ways to gauge and factualize the general interest, that is, sort out matters of concern. Here we will discuss two of the most obvious technocratic proxies for the public interest: truth and money. Firstly then, we explore how some recent attempts at depoliticizing urban neighborhood policy produces an infatuation with facts and figures of policy effects but also how this runs into a local ‘politics of methods’ and other limits of scientific evaluation (Section 6.4.3). And secondly, we look at the (in)capacities of increasingly area-based and demand-driven public budgeting (Section 6.4.4).

6.4.3 Government at a distance failing: Truth, pride and grace

More than for most other thirty-nine participating Dutch districts, the national, so-called Vogelaar neighborhood program (2007–2009) provided Klarendal’s existing policies with a significant boost. The ambitious program named after Ella Vogelaar, the specially appointed Minister of Housing, Neighborhoods and Integration of the Labour party (PvdA), was to elevate within eight to ten years the country’s worst ‘problem areas’ (*probleemwijken*) into ‘powerful’ places of opportunity (*krachtwijken*). Forty districts, henceforth dubbed ‘Vogelaarwijken’, ranked lowest on a specially devised index (re)constructed by statistics company ABF Research (Brouwer and Willems, 2007). The rather troubled 18 indicator index (Van Gent et al., 2007, 2009) combined ‘facts’ on economic and physical ‘laggings’ (*achterstanden*) and ‘judgements’ on ‘problems’ of ‘livability’ concerning ‘the neighborhood and its residents’ (Minister Vogelaar, 22-03-2007). While a rather stigmatizing triage, it was soon accepted as part of the deal by targeted areas when it became clear how much money was involved. Local housing corporations, moreover, were to play an important part in the transformation to powerful neighborhoods, not just financially but by cooperating closely with other welfare institutions. They should no longer just be ‘stacking bricks’ (*stenen stapelen*) but also invest in ‘people’ (*mensen*).

Part of the program, and in line with a general New Labour governmentality (Sullivan, 2011), was that it was to be monitored and evaluated scientifically by the nationally operating Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (SCP). But other research institutes were also invited to evaluate the neighborhood policies. While by then, as mentioned, Arnhem and Klarendal already had an extensive tradition of area-based policy making, the Vogelaar funds were very welcome in reinforcing existing policies and with the establishment of the Fashion Quarter. Despite the PvdA staying on as a national governing party, Vogelaar's program proved short-lived. While it was supposed to run for ten years it lasted only three and a half, also counting the already uncertain preparation phase. As a consequence of her resignation, forced by the party leadership in November 2008, the revelation of some administrative scandals involving housing corporations and the political impact of the global financial crisis, the will to carry on the neighborhood program diminished with every successor (Van der Laan; Middelkoop; Blok). Corporations were to return to their core business of 'stacking stones'.

The publication of an early evaluation study by the prominent *Atlas voor gemeenten* did not help either, supporting a similar conclusion (Marlet et al., 2009, the same 'social cost-benefit analysis' mentioned earlier in 5.3.4.3, which monetized livability through house prices). Based on statistics from before the program (1999-2008) it demonstrated that 'social investments' by housing corporations in neighborhood



Images 6.47-6.48. Covers of evaluations of neighborhood policy. On the left one of the SCP quasi-experimental studies ("Work on the neighborhood: A quasi-experimental evaluation of the Vogelaar policy", 2013) and on the right the realistic evaluation by Verwer ("An issue of trust: The workings and strengthening of collective efficacy in disadvantaged neighborhoods", 2012).

centers, playgrounds, community associations and social events had no significant effect on livability but ‘physical investments’ such as restructuring or the sale of social housing did. To cap off the program’s downfall and as the public deathblow to the ambitious social engineering ideal it implied, came two devastating quasi-experimental evaluation studies by the SCP (Wittebrood et al., 2011, Permentier et al., 2013, Image 6.47). While the latter’s conclusions were anything but straightforward, aside perhaps from those on the effects of restructuring, the general implication was that the only way for Vogelaar’s concerns of ‘livability’ to improve (an index, it has to be noted, contaminated if not tautologously determined by class and ethnic composition, cf. Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008, Uitermark et al., 2017) was gentrification by bulldozer, ‘physically’ restacking humans in supposedly more balanced compositions.

The rather technical SCP reports, which would normally not find their way to Klarendal easily, nonetheless stirred up quite a controversy there. Not feeling represented by the statistics, the municipality, housing corporation and even residents loudly voiced their discontent in the media (De Gelderlander, 24-06-2011, De Volkskrant, 03-08-2013). Despite the reports’ careful argumentation, disclaimers and conclusions, which were indeed not served the most nuanced press coverage, people in Arnhem found them doing great injustice to their efforts. Proud of the results they thought they had achieved, they were hoping Klarendal could finally leave behind its age-old stigma. Confronted with the SCP’s harsh facts, the first reaction of affected policy makers was to start semantically deconstructing them. Some targeted methodological decisions underlying the figures (De Gelderlander, 24-06-2011, Trouw, 03-09-2013), like the use of ‘outdated data’. What might not be ideal but inherent to the logic and practice of data-driven quasi-experiments, like evaluating social investments of the Vogelaar program (2007-2011) with the use of data on previous programs (*Onze Buurt aan Zet*, 2001-2004), looks like an absurd detachment for the ‘more local’ administrators. Other policy makers immediately pointed to alternative conclusions from other evaluation studies (Trouw, 03-09-2013), or would doubt the measurability of social interventions (De Volkskrant, 03-08-2013) or even questioned the intentions of the researchers (De Gelderlander, 02-07-2011).

Apart from administrators, other evaluators of a different methodological cut also made themselves heard. One of the authors of a qualitative and ‘realistic’ evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) of Arnhem’s neighborhood policies, commissioned by the city’s five housing corporations, called the SCP report misleading (Verwer, 2013). While the said evaluation study did not question the prevailing hierarchy of scientific evidence (Verwer and Walberg, 2012: 21-25, citing Sampson et al., 1997, as also found in Wittebrood et al., 2011), it points at the impossibility of quasi-experimentally testing the Vogelaar program because of its ‘social’ nature. Instead, the realists say, an evaluation of neighborhood policy should get in touch with a community’s ‘collective efficacy’, which is an issue of social trust (Image 6.48), among a collective of humans that is. Were all these commentaries acts of politicization ‘proper’ against a ‘police’ regime of governmentality? Not exactly. They were neither contesting the technocratic premise that local concerns and their uptake may be properly evaluated and channeled by science, nor were they espousing to antagonize any

instance in particular (except perhaps for those doubting the disinterestedness of the researchers' intentions). But practices of politicization they were nonetheless. What they were politicizing were the limited *methods* employed by the official researchers, which were quite consequential in addressing certain concerns while marginalizing others.

6.4.3.1 Rational distance versus charismatic groundedness?

However, while all these policy evaluations and their critics attempted to decide *over* Klarendal 'at a distance', there were indignant reactions from *within* the neighborhood too. For instance, one community leader we spoke to, wrote a letter to the SCP protesting their 2013 report: "On behalf of many volunteers and residents of Klarendal we ask, how is it that all our efforts over recent years have, *in your opinion*, done nothing? How our neighborhood has made such progress and how *proud* are we of it." (De Volkskrant, 03-08-2013, my translation, emphasis added). Sure, he later opined to us, some progress could be ascribed to a level of mild, predominantly commercial gentrification, but only in combination with a whole host of 'social' organizations, projects and events (Interview no. 008). Two years earlier, the 2011 report was met with even less mercy by another active and respected neighborhood figurehead: "Those scholastics may do whatever they like [*ze doen maar die gestudeerden*], but Klarendal has greatly progressed over the last ten years" (De Gelderlander, 24-06-2011). Later in an interview he further explained to us: "Those numbers stand outside reality. These guys [researchers] should come here, to the neighborhood, with their feet in the mud [*met de poten in de modder*], and then you can evaluate how things stand around here." (Interview no. 036) The 'mud' that he speaks of in the Dutch expression for getting one's feet wet and hands dirty, is the material-semiotic concerns circulating through the neighborhood. And the problem he has with 'those scholastics' is the maximal distancing they enact in their attempt to translate humans into stone-like atoms (cf. Latour, 2010c).

However, neither reducible to a distant stack of human bricks nor to a somewhat more proximate social collective of trusting and efficacious human souls, a neighborhood's political life is a pressing bundle of 'human-stone' issues that can get lost on us when the two are 'bifurcated' by science (Latour, 1993). Indeed, already in our 'deep history' a close interrelation can be traced of the mineral, the organic and the cultural: first the mineralization of life in the evolution of vertebrate endoskeletons and then the building of stone urban 'exoskeletons' (DeLanda, 1997: 27). But presently as well, neighborhood life constitutes a singular 'human-lithic enmeshment' at base, which kindles all the practices, stories and metrics that try to give it a sense and direction. In the words of medievalist Jeffrey Cohen: "Stone becomes history's bedrock as lithic agency impels human knowing. Neither dead matter nor pliant utensil, bluntly impedimental as well as a collaborative force, stone brings story into being, a partner with language (just as inhuman), [...] a 'matterphor'." (2015: 4) For those active in the neighborhood on a daily basis and for decades already that 'mud' of concerns is both more than a physical environment and a metaphor. It is a living matterphore.

How may one politicize such a muddy matterphore if not as a stack of atoms or ethereal social whole? At this point it seems we are reaching the limits of the *scientific* method as an instrument for making visible and sorting out the present concerns, at least as it has evolved up to now. Is it here then finally that the Schmittian ‘politics proper’ takes off? Again, not exactly. On the one hand, agreeing with classical sociologies of power by Schmitt (2008) or his teacher Max Weber (1978), this seems to be the entry point for that special knowledge and power, or grace (*charis*), that befalls only prophets and other charismatic leaders. Weber and Schmitt share a rather spectacular and personal conception of charismatic authority – the latter would say, a secularized ‘political theological’ conception (Schmitt, 1985, 2008). Both thinkers also obsess about the limits of rational scientific (‘depoliticized’) rule and how any hope of escaping the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucracy would have to come from ‘extraordinary’ moments of crisis and vocational heroism. At first impression, the story of Klarendal appears to fit this picture. There were the years of crisis in the 1990s, marked by riots and resentment over an unresponsive and permissive social democratic state, and then relief by a fresh caste of community leaders and a charismatic mayor, who according to local lore (as told especially by the protagonists themselves) instigated the burrough’s eventual salvation by addressing it from a crate among the rubble of a vacant lot.

On the other hand, this oppositional contiguity of rationality and charisma is too simple. While Schmitt’s overly legalistic structuralism would never bother with any non-miraculous political practice (Kalyvas, 2008), Weber did at least attempt to ground charismatic authority in emotional motivations or ‘public fears and wishes’ (DN Smith, 1998: 47). Still, as Schmitt saw very well (1985: 44), devolving authority by charisma to personality and followers’ motives, only displaces the enigma of its workings to psychology (is it ‘personal’ and ‘innate’ to the ‘exemplary’ individual leader or does it inhere to the ‘emotional’ decision and ‘irrational’ devotion of the followers?). If Weber’s notion of charisma was elusive and ambiguous, it was because it thus put the individualism and rationalism of his sociology to the ultimate test – much like ‘collective effervescence’ did for Durkheim (2001) coming only from a macrosociological position (indeed the aforementioned vindication of Gabriel Tarde, who knew how to address this affective dimension in less mysterious terms, very much rests on this issue, see Chapter 2). In the neo-Kantian sociologies of Durkheim and Weber, sublime social events and feats of extraordinary individuality offer the aesthetic lines of flight (cf. Deleuze, 1984) that both dissolve and reconstitute the micro-macro link and magically reconnect sociology to its psychological substrate. Ultimately, however, this (dis)graceful irrationality at the core of social life and science does not sit easy with the latter’s fundamental ambitions. The irrational (affect, charisma) is obviously an essential part of human life, but for exactly the same reasons that it still persists through extensive bureaucratization it defies scientific interpretation – at least as classically defined. What ultimately keeps classical sociologies and policy evaluation studies that rely on them from truly engaging with the charismatic element of political efficacy is their stubborn alignment of charisma with the ideal, the transcendent, the religious and the political, while contrasting it with material life, the immanent, the economic, and the everyday. Consequently the obvious materiality of the most spiritual gatherings and practices does not truly

register. However, not bifurcating matter and spirit in the first place, while neither jumping into Schmittian abstractions, would make charisma no less ‘material’ and ‘everyday’ than any bureaucratic, economic or scientific practice. It would have us notice the materiality and mundanity of the practice of grace. Indeed, contrary to Weber’s understanding there is a lot of ‘routinization’ and skill to the practice of charisma. Moreover, we would see non-human ‘objects’, including those in the urban environment, as more than mere projections or carriers of a more ‘primary charisma’ emanating from special human individuals or events (as in Weber in Potts, 2009: 121). To skillfully navigate and practice the routine ‘everyday diplomacy’ (Sennett, 2012) *from within* the aforementioned ‘matterphor’ that is Klarendal, one has to be in touch with its singular *grace* – a relation indeed anathema to scientific evaluation.

6.4.3.2 Pastoral powers: The care work of charis-ma

From a non-modernist perspective then (cf. Latour, 1993, 2005a, Miller, 2013), grace and political theology could come to look very different from Weber’s or Schmitt’s conceptions. Instead of taking the religious as the simple opposite of science, where the latter coldly measures (‘knows’) given matters of facts while the former interprets (‘believes in’) miraculous interventions by a transcendent sovereign (thus making it a rather poor science), both do different work in practice. Indeed, where it comes to their practical orientation, things are exactly the other way around, as Miller explains: “Both the unavailable and the acquiescent tend toward invisibility. In one case [of science], the object is too distant, too opaque, too transcendent. In the other [case of religion], it is too close, too transparent, too immanent.” (Miller, 2013: 119) Thus addressing two kinds of invisibility, religion can be a corrective to the farsightedness of science (or whatever else passes for universal rationality), myopically returning us to the grace of the all too available everyday and “breaking our will to go away” (Miller, 2013: 145), that is, taking distance, explain and govern rather than be present and attentive to everyday suffering. In this regard the politicizing and evaluation practices we found with Klarendal’s energetic, thirty-six-year-old pastor were again of a different kind. Whereas the aforementioned community leaders, standing at the birth of the new Klarendal, tend to be a little quick in taking credit for a job (almost) done, the neighborhood pastor knows better to stay ‘present’ with marginalized matters of concern and resist fleeing into fast conclusions about its deliverance. Practicing a ‘presence approach’, as taught to him by theologian Andries Baart (2001, Klaver and Baart, 2011) and originating from the tradition of ‘worker-priests’ (*prêtres ouvriers*) and ‘urban mission’ (Greenway, 1979, Schippers, 1990), the pastor sets out to make visible and sometimes public through blogging, the silent suffering of hundreds of marginalized residents of Klarendal. Thus addressing and in a low-key manner politicizing their pains and concerns he works to service desperate needs for ‘soul care’ (*zielzorg*) while also serving as a ‘diaconal’ conduit for other care institutions otherwise avoided. A theologian by training, he describes this care for the soul as ‘mystagogic maieutics’: connecting to people’s ‘lifeworld’, at once ‘banal’ and ‘radical’, to reveal to them and their neighbors the mundane ‘mystery’ of their own story and identity, clouded as they can be by self-neglect, apathy and drug abuse. Present in and for the neighborhood then, with feet in mud, the pastor sees and works with an

ever persisting suffering that is only hidden from view by ‘investments in stones’ (*sic*) and evaluations or micro-eschatologies of social salvation.

In daily pastoral practice this implies, on the one hand, a dynamic and patient presence in the neighborhood, ‘organizing coincidence’ by literally walking, cycling and bumping into people and, after initial contact, snowballing further through their social networks to address needs of care. While very spiritual work, it is not without its mundane ‘pastoral technologies’ (cf. Foucault, 2007), such as a computer database on past and present social relations and on who could appreciate when a visit or postcard. On the other hand, presence denotes a practice of devoted attention and perseverance, which also exposes some very real limits to current state policy and street-level bureaucracy. While certainly having its rightful place, the latter is always bound to certain policy interests and targets to be evaluated (invariably leading to opportunistic ‘creaming’ practices that divest assistance from those who most need it, Lipsky, 2010). Since his prescribed mission and presence are not of the proselytizing but solidarizing kind (see Roozen et al., 1984, Schippers, 1990: 214) the pastor does not have such direct interests, and residents sense this with him and his colleagues. It allows him “to not give up where regular social assistance stops. That’s only where my work begins.” His words echo his former teacher’s: “Practitioners of presence do not distance themselves when something seems to be insolvable or incurable as they are not only directed by the desire to successfully fix what is broken, or to only cure.” (Klaver and Baart, 2011: 687).


What we thus find in the invaluable presence of the pastor is a hardly perceptible practice of politicization. On the one hand, notwithstanding his relatively young age, he could be seen as a relic of an old pastoral power, described by Foucault (2007: 358) as the cultural historical hinge between premodern sovereignty and modern bureaucratic governmentality.²⁰² And indeed some core specificities of (Christian) pastoral practices (2007: 125–130, 167–185) can be recognized in his work, such as a dedication to anyone’s salvation to the point of *self-sacrifice* (or in his case, actual burn-out), the meticulous analytical rather than global accounting of his network (his ‘flock’), and an affective concern and attention for the most quotidian minutiae of people’s conduct in spite of their invisibility and disposition to care avoidance (ie. their ‘recalcitrant availability’, cf. Miller, 2013). We might even find in the pastor’s practice some historical elements of ‘counter-conduct’ inherent to the pastoral

²⁰² On the one hand, Foucault’s tracing back of modern governmentality to religious roots might seem to resemble Schmitt’s thesis that modern state theory constitutes a secularization of the theological concepts. In method however, both differ quite significantly, with Foucault professing a materialist practice theory and Schmitt keeping to more abstract theological-philosophical interrogations (cf. Golder, 2007: 171). As a result the latter tends to see too much continuity and sameness in between religious and secular power. On the other hand, Foucault (2007: 358) also distinguishes his approach from any micro-macro dialectics of secularization such as found in Weber (which, as explained above, is ultimately unintelligible). Still, when looking at Foucault’s own descriptions of the exact discontinuities between pastoral and governmental power, they remain *self-admittedly* jumpy with science (the ‘classical episteme’) intervening rather abruptly (ibid.: 234–239). What should be recognized instead, is that historically as well as in the present both pastoral and governmental powers may subsist and unfold along a gradual continuum of practices defined by more or less distant expressions of matters of concern.

assemblage, challenging its hierarchical structure from within (Foucault, 2007: 202–212), such as his community-building activities, crucially enrolling many middle class residents, both old and new, his public asceticism (blogged commiseration) and low-key mysticism (the ‘mystagogic maieutics’). On the other hand, however, his religious practice of politicization comes out refreshingly novel compared to the somewhat worn-out and limited modes of secular governmentality that did away with much of the self-sacrificial passion and analytical reach that we see in the pastor’s urban mission. In contrast, by minimizing distance to marginalized matters of concern and by resisting evaluative conclusions on its salvation, through gentrification or otherwise, the pastor’s (and any successor’s) work will keep haunting the *polis* of Klarendal indefinitely.

To conclude, in spite of the many disclaimers in governmentality scholarship about the contention and contingency of policy and evaluation instruments and rationalities, practices of ‘governance at a distance’ are essentially more fragile and limited than they are generally made out to be in that tradition (cf. Li, 2007). We can see this exemplified in the SCP’s distant evaluation of Klarendal politics, as decreed by national powers. Modeling its practice after the natural sciences, the bureau attempted to turn a ‘double hermeneutic’ between political ‘subjects’ into a unilateral translation of ‘objects’ (cf. Giddens, 1984). But if, as so many ANT studies demonstrate, this double translation is already a tedious process in relation to scallops, stones and other nonhumans inhabiting ‘nature’ (cf. Schinkel, 2004), then the governmental establishment of a ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 2007: 389) among humans surely promises even more trouble in practice. And indeed, soon enough after their publication the SCP’s truths, as a ‘technology of distance’ (Neylan, 2008: 16), ran into the methodological wit, pride and grace of a class of more proximate evaluators.

Perhaps then in a more fundamental sense, the phrase ‘government at a distance’ already communicates too much of an end result, a retroprojection of a presumed actuality of distance. Instead of speaking of the government of one actor by another ‘at a distance’ it thus seems more appropriate to take government and political citizenship as the product of a constant play of practices of ‘distancing’ (akin to Giddens’ (1984) definition of ‘power as time-space distanciation’), a material-semiotic relation which *produces* actors’ identities *as* more or less distant (see also Law and Hetherington, 2001). Rather than bridging some pre-existing absolute distance (between sovereign and subject or government and object), the SCP evaluation is a practice of distancing through the fragile construction of very particular metric spaces – and a failing one so we learned. However, these empirical and ontological limits to advanced liberal technocracy (‘police’) also point to potent modes of politicization other than the Schmittian kind championed by Swyngedouw and others (‘politics proper’), that is, capacities we have yet not recognized as such. Locally, that is, ‘distanced’ as such, there are many resistant politicizations to be found, whether in the form of a ‘politics of methods’ among stakeholders (cf. Savage, 2010: 237–238) or the graceful ‘presence’ with the ever troubled matterphore of Klarendal. However, while the truths of modern science might fail to sort out and do justice to many matters of concern in Klarendal, another avenue of (de)politicization promises more proximity: demand-based policy and participatory budgeting.



Images 6.49–6.51. Covers of the incidental ‘Course memo’ (Koersnota), the regular ‘Prospective memo’ (Perspectiefnota) and ‘Multi-annual budget’ (Meerjarenprogrammabegroting, MJPB) that

6.4.4 Maximal devolution: Ideological liminality and budgetary affects

The European and national austerity regime maintained in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008 has again forced a reshaping of neighborhood governance and its ‘practices of distancing’. Instead of setting aside billions for neighborhood improvement like the Vogelaar program, the national government is now devolving core welfare responsibilities to municipal level. So although Arnhem was and still is a relatively left-leaning town, it has to make do with continuously imposed austerity measures directly related to European budget rules and the more right-leaning national government’s unperturbed commitment to them.²⁰³ Similar to the stubborn continuation of Vogelaar initiatives despite the national program’s collapse, Arnhem’s response is to further radicalize its long existing ‘neighborhood oriented’ policy practices (*wijkgericht werken*). As Green Left city alderman Henk Kok explains in terms much reminiscent of British Labour’s ‘double devolution’ (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 53):

“The decentralizations [of non-medical care and welfare (2015)] do not stop at city hall. We decentralize further, to areas, districts [wijken] and neighborhoods [buurten]. To the place where people live and have their needs.” (Gemeente Arnhem, 2014, our translation)

What the alderman was anticipating in 2014 was a significant overhaul of the municipal organization and budgeting system, making it even more area-based

²⁰³ These measures reach the city government of Arnhem and its financial department as immutable mobiles, ie. hard political facts that initiate new rounds of negotiations within the City Council, the College of Mayor and Aldermen and the executive organization. Concretely, these negotiations take on the written form of a chain of documents Arnhem’s civil servants call the ‘policy cycle’. Except for the yearly appearing ‘multi-annual budget’ (*Meerjarenbegroting*), this chain of ‘cycle products’ also includes a preceding ‘prospective memo’ (*Perspectiefnota*, or sometimes *Koersnota*) (Images 6.49–6.51). Both might be considered ‘white’ and ‘green’ papers respectively.

and increasingly ‘demand-driven’. Anticipating, because more recent financial imperatives forced Arnhem to adapt once more, leading to the *Van Wijken Weten* program, which intended to cut another 11 million euro in neighborhood budgets and social work (Gemeente Arnhem, 2015a, 2016, Image 6.49). However, aside from and already before these financial imperatives, few efforts inspire as much consensus in Arnhem as plans to decentralize civil services, budgeting and decision-making. In this sense it very much resembles British conservative ‘localism’ (Jacobs and Manzi, 2013), which in fact directly prompted a large City Council coalition, including Arnhem’s socialists (SP), liberal democrats (D66), greens (GroenLinks), Christian democrats (CDA) and locals (Zuid Centraal) to file a motion in 2014 for instituting community rights (*buurtrechten*). Ironically, only the Toryesque conservatives (VVD) voted against it (Gemeenteraad Arnhem, 03-11-2014). It was to be a preamble to the much more elaborate *Van Wijken Weten* program.

So what does this policy program imply? The very Dutch wordplay of its name actually spells it out: ‘van wijken weten’ could mean both ‘knowing of neighborhoods’ and ‘knowing when to step aside’. The first meaning alludes to the new limited role of aldermen and City Council, which are to govern more liberally by monitoring (‘knowing’) performance: “to focus on the results of area governance, the ‘outcome’ [*sic*] of the deployment of policy and resources and less on policing compliance to all the municipality’s policies, procedures and rules [...] which thus requires restraint of intervening in the case of incidents and/or dilemmas during policy execution” (Gemeenteraad Arnhem, 29-02-2016, our translation). The second meaning is about the maximal devolution of decision-making and responsibilities to the level of the neighborhood and its residents. Sandwiched in between the two is the executive bureaucracy, which is to reorganize itself internally according to area-based service demands. Central powers thus ‘step aside’ by departmenting budgets and personnel (*ontschotten*) and reallocating them based on area statistics and performance feedback from citizens. Together with residents and other concerned parties area-based Environment Teams (*Teams leefomgeving*) then decide on *all* budgets involving neighborhood and street level services. This includes a very broad range of policy domains, from safety measures to green space to sports and culture. So-called Social Teams (*Sociale wijkteams*), also area-based, respond to individual (care) demands and are to work closely with the Environment Team.

All these changes are announced in municipal whitepapers with a fair amount of depoliticized newspeak about organizational ‘toppling’ (*kantelen*), ‘contraviewers’ (*dwaarskijkers*) and ‘freshthinking’ (*frisdenken*), all expressing the need for a grand but ideologically desubstantialized ‘transition’ (cf. Jhagroe, 2016). Part of the reason for this narrative’s existence is the aforementioned electoral equilibrium. While in the 1970s when the Labour party still reigned supreme Arnhem’s coalition agreements filled a mere dozen pages of bullet pointed plans, today all party factions need to see their demands reflected in every policy document, resulting in an illegible ‘word salad’ promising all and everything (Interviews no. 028, 026). Another, closely related reason is the professionalization of the increasingly academic caste of civil servants who draw up these ‘policy cycle products’ (see note 203, Images 4.50-4.51). However, in order to then become maximally responsive to local demands and

allocate resources with exact spatial precision, the erstwhile compartmentalized and hierarchical municipal bureaucracy is 'to topple' (*kantelen*) and become a lean network of 'clusters' led by 'change missions' (*veranderingen*) and uninhibited by procedures and rules. Leaving precise details persistently obscure this language of open-ended transition and experimental freedom introduces a permanent sense of uncertainty into political practices, about future roles and responsibilities of bureaucrats and citizens and the risks and opportunities that may come with them (cf. Coote, 2011 on Britain's Big Society policies). Meanwhile, as financial decisions increasingly fall on the shoulders of the new area-based teams, the Neighborhood Council gains importance as a channel for consultation about local 'demand' and as a platform for participatory budgeting (PB).

6.4.4.1 *Affects of citizenship: Warm communitarianism*

How these transitions play out, if they ever do, remains to be seen, but as our observations show, new (in)capacities for politicization emerge with it. To understand the latter, it is useful to compare Klarendal with a similar Dutch case, as recently described by De Wilde (2015). In her ethnography of neighborhood politics in Slotermeer, Amsterdam De Wilde minutely accounts how 'territorial governance' and 'affective citizenship' jointly effectuate a 'depoliticization' of urban governance. The city no longer engages with the citizens of problematic territories in their capacity as rational, individual and calculative subjects participating through formal, deliberative platforms. Instead it favors a communitarian subjectivation that molds urban dwellers as affective members of a neighborhood community through all kinds of 'technologies of social cohesion' engaging "warm feelings, intimate doings and joint actions in informal settings" (2015: 36). Thus in Slotermeer the former Neighborhood Consultation (*buurtoverleg*), a platform ruled by formal, rational deliberation and, not coincidentally, dominated mostly by very vocal middle-aged, white working-class men, was replaced by a Neighborhood Circle (*Wijk Cirkel*), an a-politically cosy meeting (*gezellig* in typical Dutch) much more welcoming to (post) migrant women and new creative class volunteers. As a consequence, now certain concerns tend to be marginalized, especially those difficult to address through cosy or festive gatherings or by the new positive discourse of 'dreams' or 'opportunities' (*kansen*) that goes with it. In contrast but as a supplement to Amsterdam's technocratic Neighborhood Management (*Wijkaanpak*), the Neighborhood Circle, thus serves as a kind of conservative, top-down imposed version of the aforementioned anarchist 'prefigurative politics' (De Wilde, 2015: 193). As such it seems to be a more or less conscious attempt to *contain* certain matters of concern, such as the sale or demolition of social housing, in a 'pre-political' larval state, keeping them, on an affective level, from crystallizing into molecular or molar action. Still, those autochthonous working class residents who remember the old platform (and memorialize it in a rather nativist vocabulary) do at times try to 'repoliticize' the new practice by persistent disruption, asking critical questions. However, these 'negative' questions are then typically laughed away or deferred by policy practitioners wanting to keep a cosy atmosphere (De Wilde, 2015: 43).

In many ways De Wilde's account of Sloterveer reads like that of Klarendal, while in others it does not. Like so many Dutch inner city districts the latter has also endured two significant demographic transitions, one in the 1970s, of mostly Turkish labor immigrants entering the area, and one more recently, of mostly white middle class homeowners. Like in Sloterveer both groups were met with suspicion in Klarendal, although more ambiguously with the new gentry, as many welcomed any newcomers with whom they share their ethnicity (cf. Ernst and Doucet, 2014). And as in Sloterveer political styles differ among Klarendal's three demographic segments. Our interviews (eg. no. 026) and observations also show evidence, both literally and figuratively, of natives raising their voice, (post)migrants hesitantly whispering theirs, and middle class newcomers mostly avoiding confrontation, wanting to keep things cosy and constructive. And like in Sloterveer, we have seen policy practitioners attempting to contain certain 'irrational' voices. This we witnessed, for instance, when a Klarendal social worker, central to arranging council meetings, decided to organize a separate meeting for a group of angry 'loud-mouths' (*schreeuwlelijkerds*), divorced from the general neighborhood assembly. Supposedly, the idea was to give the group their due time to voice their concerns about a spatial planning issue on their own terms. But this attempt at expelling antagonism only backfired and led the group to start a rather intimidating riot at the evening of the general assembly.²⁰⁴ However, notwithstanding these similarities with Sloterveer, Arnhem and Klarendal in particular have also taken a different trajectory of (de)politicization. For better or worse, a steadily increasing focus on participatory budgeting (PB) has had a way of transcending many differences of style and outlook, thus introducing new practices of (de)politicization and modes of citizenship to the neighborhood.

6.4.4.2 *Affects of budgeting: Cold neoliberalism?*

In spite of dominant origin stories of PB, which locate its invention in progressive Porto Alegre, the (early) Dutch experience has little to do with the Brazilian (Engbersen et al., 2010). Emerging in 1989 out of a more pragmatic discourse in small-town Deventer and from there haphazardly spreading and ending up in Arnhem in the early 1990s (Gemeente Arnhem, 1994, 1995). Since then participation through neighborhood budgets (*wijkbudgetten*, *burgerbegroting*) has steadily settled in as a city-wide procedural routine, also in the Klarendal Neighborhood Council. Within the new *Van Wijken Weten* policy, however, PB has in many ways taken center stage. Here again, budgetary discretion is maximally decentralized, with the Neighborhood Council having an advisory role in some areas and full decision-making power in

²⁰⁴ This example indicates the pivotal role that policy practitioners often play in the way local public deliberations take shape. Many have noticed before how the organization of public deliberation implies making sensitive choices: "Organizing a deliberation is also an exercise in power. It requires making substantive decisions that can be controversial. Even to invite people to a deliberative session, one must give oneself the right to define the scale and scope of the community, to identify certain issues as important, and to select a method of format for discussion" (Levine and Nierras, 2007: 1). On a 'mesopolitical' level, as will be discussed in the general conclusion of this chapter, these choices also include the appropriate mode of *practice* (antagonistic, agonistic, deliberative etc.), which also implies a certain art of diplomacy for practitioners and communities to master.

others, depending on which ‘demands’ are to be serviced. On an ideological level, this new demand-based decentralization imperative creates highly ambiguous political terrain, which is indeed acknowledged positively in one of the aforementioned white papers: “One calls it the right to the city, another calls it subsidiarity while someone else still calls it no government interference” (Gemeente Arnhem, 2015b: 26, our translation). It seems to imply: decentralize governance enough and old ideological differences start to converge on and surrender to the true demands of citizens. What results in practice is a Council as a kind of liminal ‘contact zone’ (cf. Newman, 2012) where all political issues may be translated into serviceable demands, free from ideological strife. Participatory budgeting, a rather common sense practice accessible to about any level of education, and apparently malleable enough to fit any ideological motivation (Peck and Theodore, 2015), fits right into this advanced liberal governmentality.

However, within this new ideological liminal zone that is the Neighborhood Council, the budget, or more precisely, the set of spreadsheets and minutes that bridge meetings in time, becomes its mainstay and an ‘obligatory passage point’ (cf. Law and Hetherington, 2001). Unfortunately, the literature around participatory budgeting (PB) says little if anything about the budget as a material-semiotic mediator and actant in itself. Deliberative practices are always materially situated and recognizing this may lead to exciting new formats of ‘material deliberation’ (Davies et al., 2012). However, the ‘materiality’ of more traditional practices of governance still too often escapes critical attention because of its seeming triviality. There certainly are critical accounts of PB’s diffusion, describing its accelerating travels from its supposed origin in Porto Alegre to the rest of the world, mutating en route from a comprehensive progressive policy instrument to an isolated and denuded device serving centrist or neoliberal institutions (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, Baiocchi and Summers, 2017, Peck and Theodore, 2015). Yet nowhere do these relational geographies go into the nature of the device itself, treating it as a rather trivial intermediary of which ever ideology comes to adopt it. Yet it could very well be the case, as Wällstedt and Almqvist (2017) demonstrate, that a budget in itself constructs objects and subjects of public management in such a way that it constrains a more communicative practice in favor instrumental and transactional rationalities. Even ethnographic accounts of PB tend to likewise omit the budget itself, focusing instead on the discursive modes and deliberative qualities found in PB processes (Talpin, 2012, 2013). What is specific to PB practices as compared to other forms of deliberative democracy gets lost. To understand therefore the role of the budget in Klarendal political practices, we have to resort to other literatures.

Recent research on accounting informed by actor-network theory (Robson and Bottausci, 2017) does attend to the budget, not just an obligatory passage point for decision-making and oligoptic lever for government at a distance, but also as an ‘affective technology’ prompting hopes and anxieties among its users (Boedker and Chua, 2013) or even feelings of belonging (Bryer, 2018). A proper practice understanding of PB over and beyond apparently arbitrary ideological contents should acknowledge the unavoidable superposition of more-than-human capacities. As neuroscientist Damasio famously demonstrates while ‘correcting Descartes’

(2006) and ‘looking for Spinoza’ (2004), any rational decision-making fails miserably without the supporting affects. Unfortunately though, Damasio, like so many others, equates the latter with ‘basic’ emotions (including a higher order of human ‘feelings’), which then accompany other internal processes of cognition of similar generality.²⁰⁵ For a practice approach such as ours, however, the concept of affects needs to be both more abstract, in the broad, Spinozist sense of capacities to affect and be affected (Deleuze, 1988a) and not just human feelings (as in Anderson, 2014, 2016), *and* more relationally specific, tied to certain practical superpositions of capacities such as between humans and budget sheets. Affects come first while ‘basic’ emotions only emerge from them as subjectified and generalized representations (but possibly feedback to affects as such). The skillful handling of particular non-human actants then, adjusting to their singular intensities and degrees of freedom (immanent limits and thresholds), is accompanied by and links directly yet nonlinearly to practice specific bodily and neurological states of excitement. As explained above, revolts and demonstrations, for instance, are fueled by their specific joys and sorrows that result from the affordances of open and crowded urban spaces (cf. Woodward, 2014, Woodward and Bruzzone, 2015). But also practices deep within the (Turkish) state bureaucracy, including ‘microfigures’ like hallways, files and laws, produce their particular Kafkaesque affects, desires and capacities. Participatory budgets, like the one found in Klarendal Council meetings, in turn rear their own affects, which might be called ‘neoliberal’ (Anderson, 2016).

While, as in Slotemeer, regular Council meetings in Klarendal can and indeed have to be pleasurable, a particular atmosphere of seriousness is also maintained. The prevalent mood, when it comes to treatment of the budget, might best be characterized as a mundane version of the ‘vigilant state phobia’ that according to Foucault (2008) accompanies the more specialized and intellectual discourses of ordo- and neoliberalism. The latter’s momentum, says Anderson (2016), was indeed carried by certain neoliberal affects (feelings, moods, atmospheres) as they traveled through think tanks, from the infamous Mont Pelerin Society into other expert and policy networks. One central hub if not intellectual heartland became the Chicago School of economics, where a most ‘assertive’ or even ‘bellicose’ atmosphere enveloped the new liberal discourse (Anderson, 2016: 744). Those who revelled and thrived in the milieu, such as its most notable representative Milton Friedman, were iconic frontrunners of a blunt, rationalistic air and attitude that would become hegemonic in the years to come. Both the vigilance toward what a state might be and do and the commonsensical, assertively rationalist ‘straight talk’ of the neoliberals we see elicited in milder forms in Klarendal budget meetings. When the budget is around, the mood changes. This is evidenced first of all by comparison to the more free-floating discussions lacking any concrete financial decision-making (such as the aforescribed meetings around yearly Neighborhood Plans). These tend to wander,

²⁰⁵While Damasio (2004) seems somewhat critical of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza and affects, both neurologist and philosopher find sufficient reason for decision-making in affect. Deleuze, however, like Spinoza, feels less of a need to subsume and restrict affect to essential human or even animal feelings, instead conceiving it in terms of differential relations (assemblages) among singular entities of any kind (Deleuze, 1994, 1988a).



Images 6.52-6.53. Council members closely examining and peering over the neighborhood budget spreadsheets (25-01-2018) (source: own photos).

often ending up in discursive black holes of dog poo, reckless driving or parking space, which can be rather disappointing and frustrating, as the same issues return with apparently little progress made on them.

However, also *within* the structure of a typical bi-monthly meeting of the Neighborhood Council the difference can be felt. The first hour of such a two-hour meeting is closed to the public, to professionals, except for the one social worker chairing the meeting, and, importantly, to subsidy applicants. It discusses the current budget and new requests for project financing, which range from street furniture and decoration to art festivals and youth activities. This part is closed mainly because disappointing choices by the Council can quite easily disrupt personal relations at this level of localization. The second, open part communicates the decisions made in the first part, gives new applicants the opportunity to pitch projects to be subsidized and finally opens the floor to members of the public to vent concerns of whatever non-financial kind. Professionals from the municipality and housing corporation (present only during the open part) usually address these directly. While this open part is interesting in and of itself, as it may sometimes invoke its own nerve-wrecking ‘neoliberal affects’ when having applicants compete for budget space before the Council like startups facing a ‘shark tank’ of venture capitalists, it is the closed part that is politically most consequential and theoretically interesting. In sharp contrast with the jolly mood before and more diplomatic and official atmosphere directly after, this part is defined by a collective focus on the budget (Images 6.52-6.53).

6.4.4.3 Participating in trials of explicitness

As the anchoring techno-affective mediator of political practice, the neighborhood budget harbors a number of affordances. First and foremost, by synoptically bringing together all projects in just one or two optically consistent diagrams it erects a proper ‘center of calculation’ (Latour, 1986), a small laboratory for (financially) purifying matters of concern. However, like a puzzle that needs solving, the spreadsheet at the same time invites a close scrutiny of its many entries and demands a clear explication of who is due how much exactly. The way this typically works out, as a practice of

politicization, we observed in a particularly spun out Council discussion over a broken floor in a new neighborhood center. Not satisfied with the spatial location and uncanny amenities of the appointed ‘multifunctional center’ newly built by the municipality, some old-time Klarendallers took it upon themselves to bring together various public and private resources, including from the neighborhood budget, and establish two new social hubs, one billiard center and one small dancehall that would be used for various kinds of activities and events. Both are located in private properties owned by a landlord notorious for housing much of Arnhem’s former red light district, here pseudonymized as Dirk. When a member of the dancing group that manages the dancehall-to-be applies for a grant of €750 to help pay for a €3100 reconstruction of the wooden dance floor a heated discussion unfolds, mostly between a lady in her sixties, born and raised in Klarendal (Resident 1), and a young cafe owner, a relative newcomer (Resident 2):

Chairman, social worker: “Are those not simply maintenance costs for Dirk?” [...]

Resident 1: “No no he’s for sewer repair and such, not for refurbishing of..”

Resident 2: [veers up] “Wait no look, there’s a difference between crashing through the floor, then it’s an architectural matter [*bouwkundig*, for which the landlord is responsible], or you just want it to look nicer, then it’s a different story..”

Resident 1: “No you really crash through the floor.”

Resident 2: “Well then it’s architectural [...] And moreover, it doesn’t feel right for me to put money into someone else’s property [*band*]. Aside from the benefits users will eventually have of it, we are not going to pay someone who, last time I checked, is quite big in glue [*in de slappe was*] [laughs].”

Resident 1: “Yes he sure is..”

Resident 2: “But really.. Apart from whether it is Dirk or someone else..” [...] [other residents agree]

Energized by the accumulating support of other Council members, Resident 2 thinks up and appends more arguments against adding the floor to the budget as the discussion continues. The final blow comes when he finds out that the landlord only gives out yearly rental contracts, which would imply he could just walk away with a new, publicly financed floor after a few months. The cafe owner suggests letting an expert look at it first, perhaps someone from the housing association, to see if it is an architectural or aesthetic matter, “who has a right to what”, or whether “it’s a grey area”. When the chairman recaps and suggests to inquire with the spokesperson of the housing association who will be present in the ensuing open part, Resident 3, a social entrepreneur in her fifties, says she has already spoken to the representative before the meeting:

Resident 3: “[The representative] has already looked at the papers about the floor and she immediately thought of the Arnhemse Uitdaging [‘Arnhem Challenge’, a charity organization of construction companies], who may provide some workers to do it *pro deo*, and she could at least mediate the contact or..”

Resident 1: “That would be great, all that needs to be covered are materials, we [old Klarendallers] can supply our own *pro deo* construction workers.” [...]

Resident 4: [in a cynical tone] “but why not renovate all of Dirk’s properties then..”

Resident 3: “No no wait, I would go back, not immediately to the Uitdaging, that would change nothing of the situation, and see what the expert has to say” [...]

Chairman: “[Resident 3], would you like me to broker that for you? Shall I ask [the expert] for you?”

Resident 1: Uhhm... you may... but I am afraid that if I confront Dirk with that he will further dig in his heels [*gooit ie de kont in de krip (sic)*], as we say in Klarendal

Chairman: [indignant] “But that’s not right!”

And so the conversation continues, reiterating the same points a few times more, alternately attended by displays of financial vigilance, bouts of incensed laughter or outrage and righteous appeals to common sense rationality. With great attention for financial details and in constant search for alternative sources (‘potjes’) such as the charity association, an attempt was made to transform a wooden floor into a budget entry – a matter of concern searching for a public. Then and there, straddling the multiplicitous border between practices of socialization, economization and politicization (see Chapter 3), the personal, the private and the state were explicated in one particular manner. As such it embodies a maximally devolved kind of ‘trial of explicitness’, as described on a national level by Muniesa and Linhardt (2011). Rather than merely implementing a prefigured neoliberal state, the participatory budget, as a specific practice of statecraft, works to actualize it in trials of explicitness, every time demanding a clear and accountable distinction of property relations, legal responsibilities and past, present and future allocations of public monies. However, not mentioned by Muniesa and Linhardt is how affectively charged this process of ‘border work’ can be within political liminal zones (Newman, 2012: 471). Collectively sifting through the budget proposals, Council members are constantly primed for giveaways and possible freeloaders which, when found, are exposed with due ‘state phobic’ drama. Now of course there is nothing ‘neoliberal’ about these emotions of indignation or anger if taken in a universal sense, it is rather their production in *affective* relation to certain (objects of) practices that makes them so. *Neoliberal* affect is rather the persistent assemblage of civil capacities and concerns (to reckon, to be outraged etc.) around tax money budgets and the ‘public choice’ architecture that they afford. Still, it remains a legitimate question whether it is useful to speak of ‘neoliberal’ affects, as it has become such catch-all term. Why not simply speak of ‘budgetary affects’?

To sum up, how should we assess the practices of politicization found in the *Van Wijken Weten* program, with its maximal devolution of power through a combination of integral area-based government and PB councils? Does it marginalize any concerns of gentrification in particular? What we can see emerge are new (in)capacities for politicization that afford their own opportunities and risks. On the one hand, the program enacts a genuinely ‘enabling’ kind of bureaucracy (cf. Adler and Borys, 1996) and is not simply manipulating consent through a covert kind of coercion. The devolution (and diffusion) of responsibilities to integral area teams and PB do enable many new strategies for citizens. Especially those savvy residents who see through the newspeak recognize the perpetual ambiguity brought about by municipal decompartmentalization (and its relative dehierarchization) and the uncertainty it causes with civil servants. For them it presents an opportunity to exploit and put

pressure on the new area-based teams for more funding or more freedom to spend it as they please. PB, moreover, enables an attractive decisiveness on a more regular basis. Paradoxically, it is the combination of the budget as an actant and the creation of, in this case, a demographically heterogeneous ingroup by closing the discourse (in the ‘closed part’ of Council meetings), that allows a certain open straight talk to take place that otherwise might not happen.

On the other hand, there are risks involved as well. As *Van Wijken Weten* proceeds, residents indeed get more political influence and can certainly make expenditures more efficient – the two arguments usually made in favor of participatory governance (eg. Ganuza and Francés, 2012). But combined with continuous austerity measures and the departmenting of budgets, PB can devolve some heavy choices to the neighborhood (Does the neighborhood still need a social worker? Or do we need more speed bumps? Should this or that association still be subsidized?). Furthermore, while the new practice accords neighborhood councils a lot of decision-making power, it of course does not give them any taxing power or much control over the larger municipal budget, just like the city is largely bound by national fiscal policy. And since municipal housing has long been transferred to housing associations, there also is no prospect of any inclusion into *financial* decision-making concerning fundamental housing questions either. Other restrictions for politicizing is a possible closure to non-financial concerns, such as nuisance, discrimination or political exclusion: if it cannot be translated into a subsidizable project it cannot be addressed. Moreover, PB and its trials of explicitness may contaminate other deliberative practices, since the latter may come off as rather free-floating, vague and inconsequential in comparison. Retaining the capacity for more substantial deliberation meetings (such as those on neighborhood action plans) thus remains of crucial importance. For this, as will be treated in the discussion of this chapter, flexibility in political practice is key.

6.4.5 *Gentrification's career in Klarendal*

Considering Klarendal's political history, gentrification as an issue has taken on many forms. From a threat of large-scale demolition and residential displacement to a more subtle and multifaceted matter of concern. In more or less articulate forms, issues of decay and displacement expressed themselves and mutated with every political practice, from the incidental antagonism of the 1960s, to the agonistic organization in the 1970s of the *Werkgroep*, to the eruptive remolecularization in the riots of 1989, to finally the steady development of an integral, area-based consensus politics in the 1990s. It is within this historical trajectory that we should understand how the latter practice managed to actualize a strikingly cooperative stance among working-class residents for policy measures apparently contrary to their interest, such as gentrification. They cooperated not under the spell of some ‘false consciousness’, but, especially after the riots, out of a strong desire for social order, safety and livability (cf. Van Eijk, 2010: 830), which, it must be said, also contained some rather conservative, if not revanchist and racist sentiments (cf. Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008). Participants in Klarendal were well aware – and still are – of the preconditions of consensus or budgetary politics and have devised their own tactics for disrupting

it when needed, not to opt out, but as part of the play. However, it was after 2001 that a relatively mild, mostly commercial gentrification became one component of a whole assemblage of policy instruments to improve the neighborhood's livability and social integration (cf. Uitermark, 2014). Half a decade later this assemblage was sanctioned and boosted on the national stage by the Vogelaar program. The subsequent controversies around its scientific evaluation epitomized the serious limits to 'governing at a distance' through supposedly depoliticized metrics. For reasons of method, pride and grace gentrification was not accepted as the one and only option. Over the last decade and in the long aftermath of the same financial crisis that, among other reasons, made the Vogelaar program's continuation increasingly implausible, a radicalized decentralization of political decision-making has been taking shape in Arnhem under the *Van Wijken Weten* plan. After ideology and truth, maximally localized 'demands' have become the object of a political practice ruled by money, that is, departitioned and participatory budgeting. While, if desired, gentrification may be still addressed in the scarce deliberative conventions being held, the issue's politicization depends for the most part on indirect translations into particular subsidizable projects.

So with every epoch and every practice that defined it, different skills of politicization were enabled but also became required, in terms of both general citizenship and local leadership. Many have noted before that as a performative practice, participatory governance fosters a particular kind of 'active citizenship' (Turnhout et al., 2010, Hobson 2009) and as De Wilde (2015) shows, this is not necessarily one of the republican, 'deliberative' kind. Among many possible others, deliberation, community and budgetary practices all enroll their specific sets of affects and as such actualize, in different combinations at different points in time, a particular 'citizen'. However, this perhaps too general description of political subjectification applies *par excellence* to those citizens and professionals who come to play a prominent role during any particular epoch of a polity's history. This could perhaps shine a new light on discussions in the Netherlands around 'exemplary practitioners' and their role in governing the Vogelaar neighborhoods (Van Hulst et al., 2011, 2012). In Dutch these exemplary people are termed in the Anglicism 'best persons' (Van den Brink et al., 2012), as opposed to the well known phrase of 'best practices', because observers have seen how the latter practices, the 'best' on average, do not work for deprived, non-average neighborhoods and their 'wicked problems'. Such complex contexts instead warrant special individuals to make general policies work there. While certainly an intriguing take on neighborhood policy that is worth pursuing further, the attributes of the (non-exhaustive) set of types of best persons listed by Van Hulst et al. (ia. 'deliberative practitioner', 'front-line worker' or 'everyday fixer'), can be rather too generic ('emphatic', 'enthusiastic', 'result-oriented', 'networker') and are only partially tied to specific affects or skills of politicizing as laid out in this chapter. Moreover, the obvious theme of charisma, a notion that could be given a new productive meaning in a theory of political practices and their exemplary practitioners, is carefully avoided, probably because of its aforementioned elusive, 'irrational' status in traditional sociology.²⁰⁶ Regarding the above, we would concur

²⁰⁶ Considering that their concept of bureaucracy (Van den Brink et al., 2012: 73-76) – the systemic

there are no political practices that are ‘best’ in general, but tying success back to ideal typical persons tends to wrest the practitioner from the singular ‘mud’ of her practice. On the one hand, efficacious politicization depends on charisma, a proudly staying in touch with the ‘wicked’ stone-human matterphore of the neighborhood, or in the words of Van Hulst et al., on “bring[ing] to the table some crucial skills [of] cleverly combining work on physical matters with work on social relations” (2011: 135). On the other hand, as the latter analysts also recognize, “making a difference now is not the same as making a difference 30 years ago. Time matters.” (ibid.). To make sense of this, however, a look at a neighborhood’s political biography will do more than generic personal attributes. Over time, different practices and their charismatic enaction required very specific skills, capacities that are impersonal by nature but always embodied (which might give the impression they inhere to the exemplary person). The recent rise of participatory budgeting, for instance, tends to favor financially savvy entrepreneurs to take a lead, such as the cafe owner mentioned in the example above (‘Resident 2’). Conversely, the transition to consensus politics condemned the activist from the more agonistic *Werkgroep Klarendal* era – when the tide turns, charisma can indeed wane fast.

Part 3

6.5 Conclusion: Co-counter-actualizing politicizations

“The divisions of oppressor and oppressed, repressors and repressed, flow out of each state of the machine and not vice versa” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 56-57)

Returning to the third set of research questions presented in Chapter 1, how are issues of gentrification planned for, voted on or protested through practices of politicization in Klarendal, Arnhem and Beyoğlu/Cihangir, Istanbul? And what does this say about capacities for fostering democracy? Looking at the Turkish and Dutch political machines and their singular machinations, which include more than a state apparatus and its resistance, we find a realm of virtually endless political concerns and practices to politicize them. These manifold practices of ‘distancing’ are instrumental in the constitution of more or less clear-cut or ambiguous divisions of the state and its others, of ‘oppressor and oppressed’, or indeed of gentrifier and gentrified. ‘Co-counter-actualizing’ both cases (see Section 1.5.3), we see national electoral politics (aggregative practices) disappoint and marginalize local concerns of gentrification, yet in different ways. In Turkey, the ruling AK party, based only on a thin majority, unilaterally rolls out its ‘urban transformation’ (gentrification?) plans over Beyoğlu. The latter responds, holding on dearly to civility through practices of association, litigation and direct action. In the Netherlands, the electoral system remains undecided with fragmented mandates and policy programs. In response, decisions are maximally devolved to municipalities, social partners, and citizen

structure in relation to which the ‘exemplary’ agents operate (ibid.: 70, Van Hulst et al., 2012) – relies on a classic text by Weber in which it immediately follows a discussion of charisma (ie. the German edition of Weber, 1978: 956-1005, 1146-1157), it is safe to say the latter topic is deliberately avoided.

councils, and urban planning looks for other metrics besides votes (truth, money) to base and evaluate plans by, including plans of ‘neighborhood redevelopment’ (gentrification?).

Thus, as soon as we glance beyond electoral democracy, both ‘careers’ of the issue of gentrification could not be much different. One has been pushing toward antagonism, while the other towards depoliticization. However, it would be wrong to therefore conclude that the Turkish and Dutch cases are incommensurable expressions of, respectively, class antagonism and technocratic governmentality. They might be ‘more than one’ (liberal democracy) but also constitute ‘less than then many’ types or arenas of politics. Instead, they turn out divergent actualizations of, or contingent ‘solutions’ to, the same universal yet differential problem of politicization as represented by the diagram of Images 6.3 and 6.4 (cf. Deleuze, 1988b, DeLanda, 2005, 2009). It is also in this sense that both urban trajectories despite their supposed topographical and developmental (North/South) differences still ‘inhabit each other’ topologically (cf. Robinson, 2011, see Section 1.5.3) (and not so much through ‘actually existing comparisons’ such as direct ‘global city’ metrics or indirect ‘creative city’ interpretations). In a performative sense, it is precisely their co-presentation in this chapter that *composes* their problematic commonality, not so much to determine and specify them (as ‘x-ification’) but to learn from their juxtaposition on a pragmatic or, what will be designated below as, a ‘mesopolitical’ level. It is within the spectrum of practices through which the issue of gentrification makes its careers, that new practice theoretical concepts of planning (‘bureaucratic affects’, ‘anticipatory practices’, ‘hyperobjective planning’), civic resistance (‘practices of civility’), government at a distance (‘methodological distancing’, ‘pastoral charisma’) and budgeting (‘cold neoliberal affects’) become significant.

6.6 Discussion: The nonlinear mesopolitics of gentrification

With this new conceptual armory we can further take on and discuss that second, ethical question about political displacement and fostering democracy. This chapter provides us with three insights that together point us toward a new pragmatics of urban politics.

6.6.1 Political gentrification

The first insight concerns the primacy in the assessment of political displacement of concerns and their politicization in practice. There are political practices at play that process and displace concerns, in the process effectuating non-pre-existing distinctions between government and governed, consenting and dissenting. From this perspective the issue of gentrification does not solely concern the social and economic event of displacement, but more so the threat of a political displacement. *Political* gentrification or displacement then is the obstruction of the politicization of certain concerns around gentrification, which would encompass much more than a segment of the people being politically outnumbered or outvoted by the middle

classes (Chernoff, 1980, Betancur, 2002, Martin, 2007, Hyra, 2015) and would neither be limited to an absence of class antagonism ('post-political' depoliticization, Swyngedouw, 2007, 2011, Uitermark and Nicholls, 2014). In Istanbul, for instance, we saw how in bureaucratic *practice* the spatial and temporal dimensions of planning were fragmented and shrinking, thereby excluding strongly interrelated concerns for spatial quality, local living history and public participation. In Arnhem, participatory budgeting effectively focused politics on very explicit projects, such as maintaining (a functioning floor of) neighborhood centers, but marginalized less local and non-financial concerns around gentrification. However, based on our expanded political ontology, we also found practices that resisted political displacement in unexpected ways. Litigation practices in Istanbul could appear as more than 'pseudo-participation', expressing a strategy of civility. Likewise, the almost 'pre-political' practices of the Klarendal neighborhood pastor managed to gracefully address and make public some of the most marginalized concerns.

6.6.2 *The nonlinear careers of gentrification*

A second observation that comes out of our two cases is that, as intuited by Latour (2007), issues in general, and certainly that bundle of concerns we name gentrification, have their own singular careers, subsisting through history while transforming in their practical expressions. In Istanbul-Beyoğlu-Cihangir practices of planning gentrification evolved from technocratic and clientelistic to antagonistic, while resistance moved away from consensus politics but remained civil. Today, the gentrification war is fought out in between antagonistic movements ('speeding') and agonistic positioning. In Arnhem-Klarendal, the practice of gentrification politics developed roughly in the other direction, from a class-based antagonism to a near depoliticized governmentality, interspersed with a defining moment of molecularization. Today, gentrification is politicized, somewhere in between deliberative meetings and technocratic budgeting. Through (and as) time then, politics are actualized by (and as) affects of revolt, war, bureaucracy or advanced liberal governance. But as both cases demonstrate as well, this in no way implies any teleology towards depoliticized governmentality. Instead we see marginalized matters of concern and the virtual capacity for other kinds of practices always haunting the actual *polis*. We might even hypothesize that as some concerns are politicized in a certain way, thereby gaining in resolution, pressures exerted by other, marginalized concerns start mounting. However, both Cihangir and Klarendal drew out their very own nonlinear trajectories throughout the political phase space of Image 6.4. Moreover, these trajectories suggest there is not one optimal point ('politics proper') or 'best practice' between the substantive and procedural that is general to all issues, any place, any time. To borrow from complexity science (familiar with nonlinear phase spaces), urban politics constitutes a system far-from-equilibrium (cf. Wagenaar, 2007), and in such a system history matters. The best way then to politicize an issue at any moment is highly contingent on past practices and therefore path-dependent (ie. on current tendencies to move in one direction or the other). In relation to the spectre of violent antagonism, agonistic politics are highly desirable, whereas in a consensual, deliberative setting they might not be.




Image 6.54. Urban mesopolitics can be thought of as the operation of a six-gear motor transmission (source: Wikipedia.org, accessed 03-10-19, text removed). Departing from matters of concern (cf. Image 6.4), the six gears each politicize these concerns differently (molecularize, antagonize, agonize, deliberate, vote, govern). Just as driving a car, some gears might be skipped, but this can be risky and found illegitimate, especially when speeding up (eg. jumping from antagonism to policing and construction). While this image is perhaps a bit too mechanical and the gears not as clearly separated in practice as their respective theorizations (Le Bonian, post-Marxist, Habermasian etc.) might suggest, it does propose a way to imagine the emergence from in between those practices of political subjectivity (ie. the 'driver', whether collective or individual).

6.6.3 Urban mesopolitics and diplomacy

Still, another politics of gentrification is possible, a pragmatic one that takes note of the above kind of nonlinear histories and path-dependencies. Isabelle Stengers, who has for a long time been writing about the philosophical implications of such dynamics (eg. Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), may provide us with the intellectual tools to conceive of politics as situated within a complex 'ecology of practices' (Stengers, 2005a), that is, as a 'mesopolitics' (Stengers, 2008b, a term she uses on fewer occasions than the near-synonymous and more well-known 'cosmopolitics', Stengers, 2005b, Blok and Farías, 2016). Here the 'meso' denotes not an intermediate *scale* more general than the micro and more specific than the macro (eg. 'institutional', Brenner 2004), but an out-of-equilibrium *event* that ontologically precedes the stable structures traced by equilibrium models of 'micro and macro physics of power' as found in Foucauldian and Marxist theories of discipline and political economy (Jessop, 2007, 2011).²⁰⁷ In the realm of the meso, history is made 'through the middle' (Stengers, 2008b, cf. Deleuze, 1988a) in a constant diplomatic switching between the six speeds or 'gears' of politicizing presented in the phase space of Image 6.4. Indeed, we might visualize this mesopolitics through the metaphor of the gearbox above (Image 6.54).

²⁰⁷ On the analogical difference between classical (micro) and statistical (macro) physics and the physics of far-from-equilibrium, chaotic and complex (meso) systems, see Prigogine and Stengers (1984).

And, as all six practices, from molecular to governmental, imply different libidinal and technical affects, joys and sorrows, good civic craftsmanship would know how to anticipate these and if needed facilitate diagrammatic transitions in order to address and channel political concerns efficaciously. This critical capacity we may recognize in the practices of civility found in Beyoğlu (whether associative, legal, majoritarian or minoritarian), as they steer away from antagonism as the situation requires it (see Section 6.3.3). Conversely, we see it fail as the social worker in Klarendal tried to expel any antagonistic sentiments by vainly attempting to quarantine them in a separate meeting organized for ‘loud-mouths’ (3.4.1). On the contrary, the Klarendal community leader (in Section 6.4.2) cunningly deployed this virtual threat of antagonism and even riots to counter his constituency’s political displacement.

Thus everyday neighborhood diplomacy (cf. Sennett, 2012) or ‘urban mesopolitics’, requires vigilance as one form of practice easily slips into another (eg. from an exclusive consensus rationality into a molecularization of groups deemed ‘irrational’). Furthermore, it implies a knack for introducing in a timely manner elements of other practices when a situation calls for it (eg. knowing when not to start a voting procedure). In a way these points may be very obvious to actually practicing neighborhood ‘diplomats’ but they are rarely reflected on, especially as part of the whole spectrum as presented here. As such it can help urban mesopolitical practitioners and groups be aware at all time of the range of risks and opportunities the diagram distributes, rather than go where the wind blows and run after the latest policy fashion or, alternatively, retreat into needless ideological rigidity. Skilled diplomats, Stengers tells us (2005b: 193), know how to turn territorial and ideological contradictions into pragmatic contrasts – a perhaps risky business, involving a potential for betrayal that is missing in the strict representation of interests, but often a more fruitful mode of doing politics. Indeed, perhaps more than a practice onto itself, urban mesopolitical diplomacy is a *mode* of politicizing in which “the problematic copresence of practices may be actualized” (Stengers, 2011a: 371–372). In other words, with no neutral, meta-political standpoint available from which to decide which practice of politicizing gentrification is most apt, skilled political practitioners standing in the middle of things would want to (know how to) keep their options open. In a healthy political culture marginalized concerns are thus always allowed to come back and haunt the *polis*, but this requires capable diplomacy.

Chapter 7

Conclusion and discussion: Ontological multiplication, ethical differentiation

7.1 *A new symptomatology: Gentrification regrouped and multiplied*

How does gentrification emerge as a problem and practice? What ethics may follow from this explanation? These were the basic questions we started out with, in full knowledge of their impossible breadth, but also realizing that a certain level and kind of abstraction was required to revisit and diagnose differently an urban condition that had far outgrown its initial grouping of symptoms ('Ruth Glass syndrome'). We have tried to capture here the form into which gentrification has evolved as a problem (an ontologically multiple event that includes its popular and academic observations) through specifying it into domains of social, economic and political practices and by comparing three European neighborhoods showing a variety of signs of gentrification: Klarendal, Arnhem; Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, Vienna; and Beyoğlu, Istanbul. The primary research strategy to theoretically understand and empirically navigate these domains of practice was counter-actualization. Proceeding in each domain and each case from various *metrics* (territories, statistics, prices, votes etc.) to underlying and alternative *interpretations* (identities, values, ideologies etc.) to *practices* producing such metrics and interpretations, counter-actualization brought forth a series of empirical contrasts of social, economic and political practices that enabled a fundamental revisiting of standing theoretical debates around gentrification. Moreover, the specification of social, economic and political practices by counter-actualization also led to the formulation of sub-questions that split up the ethical issue of gentrification into mutually irreducible aspects of diversity, equality and democracy. The urban comparisons were similarly divided, with each comparative configuration adjusted to suit the needs of the sub-theme at hand, both in content (Vienna for its social dynamics, Arnhem for its housing market, Istanbul for its politics) and form (procedure of counter-actualization). Premised on the relational principles of fractionality, topology and performativity, the comparisons traced out various convergences and divergences of practice within and between the three cities with the objective of obtaining a more universal understanding of their range and potential in terms of diversity, equality and democracy.

However, if the preceding chapters have shown us anything, it is how much the research questions stated above are intimately intertwined on a practice level. Having rigorously followed the epistemic dictums of the counter-actualization method set out in the first three chapters, the following analyses of the social, economic and political dimensions of gentrification have indeed, as anticipated in Chapter 3, fanned out "to the limits of our tolerance for dimensionality and detail" (Gibson-Graham, 2006b: xxxi). Being now in a position to draw conclusions, can we tie them back together somehow, without again reducing "complex processes of eventuation to the operation of one or several determinants" (ibid.)? Let us look again at the counter-actualization

diagram presented in the introduction (Image 1.10). In every chapter this diagram has been worked out in order to revisit with fresh eyes the analytical and ethical issues surrounding the social, economic and political practices of gentrification. Thus, the ultimate result is not an exposition of simple parts that may add up to a whole (perhaps 'greater than that sum'). What we get is not a 'social totality' of economic, political and ideological/scientific practices, determined and sutured in the last instance by a mode of production (as for eg. Althusser, 2005). Rather, what has transpired throughout this thesis is an explosive multiplication of reality, resulting in a multiplicity that cannot and should not be summed up and repackaged *in toto*. Instead we should look at how its different metrics, interpretations and practices resonate through their differences and further multiply by catalyzing, overflowing and overpowering one another.

Therefore, as much as these conditions of fractionality allow, this last chapter will not just recapitulate the results of the empirical studies, but also synthesize, reflect and further complicate our economic and political matters of concern by way of 'ontological multiplication'. Each pertaining to a level of the diagram (metrics; interpretations; practices), the following sections are part theme-specific resume and conclusion (and answer to one of three sub-questions) and part 'multiplication', whereby themes are brought into conversation in modalities appropriate to their level (metric 'cross-calculation'; interpretive 'interpenetration'; and practical 'overflowing'). This will be visualized by combinations of miniature forms of the stairs-shaped diagrams of socialization, economization and politicization (of Section 3.6 and substantiated throughout Chapters 4-6). Theme-specific summaries are signified by the arrows *inside* the small diagrams, while multiplications are indicated by the arrows placed *in between* them.

7.2 Reality multiplied: socialization x economization x politicization

7.2.1 Metric cross-calculation

In Chapter 3, we explored the kind of problem gentrification is: a singularity ('a Klarendal / Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus / Beyoğlu') undergoing a multidimensional event of displacement ('to gentrify'), that is, a unique event in which certain spatiotemporal practices (tend to) overpower others. In the same chapter, a program was set out to study the many practices of socialization, economization and politicization that unfold and actualize concrete problem-events of gentrification (by such overpowering). The ensuing empirical chapters tried to enact this program in relation to three European neighborhoods: 'a Klarendal / Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus / Beyoğlu to gentrify'. According to the methodological principle of counter-actualization, this was done not by starting anywhere, but from axiomatically separated metrics of truth, property and power *respectively*. Chapter by chapter, the points of entrance into the assemblages of interest were the changing demographics, rising prices and political (electoral, bureaucratic) evaluations. In each case, we took a closer look at the kind of social identities, value claims and political ideologies that inform these metrics and how they are practiced. However, in every subsequent chapter it was also

clear that the axiomatic distinction of our modern ‘systems’ of knowledge, property and power (by axiom money cannot buy power etc.) immediately starts to break down when such systems are shown to be quite selective on an interpretive level. Not just by excluding a range of alternative identities, property claims and antagonisms, but also by disallowing the many ‘interpenetrations’ among such societal subsystems (but more about these in the next subsection).




Image 7.1. In a first ontological multiplication the axiomatically differentiated systems of (social) science, economy and politics start internalizing one another in actual (cross-)calculations.

Nonetheless, already at the level of metrics we may see systems penetrate others, or perhaps even colonize them (Image 7.1). But, according to the theory of phased actualization presented here, we are only allowed to say this on condition of an actual practice of calculative translation or conversion being enacted. Thus a performative practice (ie. demographic change directly feeding into real estate valuation models) has to be made explicit and empirically described rather than assumed to be present as a ‘structure’ (ie. assuming house evictions directly cause demographics to change). Here we can think of calculative models that directly link together payments, facts (‘data’) or even votes. For instance, one of the politically decisive evaluation studies in relation to the Vogelaar neighborhood policy (mentioned in Sections 5.3.4 and 6.4.3) monetized effects on livability by using house price developments as a ‘hedonic’ proxy. Likewise, especially in the digital age of ‘big data’, demographics, behavioral, locational or technical data may become direct inputs for credit scores (denying people mortgages or implicitly redlining areas), appraisal models like Calcasa, or investment decisions proposed by social housing allocation models. In this regard, many new developments around fintech and indeed ‘proptech’ will certainly have their gentrifying effects if not stopped or at least regulated properly (Shaw, 2020). However, these cross-calculations may also convert into other intersystemic directions, with, for instance, inductive correlations of consumer behavior targeting and constructing new demographic groups. Or, as a last extreme example of this kind of merging or colonization by calculation, as recently surmised by a Dutch university administrator (Fresco, 2016), they would be the replacement of electoral polls by models (‘artificial intelligence’) that predict political preferences on consumer choices or other behavioral data.

7.2.2 Interpretative interpenetration

Still, notwithstanding these important and often troubling possibilities currently unfolding on the mathematical planes of our modern existence, much more familiar are the less direct intersystemic conversions. Money may now not directly buy truth or power (or vice versa) but it does become an indicator for scientific success (big grants equal truth) or decisive in neoliberal political evaluations. And truth might not directly rule the economy or people but scientific models certainly advise traders while opinion polls heavily influence electoral strategies. Thus metrics still require some human interpretative action with every conversion, which also implies that our quantified observational theories, economic values and evaluations of power can still be contested and contradicted by alternative interpretations. And this brings us again a step further in our journey of intersystemic counter-actualization, into the worlds of social, economic and political interpretation (Image 7.2). As we have seen throughout the empirical chapters, each on its own already presents us with considerable moral complexities of diversity, equality and democracy respectively (cf. Fainstein, 2016). It is these we have to focus on first, before being in a position to consider their possible interpenetration.




Image 7.2. Underlying our scientific, economic and political 'systems' we find interpretations and contradictions, chiefly the critical contradiction of quantified (and thereby often hegemonic) interpretations and alternative interpretations.

In Chapter 4 we saw that within the world of *social* identities, questions of *diversity* were defined by a central contradiction between mono- and multiculturalism. In the face of gentrification a complex dialectic of identities emerged in Arnhem and Vienna between, on the one hand, working class nativism or yuppie monoculture and, on the other, a more or less idealistic or pragmatic cosmopolitanism of the new middle class and minority groups respectively. Interpretations of a good social 'diversity' and 'mix' were an integral part of this dynamic, hinging on interpretations of the time in which the real neighborhood (ie. 'proper' composition) was to be located and should be preserved (before the arrival of the gentry, or only its latest batch, or before non-native immigration or even before working class settlement?). But they also depended on present spatial relationships of comfortable co-existence or conflict, indifference and 'social tectonics' (after the geological metaphor of tectonic plates rubbing against each other, producing the occasional frictions). Under the guise of tolerance, so we saw, cosmopolitanism can entail a rather exclusionary conjunction of groups that does not exactly entail any active mixing which could truly put anyone's identity or

habitus at stake. Thus both mono- and multicultural interpretations (etic and emic) are problematic in that, even when they involve temporal conceptions, they present rather static and, in a dialectic sense, negative modes of socialization. Escaping the contradictions of an essentialist, standpoint-theoretical kind of 'identity politics' and expanding our notion of diversity requires us to direct our inquiry to the realm of practices (which we will do below).

As in the case of social diversity, the question of *economic (in)equality*, as treated in Chapter 5, can be defined by a central contradiction, or so it seems, between the proletariat and the landed and capitalist classes. While the latter compete amongst each other in *the* market for the highest rents, profits and interests, the former find themselves on the short end, exploited, dispossessed and displaced. When reasoning from this clear-cut contradiction of economic interests (reflected by equally unambiguous academic positions), ethical prescriptions suggest themselves by a straightforward dialectic. Making it 'untrue' then means simply eliminating competitive allocation, private property and the (neo)liberal myths that sustain them. However, looking at actual relations of competition and class, such as those in a neighborhood like Klarendal, Arnhem, gentrification frontiers and class divisions become rather blurred and overdetermined. As a consequence, the ethical question becomes so too. Even after a wholesale socialist abolition (negation) of private property, we still need a positive notion of how to care for houses and the people that live inside them. Whether now or in that improbable future (ie. irrespective of the observation of any static either/or contradiction), this requires we study and develop dynamic material practices that create material and social wealth or 'commons', practices that know how to care for real estate, territorial claims (and stigmas) and a large variation in housing needs and (dis)abilities. Again, notwithstanding their often hard material reality of neglect and eviction, we find reason to look beyond legal and extralegal interpretations of property to get at the pragmatic intricacies of the urban housing problem.

Regarding the *politics* of gentrification, we also encountered a central interpretive contradiction, this time between the antagonism professed by left progressives (which may just as well come from conservatives, think of Schmitt, 2007) and the consensus politics of deliberative and liberal democracy advocates. While the latter, better represented among planners than critical scholars, retain faith in the possibility of a rational discourse on the benefits of social mix for the general interest, the former see real democracy and the interests of class minorities squashed by 'postdemocratic' consultation cons, obfuscatory language and neoliberal majoritarianism. In Chapter 6, we saw both modes of political discourse appear at different moments in the histories of Klarendal, Arnhem and Beyoğlu, Istanbul. In the Dutch working class neighborhood antagonistic politics defined the 1960s and early 1970s, before it became more agonistic with the formation of Working Group Klarendal. Nonetheless it sometimes resurfaces, often quite consciously, in response to the marginalization of concerns (as 'unreasonable') by more deliberative 'postdemocratic' platforms. In Istanbul, antagonism mostly came from the right-wing AKP government, with citizens finding ways to retain a more civil and humorous political discourse. However, once more, but in a slightly different form, the problem with this contradiction of 'real'

antagonistic politics and ‘postdemocracy’ is that we are left with a political essentialism that either renders any effort at consensus suspect (as either manipulation or false hegemony) or every antagonism an unenlightened illusion or contrarian nuisance. Against this static essentialism we may place the contingency of an issue-centred dynamics, so that both sides of the political split diffract into a contrast of practices of politicization that among themselves dynamically process any issue of gentrification.

Thus we find each ‘system’ already producing its own internal moral questions and contradictions of diversity (mono- versus multiculturalism), equality (capitalism versus socialism) and democracy (antagonism versus governance); moral quandaries which on closer inspection call for a more dynamic, practice-oriented ethics. However, each of these areas becomes even more complicated when they start ‘interpenetrating’ and contradicting one another, often requiring certain trade-offs to be made (cf. Fainstein, 2016, Fraser and Jaeggi, 2018) (Image 7.3). These are the kinds of difficulties that current invocations of ‘democratic socialism’ (eg. by Democratic Socialists of America or Democracy in Europe Movement 2025) try to navigate on a (supra)national level: how to bring about economic equality without destroying democracy by stalinism? How to emancipate minorities and create economic solidarity while recognizing historical and performative diversity? In their own way, each of these contradictions also play out at neighborhood level. In this regard, of course, the first contradiction lies in the effects of economic revaluation of a disadvantaged area (by revenue generating, anti-stigma or care service investments), which can attract a higher class demographic with different identities and moral conceptions that in turn invoke political demands to surveil more intensively or remove those who the initial investments were supposed to serve (ECO => SOC => POL). Or conversely, attempts at bringing about a more ‘inclusive’ neighborhood politics may attract only middle class people who ascribe to that cosmopolitan ideal, which in turn defines the area’s economic policy in their interests (POL => SOC => ECON). Another possible contradictory interpenetration occurs when differences among classes and groups (citizen status, disabilities, age etc.) are used to differentiate allocation of social housing, which in turn incenses political backlash (eg. when refugees are prioritised at the expense of marginalized natives) (SOC => ECO => POL). But this interaction of ‘systems’ need not be of a contradictory nature. For instance, weakened or strengthened class or ethnic identities allow for new political coalitions that in turn convince social housing developers to invest in the neighborhood (SOC => POL =>




Image 7.3. Second ontological multiplication by interpenetration of social, economic and political interpretations/contradictions of gentrification.

ECO). Ultimately, however, like sets of ‘baggy clothes’ (cf. Deleuze, 1990b: 44), all of these dialectics suffer from the same, all too familiar imprecision (see also Section 3.3 on the problems of Lefebvrian trialectics). As much as they can no longer rely on the pure axiomatic distinction of society, economy and politics they also lack a foothold in practices. Only when we turn to practices, can we see how the axioms (as ‘real abstractions’) and interpretations distinguish these three ‘systems’ in our performative doings ‘in the wild’, such that not ‘everything’ becomes social, economic or political, but that we can still make a difference.

7.2.3 Practices overflowing

As we have now seen again and again, to really gain a deeper understanding of both these ‘intrasystemic’ and ‘intersystemic’ tensions we should look at the ethical practices and processes from which they emerge. In ethological terms, we have to explore with diplomacy where and how we may turn fiery contradictions into fluid contrasts (see Section 1.2.6). Pushing this multiplication of reality even further, then, from the world of interpretations into the ethological nether realm of practices, we can see how socializations, economizations and politicizations do not just interact by mutual interpretation, but also ‘intra-act’, by overflowing into, interfering with and indeed overpowering and displacing each other. Thus we arrive at the point where (and when) gentrification is defined by how it is enacted.

Firstly, we have seen in every chapter how certain spatiotemporal practices already overpower others ‘intrasystemically’ (Image 7.4). Among practices of socialization, as presented in Chapter 4, there is a contrast between, on the one hand, social scientific practices, which in a bodily detached way naturalize and measure hegemonic distinctions and, on the other, vernacular modes of public interaction, in which categorization has a much livelier, situationally contingent and conditional character. Still, there is a lot of ‘contamination’ between such practices, as when statistical categories chosen for their supposed neutrality gradually seep into everyday interaction and receive a pejorative connotation (eg. ‘allochthonous’ in Dutch) or when the disuse of class in favor of ethnic labeling in ordinary discourse starts reshaping what is measured by statistical bureaus (as is the case in Arnhem




Image 7.4. The interpretations in the different systems or spheres of interaction are brought forth by heterogeneous practices of socialization, economization and politicization. Each of these display their own continuum of co-actualizing and overpowering practices.

and The Netherlands more generally). Although less directly visible the inverse could be said to take place in Vienna: Everyday cosmopolitanism among the professional classes and statistical practices shared a general mode of avoidance of distinction. However, beyond hegemonic discourse and habitual interactions we also found traces of certain singular events that shaped the neighborhood in a different and less continual fashion. In the Dutch case, this was a community theatre that for a moment managed to break habitual divides and thereby made a new shared history (Ballroom Theater). In the Austrian case, a similar process was suddenly triggered around a seemingly forgotten public square (Schwendermarkt). Both cases suggest that social mixing and the affirmation of diversity need not imply monocultural integration, balkanized multiculturalism or the cosmopolitan comfort of tolerance, but can be more singular and eventful if we allow ourselves to see it. And that when we do, new avenues may open up for the *cultivation of singularity* and the capacity for doing so. In a very performative sense, hegemonic social distinctions, backed by statistics or a product of habitual tectonics, make events of inclusive disjunction a rare occurrence and displace the art of cultivating them. Within the contrast of practices of socialization then, gentrification implies an *overpowering* of social mixture by identitarian modes of integration, exclusion and indifference.

Similarly, Chapter 5 presented a contrast of practices of economization as found in Arnhem, from the most speculative, rent-seeking and capitalist to the prestige-seeking, aesthetic and use-value oriented. Having our analysis wander through this contrast of practices rather than jump onto a general contradiction of class, gives us a very different view of the housing market. Instead of a series of rent gaps constituting a simple frontier, 'the' housing market is defined by a chaotic and overdetermined arrangement of different agencements, each economizing their own 'gaps' (not just of rent, but of reputation, utility or social wealth). In Arnhem, significant differences were found between global financial speculation, capitalist development and realty, prestige driven material hermeneutics, collective building and lastly, as an agencement that in its own singular way combined all these practices, social housing provision. Again, from this spectrum we could also trace some lines of flight away from the impatient pulls of rent and prestige. In Chapter 5 these were thematized within an *ethics of care* as strategic affirmations of economic dyscalculia and dyslexia. In this regard, the main housing association of Klarendal in particular developed its own prosthetic practices of financial patience (such as the 'water table'), socio-ecological calculation (the 'cluster book'), anti-stigmatization (such as Station Klarendal) and street-level care coordination. In sum, going further than the relative size of wallets and legal rights to housing or to place, inequality is thus approached from an (cap/dis)ability perspective. In this view, gentrification basically becomes a matter of certain capacities or affects losing out within a rather indirect competition, or rather, evolutionary intra-action. Among practices and agencements of economization, gentrification comes to denote an *overpowering* of affects of caring and commoning by violence and finance.

Lastly, in Chapter 6 we encountered a whole continuum of practices of politicization, by which we can trace out dynamic trajectories of issues and publics emerging and transforming around concerns of gentrification. In both the Turkish and Dutch

cases, these trajectories were no linear histories, in which gentrification evolved from an unaddressed concern to it becoming part of official policy. In many shapes and forms, its politicization shifted from antagonizing uprisings to deliberative governance and back. In this regard, the politicization of concerns, or its obstruction, turns out not to depend solely on electoral majorities or the expression of (class) antagonism, as is often implied by standard accounts of the political process. Instead, marginalized matters of concern may, with varying probabilities, gain entry into government planning by way of riots, carnivalesque occupations, legal bricolage, participatory budgeting or even pastoral practices. However, this also means that, at any moment, one particular practice may *overpower* and block certain concerns from being addressed. In Istanbul, for instance, we saw how antagonistic planning practices steadily displaced the concerns of gentrification of a budding civil society, undermined its litigation options and eventually had to violently beat down peaceful gentrification protests. In Arnhem, we observed how national attempts to politicize gentrification through scientific evaluation programs were successfully challenged by the ‘politics of method’ of more local actors. Another technocratic practice, participatory budgeting, turned out more successful in ‘depoliticizing’ gentrification issues, or rather blocking their address by other means than subsidizable projects. In light of these dynamics of politicization and displacement of concerns, and parallel to the foregoing cultivation of singularities and the ethics of care, it becomes crucial that we develop a transversal practice of *mesopolitics*, which knows how to reflexively switch between practices of politicization appropriate to the matter at hand. This fine art of everyday urban diplomacy (cf. Sennett, 2012) could well be a pragmatic instantiation of that ‘perennial midwifery’ we now understand democracy to require (as opposed to it constituting some essential form and ‘export product’ handed down to us by ‘founding fathers’, Taylor, 2019).

In every sphere of practice, what we see emerging is a kind of reflexivity. Not of the ‘meta’ sort, as has been the hallmark of Modern intellectual reflection, but of a post- or non-Modern kind where both naive positivity and critical negativity from outside give way to an affirmation of the middle, a place of genesis and ‘general’ complexity (not to be confused with the ‘political middle’: all actually existing capitalisms and socialisms have to deal with it). What we get is a kind of deindividualization or desubjectification of the social without lapsing into an Althusserian structuralism too general and static to be real (and which still presupposes positional determinations anyway). Without denying their performativity, this practice offers to relativize, or rather ‘relationalize’, social, economic and political positions, thus proposing the possibility of momentary but transformative escape routes away from often tiresome discussions of identity politics, wallet sizes and entrenched animosities.

On the other hand, there are also notable instances of ‘intersystemic’ interferences and overflows, situations where one kind of practice superimposes itself onto or triggers another. In Chapter 4, practices of economization and politicization tended to overpower social practices in Vienna. Political practice, for instance, formed a break on the production and use of demographic statistics. Also, Schwendermarkt was threatened as a commons by politicization (demolition, regulation) and economization (commercial gentrification). In Chapter 6, social scientific and budgetary practices

proceeded but largely failed to satisfactorily replace disappointing electoral politics in Arnhem. In the Turkish case, investors economized not just in obedience to the law but also by testing it and pressuring for legal exceptions that displace other concerns and the practices to politicize them. But there are also many more and less forceful overflowings between the different kinds of practices, where each triggers and catalyzes others through (concatenations of) interpretive and metric forms of expression. Thus alternative economizations trigger dominant politicizations or open up social lines of flight (Image 7.5). For instance, alternative property claims (eg. 'right to place') may trigger a referendum or reactionary policies from neoliberal ruling parties. Or they may blur former group identities, forge new alliances and trigger the opening up of new common spaces.

However, taking a last step of intersystemic counter-actualization (Image 7.6), we can also see 'systems' break down entirely,²⁰⁸ as we move all the way left in the actualization diagrams (ie. toward the 'under or non-represented practices' of Image 7.6). On the one hand this is a (onto)logical outcome of leaving behind the world of neatly distinguished interpretations. But also empirically we have seen a blurring and diffraction of the social, economic and political in this area of the diagram. If we could locate the dialectical notion of 'thirdspace' (Soja, 1996, Phillips, 2004, criticized in Chapter 3) somewhere in the diagram, it would be here. Nevertheless, it need not be as exotic as that category is often portrayed. Think for instance, in relation to the Klarendal case, of the practices of the cultural entrepreneur organizing Ballroom, the housing counselor at People's Housing and the neighborhood pastor. Embedded, attentive care, concern and 'organized coincidence' are all simultaneously involved in the community theatre, in the strong caring networks of street-level professionals and in the spiritual 'staying present' with the most marginalized matters of concern. In sum, material aesthetics (art), collective care (health) and proximate concern (spirituality) all featured as near-synonymous, Nietzschean lines of flight, relying on the most tacit skills and fragile capacities.²⁰⁹ At once precious and elusive, neither Habermasian 'lifeworld' nor 'thirdspace', these practices all involved an often ambiguous yet vital balance of affects, between the joys of belonging, care and concern and the sadness of fear, injury and silence. As such they touch on the beating heart of the problem-event that is gentrification (desubjectified, singularized, affective). Where the distinction between the social, economic and political dissipates, or as Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 1994) would say, 'deterritorializes absolutely', the new is ushered in. Beyond good and evil gentry-fication becomes gen-trification.

²⁰⁸ Which is another strong reminder that these 'systems' are ultimately only discursive constructions that 'rest' on a chaotic multiplicity of problems and practices which do not abide by logical distinctions and axiomatic decisions.

²⁰⁹ See, for instance, Reiner and Reinert (2006) on how Nietzsche thematizes art, health and spirituality in order to think affirmatively about 'creative destruction'. That is, conceive of it beyond mere representation: beyond notions of Great Men representing the History of World Spirit, as in Hegel, or classes representing (possibly by negation) the dynamics of Capital, as in Marx. Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987) can be said to modernize Nietzsche's work when they seek to affirm schizophrenia as a 'line of flight', beyond its (psychological) representation under capitalism.




Image 7.5. An example of intersystemic assemblage dynamics. Emerging from territorial practices (ie. common life in the neighborhood), an expression of alternative economic interpretations (eg. 'right to place') may influence political ideologies, party programs or policies which subsequently face evaluation through local polling. Or new social ties are forged across class and cultural divisions by a place-defining community event.




Image 7.6. Third ontological multiplication in which practices of socialization, economization and politicization intra-act, as singularities, affects and concerns resonate and catalyze each other to deterritorialize current social, political and economic systems.

7.3 Reflection: Causes and effects of gentrification?

From this new angle of ontological multiplicity, we can now return to the question of causality. In Chapter 3 we established with Jane Jacobs, that the city and by extension gentrification, is not a ‘two-variable problem’, where gentrification would for instance be a simple outcome of supply and demand for housing, nor even, as she herself would contend, a problem of ‘organized complexity’, in which gentrification would be the rather overdetermined product of “several dozen quantities [...] all varying simultaneously and in subtly interconnected ways.” (1961: 433). However, as already suggested in Chapter 3, even Jacobs’ description of the city, despite her reservations about ‘sentimentalizing nature’, still connotes too much of an ‘organized whole’ in equilibrium. Indeed, the ‘high-energy’, ‘unaverage’ intensity of today’s gentrifying cities is perhaps better understood as a metastable state of ‘solidified chaos’ (Jacobs, 1961: 436, 442), which by now has taken on a more positive, topological meaning (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, DeLanda, 1997, 2005).²¹⁰ However, whereas the old ‘Copenhagen interpretation of gentrification’ (Clark, 1994) interpreted this chaos as epistemic uncertainty resulting from incommensurabilities of analytic abstractions, the new, Bohrian-Baradian interpretation, presented in Chapter 3, affirms it as a fundamental, synthetic feature of reality (of which any observer of gentrification takes part). In the latter view, gentrification becomes a multidimensional and fractal event: more than one (multi-sided) thing in itself, yet less than a collection of isolated phenomena (cf. Mol, 2002: 55). It follows that, in order to understand this paradoxical object, we have to trace how it actualizes itself as a problem in practice, which reflexively includes the construction of social, economic and political imaginaries and measurements of gentrification itself (possibly but not necessarily going by that name). Thus, as proposed in Chapter 1, we get a truly ‘general’ complexity, which relates disorganized and organized complexity while taking account of epistemological relations (cf. Morin, 2006: 6–7), but then from the perspective of a differential empiricism rather than a dialectic idealism or realism.

What about cause and effect within this new paradigm? Can we still speak of causes of gentrification (in Klarendal, Beyoğlu, Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus or elsewhere)? As mentioned in Chapter 3, our new ontological scheme of things impacts the concept of causality as well. In contradistinction to logical empiricist, critical realist or interpretive notions thereof, causation has been reconceived as nothing more than a contingent process of actualization, from tendencies to practices and then to interpretations and then, sometimes but increasingly often, to metrics.

²¹⁰ When Jacobs (1961: 428–448) asks the question of what ‘kind of problem a city is’ (in reference to Warren Weaver’s famous typology of scientific problems), she responds to rationalist city planners such as Ebenezer Howard, who reduced the city to a ‘problem of simplicity’ of two variables such as quantity of housing (or population) and the number of jobs, or Le Corbusier, who approached it as a matter of ‘disorganized complexity’, analogous to the problems of statistical physics (ie. disorganized individuals behaving orderly when averaged, and therefore really only a macroscopic version of simplicity). Reasoning along similarly classical lines, urbanists such as Lewis Mumford or Clarence Stein did not see anything but ‘chaotic accident’ and ‘solidified chaos’ in a degenerate city where Jacobs saw lively, diverse and intense ‘organized complexity’, as parallel to biological life. Here we may revalue the solidified and accidental chaos without the epistemological and moral baggage imputed by classical rationalism.

'Effectuation' then signifies the performative, counter-actualizing ramifications of these actualizations. That is, a respective reordering and transformation of the possibilities, capacities and tendencies for further actualizations. As when a public social event breaks interaction habits and redefines a neighborhood's self-identity or when patient, anti-stigmatizing investments of a housing association set a norm proscribing the speculative flipping of properties. This also reflects back on the concept of performativity. Usually it is invoked to emphasize the power of words 'to do things' (Austin, 1962, Butler, 2010). We are reminded that speech acts have (at least) equal powers to non-speech acts to assert effects in the material world. While this may seem to be a proper correction to a problematic Modernist dualism of words and things, the ontological distinction is nevertheless retained, be it in a negative way (speech acts are *no* different from other acts in terms of having effects). However, the real post-correlationist challenge (see Chapter 2) is to try and understand performativity beyond the distinction, in a positive sense. How do things do things with things? Well, even 'things' never directly cause anything billiard ball-style (without the construction of a billiards table-style framework, which is then part of the 'causal' assemblage). Nor is there an intransitive 'larger' or 'deeper' thing that does it for them. Instead, mutual capacities and tendencies are reconfigured (limited or expanded) with every co-actualization. Depending on how radical that transformation of capacities is (that effectuation), further actualization can be increasingly uncertain and improbable.

Gentrification thus describes both causation and effectuation. Practices of socialization, economization and politicization (usually but not necessarily 'urban', 'middle class' or 'capitalist') overpower other such practices by the *actualization* of their own interpretations and metrics. But they also simultaneously overpower by more or less directly *counter-actualizing* other practices. That is, by restructuring capacities for different practices, possibilities for alternative interpretations and the properties of new metrics. Such causation of gentrification somewhere, sometime, differentially and singularly recapitulates genealogies of practices that reach back eons and may enjoy nearly global dissemination (which could then be nominated as its 'cause'). What then distinguishes this causation from simple determinism is not just the basic malleability and abstractness of such expansively recapitulated and disseminated capacities (remember, they are topological and differential in nature), but also, in a dynamic sense, the necessary correlate of counter-actualization, which at every actual instant (the resonance among tendencies to form a capacity, the projection of capacities into a possibility, or the realization of a possibility into a univocal property) performs a *further* cascading differentiation of new tendencies, capacities, possibilities and properties, thereby continually deferring closure and guaranteeing contingency. Thus with every actualization comes an effectuation of a time infinitely divided into potential (alternative, emergent, accidental) pasts and futures. For instance, from the 'geology of morals' of Chapter 3, we learn that any measured or habitual crustation of the social lithosphere makes room for new volcanic singularities that can rupture it. In the evolutionary language of Chapter 4, any adaptation to a bookkeeper's bottom line may encourage an exaptation or non-adaptation that changes the course of reality in a neighborhood's real estate. Or in terms of the career paths set out for matters of concern in Chapter 5, the suppression of an

issue through technocratic governmentality may trigger the antagonistic emergence of a protest movement. To repeat, there are no constant conjunctions or deeper mechanisms at work here. There is 'only' the performative drama of spatiotemporal dynamisms (eg. displacements) of practices, interpretations and metrics. Fully performative, there can be no actual spacetime container or reality, such as absolute space, the social, the market or the state (cf. Butler, 2010) that pre-exists their thereby fully contingent expression (socialization, economization, politicization).

7.4 Positionality and ethics of gentrification science

Taking all the above ideas together, of axiomatics, intersystemic interpretation, interference, causation and performativity, we may look with different eyes at our position as researchers, or rather, at the performativity of our research practice. It is Schlichtman et al. (2017) who have for the first time really thought through the actual positionality of gentrification researchers, so often *gentrifiers* themselves, living in university (down)towns on average, middle class incomes (see also the response by Marcuse, 2016). Rather than assuming a critical perspective located comfortably outside capitalist society (perhaps from some imagined proletarian vanguard position) and beyond the broad-stroked branding of colleagues as uncritical 'academic nobility' (Allen, 2008), they try to address the moral and political contradictions that arise when accepting that middle class people (like them) have to live somewhere too. Taking the autoethnographic route, they start from the risky, intersectional 'middle of things', asking the question, '*who are we?*'. Still, while necessary, this can only be a first step, as it remains tied to a *positional* politics of identity and place (which still insists on a transcendental dialectic of social structure and epistemic position).

To move beyond this standpoint-epistemology and politics, we also have to ask the meso-pragmatic question of *what we do* as gentrification researchers. That is, the performativity of our inventions and expressions, the differences we make to our postcolonial ecologies of practices. As scientists, perpetually on the lookout for new relations and alliances (Latour, 2004a), we are to stay perplexed and 'response-able' (Barad, 2007), which in the case of gentrification studies means withstanding the epistemic pull of capital (and its 'firstspace' and 'History 1'). In our search for sources of resistance and battle cries, but also by relaxing oppositions when possible, we should allow for diplomacy and the invention of new, generic concepts, propositions and questions. Within a discourse filled with ugly euphemisms and calls for war, this thesis has attempted to invent a set of more *diplomatic* concepts: volcanic singularities, dyscalculic/dyslexic affects of care and the mesopolitical gearbox. Whether they will live on, travel and mutate simply depends on the future relations they enter into. While there are no guarantees, efforts have been made to design them in a way to avoid their misuse (as apologetic genteelisms or false alarms). Apart from writing this thesis, I have tried to live up to the same *ethos* when manifesting myself in the *oikos* I found myself researching. As professional authors, our rhetorical and analytical skills are very much needed to co-write anti-gentrification strategy guides such as those of the London Tenants Federation et al. (2014) or Phillips et al. (2014) in San Francisco. Yet as Lees et al. (2016) concur with reference to the Swedish

context, specific strategies have to be developed for other places. In my own non-academic writing for the bimonthly gazette of Klarendal (see Appendix IV for an example), I have taken a more diplomatic and problematizing approach, saving my battle cries for those moments when they are obviously in place (knowing also that a hard critical approach incites mostly counterproductive hostility there, from all parties, which I refuse to take as mere evidence of my being right). Likewise, the final public presentation of this research in Klarendal (Posttheater, 28-11-2017, see Appendix V) took heed of the diversity of stakeholders present (ie. about 75 of the interviewees). While certainly critical towards any further sale of social housing by their public owners, it focused the discussion mainly on the abovementioned geological, evolutionary and mechanical concepts, which as far as I could tell resonated quite well with the audience.²¹¹ To conclude, just as we have the critical moral duty to address exclusionary relations, and to help others to do so, we should also feel ethically obliged to actively look for unexpected vectors of connection and evolution (and to never presume a situation is not amenable to any such lines of flight). I hope to have demonstrated that the approach developed here manages to do both, encouraging the imagination of radical alternatives and horizons, but demanding of them to try to find fertile soil in current sentiments and practices and their more-than-human/capitalist genealogies.

7.5 Good metrics, better interpretations, best practices

It would seem appropriate to close this thesis with some recommendations for policy. Overall, however, these cannot be straightforward blueprints or algorithms for good governance. Therefore, I instead attempt to set out some broad 'ethical coordinates' to better measure, interpret and practice the problem of gentrification. In the spirit of this thesis, this is done in full awareness of the fact that my scientific practice has little direct influence on political and economic practices (and that this diplomatic reflection might nonetheless be helpful). In all modesty, I can only hope that some of these words, written in an unavoidably novel and foreign language, somehow reach and positively inspire someone practically involved in the matters at hand. In my advice I will restrict myself to the Dutch-Arnhem-Klarendal case, as it is the only situation I have treated integrally, including all social, economic and political dimensions, and therefore feel comfortable making policy suggestions for. Again, we can split up the recommendations in terms of these three dimensions. This time, however, socialization and, by implication, science comes last, as it flows more nicely into the afterword on slow science.

²¹¹ In the presentation (see Appendix V), the economic theme, treated in the evolutionary terms put forth in Chapter 5, focused more on the commercial gentrification of Klarendal. It made a plea for supporting diversity among entrepreneurs and businesses (between *homo economicus*, *homo sociologicus* and *homo faber* agencements).

7.5.1 Practices of real estate economization: Good economics, better values, best practices of econodiversity

As shown in Chapter 5, land and housing are economized in many coexisting ways. Policy always has a strong role to play, whether by subsidizing or taxing certain practices of construction or finance or by protecting monuments. In the Netherlands, a good share of this policy is decided on by the national government and the EU. As mentioned, during the past three decades, even after 2008, the Dutch government has been stimulating ownership through tax breaks, specifically on mortgage interest (*hypotheekrenteaftrek*) and the deregulation of mortgage banking. Meanwhile, very few affordable properties have been built. On top of this, social housing has been residualized and its providers even heavily taxed (through the *verhuurdersheffing*, see Chapter 5), thereby further hampering any new construction. However, as ownership becomes increasingly unattainable and rents unaffordable for a whole generation, the topic is back on the national political agenda. If the political programs of parties taking part in the 2021 elections are to be believed, even those of the ruling conservative VVD and liberal D66, everyone recognises the problem and, at minimum, intends to abolish the just mentioned taxing of providers of social housing (Van Bockxmeer, 2021). There is also increasing consensus on phasing out the mortgage interest subsidy and moving gains from homeownership to the equity tax bracket. At least on paper, none of the main parties is still explicitly preferring ownership over renting. Center-Left parties (GL, SP, CU), who have for years supported homeownership, at least among low-income households, now want to expand social housing to include currently excluded middle class households and decouple rents from market values (the 'WOZ-value'). The Center-Right parties (D66, CDA) want to allow social housing corporations to build and rent out middle class homes in the 'free market' (ie. for a price above the social maximum, ca. 750-1000 pm), trusting they will keep prices low. All parties, including the right-wing VVD, have indicated that new rent controls are only reasonable. Within the dire circumstances, all these measures are seen as less of a problem of 'spoiling' market competition.

At least on the housing question then, the wind of economic policy seems to be changing. All seem to observe that a further 'liberalization' (or rather, financialized neo-feudalization) of real estate runs into popular limits. So while the rather unique social housing provision in the Netherlands, the product of an accommodating kind of stakeholder capitalist tradition (*polder model*), has been under a lot of pressure, the tide seems to be slowly turning by a similar economic accommodation. Neoliberal dogma thus may be said to wane somewhat, also in other sectors such as health care, yet it still remains to be seen whether this (counter-)actualizes into different practices. But within these changing conditions, the reflections of the preceding chapters can only become more relevant. Other conditions, like in Turkey or the US, where gentrification takes on much more violent forms such as mass evictions, do not allow much for such fine-tuned contemplation (and perhaps are not even served by it at this moment). Still, ultimately, a move away from wasteful rentier capitalism and towards a sophisticated set of democratic (eco)socialist practices has to be developed not just by thought experiment and by learning from history but by studying the nitty-gritty of practice in places where they might actually emerge. In

this sense, the Netherlands might reaffirm its status as a laboratory for progressive housing practices.

This thesis has tried to develop some concepts that help Dutch policy-makers navigate the ethical coordinates of the housing question (read: the problem-event of gentrification) as it is presented to them today. In the sphere of real estate economics, Chapter 5 suggested we orient our practices toward the *care* for our *common* economic dyscalculia and dyslexia. This is a form of care that does not simply correct economic ‘dysfunction’ to the rentier capitalist norm (by whatever subsidies, means-testing or other incentives), but actively attempts to affirm differently abled, non-profit-oriented and non-stigmatizing practices. Thus giving the old socialist phrase ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’ a new and refined, less utopianist meaning in the ‘econodiverse’ here and now. In order to care for the economically dyscalculic and dyslexic it is important, on the one hand, to maximize public participation in economic matters, while on the other to also recognize the complexity of housing needs and unequal, non-arbitrary capacities to build, appreciate and calculate. Right now, economic, more-than-monetary capacities are not distributed equally on a practice level. This can partly be addressed in policy through the stimulation of cooperative and participatory economics. Building cooperatives of owners (such as the Court of Saints in Chapter 5) may create and cultivate local, sociomaterial commons in the form of unique vernacular architecture, construction skills and social connections. Genuine participation means giving tenants economic decision-making power over housing investments, an option that has unfortunately fallen into obscurity since the 1970s (market research among passive consumers is not the same). There is no reason, other than corporation managers not willing to give up some of their power, to try and reinvigorate this tradition wherever feasible. However, cooperatives and economic participation also come with the concomitant risks of parochialism (the serving of only members or users) and of an exclusion of those unable to participate for lack of appropriate skills, time, energy or health. So where asymmetries cannot be redistributed by such practices, technologies of care come into play.

This more-than-medical care for differently abled city dwellers and their econodiverse practices should be the policy objective for progressive housing providers. To affirm and care for differences of ability and need, a demanding balance has to be struck between economizing more fairly (in a possibly reinvigorated tradition of ‘socialist accounting’) and caring for our urban ‘commons’ of housing, health, education and community. Besides public resources, this takes courageous action by housing corporations, from management to street-level counselors. On the one hand, dyscalculic housing stock policy means ‘calculating differently’, inserting social and ecological metrics into investment decisions, tinkering upstream within an environment still marked by increasing financialization and slumlordism. On the other hand, dyslexic leadership should cultivate integrity, defy the pull of business prestige and focus on carefully countering territorial stigmas. Beyond and basic to these strategic objectives, however, are the less visible but most crucial activities and dedication of housing counsellors and maintenance staff. The home and neighborhood being the prime locus of daily care, these workers should be given the resources and

the time to assert their central role within the integral care coordination so much needed in disadvantaged districts. We need housing to first respond to care gaps not rent gaps.

7.5.2 Practices of politicization: Good democracy, better agony, best practices of diplomacy

In Chapter 6 an argument was made not to exalt one practice as the essence of politics or democracy. This is not just a theoretical insight but a practical recommendation as well. Instead of approaching urban politics as an essentially Machiavellian power play, as in the Alinskyan school for instance, we need to recognize the performative effects of such assumptions: politics then *becomes* cynical instrumentalism. Within a fully reflexive and performative model, we have to consider a broader, more dynamic palette of ethical coordinates for practices of politicization, which then encircle concerns and issues rather than institute set powers and interests. To this end, Chapter 6 presented a ‘mesopolitical’ diagram of practices, which recognises that the politics of choice is neither essentially determined nor free, but a path-dependent, materially distributed and diplomatic affair. Politicians, practitioners and citizens should be educated in the workings of our political gearbox, increasing their diplomatic skills. We need better and smarter mesopolitics, in the national and municipal electoral arenas, but also at neighborhood level.

On the one hand, Dutch national politics seem incorrigibly consensus-oriented. It is the preeminent ground for what public administration scholars like to call governance, preceded by adjectives such as participatory, stakeholder, network or co-creative (in Dutch: *polderen*). While electoral politics have shifted over the years from a kind of corporatist (*verzuijing*) to a competitive elitism, and denominational paternalism has given way to numbers-driven technocracy, the inclination to seek consensus on economic issues outside the electoral arena has stayed much the same. Consequently, housing has not been a hot electoral issue for a long time, and national policy has silently shifted into a conservative ‘neoliberal’ direction. On the other hand, contributing to this silence, electoral politics have been dominated since the turn of the century by conservative and nativist ‘cultural politics’. Even if, as mentioned, some change may be in the air as to expanding the rental sector again, any sustained discussion of the housing question and gentrification is crowded out by cultural antagonism. On the national media stage, gentrification tends to be narrated and discussed mainly through aesthetic stereotypes of ridiculous hipsterism and nostalgia for white working class culture. In the worst cases, the lack of social housing is not attributed to the aforementioned housing policies of past conservative ruling party coalitions (VVD, CDA, PvdA, D66) but to the few immigrant refugees coming into the country and grabbing it from eligible natives.

How might we change this dynamic for the better? It is of course tempting to try and repay this right-wing aggression in kind and strive for a Left populist antagonism and in a defensive mode this might certainly be justified at times (if only as a threat). Yet even supposedly Leftist antagonistic politics have a way of degenerating into violence as authoritarian ‘vanguards’ hijack emancipatory projects. If we take the

definition of Leftist politicization given in Chapter 6, as the ‘procedural’ inclusion of ‘substantively’ inclusive concerns, then antagonism can take us only so far in a Left direction. If the Gezi uprising, for instance, was the ultimate Left populist embracing of inclusive concerns (see Section 6.3.3.2), it was soon obvious that in order to continue the ‘spirit of Gezi’, a Leftist leadership in the mirror image of Erdoğan would be out of place. That the following forums were not as sustainable as hoped for should not be reason to view the experiment as unsuccessful. So often oscillating uncontrollably between technocratic consensus and moralistic antagonism, Dutch political culture could learn something from Turkish grassroots and their courageous and often impossibly joyful agonistics. To open up Dutch electoral practices to concerns about housing and gentrification, we must learn to better switch gears and dare to agonize more by creatively naming and dramatizing persistent economic inequalities and malpractices. It is not that antagonizing around issues or their technical management is essentially unwanted. Rather, it is a matter of knowing or learning how to switch between and bridge the two by agonistics. While there is enough theory on the latter type of politics, what we now need is a conscious, comparative experimenting with its actual practice.

At city level, especially in mid-sized cities such as Arnhem, a thick parliamentary consensus and undecidability can become politically asphyxiating. Especially in tandem with efforts at a more integral, area-based governance, politics can become captivated and captured by a static governmentality that is no longer open to marginalized concerns. While this problem cannot just be passed on to the level of the neighborhood (as part of such area-based governance), new solutions remain to be discovered. Meanwhile, at neighborhood level, there are generally no ‘best practices’. Keeping alive a diversity of relatively autonomous platforms and practices may allow for a nimble mesopolitics. Some issues are better served by plenary neighborhood meetings, others by neighborhood councils or participatory budgeting. And in this regard, there can be no generic ‘best persons’ to rely on either. Effective and charismatic leadership is tied to (historical, timely) conjunctures of practices and styles of politicization. Certain practices favor certain persons in tune with certain matters of concern. Nonetheless, a mesopolitical consciousness and diplomatic capacity should be attainable across all of them. This, however, requires us to better educate ourselves. Much like the aforementioned challenge of progressive economization, the political Left is confronted with the exceedingly demanding task of balancing the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ extremes of the spectrum of practices of politicization, whereas the Right can more comfortably sit in the middle and antagonize in favor of exclusive concerns (although this may ultimately also be suicidal). The maximizing of relative inclusivity by the inclusion of more and more marginalized concerns into the government apparatus is slow and difficult, especially if economic conditions pull into the other direction. How to ‘steward’ issues through the string of practices (nonlinearly, switching back and forth) is what we need to further study and learn.

7.5.3 Practices of socialization: Good statistics, better understanding, best practices of singularization

In Chapter 4, an alternative view was presented on how social interaction and ‘mixing’ can take shape in a gentrifying neighborhood. The first advice to policy-makers is to abandon the strong beliefs in the ‘concentration’ or ‘neighborhood effects’ hypothesis, which states that problems of individual households are somehow made worse by the presence of other disadvantaged residents and that, conversely, the presence of more well-off people (a more ‘balanced mix’) would somehow improve their conditions through role model or network effects. Since there is no strong evidence for this (and certainly not in a Dutch context), this can never be a reason to differentiate housing in a way that displaces a portion of the original residents. By extension, aesthetic reasons for mixed urban living, while much more important than critical voices generally admit, can never be sufficient for demolishing or selling social housing either. That being said, however, there is much to be improved in the always dynamic and mixed social environment of the modern city. So while, on the one hand, ambitions of ‘integration’ are often set too high (and unequal) for social interactions, on the other, we need not be content with an everyday familiarity and ‘tolerance’ in public spaces.

Within mixed neighborhoods, policy can enhance its responsiveness to so-called ‘social tectonics’, named as such after the geological metaphor of tectonic plates (read: groups, classes) rubbing against each other. Street-level spatial organizations such as the placing of tenure types, public park design and so on, easily translate into ‘invisible walls’ that breed conflictual and comfortably indifferent social interactions. As the Viennese case demonstrated, such physical organization, or a more explicit moral regulation of public space (by signs, placards and surveillance) may not be the answer. A living neighborhood needs moments when mono *and* multicultural interactions and habits are put at stake and a more common (hi)story can write itself. Daily tectonics demand not-so-daily ‘volcanic’ events to bring people together, even if through their ‘uncomfortable’ differences rather than similarities. As the cases of Ballroom Theater and Schwendermarkt in Chapter 4 showed, the very singular events and spaces through which this happens are very hard to plan for. They probably require a combined strategy of letting a thousand flowers bloom and having an aware and well-resourced community of cultural scouts and pacemakers who sense when things are in motion and understand that frictions are an integral part of forging improbable relations and overcoming oneself. We need to learn to appreciate practices and events of social mixing beyond overly ambitious expectations of structural change (there are other, economic and political practices better equipped to achieve that).

Lastly, policy makers, including citizens, should be made aware of the power and contingency of social science in the wild. Statistics and rankings of citizens, neighborhoods and cities are not neutral or ‘natural’ without a practice enacting them as such. When we counter-actualize the ubiquitous ethnic profiles and livability rankings coming from social scientists, we see that choices are being made and some essential social qualities are not being quantified. In Chapter 4, for instance, we saw

how Arnhem has not been measuring direct class indicators, but only unemployment and welfare recipients. This betrays quite a severe bias which asks for more ‘social balance’ in a rather different sense. The balance, in other words, can only exist in (grounded) statistics and can therefore, within bounds, be arranged otherwise. Awareness of the performativity of social metrics should inspire more responsibility toward our abstractions. The choice of classifications is not just a response to highly political problematizations but also the other way around. Routinely presenting the number of welfare recipients or *allochtonen* during neighborhood meetings and in city government communiques, instead of, for instance, wealth inequalities or tenure types, structures ensuing conversations both at political platforms and at street-level. For better science, we need a habit of questioning and justifying such choices.

7.6 Some final reflections on the trials of a slow science in a fast world

Working on the topic of gentrification for seven years has raised my consciousness in many ways. Over the course of ten years, the housing question has become more pressing for my generation and social class, intimately tied as it is to the socially and ecologically unsustainable economics and right-wing politics prevailing at the moment. It is a lived experience and concern that drives me to search for new ways to understand our predicament and to look for alternative ways to live in common. Moreover, during my modest time in academia, spanning about the same 10 years, I have also seen its practices change dramatically. The ever growing workload and narrowing of what good academic production and teaching means, makes our sciences just as unsustainable.

The developing content and the process of writing this thesis have convinced me that we need a different kind of ethics to live and work by. In the preceding chapters I have already pointed to the possibility of an ‘ethology’ of practice. In the philosophical tradition of Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze and Stengers, the good and the bad, as embodied by more-than-human affects, become a matter of speed and slowness (which, to repeat, should not be read in absolute chronometric terms, but as a matter of differential relations, thresholds, intensities and timing). Designed to go beyond moral essentialisms of good and evil, such an approach does not easily fit our rather exhausted oppositions of capitalism versus socialism, real politics versus submission and hard science versus humanities. In the two preceding chapters, these oppositions were transformed into dynamic contrasts and continua of practices defined by their speeds and slownesses. Indeed, the diagram by which that translation was made was itself an ethological device, combining the speed of maximum ontological abstraction and the slowness of detailed empirical study in order to find pathways to more joyful ecologies of economic, political and scientific practices.

Now of course I am far from alone in this turn to speed or acceleration to try and grasp the problems that define our lives today. Inspired by the same Stoic-vitalist and Platonist-rationalist currents of thought that are implicated in the here presented theory of actualization (see Chapter 1-3), there are those who look for societal alternatives in ‘slow living’ or, alternatively, in ‘accelerationism’. Originating from

Italian, vitalism-inspired autonomism, there are the proponents of Slow Food and *Cittaslow*, or Slow City (Petrini, 2003, Honoré, 2004). With food and home at the center (and ample attention to risks of gentrification, eg. Parkins and Craig, 2006: 106-107, Osbaldistan, 2013: 87-88, Steel, 2020: 207-209), these social commentators propose ways to decelerate our work, care, sex, education, money and science. In the age of the Anthropocene, Steel (2020) argues, the time has come to slow down, refashion our aesthetics of existence into a 'hybrid of Stoicism and Carnival' and turn our cities into 'sitopias' (from the Greek *sitos*, food). In contrast, the more rationalist accelerationists (Williams and Srnicek, 2014, Bastani, 2019) say we need to transcend our inherited scarcities by technological progress, such as GMO crops, solar power, cultured meat and so on. Demanding 'full automation' and 'luxury communism' on a world scale, they condemn the 'localist' Slow Movement as an ineffective 'folk politics' and self-disqualifying 'horizontalism' (Williams and Srnicek, 2015: 15, 41-42). It is an unfortunate strawman, as both movements mainly agree that what our ethics and politics require is neither technophobic deceleration nor accelerationist hubris, but a more virtuous interplay (assemblage) of speeds and slownesses. Which, in practice, excludes neither automation nor asceticism.

From the ethological perspective introduced in this thesis, moving 'too fast' really means a neglect of both extremes of the spectrum. Extractive, financialized capitalism tends to thwart both innovation and efficiency, while antagonist populism tends to both marginalize concerns and hollow out democratic checks and balances. In these terms, we have been living through some rather sad accelerations. With real estate at its center, but really including anything that can be financialized, our economics running up to and ever since the great recession of 2008, has turned into a veritable inequality amplifying machine. Not surprisingly, after years of austerity following that crisis, there came the great conservative backlash of 2016, with amongst others Brexit, the American election of Trump, the Turkish *coup d'état* attempt and the Dutch Ukraine-EU referendum. And there are no signs that the current Covid crisis is changing the direction of any of these developments, with a rent-seeking, wasteful 'platform capitalism' rapidly monopolizing supplies to an increasingly isolated and indebted populace. And with Leftist parties somehow still losing election after election. In the face of these rather despairing accelerations, we have to find a way to slow down. The answer can never be simply accelerationist, which would imply speeding up now on a dangerous promise of a great future deceleration. Conversely, the 'decelerationist' slow living movements can degenerate into mere virtue signaling and the, just as perilous, promise of a coming age of universal awareness. Slowing down, in a properly relative sense, can only be a dynamic, relational and practical affair.

From this perspective, finally, practices of science would also benefit from an ethological slowing down. As Stengers has recently pointed out, in primary reference to 'hard' experimental, capital-S science, it is "... 'fast' not in the sense that it demands little work or effort, but in the sense that no objection will lead to compromise on questions of principle or doctrine" (2018: 53). Fast science practice is about safe alignments on islands of peers and journals, ramped up by New Public Management at universities. And it is about viewing symmetric engagement with the public, also

about the messy work and consequences of science, as a distraction. In this sense, a kind of fast science also prevails in the social, economic and geographical sciences, including both positivist and supposedly critical forms. It takes the shape of ‘toys for econometric boys’, ever tweaking ahead on the next inconsequential model, but also a kind of (post-)Marxist journalism, churning out new disclosures of how every latest cultural or policy concept is actually ‘neoliberal’ (meanwhile nipping in the bud many attempts at doing things differently). As science becomes a pledge of allegiance called peer review, we should not kid ourselves to think that such energy consuming products make much of a positive difference in practice.

Within the current, Dutch academic *oikos*, characterized by structural overtime (as of 2017 at least six hours per week for 68% of Dutch academics, FNV/VAWO, 2017), exploding student numbers (a rise of about 60% in twenty years), declining budgets (about 25% per student) and ever diminishing time for research, the slow science *ethos* embodied by this thesis is out of place and out of pace and, at least in my experience, unhealthy and literally painful (63% of Dutch academics report similar complaints, *ibid.*). Seeing so many perish around me under the pressures to publish and teach, I am not sure I will stay well and motivated to further pursue a career in this rather unhappy environment. We need a slower science and university, but how? On the one hand, collective struggles are needed to take back control from management and get the above numbers down. Yet, on the other hand, slow cannot just mean control over the pace of work, or more generally, a ‘freedom from (neoliberal) power’ (eg. Martell, 2014). Power is *defined* by relations of speed, and *positive* freedom has to come from a new configuration (ethics) of speeds and slownesses. As Stengers alludes, slow science “represents not only a challenge to fast, mobilised science. It is also a wager. A wager on the capacity of scientific thought collectives to enter into new symbiotic relations with other collectives that have different matters of concern. The very term ‘slow’ is indicative of this wager. Slow, today, designates all those social movements that endeavor to escape what has been put forward in the name of efficiency...” (2018: 103–104). A future slow science, one of problems and practices, will claim neither positive Truth nor critical revelation in the face of emergency, but enters into less expedient but more symbiotic relations with other publics and movements. May this thesis and its recipe for counter-actualization contribute to this, slow us down and have us joyfully appreciate the mess we are in.

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Appendix I: List of interviews referenced

033	Arnhem	Real estate agent	Also investor
034	Arnhem	Real estate agent	
035	Arnhem	Real estate agent	Hired by housing association
036	Arnhem	Resident, comm.	Old, working class, Dutch, male (comm. leader)
037	Arnhem	Resident, comm.	Old, working class, Dutch, male (comm. leader)
038	Arnhem	Resident	Old, working class, Dutch, female
039	Arnhem	Resident	Old, working class, non-Dutch, female
040	Arnhem	Resident	Old, working class, Dutch, female
041	Arnhem	Resident, comm.	Old, working class, Dutch, female (+husband)
042	Arnhem	Resident, comm.	Old, middle class, Dutch, male
043	Arnhem	Resident	Old, working class, non-Dutch, female
044	Arnhem	Resident	New, middle class, Dutch, female
045	Arnhem	Resident, ent.	New, middle class, Dutch, male
046	Arnhem	Resident	New, middle class, Dutch, male
047	Arnhem	Resident	New, middle class, Dutch, female
048	Vienna	Community org.	Cultural interventions (Right to the city)
049	Vienna	Housing ass.	Wohnfonds Wien
050	Vienna	Politician	District Council member, Social-democr. (SPÖ)
051	Vienna	Politician	District Council member, Populist-cons. (FPÖ)
052	Vienna	Resident	New, middle class, Austrian, female
053	Vienna	Resident	Old, working class, Austrian, female
054	Vienna	Resident	Old, working class, Austrian, male
055	Vienna	Resident	New, middle class, Austrian, male
056	Vienna	Resident	New, middle class, Austrian, male
057	Istanbul	Academic	METU, Urban Planning, Prof.
058	Istanbul	Academic	METU, Urban Planning, Prof. (former planner)
059	Istanbul	Academic	METU, Urban Planning, Prof.
060	Istanbul	Academic	Mimar Sinan Fine Art Univ., Ass. pr.
061	Istanbul	Academic	Middle East Technical Univ., Postdoc
062	Istanbul	Academic	Middle East Technical Univ., Postdoc
063	Istanbul	Community org.	Member of Ayaz Paşa Neigh. Ass.
064	Istanbul	Community org.	Cihangir Neighb. Ass. member (initiative head)
065	Istanbul	Community org.	Cihangir Neighb. Ass. member (founding)
066	Istanbul	Community org.	Cihangir Neighb. Ass. member (ex-chairman)
067	Istanbul	Community org.	Group interview Neighb. Ass. Cihangir
068	Istanbul	Municipality (gov)	Planner at Ministry of Urbanism, Ankara

	FdH, HP	Face-to-face	20/05/2015	Yes	Yes
	FdH	Face-to-face	22/07/2014	Yes	Yes
	FdH, HP	Face-to-face	22/06/2015	Yes	Yes
	FdH	Face-to-face	02/10/2014	Yes	Yes
	FdH	Face-to-face	12/10/2015	Yes	Yes
	FdH	Face-to-face	25/07/2016	Yes	Yes
	RvM	Face-to-face	09/09/2015	No	No, notes
	FdH	Face-to-face	12/07/2016	No	No, notes
	FdH	Face-to-face	27/08/2015	Yes	Yes
	FdH	Face-to-face	18/07/2016	Yes	Yes
	SV	Face-to-face	22/01/2016	Yes	Yes
	FdH	Face-to-face	18/07/2014	Yes	Yes
	SV, HE	Face-to-face	09/03/2016	Yes	Yes
	SV, HE	Face-to-face	09/03/2016	Yes	Yes
	SV	Face-to-face	18/08/2016	Yes	Yes
	MF, IB	Face-to-face	19/08/2015	Yes	Yes
	YF	Face-to-face	09/10/2014	Yes	Yes
	MF, YF	Face-to-face	22/06/2015	Yes	Yes
	MF, YF	Face-to-face	27/01/2015	Yes	Yes
	v.s.	Face-to-face	08/10/2015	Yes	Yes
	v.s.	Face-to-face	31/10/2015	Yes	Yes
	v.s.	Face-to-face	31/10/2015	Yes	Yes
	v.s.	Face-to-face	31/10/2015	Yes	Yes
	v.s.	Face-to-face	05/08/2015	Yes	Yes
	FdH	Face-to-face	08/09/2015	Yes	No
	FdH	Email corr.	28/022018	N/a	N/a
	FdH	Email corr.	21/01/2018	N/a	N/a
	FdH	Skype	14/06/2020	Yes	No
	FdH	Skype + email	21/07/2019	Yes	No
	FdH	Email corr.	24/09/2019	N/a	N/a
	ŞD, MG	Face-to-face	25/12/2014	No, only notes	N/a
	SK, EY	Face-to-face	11/09/2014	No, only notes	N/a
	SK, EY	Face-to-face	12/09/2014	No, only notes	N/a
	SK, EY, ŞD	Face-to-face	01/07/2014	No, only notes	N/a
	G2.o	Face-to-face	10/04/2015	Yes	Yes
	FdH, SK, EY	Face-to-face	09/09/2015	Yes	Yes

o69	Istanbul	Municipality (gov)	Planner at Ministry of Urbanism, Ankara
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EY	Emine Yetişkul	METU
FdH	Freek de Haan	RU
HE	Huib Ernste	RU
HP	Huub Ploegmakers	RU
KG	Kostantinos Gourzis	RU (Master student, intern)
MF	Michael Friesenecker	UNIVIE
MG	Merve Gürsoy	METU (Master student)
RV	Rowan Voermans	RU (Bachelor student)
RvM	Rianne van Melik	RU
ŞD	Şule Demirel	METU
SK	Serap Kayasü	METU
SV	Stefan Venema	RU (Master student, intern)
YF	Yvonne Franz	UNIVIE
v.s.		UNIVIE (Various students)

	FdH, EY	Skype	18/12/2017	Yes	Partially
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Appendix II: List of documents referenced

ABN Amro	11/2012
Başka Haber	25/06/2013
BUWOG/EHL	2016
BUWOG/EHL	2017
Calcasa.co.uk	2018
Calcasa.nl	2018a
Calcasa.nl	2018b
De Gelderlander	18/06/2007
De Gelderlander	24/06/2011
De Gelderlander	02/07/2011
De Volkskrant	03/08/2013
Der Standard	05/11/2015
Diken	24/11/2014
Facebook.com/Schwendermarkt	13/06/2016
Financial Focus	06/09/2017
Financieel Dagblad	06/09/2014
Gebietsbetreuungen Stadterneuerung	06/14/2015
Gemeente Arnhem	1994
Gemeente Arnhem	1995
Gemeente Arnhem	1997
Gemeente Arnhem	2001
Gemeente Arnhem	2003
Gemeente Arnhem	2009
Gemeente Arnhem	2014
Gemeente Arnhem	2015a
Gemeente Arnhem	2015b
Gemeente Arnhem	2016
Gemeenteraad Arnhem	03/2004
Gemeenteraad Arnhem	26/03/2007
Gemeenteraad Arnhem	13/05/2011
Gemeenteraad Arnhem	12/11/2012
Gemeenteraad Arnhem	03/11/2014
Gemeenteraad Arnhem	29/02/2016
Hürriyet	07/04/2013
Hürriyet	19/08/2014
İleri Haber	04/11/2016

BIM Biedt Bouw Business: Onderzoek naar verdienkansen door BIM
Cihangir Forumu Toplantılarını Sürdürüyor: İrtibatı Kesmeyelim
Erster Wiener Wohnungsmarkt Bericht, Ausgabe 2016
Erster Wiener Wohnungsmarkt Bericht, Jubiläumsausgabe 2017
Calcasa Automated Valuation Model
Calcasa Methodiek statistisch waarderingsmodel
Calcasa Methodiek huisprijsindex
Klarendal wil theater niet kwijt
Ergernis over 'gedateerd onderzoek' rond matige vooruitgang krachtwijk
Wethouder Kok maakt wegwerpgebaar bij onderzoek krachtwijken
'Alles beter sinds we Vogelaarwijk zijn'
Sanfte Stadterneuerung im Wiener Reindorfviertel
Erdoğan, bir inşaat projesi durduruldu diye hakimlere 'vatan haini' demeye getirdi
Probleme im Grätzl - die Stadt Wien hilft sofort (link posted)
Portret - Een echte koopman
Oprecht gepassioneerd, maar ook ongeremd megalomaan
Mehr als nur ein Markt
Werk in uitvoering: Bestuursakkoord 1994-1998
Werk in voorbereiding II: Uitwerking bestuursakkoord 1994-1998
Wijkplan 1998-2002
Klarendal Kom op!
Klarendal: Kleur en Karakter
Erfgoed in Beeld
Twintig jaar wijkaanpak in Arnhem: Van project naar standaard in stad en stadhuis
Koersnota Van Wijken Weten
Perspectiefnota 2016-2019
Perspectiefnota 2017-2020
Bestemmingsplan Klarendal-Sint Marten 2004
Part. herz. bestemmingsplan Klarendal-Sint Marten 2006
Bestemmingsplan MFC Klarendal
Bestemmingsplan Klarendal-Sint Marten 2012
Motie 'Instellen Buurtrechten / Buurtwet'
Collegenota 2015.0.100.437
Police intervene at Emek Theater protest featuring Costa-Gavras
Galataport'u protesto ettiler
Cihangir Roma Bahçesi aktivisti Deniz Özgür: Burada kentsel faşizmle mücadele ediyoruz

İMO (İnşaat Mühendisleri Odası)	2012
Independent Türkçe	25/01/2019
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality	2007
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality	2009
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality	2011
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality	14/01/2011
Kloggroep	2013
Kurier	10/10/2014
Meinbezirk.at	09/12/2014
Minister Vogelaar	22/03/2007
Modül Planlama	2017
Morel Makelaars Instituut	2011
Morel Makelaars Instituut	2011
NRC	14-06-2014
ÖİB (T.C. Başbakanlık Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı)	2012
Postvirtual.wordpress.com	27/06/2013
Resmi Gazete	30/03/2004
Resmi Gazete	03/07/2005
Samstaginderstadt.at	2015
Scale-Stipo	2011
Stichting Pompoen	2007
The Guardian	14/06/2013
The Guardian	17/06/2013
Trouw	03/09/2013
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	28/12/2010
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	27/06/2011
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	17/07/2011
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	20/01/2012
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	01/02/2012
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	01/11/2012
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	30/12/2012
Volkshuisvesting	05/05/2004
Volkshuisvesting	12/07/2011
Volkshuisvesting	2011
Volkshuisvesting	2014

Yapı Denetimi Hakkında Kanun ve Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Taslağı ‘Kıyı Kanunu’nu Nasıl Etkiliyor?
Gezi eylemlerinden sonra dördüncü kez... Erdoğan: Taksim’e Topçu Kışlası’nı yapacağız
The Istanbul Master Plan summary
Istanbul çevre düzeni planı (1/100.000 Ölçekli)
Beyoğlu Kentsel Sit Alanı Koruma Amaçlı Uygulama İmar Planı Raporu
Beyoğlu Perşembe Pazarı Kentsel Sit Alanı Koruma Amaçlı Nâzım İmar Planı Raporu
Klokgroep Jaarverslag 2012
Arm, aber sexy
Schwendermarkt: Unterschriftenaktion geht weiter
30995 Aanpak Wijken
Planlama ve İmar Mevzuatı VI
Regiŝter-makelaar taxateur in onroerende zaken. Aanvullende theorie wonen/MKB. Les 12 Taxatieleer
Regiŝter-makelaar taxateur in onroerende zaken. Aanvullende theorie wonen/MKB. Les 13 Taxatieleer (vervolg)
Ze waren zonnekoningen en ze werden ook vorstelĝjk beloond
İstanbul İli Beyoğlu İlcesi Salıhpazarı Liman Bölgesi: Koruma Amaçlı İmar Planı
Historical Atlas of Gezi Park
Kıyı Kanununun Uygulanmasına Dair Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Yönetmelik
Özelleştirme Uygulamalarının Düzenlenmesine ve Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanunda ve Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun
Samstag in der Stadt am Schwendermarkt
De nieuwe kracht van Klarendal: Mode als startpunt voor vernieuwing
Het Ballroom Theater: Theater voor de Klarendaller
Erdoğan offers to suspend Gezi Park redevelopment pending court case
Turkish police confiscate piano used to serenade Taksim Square protesters
Nog steeds trots op de Vogelaarwijken
Niks te zien
Nadenken over klushuizen 2
Liever dit
Parlez-vous klussen? Posted
Samen leren calculeren
Ontwerp voor de laatste huizen
Jaaroverzicht 2012
Memo: Aankoopbeleid panden Klarendal
Slotrapportage: 100% Mode Klarendal
Jaarverslag 2010 Volkshuisvesting Arnhem
Jaarverslag 2013 Volkshuisvesting Arnhem

Volkshuisvesting	2016
Werkgroep Klarendal	1987
Werkgroep Klarendal	1997
Wijkkrant Klarendal	01/2016
Wijkkrant Klarendal	03/2016

	Jaarverslag 2015 Volkshuisvesting Arnhem
	Klarendal: Een overzicht van de stadsvernieuwing tussen 1972-1987
	25 jaar Werkgroep Klarendal
	Achter de Linden: Twintig nieuwe koopwoningen
	Middenstand cultuur achter de voordeur

Appendix III: List of sources of images

#	Title	Date
1.1	Satellite view of Klarendal, Arnhem	2020
1.2	Row of redeveloped properties at Hommelseweg	04/2016
1.3	Fashion Quarter crossing (Sonsbeeksingel-Klarendalseweg)	04/2016
1.4	Satellite view of Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, Vienna	2020
1.5	Vogelweidpark sign explaining rules of social conduct	31/10/2015
1.6	Some stalls at Schwendermarkt	24/08/2013
1.7	Satellite view of Beyoğlu, Istanbul	2020
1.8	Computer rendition Tarlabası renewal plans	2011
1.9	Beyoğlu Gezi Forum at Cihangir Park	25/06/2013
1.10	General diagram (counter-)actualization	2021
1.11	Counter-actualization in six steps	2021
1.12	Schematic of research design	2021
3.1	The famous 'double slit' setup	2007
3.2	An ontological classification actants in terms affects	2021
3.3	General diagram (counter-)actualization intra-active practices	2021
3.4	(Counter-)actualization of practices of socialization	2021
3.5	(Counter-)actualization of practices of economization	2021
3.6	(Counter-)actualization of practices of politicization	2021
4.1	Diagram practices, interpretations and metrics of socialization	2021
4.2	Screenshot neighborhood profile (wijkprofiel)	2012
4.3	Photocopy statistics/map handout neighborhood meeting	07/10/2015
4.4	Development Klarendal's housing stock, sorted by property	13/09/2017
4.5	Change of ethnic composition in Klarendal	13/09/2017
4.6	Dispensable income Klarendal residents compared to the city average	13/09/2017
4.7	Percentage welfare recipients Klarendal compared to city average	13/09/2017

Source	URL
Google Maps	
Own photo (FdH)	
Tripadvisor.nl	https://www.tripadvisor.nl/Attraction_Review-g188568-d10156059-Reviews-Modekwartier-Arnhem_Gelderland_Province.html
Google Maps	
Own photo (v.s.)	
Wikipedia.org	https://nl.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolfsheim-F%C3%BCnfhaus
Google Maps	
Beyoğlu Conservation Plan	
Başka Haber	http://www.baskahaber.org/2013/06/cihangir-forumu-toplantlarn-surduruyor.html
Own drawing (FdH)	
Own drawing (FdH)	
Own drawing (FdH)	
Barad K (2007)	
Own drawing (FdH)	
Own drawing (FdH)	
Own drawing (FdH)	
Own drawing (FdH)	
Own drawing (FdH)	
Own drawing (FdH)	
Neighborhood action plan Klarendal 2013-2015	
Own photo (FdH)	
Arnhemincijfers.nl	Arnhemincijfers.nl

4.8	Typical Klarendal display of stoopsitting	05/2014
4.9	Sitting area overseeing playground Leuke Linde	30/09/2015
4.10	Turkish wrestlers accompanied by opera singer	2007
4.11	Still from the grand finale Ballroom	2007
4.12	Front of Ballroom Theater during first year	06/07/2007
4.13	Photo of interior Ballroom Theatre	06/07/2007
4.14	Page R-F housing market report: Vielfalt im wandel	2016
4.15	Enlargement of the lower section 4.14	2016
4.16	Mapping of R-F's SINUS-milieus	2017
4.17	Reindorf redevelopment project Wohnfonds_wien	2015
4.18	View on the basketball/football court at Dadlerpark	2015
4.19	Vogelweidpark sign explaining rules of social conduct	31/10/2015
4.20	Schwendermark fixed stalls	2013
4.21	Schwendermarkt open space	2004
4.22	Air photo Schwendermarkt	01/06/2019
4.23	Announcement of Schwendermarkt demolition	22/07/2014
4.24	Citizen's initiative offering petition to district manager	31/01/2015
4.25	Some results of Schwendermarkt gardening actions	23/04/2015
4.26	Children on self-made street furniture	23/04/2015
4.27	Schwendergarten summer harvest gathering	16/07/2015
4.28	Cafe Landkind (Bauernladen & Markcafe)	09/2017
5.1	The classic tree of life	1859
5.2	The rhizomatic net of life	2005

Google Street View	
Own photo (RvM)	
DVD 'Het Ballroom Theater. Theater voor de Klarendaller.'	
DVD 'Het Ballroom Theater. Theater voor de Klarendaller.'	
Ytje.blogspot.com (Ytje Veenstra)	http://ytje.blogspot.com/2007/06/ballroom-theater-klarendal-arnhem.html
Ytje.blogspot.com (Ytje Veenstra)	http://ytje.blogspot.com/2007/06/ballroom-theater-klarendal-arnhem.html
EHL and BUWOG housing market report	
EHL and BUWOG housing market report	
EHL and BUWOG housing market report	
Wien.gv.at	https://www.wien.gv.at/bauen-wohnen/reindorf.html
Courtsoftheworld.com	https://www.courtsoftheworld.com/Austria/Vienna/Dadlerpark/
Own photo (v.s.)	
Wikipedia.org	https://nl.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bestand:Wien_15_Schwendermarkt_a.jpg
Artfile.at (Franz Wibmer)	http://www.artfile.at/artfile/picts/Wand_der_Sprache_1.jpg
Google Maps	
Heute.at	https://www.heute.at/s/kommt-das-aus-fur-den-schwendermarkt--14902954
Meinbezirk.at (Ulrike Kozeschnik-Schlick)	https://www.meinbezirk.at/rudolfsheim-fuenfhaus/c-lokales/schwendermarkt-neustart-am-rundentisch_a1225942
Samstaginderstadt.at (Johanna Riess)	http://samstaginderstadt.at/Samstag%20in%20der%20Stadt_2015.html
Samstaginderstadt.at (Johanna Riess)	http://samstaginderstadt.at/Samstag%20in%20der%20Stadt_2015.html
Samstaginderstadt.at (Johanna Riess)	http://samstaginderstadt.at/Samstag%20in%20der%20Stadt_2015.html
Google Street View	
Darwin, 2006: 320-321	
Kunin et al., 2005: 957	

5.3	General diagram actualization of economic agencements	2021
5.4	Diagram specified to assemblages of monetary regulation	2021
5.5	Specific diagram practices of real estate economization.	2021
5.6	Temporary buildings of elderly homes and youth center	10/2008
5.7	Plot with billboard announcing development by Clockwork	05/2015
5.8	The new middle class houses built	08/2018
5.9	The surrounding working class dwellings	08/2018
5.10	The construction site next to the park and playground	2019
5.11	Clockwork Inc.'s headquarters	08/2017
5.12	BasicHouse prototype 1	2019
5.13	BasicHouse prototype 2 (realized in Klarendal)	2019
5.14	BasicHouse prototype 3	2019
5.15	BasicHouse prototype 3 realized	2019
5.16	Template appraisal report from realtor training syllabus	2011
5.17	Template appraisal report from realtor training syllabus	2011
5.18	Real estate database software RealWorks shown on a computer in the office of one of our interviewees	22-01-2014
5.19	Map house price index of the Netherlands (Calcasa)	2019
5.20	Real estate software Vraagscan, 'object features'	2019
5.21	Real estate software Vraagscan, cartographic interface	2019
5.22	The row of prewar houses before renovation by Richman	07-2009
5.23	The facades under construction	10-2016
5.24	The houses just after completion, with 'for sale' sign in place	06-2017
5.25	A frontal view of some facades	06-2017
5.26	Original facade of 1912 grocery store (1934)	1934
5.27	Intermediate pre-renovated state of grocery store (2010)	2010
5.28	The grocery store 'saved' and 'given back' (2017)	2017
5.29	The Necker cube optical illusion	01/05/2007

	Own drawing (FdH)	
	Own drawing (FdH)	
	Own drawing (FdH)	
	Google Street View	
	Google Street View	
	Google Street View	
	Google Street View	
	Google Earth	
	Google Street View	
	Klokgroep.nl	https://www.klokgroep.nl/activiteiten-concepten/basehome-woningtypes
	Klokgroep.nl	https://www.klokgroep.nl/activiteiten-concepten/basehome-woningtypes
	Klokgroep.nl	https://www.klokgroep.nl/activiteiten-concepten/basehome-woningtypes
	Klokgroep.nl	https://www.klokgroep.nl/activiteiten-concepten/basehome-woningtypes
	Morel Makelaars Instituut	
	Morel Makelaars Instituut	
	Own photo (FdH)	
	Calcasa	https://www.calcasa.nl/huisprijsindex
	Funda.nl	https://www.funda.nl/voormakelaars/producten/vraagscan/
	Funda.nl	https://www.funda.nl/voormakelaars/producten/vraagscan/
	Google Street View	
	Bastionoranje.nl ((Het Noordbrabants Museum))	https://www.bastionoranje.nl/index.php?pagina=nieuws&categorie=437&artikel=14893
	Bastionoranje.nl (Will Porrio)	https://www.bastionoranje.nl/index.php?pagina=nieuws&categorie=437&artikel=14893
	Own photo (FdH)	https://www.bastionoranje.nl/index.php?pagina=nieuws&categorie=437&artikel=14893
	Wikipedia.org	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necker_cube

5.30	The rabbit–duck optical illusion	23/10/1892
5.31	Scraping off paint to reveal ‘original’ property	2016
5.32	Richman and municipal official inspect an old door	2016
5.33	The realtor’s equipment for on-site appraisal	19-06-2015
5.34	Life cycle protoctist slime mold (<i>Dictyostelium discoideum</i>)	1989
5.35	Air photo of block of sweat equity houses	2019
5.36	The row before redevelopment, occupied by squatters	07-2009
5.37	House seeks handyman	04-2013
5.38	Refurbished buildings with shop windows left intact	04-2016
5.39	Learning to calculate together	01-02-2012
5.40	Deliberations colors of rear of houses	01-11-2012
5.41	Architect revealing design of rear of houses	01-11-2012
5.42	Rather this: Demolition work	17-07-2011
5.43	Cover of textbook ‘Humans, bricks, money 2.0’	2013
5.44	Two functions of real estate: Use value and exchange-value	2013
5.45	Housing production between financial and societal	2013
5.46	Before picture social housing Willemstraat, Klarendal (1)	05-2014
5.47	After picture social housing Willemstraat, Klarendal (1)	10-2016
5.48	Before picture social housing Willemstraat, Klarendal (2)	05-2014
5.49	After picture social housing Willemstraat, Klarendal (2)	10-2016
5.50	Phillips standing next to his MONIAC machine	1958
5.51	Sketch of water table constructed by general director PH	2020
5.52	Page of realtor’s report acquiring properties for FQ	2007
5.53	Page of realtor’s report acquiring properties for FQ	2007
5.54	Page of realtor’s report acquiring properties for FQ	2007
5.55	Page of realtor’s report acquiring properties for FQ	2007
5.56	Cluster book: Radar chart client and societal value	17/11/2016
5.57	Cluster book: Full user interface, color-coded scores	17/11/2016
5.58	Cluster book: Bar chart comparative financial value of cluster	17/11/2016
5.59	Cluster book: Bar chart actual and target rent of cluster	17/11/2016

Wikipedia.org	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabbit-duck_illusion
Oogoparnhem.nl (Zefanja Hoogers)	
Oogoparnhem.nl (Zefanja Hoogers)	
Own photo (FdH)	
Maturana and Varela, 1989: 78-79	
Google Earth	
Google Street View	
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	https://sintmartenshof.wordpress.com/page/7/
Google Street View	
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	https://sintmartenshof.wordpress.com/2012/02/01/samen-leren-calculeren/
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	https://sintmartenshof.wordpress.com/2012/11/01/ontwerp-voor-de-laatste-huizen/
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	https://sintmartenshof.wordpress.com/2012/11/01/ontwerp-voor-de-laatste-huizen/
Sintmartenshof.wordpress.com	https://sintmartenshof.wordpress.com/2011/07/17/liever-dit/
Van Os, 2013	
Van Os, 2013: 19	
Van Os, 2013: 20	
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Google Street View	
Google Street View	
Google Street View	
Wikipedia.org	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Phillips_(economist)
Own photoscan (FdH)	
Volkshuisvesting, archives	
Volkshuisvesting, archives	
Volkshuisvesting, archives	
Volkshuisvesting, archives	
Volkshuisvesting	
Volkshuisvesting	
Volkshuisvesting	
Volkshuisvesting	

5.60	Maps ongoing and finalized sustainability projects	14/11/2016
5.61	Map commercial planning block-level (1:1500)	14/11/2016
5.62	Entrance Klarendalseweg before Station Klarendal	unknown
5.63	Entrance Klarendalseweg after Station Klarendal	28/01/2011
5.64	Former location post office at Arnhem Central Station	14/04/2003
5.65	Station Klarendal under construction	11/03/2007
5.66	Promotional map participants Night of Fashion 2018	2018
5.67	Logo of business association DOCKS	
5.68	Promotional map Fashion Quarter (2010)	2011
5.69	Promotional flyer Night of Fashion 2013	09/06/2013
5.70	Postcard drawing old Menno van Coehoorn barracks	unknown
5.71	Renovated barracks and Multifunctional Center Klarendal	2013
5.72	View of whole MFC complex at Klarendalseweg	2019
5.73	Diagram actualization practices of real estate economization	2021
6.1	Classical Marxist political ontology	2021
6.2	Governmentality and post-Marxist political ontology	2021
6.3	Full ontological spectrum of practices of politicization	2021
6.4	Sketch of a phase space for the politicization of concerns	2021
6.5	Practices of politicization institutionalized in modern states	2021
6.6	Beyoğlu project map adapted from Cons. Plan (2011)	05/10/2020
6.7	The (former) Ministry of Env. and Urb. in Ankara	20/03/2016
6.8	Erdoğan meets activists from Taksim Solidarity	12/06/2013
6.9	Erdoğan chairing meeting at the Presidential Palace	20/07/2016
6.10	Erdoğan in a telephone meeting with pres. Trump	24/11/2017

	Own photo (FdH)	
	Own photo (FdH)	
	Zefanja Hoogers	
	Wikipedia.org	https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Station_Klarendal
	Gelders archief (1501-01 – 1660)	https://indebuurt.nl/arnhem/toen-in/toen-in-arnhem-hoe-het-stationspostkantoor-naar-klarendal-werd-verplaatst-68739/
	Gelders archief (1501-01 – 9179)	https://indebuurt.nl/arnhem/toen-in/toen-in-arnhem-hoe-het-stationspostkantoor-naar-klarendal-werd-verplaatst-68739/
	Modekwartier.nl	https://www.modekwartier.nl/where-to-find/
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	Jaarverslag Volkshuisvesting 2010	
	Elle.com	https://www.elle.com/nl/lifestyle/uitgaan/a307403/tip-nacht-van-de-mode-2013/
	Arnhem.nl	https://www.arnhem.nl/ruimtelijkeplannen/plannen/NL.IMRO.0202.755-/NL.IMRO.0202.755-0201/t_NL.IMRO.0202.755-0201_2.2.html
	BRCcontrols	
	Google Earth	
	Own drawing (FdH)	
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	Own drawing (FdH)	
	Own drawing (FdH)	
	Own drawing (FdH)	
	Own drawing (FdH)	
	Own drawing (FdH)	
	Yetiskul et al., 2016	
	Wikipedia.org	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Environment_and_Urban_Planning_(Turkey)
	Turkey Tribune	https://www.turkeytribune.com/2013/06/erdogan-meets-artists-and-taksim-solidarity-over-gezi-park/
	Foreignpolicy.com	https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/20/situation-report-fp-exclusive-nato-chief-on-turkey-erdogans-crackdown-continues-next-steps-in-isis-fight-north-korea-practices-for-strikes-on-u-s-troops-and-lots-more/
	Haberler.com	https://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-in-paylastigi-fotograftaki-10278157-haberi/

6.11	Actor-network of Turkish planning practice (including new image of aerial photo of Galataport construction)	2021
6.12	Henri Prost's 1937 master plans for Beyoğlu	1937
6.13	Photograph by Prost, Taksim Gezi Park	unknown
6.14	Cover Istanbul Master Plan (1/100000)	2009
6.15	Cover of the Galataport project development plan (1/5000)	2012
6.16	Plan notes Perşembe Pazarı Master Plan (1/5000)	14/01/2011
6.17	Illustrative detail plan notes Perşembe Pazarı Master Plan	14/01/2011
6.18	Land-use map from Beyoğlu Conservation Master Plan	2011
6.19	Early design Galata Project	2001
6.20	Map of Cultural Industries and Tourism in Istanbul'	2007
6.21	Tarlabası renewal project, 'renovated' facades	2011
6.22	Tarlabası renewal project, extra stories added	2011
6.23	Tarlabası renewal project, modern backside	2011
6.24	Tarlabası renewal project, map showing gated courtyard	2011
6.25	Galataport Project plan (1/1000) including enlarged plan notes	2012
6.26	Legal handbook 'Planlama ve İmar Mevzuatı VI' (ed.4)	09/09/2015
6.27	First page table of contents legal handbook (ed.6)	2017
6.28	Protest against Galataport by Urban Defence	19-08-2014
6.29	Leaflet 'İSTANBUL CLAIMS ITS RIGHT TO THE CITY'	2012
6.30	3D rendition of 2012 plan for Gezi Park and Taksim Square	2012
6.31	Map of the 'Gezi Republic' during the park's occupation	27/06/2013
6.32	Beyoğlu's Gezi forum at Cihangir Park.	25/06/2013
6.33	Gestures to express one's opinion at Gezi forum	2013
6.34	Penguin wears gas mask	2013
6.35	Army of penguins gives Erdoğan headache	2013
6.36	Duran adam protest on Taksim Square	19/06/2013
6.37	Yeryüzü Sofraları occupation of İstiklâl Street	12/07/2013
6.38	Whirling dervish with gas mask at Gezi protests	unknown

Part own drawing (FdH), part copied images	https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2017/03/04/galataport-project-starts-offers-new-gateway-to-istanbul-culture#gallery
Akpınar, 2014	
Akpınar, 2014	
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality	
ÖİB	
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality	
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality	
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality	
Tabanlıoğlu Architects	http://www.tabanlıoglu.com/project/galataport/
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality	
ÖİB (T.C. Başbakanlık Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı)	
Own photo (FdH)	
Modül Planlama	pdf screenshot
Hürriyet.com.tr	https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/galataportu-protesto-ettiler-27032424
Schwegmann, 2012	
Archive.nytimes.com (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality)	https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/07/world/europe/The-Plan-to-Change-Taksim-Square.html
Postvirtual.wordpress.com	Postvirtual.wordpress.com
Baskahaber.org	http://www.baskahaber.org/2013/06/cihangir-forumu-toplantilarn-surduruyor.html
İnceoğlu, 2013	
Aestheticsofcrisis.org (passiontakingflight.com)	http://aestheticsofcrisis.org/2013/of-penguins-and-tear-gas/
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t24.com.tr	https://t24.com.tr/haber/13-kose-yazarindan-duran-adam-yorumlari,232308
Everywheretaksim.net	http://everywheretaksim.net/tr/38-yasindayim-boyle-iftar-yapmamistim/
Pinterest.com	https://nl.pinterest.com/pin/315744623849182720/

6.39	V for Teyzetta, auntie humor	02/06/2013
6.40	Protesting Darth Vader with Turkish flag	06/2013
6.41	Star Wars meme, analogy political groups around Gezi	06/2013
6.42	Aerial photo demolition and new social housing 1970s	1997
6.43	Working Group Klarendal protests during Carnival	1997
6.44	The Klarendal round table, literally and deliberately so	2017
6.45	Voting by stickers on “Housing and environment”	28/10/2015
6.46	Voting by stickers on “Shops and Fashion Quarter”	28/10/2015
6.47	Cover evaluation study by SCP, ‘Werk aan de Wijk’	2013
6.48	Cover study by Verwer, ‘Een kwestie van vertrouwen’	2012
6.49	Cover of ‘Koersnota Van Wijken Weten’	2015
6.50	Cover of ‘Perspectiefnota 2017-2020’	2016
6.51	Cover ‘Meerjarenprogrammabegroting 2017-2020’	2016
6.52	Examining the neighborhood budget spreadsheets 1	25/01/2018
6.53	Examining the neighborhood budget spreadsheets 2	25/01/2018
6.54	Urban mesopolitics as six-gear motor transmission	03/10/2019
7.1	First ontological multiplication: Cross-calculation	2021
7.2	Social, economic and political interpretations, contradictions	2021
7.3	Second ontological multiplication: Interpenetration	2021
7.4	Practices of socialization, economization and politicization	2021
7.5	An example of assemblage dynamics	2021
7.6	Third ontological multiplication: Overflowing	2021

Twitter.com	
Youtube.com	https://youtu.be/tNAG-xqhlpM
Gaysofturkey.wordpress.com	https://gaysofturkey.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/936338_624687534208921_25975992_n-1.jpg
Werkgroep Klarendal	
Werkgroep Klarendal	
Own photo (FdH)	
Own photo (HP)	
Own photo (HP)	
Permentier et al., 2013	
Verwer and Walberg, 2012	
Gemeente Arnhem	
Gemeente Arnhem	
Gemeente Arnhem	
Own photo (FdH)	
Own photo (FdH)	
Wikipedia.org	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manual_transmission
Own drawing (FdH)	
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Appendix IV: An example of a column for the Klarendal newspaper (Wijkkrant Klarendal)

TRANSLATION (ORIGINAL BELOW):

Klarendal research district

By *Freek de Haan* of Radboud University Nijmegen

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY ‘GIVING BUILDINGS BACK TO THE NEIGHBOURHOOD’?

Our cities and their neighborhoods have had a rough time since the war. Many inhabitants no longer wanted to live there and, given the opportunity, left for the quiet and space of the suburb. The current reappraisal of city living might almost make us forget that during the seventies to nineties the wealthy were hardly interested in the city, which they considered too busy, messy and unsafe. Nowadays, however, a so-called ‘creative class’ has arisen with the transition to a knowledge-driven economy, having new home preferences: less monotonous, historic character and close to cultural facilities like theatres and bars. Simultaneously, a lot of urban real estate has tumbled in value so it’s practically for the taking to small and big investors who are prepared to take the risk.

On the border of Klarendal (officially Sint Marten), on the HOMMELSEWEG, a lot of investments of that kind have taken place. Take, for example, the row of homes where squatters have been replaced by DIY-keen families (‘THE DIY-HOMES’). A somewhat bigger investment was made further down the road by real estate entrepreneur THEO DE RIJK, who has started renovating the buildings at KOP VAN DE LEUKE LINDE. He’s doing this with respect for historic detail, passionately diving into the Arnhem archives to find out which shade of yellow was originally given to the so-called ‘bacon-layers’. Theo tells me he would like ‘to return the buildings to the neighborhood’, referring to the state they were in around 1900, when these bourgeois homes were built.

So, where in history is the actual start of this “true” Klarendal to which you then return something? Before the war, when those wealthy bourgeois still lived there? Or after, when Klarendal, like many other city neighborhoods, was temporarily ignored by the well-to-do? Klarendallers will vary in their answers to these questions. Some will regret the (repeated) bourgeoisification of their neighborhood while others appreciate the renovated and tidy environment.

Anyhow, as long as there are enough homes for people with a small budget, a row of homes saved from decline can only improve the neighborhood’s liveability. The result, compared to what they were like before the renovation, is quite impressive.

Klarendal onderzoekswijk

voor *Freek de Haan*, *Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen*

WAT BETEKENT DAT, PANDEN 'TERUG AAN DE BUURT GEVEN'?

De meeste steden en hun buurten hebben het sinds de oorlog te verduren gehad. Veel mensen wilden er niet meer wonen en vertrokken als men kon naar de rustigere en ruimtelijkere buitenwijken. De huidige herwaardering van het stedelijke wonen in ons bijna laten vergeten dat in de jaren 20 tot '90 de hogere inkomens weinig oog hadden voor een stad die zij vooral als te druk, rommelig en onveilig zagen. Vandaag de dag daarentegen, is er met de overgang naar een kenniseconomie een zogenaamde 'creatieve klasse' ontstaan die nieuwe woonvoorkeuren heeft: minder eenvormig, historisch kenmerkend en dicht bij culturele voorzieningen als theater en café. Tegelijkertijd zijn er vele panden in de stad sterk in waarde gedaald, zodat zij praktisch voorlopig oprapen liggen voor kleine en grote investeerders die het aandurven.

In de grens van Klarendal (officieel Sint Jansdijk), aan de **HOMMELSEWEG**, hebben we een aantal van zulke investeringen plaatsgevonden. Zo is er bijvoorbeeld het rijtje panden aan de **DE KLUSSEWEG** in plaats van krakers jonge, kluslusgezinnen zijn gaan wonen ('**DE KLUS-**


WONIGEN'). Een wat grotere investering komt van vastgoedondernemer **THEO DE RIJK**, die even verderop aan de **KOP VAN DE LEUKE LINDE** panden is gaan renoveren. Hij doet dat met historisch oog voor detail; duikt met passie de Arnhemse archieven in om te achterhalen welke kleur geel die zogenaamde 'speklagen' nou eigenlijk waren. Theo vertelt mij dat hij de panden graag wil 'teruggeven aan de buurt', waarbij hij terugverwijst naar hoe ze er bij stonden rond 1900, wanneer de burgerlijke panden gebouwd werden.

Tja, waar in de geschiedenis begint dat 'echte' Klarendal eigenlijk, waar je dan iets aan teruggeeft? Vóór de oorlog, toen die welgestelde burgers er nog woonden? Of daarna, toen Klarendal net als vele andere stadsbuurten even vergeten was door de goede burgerij? Het zijn vragen waar Klarendallers verschillend op zullen antwoorden. Sommigen zullen het (opnieuw) verburgerlijken van de buurt betreuen, terwijl anderen de opgeknapte en nette omgeving waarderen.

Hoe dan ook, zolang er genoeg woningen voor mensen met een kleine beurs in de wijk aanwezig blijven, kan een rij van verval geredde huizen de buurt alleen maar leefbaarder maken. Het resultaat, in vergelijking met vóór de renovatie, mag er in ieder geval wel wezen.

Source: *Wijkkrant Klarendal*, 01, 2016: 3.

Gentrification in..



Freek de Haan, Huub Ploegmakers,
Rianne van Melik, Arnoud Lagendijk,
Huib Ernste
Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen



Gentrification?

A definition:

“Displacement of residents and/or their amenities by the influx of more affluent people and/or their amenities”



What research?

Social-geographical study of:

- Numbers
- Stories
- Practices


Dilemmas:

Socially beyond a working-class district [volkswijk]?

Economically beyond the Fashion Quarter [Modekwartier]?

Politically beyond area-based policy [wijkgericht werken]?

What is it good for? Where is the neighborhood heading.?




Social mixing beyond the working-class district?

Numbers? Little change...

Social tectonics and public familiarity

Volcanic outburst? Ballroom!




The housing corporation as care institution?

Economic caretaking

Internal care: Care coordination

External care: 'patient capital'

Selling off more social housing? Rather not!



Owner-occupied
Free market rent
Social rent



Diversity beyond the Fashion Quarter?

'Double success' clustered?



What kind of human, which *homo sapiens*, is the Klarendal entrepreneur?

Homo faber (making man)

Homo sociologicus (social man)

Homo economicus (calculating man)

Will more diversity strengthen the Klarendal economy?



Technocracy beyond area-based policy?


History: from 'Working group Klarendal' to..?

Politics = giving society's concerns a voice

Neighborhood diplomacy = switching political gears



Watch out for
technocracy because
it feeds discontent!



- 1) Concerns
- 2) Upheaval
- 3) Antagonism
- 4) Negotiation
- 5) Conversation
- 6) Voting
- 7) Governance

3 dilemmas

Social mixing beyond the working-class district?

Diversity beyond the Fashion Quarter?

Technocracy beyond area-based policy?



Summary

Today, the event of middle class takeover called gentrification seems all but ubiquitous, colonizing our minds (Schulman, 2012), planet (Lees et al., 2016) and everything in between. First exposed by Ruth Glass (1964) as a geographical process of urban change and working class displacement in postwar London, gentrification has since spread throughout the globe and adapted its form to a highly diverse range of local and historical contexts (Lees et al., 2015), affecting just about every social, commercial and political practice in its way. However, it may as such have evolved too far out of the confines of its original description, as much that a revising of the initial definition and diagnosis of the phenomenon is warranted. Through the years, many gentrification scholars have noted this and indeed the history of research and debates on the issue (Lees et al., 2008, 2010, Brown–Saracino, 2010) reads like a coming to terms with its spatial, historical and cultural multiplicity, both as practiced and as observed. Canonized are the exchanges among Ruth Glass' more radical Marxist heirs (eg. Smith, 1979a, Slater, 2006) and other, less capital determinist urban scholars (eg. Ley, 1980, Hamnett 1991). Today, after four decades of discussion, there is much more room for scientific pluralism in the discourse. While historically speaking gentrification has been at its core a Marxist problematic (eg. Glass, 1964, Smith, 1979a, Lees et al., 2010), it has been fruitfully subjected to a great many approaches, ranging from neoclassical economics (eg. Schill and Nathan, 1983, Skaburskis, 2010) to cultural geography (eg. Mills, 1988, Bourassa, 1993, Ley, 1994, Caulfield, 1989) to feminist theory (eg. Rose, 1984, Bondi, 1994) to Bourdieuvian or Polanyian sociology (eg. Jager, 1986, Butler and Robson, 2001, Bernt, 2012) to Gramscian/post-Marxist discourse analyses (eg. Loopmans, 2008, Davidson, 2009) to Foucauldian governmentality approaches (eg. Uitermark et al., 2007, Uitermark, 2014, Sequera and Janoschka, 2015).

And yet, favored paradigms and their fast explanations still dominate. Despite many attempts at appeasement and integration (eg. Clark, 1994, Phillips, 2004, Lees et al., 2008), underlying tensions among explanatory frameworks have never truly been resolved around differences of agency and structure, centered and decentered power, universality and postcolonial specificity, and so on. At this point we are left with a rich theoretical tool box to explain every economic, political and cultural aspect of the phenomenon, yet in the background incommensurabilities persist. And so we think we comprehensively know how gentrification emerges (its essential 'causes') and what it can do (its most serious 'consequences'), but on closer inspection we only have an epistemologically fragmented understanding of a supposedly ontologically ('essentially') singular phenomenon. What we need instead is an epistemologically more singular approach to what is today, and perhaps always was, an ontologically multiple event. In other words, it is not our concepts of gentrification that are too 'chaotic' for what is 'essentially', at its core, a simple problem. It is a chaotic problem that we have to learn to understand as such by means appropriate to the task.

What does it mean to say that gentrification is an ontologically multiple and chaotic event? In the words of Jane Jacobs (1961), 'the kind of problem a city is', is not a 'two-variable problem', of say supply and demand of urban space. Nor even a problem of 'organized complexity' involving several dozen interconnected quantities, as the fa-

mous urbanist herself would have it. Rather, the city is a problem of ‘solidified chaos’, and by extension the event of gentrification is too. It cannot simply be defined as a change of demographic or economic composition of a territory. As a fundamentally relational process, it ontologically precedes and brings forth such bounded entities and movements of people and capital. But neither is gentrification a simple collection of preferences or interpretations relative to economic, cultural or epistemic positions. Rather, as an inherently fractional event, it is best captured in the paradoxical formula: more than one, less than many (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, Mol, 2002). For both citizens and scholars, gentrification is more than one, perhaps multi-sided object, but also less than a mere collection of subjective ideations. Which means the event is inherently and ontologically problematic. It is a living, affective, violent and persistently puzzling problem demanding to be made sense of in material-semiotic practice.

As such, gentrification does not simply happen ‘out there’, waiting to be interpreted from disparate epistemic positions. It has to be enacted by a multiplicity of related practices (including scientific practices, cf. Mol, 2002, Callon, 2009). Gentrification-related phenomena such as social mixing, rent gaps and neoliberal policy all have to be performed by specific practices, interpretations and metrics to become real in their effects. They are rooted in specific practices of socialization, economization and politicization, which always stand in relations of superposition and tension with other such practices. Indeed, practices demonstrate their performativity in how they manage to displace and overpower other practices. That is, by how their actualization through interpretations (identities, values, ideologies) and metrics (facts, prices, votes) reshapes capacities to do so in another way. From this perspective, the problem of gentrification can be redefined as a spatiotemporal event of displacement, where some social, political or economic practices overpower others. This new definition leads us to ask again, but with a different meaning: How does gentrification emerge as a problem and practice? And what ethics of gentrification may follow from this explanation?

Counter-actualization: A science of problems and practices

As indicated by the title of the thesis, its goal is to ‘counter-actualize gentrification’. Counter-actualization is the name for the espoused research strategy and new diagnostic machinery needed to comprehensively navigate the multiplicity of theories and practices of gentrification. Briefly put, the method works in a direction counter to the way our world is posed to actualize itself, moving from surface metrics (prices, demographics, electoral patterns) to the narratives and practices that underlie, oppose and escape them. In the empirical Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the research strategy is applied to cases in Arnhem, Vienna and Istanbul in order to unearth the various practices that define the problem of gentrification in its many dimensions. First, however, Chapters 1, 2 and 3 discuss the underlying ontological theory of actualization, its derived epistemological directive of counter-actualization, its methodological translation into research design and its possible application to gentrification research.

The first introductory chapter poses the problem and academic discussion of gentrification in terms of the when, where, who and how of the process. As it turns out, the

times, spaces and actors of gentrification are quite impossible to identify exactly. It is suggested that we need to focus on the 'how' of gentrification: how social, political or economic practices overpower others. After this topical discussion, some general axioms of a science of problems and practices are introduced. The theory of actualization, which derives from and synthesizes the metaphysical discussions following the so-called 'speculative turn' in philosophy (Bryant et al., 2011), suggests two sets of concepts for studying modern human relations and their transformation. The first distinguishes practices, interpretations and metrics, by which the former bring forth the latter. The second interrelated set of concepts distinguishes practices of socialization, economization and politicization, based on an evolutionary and ontogenetic distinction of singularities, affects and concerns (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, Latour, 2005b). Both sets combined provide the conceptual apparatus to gain a sufficiently multidimensional section of the problem of gentrification.

For epistemological purposes, however, the first set of concepts is key. The epistemic procedure of counter-actualization starts from metrics (statistics, prices, votes etc.) (1) to then work down to the interpretations of which those metrics are a quantification (sociological theories and categories, property and preference, party programs and policies etc.) (2) but also looks sideways at interpretations that are not quantified (street-level identities, extra-legal property claims and values, ideologies and organizations etc.) (3). Then it relates the quantified interpretations to quantifying practices (monitoring, appraisals, voting procedures etc.) (4) and relates alternative interpretations to the practices of qualification that produce them (neighborly encounters, advertisement, protests etc.) (5). From there it is possible to trace the contours of practices that are neither qualified nor quantified and remain underrepresented (singular, place-defining events, common capacities of care, marginalized concerns etc.) (6). What results from this procedure is not just a multidimensional picture of an actual(ized) event, but a comprehensive view on other possibilities and capacities for promoting diversity, equality and democracy.

Actualization theory and counter-actualization strategy have been translated into an appropriate mix of methods and a rationale for comparative urban study. This has taken form in the European, JPI-funded research project "Practices and policies for neighborhood improvement: towards 'Gentrification 2.0'". Together with three teams from the University of Vienna, the Middle Eastern Technical University of Ankara and Radboud University Nijmegen, a common research framework and fieldwork protocols were devised based on the two sets of concepts mentioned above. Metrics, interpretations and practices were studied by a mix of methods ranging from statistics (based on secondary data) to interviews and document analysis to ethnographic observation. Social, economic and political themes of gentrification directed those methods toward a variety of actors, including residents, community organizers, investors, realtors, planners and politicians. The substantial amount of empirical data this generated was the input for our urban comparison. In recognition of recent relational and postcolonial interventions in comparative urban geography (Ward, 2010, Robinson, 2016) and gentrification in particular (Maloutas, 2011, Lees et al., 2015, Lees, 2018), a reflexive effort was made to go beyond ('unlearn') our universalist frames of communication and let our multi-sited ethnography bring out the singularity of our respective cases of choice.

Social science after the Speculative Turn

The second chapter engages with the philosophical discussions that have inspired and underlie actualization theory. As mentioned, these discussions have come out of the 'speculative turn' in continental philosophy (Bryant, et al. 2011) and have also found their way into geographical discussions through concepts such as 'actor-network' and 'assemblage' (eg. McFarlane, 2009, 2011, Fariás, 2009, 2011, Brenner et al., 2011). The intellectual move, enabled by and including the work of among others Bruno Latour, Manuel DeLanda and Quentin Meillassoux, reclaims metaphysical speculation from the general ban put on it after the great 'Critical Turn', the Kantian revolution that prohibited thinking beyond the transcendental correlation of thinking and being, mind and body, human and non-human. To arrive at a rigorous metaphysical foundation for the actualization theory deployed throughout the rest of the thesis, the chapter critically engages with and combines the work of the above mentioned philosophers and other thinkers less associated with the new turn. What results is a concept of emergence, or rather actualization, performed by four related 'abstract machines' (following Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, DeLanda, 1997). While this term is no further used explicitly in the empirical analyses, the machines theorize the relational operations of folding, affectivity, autopoiesis and quantification that bring forth the aforementioned problem-events, practices, interpretations and metrics. In modal terms, actualization implies a movement from an open confluence of tendencies to a progressively closed set of practical capacities, interpretive possibilities and metric properties, only to trigger a further differentiation and restructuring of these modalities.

Elephant becomes monster: A new 'Copenhagen interpretation' of gentrification

Chapter 3 subsequently applies this speculative ontology to long-standing gentrification debates and delineates some avenues of research that are taken up in the following chapters. Gentrification has often been called a 'chaotic concept' as it proves very hard to pin down both theoretically and empirically. Several authors have characterized the gentrification debate as a group of blind men feeling around an elephant, unable to come to a total picture of their shared object because of problems of communication and commensurability (Caulfield, 1989, Hamnett, 1991, Clark, 1992). To this day, the general answer has been given in terms of an epistemological 'complementarity' of different perspectives (Clark, 1992, Lees, 1994, Phillips 2002, 2004), by analogy to the famous Copenhagen interpretation of the paradoxes presented by quantum physics (Clark, 1994). While this may have brought relief from some rather essentialistic discussions by focusing our attention on the variegated effects or 'geographies of gentrification' (Lees 2000, Lees et al., 2015), it has by now left the causal question to a rather elephantine and taken-for-granted bundle of political economic factors. The latter lacks enough precision to deal both theoretically and ethically with the 'monstrous' multiplicity of practices that allows gentrification to emerge in the first place. Therefore, by recourse to the original and much misunderstood Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics (Barad, 2007), it is argued that we need to respect not just the epistemological complexity of gentrification (Lees, 1996), but beyond that, face its ontological multiplicity.

With this objective in mind, the epistemic procedure of counter-actualization is recapitulated in relation to gentrification and, for general programmatic purposes, tentatively applied to three prevalent sub-themes and avenues for further research: social mix, rent gaps and neoliberal urbanism. The first theme preludes Chapter 4, dealing with practices of socialization. Gentrification mixes people from different classes, ethnicities and other identity aspects and this implies displacive effects when identities and habits clash in media discourse and at street-level. By counter-actualization we not only find these displacements in between official statistics and everyday interactions but also open a window on less daily, less habitual events of constructive social mixing. In relation to the second theme, further pursued in Chapter 5, counter-actualization is a way of appreciating rather than trivializing practices of economization that produce gentrification in various ways. Rent gaps, which designate the location-specific difference between the rent currently capitalized and rent that might potentially be extracted from the site by reinvestment, are enacted in multiple ways by variously motivated actors and this should make a difference in how to empirically and ethically assess practices of investment. Lastly, in relation to the third theme of neoliberal urbanism, it is suggested that counter-actualization can give us an appreciation of the variety of practices politicizing gentrification and somewhat tempers the hermeneutic suspicion that finds 'neoliberal' oppression everywhere. This point and more are further developed in Chapter 6. Thus, Chapter 3 concludes the groundwork required for the empirical engagements that follow.

Tectonic and volcanic socializations

Comparing practices of socialization in Klarendal, Arnhem and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, Vienna, Chapter 4 contrasts the gentrification-related notion of 'social tectonics' (eg. Butler and Robson, 2001, Slater, 2005) with a new concept of 'volcanic singularities' to broaden our perspective on the issue of social mixing.

The chapter engages with the long-standing debates around neighborhood social composition and the beneficial or detrimental effects of mixing people from different classes, ethnicities and so on. While some say socially mixing urban neighborhoods is an effective way of breaking up problematic concentrations of poor people and the 'neighborhood effects' that hold them back (eg. Galster, 2007), others say it is a 'gentrification by stealth' (Bridge et al., 2012). Mixing, the latter say, produces mostly identity clashes and 'social tectonics' (after the geological metaphor of tectonic plates rubbing against each other, producing the occasional frictions). Some others still (Blokland and Nast, 2014, Blokland and Schultze, 2017), say both positive and critical views on social mixing may entertain overly ambitious ideals of integration or even, in the case of the critics, a romanticized picture of (non-mixed) deprived neighborhoods. Instead, we have to recognize the presence of a kind of 'public familiarity', designating an everyday comfort zone of weak interaction that produces a more low-key but still significant sense of belonging. Chapter 4 aims to add a fourth perspective, somewhat in line with earlier provocative suggestions on the virtues of a degree of social disharmony (Mumford 1938, Sennett 1970, Sarkissian et al., 1990). Acknowledging the pitfalls of both policy and critical perspectives and how they share rather unrealistic underlying ideals of

integration and social mobility, the chapter also challenges the fixation on the sphere of everyday interaction and comfort as the necessary site of social mixing, or its failure. Instead, it asks whether there are moments of affirmative social mixing that amount to neither harmony nor comfortable indifference. What about the not-so-daily, habit breaking events that might have little 'structural' socio-economic impact but nevertheless manage to effectively mix people beyond their comfort zone? 'Social tectonics', it turns out, are sometimes happily interrupted by 'volcanic singularities'.

In Chapter 4, counter-actualization quite strictly defines the narrative form, one case after the other: found metrics set the scene, then demographic categories are contrasted with daily street-level interaction among neighbors and then finally events are examined that unravel these habitual relations. At the level of social metrics, Klarendal and Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus differ in how these are constructed and deployed. Whereas the Dutch use them extensively, with a heavy fixation on ethnic minorities, welfare recipients and livability (instead of eg. class), Viennese authorities generally avoid them and one has to look at real estate marketeers to find any metrics in use. In correlation, ideas of where to look for 'social balance' are different: in metrics or at street-level. In both neighborhoods, however, tectonic frictions and moments of tolerant coexistence alternate. In Klarendal some may speak of an 'invisible wall' along a street opposing renters and buyers, but also find a low-key familiarity in the neighborhood playground. And the Viennese, while quick to demand of authorities to solve and regulate their public frictions, also manage to secure their comfort zones of tolerance in public space. That being said, both cases also manifest their own singular events of social mixing that amount to neither harmonious effacement of difference nor phenomenological displacement. In Klarendal a community art project called Ballroom Theater was, according to all those involved, incomparable to any other in recent history. As an approachable and eclectic series of vaudeville evening shows carefully mixing high and low brow culture, it put at risk deep social habits and bridged identity cleavages through art and cultural 'border objects'. In Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, the singularity in question was of a somewhat less explosive temporality: the rather unassuming and awkwardly spaced square called Schwendermarkt. Its announced demolition sparked a series of place-making claims that revealed its capacities as a 'commons', defying both economization (monocultural hipsterfication) and politicization (multicultural regulation). Both Ballroom Theater and Schwendermarkt, as rare and precious 'volcanic singularities', managed to temporarily break habits, mix up socializations and write a new shared history.

The chapter concludes that 'successful' social mixing does not necessarily imply harmonious 'integration' let alone social mobility. Conversely, the absence of these outcomes need not imply failure. Less ambitious goals might also be sufficient grounds to appreciate diversity and plan for mixed living. First, however, these goals can hardly be enough reason to sell off or demolish social housing in an already tight situation (cf. Gans, 1961: 183). Second, mixing does not have to play out in a domain of ordinary everyday interactions, but can be embodied by unique and significant events. Third, this not-so-daily kind of social mixture does not necessarily imply a warm bath of social comfort, and this should be okay in any real, diverse urban environment (Sennett, 1970). Lastly, in practice, social mixing is not necessarily about tension between cosmopol-

itan respect for diversity and segregation, but between a state of multi- or monoculturalist indifference and an affirmative differentiation of neighborhood life by a cultivation of singularities. The closing discussion section connects the foregoing notion of singularity to the issue of what defines a 'place' in a relational sense (as interrogated by Massey, 1994, 2005). It is suggested that the dynamic systems concept of 'metastability' can help us see and cherish in practice whatever makes a place interesting and vibrant, or 'unaverage' (Jacobs, 1961).

Economizations making the rent gap more or less true

Looking more deeply into the case of Klarendal, Arnhem, Chapter 5 addresses the variation among practices and so-called 'agencements' of economization in the sphere of real estate development. Much akin to Michel Callon's economic anthropology (Çalışkan and Callon, 2009, 2010), this chapter combines insights from evolutionary economics, practice theories of cognition, governmentality theory and disability studies in order to develop not just a critical perspective on the production of gentrification, but also a 'clinical' understanding of it tied to an ethics of care (cf. Gibson-Graham and Roelvink, 2009).

The most prominent explanation of gentrification from the perspective of its production is the so-called rent gap theory (Smith, 1979a, 1996, Lees et al., 2008, Slater, 2017, Clark, 1988, 2017, Kallin, 2017, 2020). As a Marxist, historical dialectic reinterpretation of (neo)classical and urban ecological theories of land markets it states that, in an unevenly developing capitalist economy, gentrification is most likely to occur at a location where the difference is sufficiently big between the current rent extracted from the property and the potential rent that might be drawn from it under its imagined 'highest and best use'. Because the theory considers both the preceding decline and the displacement after reinvestment as endemic to capitalism, its political view on how to ensure a more efficient and just allocation of land, is to eliminate the market system altogether and decommodify housing, thereby making both (neo)classical land theory and rent gap theory 'untrue' (Harvey, 1973, Lees et al., 2008, Slater, 2017, Clark, 2017, Kallin, 2020). While rent gap theory is convincing on a very general level, and its revolutionary prescriptions tempting, Chapter 5 argues that it is only partial and rather blunt in its explanation of the production of gentrification and, as a consequence, disabled to appreciate in any detail the alternative practices of economization that make rent gap theory 'less true'. Two general objections are raised against prevailing rent gap theories. Firstly, by way of structuralist reductionism they tend to trivialize the practices of economization that actually have to 'perceive' or rather construct rent gaps. Over and beyond wallet sizes, however, techniques and affects of construction, valuation and calculation are far from inconsequential and evolve on their own accord. Secondly, once on-the-ground practices come into empirical and comparative focus, they turn out to be oriented only partially toward rent gaps and can be said to construct and chase other 'gaps' as well, gaps of prestige, utility and care. In short, the gap becomes multiple.

To demonstrate this, Chapter 5 takes a deep, comparative dive into the range of prac-

tices of real estate economization that are actualized in Klarendal. It looks at digital databases, material aesthetics and care work and interviews the producers of housing involved with such practices: investors, renovators, realtors and social housing corporations. Four real estate agencements (operative sets of practices) are investigated, each shot through with various symbiotic, ambivalent and contradictory genealogies (tendencies of elitist, populist and autonomist assemblage) and evolutionary affects (capacities of adaptation, 'exaptation' and innovation). The first three cases serve to set the ethical coordinates around which to evaluate the fourth. The first agencement is an internationally operating investor, building a set of new middle class homes on an already cleared area adjacent to the aforementioned playground of Klarendal. Its rational and competitive mode of operation, characterized by a highly sophisticated and comprehensive cross-calculation of costs and potential rents, makes it a veritable gentrification machine. In sharp contrast, the second agencement, focused on the renovation of monuments, is embodied by an assertive and prestige-driven entrepreneur who rather refuses to calculate and instead relies primarily on his abilities to materially reinterpret the 'hidden' appeal of rundown properties. Again very different, the third case is a DIY building collective. In contrast to the former two, its calculative, aesthetic and building practices serve the common purpose of material and social development and embeddedness. Lastly, the fourth agencement is the social housing corporation. As a 'prosthetic' for its economically disabled renters, it has to perform the calculative, aesthetic and utilitarian functions of the preceding cases, but resist the inherent temptations of speculation and prestige. In its own way, it has to counter strong norms of profit-making and short-termism, learn to calculate with different socio-ecological magnitudes and devise creative territorial anti-stigma strategies. In sum, all four agencements construct and pursue their own kinds of gaps, of rent, prestige, utility and care.

Chapter 5 concludes that the real estate market of Klarendal is more than one structure of rents, yet less than many disparate locations and preferences. The agencements that construct it assemble together symbiotic and contradictory practices that are both theoretically and practically irreducible to one rent-seeking capitalist norm. Accordingly, making rent gap theory less true requires a detailed attention to the actually existing diversity of economic practices. Indeed, as argued in the discussion section, aside from wallet sizes and human rights, housing inequality should be approached from a 'clinical' perspective (cf. Deleuze, 1997). This warrants us to develop a practical ethics of care, one that cares for economic disabilities and affirms the 'differently abled' (cf. Moser, 2000). As we learn to appreciate 'cerebrodiversity' (Ferguson, 2008), we should also reclaim our economic dyslexia and dyscalculia by refusing to stigmatize and calculate as is expected from us.

The issue of gentrification politicized

This leaves the realm of politics and the practices of politicization that actualize it. In Chapter 6 theories of gentrification politics and planning are put in critical conversation with the priorly developed actualization theory and the pragmatic tradition of political theory centered around issues and their publics (Dewey, 1954, Latour, 2007).

Two gentrifying neighborhoods from Istanbul and Arnhem are empirically compared: Beyoğlu-Cihangir and Klarendal.

At first glance, the Turkish and Dutch cases of gentrification politics are typical cases of ‘class war’ (best assessed from a Marxist perspective, eg. Smith, 1996, Gürcan and Peker, 2014) and technocratic governance (best appreciated from a post-Marxist or Foucauldian perspective, eg. Davidson, 2012, Uitermark et al., 2007, Uitermark, 2014) respectively. Again, however, while there is some truth to these broad characterizations, they are rather essentialist and, empirically speaking, do not exhaustively describe the range of political practices that places such as Beyoğlu and Klarendal are capable of. The political ontologies informing the standard Marxist and post-Marxist/Foucauldian interpretations of urban politics are ultimately quite incompatible (is power centered and class-based or decentered and discursive?) and as a consequence cases become rather incomparable, disconnected and essentialized. What we need instead, following the suggestions by Latour (2005b, 2007), is a more expansive and refined ontological spectrum of practices along which issues of gentrification emerge and mutate instead of having such concerns fit one essential sort of parliamentary, antagonistic or technocratic mold of politics. The empirical challenge then of such an issue-centered inquiry is to trace the dynamic trajectory that concerns of gentrification ‘travel’, or fail to do, along a continuum of molecular, antagonistic, agonistic, consensus-oriented, aggregative and governmental practices of politicization (respectively). Apart from a more fine-grained analysis, this may also suggest a more varied range of political tactics and strategies.

In both Turkish and Dutch cases, the trajectories that the issue of gentrification took were no linear histories in which it simply evolved from an unaddressed concern to it becoming part of official policy. In many shapes and forms its politicization shifted from antagonizing uprisings to deliberative governance and back. In this regard, the politicization of concerns, or its obstruction, turns out not to depend solely on electoral majorities or the expression of (class) antagonism, as is often implied by standard accounts of the political process. Instead, marginalized matters of concern may, with varying probabilities, gain entry into government planning by way of riots as in Klarendal in 1989, carnivalesque occupations as in Beyoğlu’s Gezi uprising of 2013, legal bricolage as practiced by members of the Turkish Chamber of Urban Planners, participatory budgeting as an application for the renovation of a community center in Klarendal or even pastoral practices as in the ‘urban mission’ of the charismatic Klarendal pastor. However, this also means that at any moment one particular practice may overpower and block certain concerns from being addressed. In Istanbul, for instance, antagonistic planning practices, reinforced by the majoritarian politics of the emerging AKP, steadily displaced the concerns of gentrification of a budding civil society, undermined its litigation options and eventually, in 2013, had to violently beat down the peaceful gentrification protests at Gezi Park. In Arnhem national attempts to politicize gentrification through scientific evaluation programs were successfully challenged by the ‘politics of method’ of more local actors. Another technocratic practice, participatory budgeting, turned out more successful in ‘depoliticizing’ gentrification issues, or rather blocking their address by other means than subsidizable projects.

In conclusion, political displacement takes on many forms besides people being out-voted, excluded or conned into cooperation by technocrats. Rather, concerns of gentrification are addressed or marginalized in different ways, at different times, involving different alliances. In light of these dynamics, and parallel to the foregoing cultivation of singularities and the ethics of care, it becomes crucial that we develop a transversal practice of mesopolitics (cf. Stengers, 2008b). This fine art of everyday urban diplomacy (cf. Sennett, 2012) would know how to reflexively ‘switch gears’ and pivot between practices of politicization when appropriate to the matter at hand. Dedicating itself to the slow and tedious ‘stewarding’ of inclusive concerns into the state apparatus, it could well become the pragmatic actualization of that ‘perennial midwifery’ we now understand democracy to require (Taylor, 2019).

Ontology multiplied

The final chapter summarizes and synthesizes the results of the preceding inquiries and in addition addresses the complex interactions between practices of socialization, economization and politicization. The practices, interpretations and metrics that constitute the event of gentrification resonate and multiply, catalyzing, overflowing and overpowering each other. This is not a simple sum of parts but a dynamic ‘ontological multiplication’. At the level of metrics, there are events of ‘cross-calculation’ when, for instance, rising real estate prices end up in positive policy evaluations, or when demographic data are taken up by real estate appraisal models, credit scores and social housing allocation systems. Moving on to the level of interpretations, there are moments when the relative autonomous domains of social, economic and political communication ‘interpenetrate’. For instance, the economic revaluation of a disadvantaged area may attract a higher class demographic with different identities and moral conceptions which in turn invoke political demands to surveil more intensively or remove the original population. Or conversely, attempts at bringing about a more ‘inclusive’ neighborhood politics may attract only middle class people who ascribe to that cosmopolitan ideal, which in turn defines the area’s economic policy in their interests. We should be careful, however, not to stop multiplying at this level of interpenetration and more precisely ground these narratives in the practices that make them possible in the first place. At practice level there are events of ‘overflowing’ when one kind of practice superimposes itself, interferes with or triggers another (with the use of interpretations and metrics). Antagonistic or majoritarian political practices may block the production or use of social statistics tout court, or conversely, social scientific and budgetary practices may more or less successfully replace a disappointing electoral politics. But there is also overflowing among practices not or under-represented by habitual and dominant narratives. Singularity, care and concern all flow into each other and take flight in the most fragile but significant practices of community art, networks of care and the spiritual ‘staying present’ with the most marginalized matters of concern.

Thus extracted by multidimensional ‘section’, the emerging picture of ontological multiplicity no longer answers to prevailing causal models, and by extension, to the associated positivist or radical position of science in relation to society. In contradistinction to logical empiricist, critical realist or interpretive notions thereof, causation has been

reconceived as nothing more than a contingent process of actualization. ‘Effectuation’ then signifies the performative, counter-actualizing ramifications of these actualizations. When, for instance, a public social event breaks interaction habits and redefines a neighborhood’s vernacular history or when patient, anti-stigmatizing investments of a housing association set a norm proscribing the speculative flipping of properties. Gentrification thus describes both causation and effectuation. Practices of socialization, economization and politicization (usually but not necessarily ‘urban’, ‘middle class’ or ‘capitalist’) overpower other such practices by the actualization of their own interpretations and metrics. But they also simultaneously overpower other practices by more or less directly counter-actualizing them, reshaping their capacities to do, interpret and measure things differently. As for the position of gentrification research, its performativity depends on how it connects in practice with this process. Bringing facts and crying war are not the only modes by which science can care about the world (Stengers, 2011). Just as we have the critical moral duty to address exclusionary relations and help others do so, we should also feel ethically obliged to actively look for unexpected vectors of connection and evolution. The product of deliberate counter-actualization, the ‘diplomatic’ concepts of volcanic singularities, economic dyslexia and urban mesopolitics developed in this thesis have been an attempt to do so.

Good metrics, better interpretations, best practices

The thesis closes off with some suggestions for policy and ‘best practices’ with primary reference to the Dutch–Arnhem–Klarendal context. In terms of economic practice the winds of policy seem to be slowly changing. Under pressure of mounting housing shortages the Dutch national government seems ready to abandon their fixation on stimulating homeownership and taxing social housing providers. As neoliberal dogma seems to wane, the Netherlands may once again reaffirm its status as a laboratory for progressive housing practices. Under such conditions, the observations and contemplations in this thesis become most relevant. A demanding balance has to be struck between economizing more fairly and caring for our urban commons of housing, health, education and community. Besides public resources, this takes courageous action by housing corporations, from management to street-level counselors. On the one hand, dyscalculic housing stock policy means ‘calculating differently’, inserting social and ecological metrics into investment decisions, tinkering upstream within an environment still marked by increasing financialization and slumlordism. On the other hand, dyslexic leadership should cultivate integrity, defy the pull of business prestige and focus on carefully countering territorial stigmas. Beyond and basic to these strategic objectives, however, are the less visible but most crucial practices of daily material, bodily and social care for the disadvantaged and their neighborhoods.

In terms of politics, the issue of housing has, at least until recently, been repressed from the national stage by drifting consensus politics and a cultural antagonism pitting precarious housing consumers against each other. While it is tempting to try and counter this with an economic, class-driven antagonism, it seems more fruitful for the Dutch to rekindle their agonistic capacities (in this regard there is much to learn from Turkey). At city level, especially in mid-sized cities such as Arnhem, a thick par-

liamentary consensus and indecision can become politically asphyxiating. Especially in tandem with efforts at a more integral, area-based governance, politics can become captivated and captured by a static governmentality that is no longer open to marginalized concerns. While this problem cannot just be passed on to the level of the neighborhood (as part of such area-based governance), new solutions remain to be discovered. Meanwhile, at neighborhood level, there are generally no 'best practices'. Some issues are better served by plenary neighborhood meetings, others by neighborhood councils or participatory budgeting. Keeping alive a diversity of relatively autonomous platforms and practices may allow for a nimble mesopolitics, but this requires a renewed civic pedagogy.

In terms of social mixing the first advice to policy-makers is to abandon the strong belief in the 'concentration' hypothesis stating that problems of individual households are somehow made worse by the presence of other disadvantaged residents and that, conversely, the presence of more well-off people would somehow improve their conditions through role model or network effects. Since there is no strong evidence for this, it can never be a reason to displace residents. By extension, aesthetic reasons for mixed urban living, while much more important than critical voices generally admit, can never be sufficient for demolishing or selling social housing either. That being said, however, there is much to be improved in the always dynamic modern city. So while ambitions of 'integration' are often set too high, we need not be content with a mere everyday 'tolerance' in public spaces. Lastly, policy makers, including citizens, should be made aware of the power and contingency of social science 'in the wild'. Statistics and rankings of citizens, neighborhoods and cities are not neutral or natural without a practice enacting them as such. When we counter-actualize the ubiquitous ethnic profiles and livability rankings coming from social scientists, we see that choices are being made and some essential social qualities are not being quantified. Awareness of the bias and performativity of social metrics should inspire more responsibility toward our abstractions.

Nederlandse samenvatting

Gentrificatie contra-actualiseren: Een studie van problemen en praktijken van verdringing in Arnhem, Wenen en Istanboel

Vandaag de dag, zo lijkt het soms, is de verovering door de middenklasse genaamd gentrificatie bijna alomtegenwoordig. Ze koloniseert onze hoofden (Schulman 2016), onze planeet (Lees et al. 2016) en alles ertussenin. Nadat het voor het eerst door Ruth Glass (1964) werd benoemd als geografisch proces van stedelijke verandering en ontheemding van arbeiders in naoorlogs Londen, heeft gentrificatie zich gaandeweg verspreid over de wereld, daarbij voortdurend verandert qua vorm in een zeer divers scala aan plaatselijke en historische contexten (Lees et al. 2015). Daarbij heeft het vrijwel geen enkele sociale, commerciële of politieke praktijk in de stedelijke context maar ook daarbuiten ongemoeid gelaten. Inmiddels rijst dan ook de vraag of het verschijnsel zich niet zodanig heeft doorontwikkeld dat een herziening van de originele definitie en diagnose nodig is. En inderdaad, de geschiedenis van onderzoek en debat over het onderwerp (Lees et al., 2008, 2010, Brown-Saracino, 2010) leest als een tot inzicht komen van de verscheidenheid van gentrificaties in ruimtelijke, historische en culturele zin, zowel in de praktijk als in de beschouwing ervan. De discussies onder de meer Marxistische volgelingen van Glass (bv. Smith, 1979a, Slater, 2006) en andere, minder kapitaal-deterministische stadsgeografen (bv. Ley, 1980, Hamnett 1991) hebben hierin de toon gezet. Inmiddels, na veertig jaar discussie, is er veel meer ruimte voor wetenschappelijk pluralisme in het gentrificatiediscours. Terwijl het historisch gezien een in essentie Marxistisch probleemgebied is (bv. Glass, 1964, Smith, 1979a, Lees et al., 2010), is gentrificatie ondertussen op vruchtbare wijze onderworpen aan vele andere benaderingen, variërend van neoklassieke economie (bv. Schill en Nathan, 1983, Skarburskis, 2010) tot culturele geografie (bv. Mills, 1988, Bourassa, 1993, Ley, 1994, Caulfield, 1989) tot feministische theorie (bv. Rose, 1984, Bondi, 1994) tot Bourdieuviaanse of Polanyiaanse sociologie (bv. Jager, 1986, Butler en Robson, 2001, Bernt, 2012) tot Gramsciaanse/post-Marxistische discoursanalyses (bv. Loopmans, 2008, Davidson, 2009) tot Foucauldiaanse bestuurlijkheidsanalyses (bv. Uitermark et al., 2007, Uitermark, 2014, Sequera en Janoschka, 2015).

En toch hebben populaire paradigma's en hun snelle verklaringen nog steeds de overhand. Ondanks vele pogingen om vrede en integratie te brengen (bv. Clark, 1994, Phillips, 2004, Lees et al., 2008) zijn onderliggende spanningen tussen verklaringsschema's nooit opgelost, over verschillen ten aanzien van agency en structuur, gecentraliseerde en gedecentraliseerde machtsbegrippen, universalisme en postkoloniale specificatie enzovoort. Als resultaat zitten we nu met een rijkelijk voorziene theoretische gereedschapskist om elk economisch, politiek en cultureel aspect van het verschijnsel te verklaren terwijl incommensurabiliteiten blijven bestaan. En dus denken we alles te weten over hoe gentrificatie ontstaat (de belangrijkste 'oorzaken' ervan) en wat het kan doen (de ernstige 'gevolgen'), maar hebben we bij nader inzien slechts te maken een epistemologisch gefragmenteerd begrip van een verondersteld ontologisch ('in essentie') enkelvoudig verschijnsel. Wat we in plaats daarvan nodig hebben is een epistemologisch

eenvoudiger benadering van wat, vandaag de dag en misschien altijd al, een ontologisch meervoudig gebeuren is. Met andere woorden, het zijn niet onze begrippen van gentrificatie die te chaotisch zijn voor wat in wezen, in de kern, een simpel probleem is. Het is een chaotisch probleem dat wij als zodanig moeten leren begrijpen met de juiste theoretische middelen.

Wat houdt het in als je beweert dat gentrificatie een ontologisch meervoudig en chaotisch gebeuren is? ‘Het soort probleem dat een stad is’, in de woorden van Jane Jacobs (1961), is niet een ‘twee-variabelen probleem’, zeg van vraag en aanbod in stedelijke ruimte. Ook niet eens, zoals de beroemde urbanist het zelf zag, een probleem van ‘georganiseerde complexiteit’, waarbij de stad zich presenteert als een veelheid van met elkaar verweven grootheden. De stad, en bij implicatie ook gentrificatie, is eerder een probleem van ‘gestolde chaos’. Het kan niet simpelweg worden gedefinieerd als een verandering in demografische of economische samenstelling van een gebied. Als een fundamenteel relationeel proces gaat het ontologisch vooraf aan en veroorzaakt het dergelijke begrensde eenheden en bewegingen van mensen en kapitaal. Maar gentrificatie is ook geen simpele verzameling voorkeuren en interpretaties gerelateerd aan economische, culturele of epistemische posities. Als een inherent fractioneel gebeuren wordt het beter vevat in de paradoxale formule: meer dan één, minder dan vele (Deleuze en Guattari, 1987, Mol, 2002). Voor zowel burgers als experts is gentrificatie meer dan één, wellicht meerzijdig object, maar ook minder dan zomaar een verzameling van subjectieve verbeeldingen. Dit betekent dat het gebeuren inherent en ontologisch problematisch is. Het is een levend, roerend, gewelddadig en aanhoudend verwarrend probleem dat in materieel-semiotische praktijken nog zijn betekenis moet krijgen.

Als zodanig gebeurt gentrificatie niet zomaar in een werkelijkheid ‘daarbuiten’, in afwachting van interpretatie vanuit epistemisch ongelijksoortige standpunten. Het moet ‘gedaan’ worden worden door een meervoudigheid aan gerelateerde praktijken (inclusief wetenschappelijke praktijken, vgl. Mol, 2002, Callon, 2009). Aan gentrificatie gerelateerde verschijnselen als sociaal mixen, rendementskloven (rent gaps) en neo-liberaal beleid moeten allemaal, om werkelijkheid te worden, uitgevoerd worden middels specifieke praktijken, interpretaties en metingen. Ze zijn geworteld in specifieke praktijken van sociale, economische en politieke aard die altijd verstrengeld zijn met, en in gespannen verhouding staan tot, andere van dergelijke praktijken. Praktijken tonen dan ook hun werking en performativiteit in de manier waarop ze andere praktijken verdringen en overheersen. Oftewel, hoe ze zich actualiseren door interpretaties (identiteiten, waarden, ideologieën) en metingen (feiten, prijzen, stemmen) en daarmee de capaciteiten om dat op een andere manier te doen voortbrengen of verdringen. Zo bezien kan het probleem van gentrificatie opnieuw gedefinieerd worden als een tijdruimtelijke gebeurtenis van verdringing, waarbij sommige sociale, politieke of economische praktijken andere overheersen. Deze nieuwe definitie doet ons wederom, maar dan anderszins de vraag stellen: Hoe ontstaat gentrificatie als probleem en praktijk? En welke gentrificatie-ethiek kan uit deze verklaring resulteren?

Contra-actualisatie: een wetenschap van problemen en praktijken

Zoals aangegeven in de titel van dit proefschrift, heeft het als doel de ‘contra-actualisatie van gentrificatie’. Contra-actualisatie is de term voor de hier beoogde onderzoeksstrategie en het nieuwe diagnostisch instrumentarium dat ons helpt de veelheid aan theorieën en praktijken van gentrificatie omvattend te verkennen. Kort gezegd: de methode werkt op een wijze die contrair is aan de manier waarop verondersteld wordt dat onze wereld zich ontvouwt ofwel actualiseert. Daarbij beweegt zij van oppervlakkige metingen (prijzen, demografie, stempatronen) naar de narratieven en praktijken die daar respectievelijk aan ten grondslag liggen. In de empirische Hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 wordt de onderzoeksstrategie toegepast in de cases van Arnhem, Wenen en Istanboel om zo de verschillende praktijken bloot te leggen die het probleem van gentrificatie in haar vele dimensies voortbrengen. Daaraan voorafgaand behandelen Hoofdstukken 1, 2 en 3 de onderliggende ontologische theorie van actualisatie, het daarvan afgeleide epistemologische directief ervan van contra-actualisatie, de methodologische vertaling in onderzoeksdesign en de mogelijke toepassing ervan in gentrificatie-onderzoek.

Het eerste inleidende hoofdstuk introduceert het probleem en de academische discussie rond gentrificatie in termen van het wanneer, waar, wie en hoe van het proces. Het blijkt dat de tijden, ruimtes en actoren in gentrificatie zich niet exact laten bepalen. Gesuggereerd wordt om te focussen op het ‘hoe’ van gentrificatie: hoe sociale, politieke of economische praktijken andere overheersen. Na deze thematische discussie worden enkele algemene axioma’s van een wetenschap van problemen en praktijken te berde gebracht. De theorie van actualisatie, die een synthese vormt van de metafysische discussies rondom de zogenoemde ‘speculatieve wending’ in de filosofie (Bryant et al., 2011), stelt twee groepen concepten voor ter bestudering van moderne menselijke relaties en hun transformaties. De eerste onderscheidt praktijken, interpretaties en metingen, waarbij praktijken interpretaties voortbrengen en die laatste op hun beurt metingen. De tweede, hiermee samenhangende set concepten onderscheidt praktijken van socialisatie, economisering en politisering, gebaseerd op een evolutionair en ontogenetisch onderscheid tussen singulariteiten, affecten en zorgen (vgl. Deleuze en Guattari, 1987, Latour, 2005b). Gecombineerd leveren beide groepen het conceptuele gereedschap om een voldoende multidimensionale doorsnee van het probleem van gentrificatie te verkrijgen.

Voor epistemologische doeleinden vormt de eerste set echter de sleutel. De epistemische procedure van contra-actualisatie begint met metingen (statistiek, prijzen, stemmen enz.) (1) om daarna de onderliggende interpretaties waarvan die berekeningen een kwantificering zijn te onderzoeken (sociologische theorieën en categorieën, eigendom en voorkeuren, partijprogramma’s en beleid enz.) (2) maar ook opzij te kijken naar interpretaties die niet gekwantificeerd zijn (identiteiten op straatniveau, niet-wettige eigendomsclaims en waarden, ideologieën en organisaties enz.) (3). Vervolgens verbindt het de gekwantificeerde interpretaties met de kwantificatiepraktijken (monitoren, waardebeoordeling, stemprocedures enz.) (4) en verbindt het alternatieve interpretaties met kwalitatieve praktijken die deze voortbrengen (buurtcontact, reclame, protesten enz.) (5). Van daaruit is het mogelijk om de contouren waar te nemen van praktijken die noch gekwalificeerd noch gekwantificeerd zijn en die onderbelicht

blijven (singuliere, plaatsgebonden gebeurtenissen, gedeelde capaciteiten tot zorg, gemarginaliseerde belangen enz.) (6). Wat uit deze procedure voortkomt is niet zomaar een multidimensionaal beeld van een actueel/geactualiseerd gebeuren, maar een alomvattende kijk op andere mogelijkheden en capaciteiten om diversiteit, gelijkheid en democratie te bevorderen.

De actualisatietheorie en contra-actualisatie strategie zijn vertaald in een passende mix van methodes en een rationale voor vergelijkende stadsgeografie. Dit heeft de vorm aangenomen van het Europese, JPI-gefinancierde onderzoeksproject “Practices and policies for neighborhood improvement: towards ‘Gentrification 2.0’”. Samen met drie teams van Universität Wien, Middle Eastern Technical University of Ankara en Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen zijn een gemeenschappelijk onderzoekskader en veldwerkprotocollen bedacht, gebaseerd op de twee eerder genoemde groepen concepten. Metingen, interpretaties en praktijken werden bestudeerd met een mix van methodes variërend van statistiek (op basis van secundaire data) tot interviews en documentenanalyse tot etnografische observatie. Sociale, economische en politieke thema’s rond gentrificatie richtten die methodes op verscheidene actoren, zijnde onder andere bewoners, buurtorganisaties, investeerders, makelaars, planners en politici. De omvangrijke hoeveelheid empirische data die dit opleverde vormde de input voor onze vergelijking van steden. In lijn met recente relationele en postkoloniale interventies in de vergelijkende stadsgeografie (Ward, 2010, Robinson, 2016), en gentrificatie-studies in het bijzonder (Maloutas, 2011, Lees et al., 2015, Lees, 2018), werd een reflectieve poging gedaan om verder dan universalistische communicatiekaders te gaan (ze te ‘ontleren’) en onze multi-lokale etnografie de bijzonderheid van onze respectievelijke cases naar voren te laten brengen.

Sociale wetenschap na de Speculatieve Wending

Het tweede hoofdstuk gaat over de filosofische discussies die de inspiratie vormden en ten grondslag liggen aan de actualisatie-theorie. Zoals gezegd komen deze discussies voort uit de ‘Speculatieve Wending’ binnen de Continentale filosofie (Bryant, et al. 2011) en hebben ze ook ingang gevonden in geografische discussies via concepten als ‘actor-netwerken’ en ‘assemblage’ (bv. McFarlane, 2009, 2011, Farías, 2009, 2011, Brenner et al., 2011). De intellectuele beweging, mogelijk gemaakt en vervat in het werk van onder anderen Bruno Latour, Manuel DeLanda en Quentin Meillassoux, bevrijdt metafysische speculatie uit de algemene ban die erop lag na de grote ‘Kritische Wending’, de Kantiaanse revolutie die het verbod om verder te denken dan het transcendentale verband tussen denken en zijn, gedachte en lichaam, menselijk en niet-menselijk. Om een stevige metafysische basis te leggen onder de actualisatie-theorie die in de rest van het proefschrift wordt ingezet, behandelt het hoofdstuk kritisch en combineert het het werk van de voornoemde filosofen en andere denkers die niet noodzakelijk deel uitmaken van de nieuwe wending. Dit resulteert in een concept van emergentie, of beter actualisatie, ingezet door vier verbonden ‘abstracte machines’ (in navolging van Deleuze en Guattari, 1987, DeLanda, 1997). Al wordt deze term niet verder expliciet gebruikt in de empirische analyses, theoretiseren deze machines de relationele operaties van vouwen, affectiviteit, autopoiesis en kwantificering die de eerder genoemde prob-

leem-gebeurtenissen, praktijken, interpretaties en metingen voortbrengen. Geformuleerd in modaliteiten beschrijft actualisatie de beweging van een open samenloop van tendensen naar een steeds geslotener set van praktische capaciteiten, interpretatieve mogelijkheden en gemeten eigenschappen, waarmee alleen maar een verdere differentiatie en herstructurering van deze modaliteiten wordt getriggerd.

Olifant wordt monster: Een nieuwe 'Kopenhagen-interpretatie' van gentrificatie.

Hoofdstuk 3 past vervolgens deze speculatieve ontologie toe op al langer bestaande debatten over gentrificatie en beschrijft enkele richtingen van onderzoek die opgepakt worden in de daarop volgende hoofdstukken. Gentrificatie is vaak neergezet als een 'chaotisch concept' omdat het zowel theoretisch als empirisch heel moeilijk precies vast te pinnen is. Verscheidene auteurs hebben het gentrificatiedebat omschreven als een groep blinden die samen een olifant aftasten, niet in staat om tot een totaalbeeld van hun gedeelde object te komen door vergelijkbaarheids- en communicatieproblemen (Caulfield, 1989, Hamnett, 1991, Clark, 1992). Nog steeds is het algemene antwoord dat hierop wordt gegeven er een in termen van epistemologische 'complementariteit' van verschillende invalshoeken (Clark, 1992, Lees, 1994, Phillips 2002, 2004), analoog aan de beroemde Kopenhagen-interpretatie in de kwantumfysica (Clark, 1994). Terwijl dit in het verleden ongetwijfeld verlichting heeft gebracht in nogal essentialistische discussies, door onze aandacht te richten op de diverse effecten of 'geografieën van gentrificatie' (Lees 2000, Lees et al., 2015), heeft het nu de causaliteitsvraag overgelaten aan een nogal olifantachtige, tegelijk lomp en berustende het-zij-zo bundel van politiek-economische factoren. Deze ontbeert echter voldoende precisie om theoretisch en ethisch met de 'monsterlijke' veelheid van praktijken om te gaan die gentrificatie überhaupt voortbrengen. Daarom, zo wordt hier beargumenteerd, moeten we terugkeren naar de originele en zo vaak onbegrepen Kopenhagen-interpretatie van de kwantumfysica (Barad, 2007), om niet alleen de epistemologische complexiteit van gentrificatie beter te leren respecteren (Lees, 1996), maar verder dan dat, haar ontologische meervoudigheid te engageren.

Met dit doel voor ogen wordt de epistemische procedure van contra-actualisatie geresumeerd in het licht van gentrificatie en rudimentair en programmatisch toegepast op drie belangrijke sub-thema's: sociale menging, rendementskloven en neoliberaal stadsbestuur. Het eerste thema luidt Hoofdstuk 4 in en gaat over praktijken van socialisatie. Gentrificatie mixt mensen uit verschillende klassen, etniciteiten en andere identiteitsaspecten en dit impliceert onthemende effecten wanneer identiteiten en gewoontes botsen in media-discussies en op straatniveau. Door contra-actualisatie vinden we niet alleen deze verdringingen tussen officiële statistieken en alledaagse interacties in, maar openen we ook het zicht op minder dagelijkse, minder gebruikelijke voorbeelden van constructief sociaal mengen. Ten aanzien van het tweede thema, dat verder wordt uitgewerkt in Hoofdstuk 5, is contra-actualisatie een manier om de rol van praktijken van economisering in gentrificatie te erkennen in plaats van te trivialisieren. Rendementskloven, die het plaatsspecifieke verschil aangeven tussen huidig kapitaalrendement en rendement dat kan worden verkregen door herinvestering, worden op verscheidene manieren verricht door verschillend gemotiveerde actoren. Dit moet,

zo wordt betoogd, ook een verschil gaan uitmaken in hoe investeringspraktijken empirisch en ethisch te beoordelen. Tenslotte wordt, ten aanzien van het derde thema van neoliberal stadbestuur, gesuggereerd dat contra-actualisatie meer waardering kan voortbrengen voor de diversiteit aan praktijken die gentrificatie politiseren en daarmee ook het snelle hermeneutische wantrouwen tempert dat overal enkel 'neoliberale' onderdrukking lijkt te zien. Dit en andere punten worden in Hoofdstuk 6 verder uitgewerkt. Zo sluit Hoofdstuk 3 het voorbereidingswerk af voor de empirische studies die erop volgen.

Tectonische en vulkanische socialisaties

Middels een vergelijking van praktijken van socialiseren in Klarendal, Arnhem, en Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, Wenen, contrasteert Hoofdstuk 4 het gentrificatie-gerelateerde begrip 'sociale tektoniek' (bv. Butler en Robson, 2001, Slater, 2005) met een nieuw concept van 'vulkanische singulariteiten' om ons blikveld op het onderwerp van sociale menging te verbreden.

Het hoofdstuk sluit aan bij het voortdurende debat over de sociale samenstelling van buurten en de goede of slechte effecten van het mengen van mensen uit verschillende klassen, etniciteiten enzovoort. Terwijl sommigen zeggen dat het sociaal vermengen van stadsbuurten een effectieve manier is om problematische concentraties van arme mensen en de 'buurteffecten' die hen achter stellen tegen te gaan (bv. Galster, 2007), zeggen anderen dat dit 'stiekeme gentrificatie' is (Bridge et al., 2012). Mengen, zo zeggen de laatsten, levert vooral identiteitsclashes en 'sociale tektoniek' op (naar de geologische metafoor van tektonische platen die tegen elkaar schuren met nu en dan frictie tot gevolg). Weer anderen (Blokland en Nast, 2014, Blokland en Schultze, 2017) zeggen dat zowel positieve als kritische visies op sociaal mixen veel te ambitieuze idealen hebben over integratie of, in het geval van de critici, een geromantiseerd beeld hebben van (niet-gemixte) achterstandswijken. Daarom moeten we, zo stellen zij, de aanwezigheid erkennen van een soort 'publieke vertrouwdeheid', welke een alledaagse comfortzone van zwakke interactie omschrijft die een onopvallend maar belangrijk gevoel van thuis voelen oplevert. Hoofdstuk 4 hoopt een vierde invalshoek toe te voegen, in lijn met eerdere provocatieve suggesties dat een zekere mate van sociale onrust goed is (Mumford 1938, Sennett 1970, Sarkissian et al., 1990). Met erkenning van de gebreken van zowel het beleid als de kritische perspectieven en hoe ze allebei nogal onrealistische idealen van integratie en sociale mobiliteit aanhangen, verzet het hoofdstuk zich ook tegen de fixatie op het gebied van alledaagse interactie en comfort als de noodzakelijke plek van sociaal mixen, of de mislukking daarvan. In plaats daarvan vraagt het zich af of er momenten zijn van affirmatief sociaal mixen die noch op harmonie, noch op comfortabele onverschilligheid uitkomen. Wat te denken van de niet zo alledaagse gewoontes-doorbrekende gebeurtenissen die weinig sociaal-economische impact hebben maar toch erin slagen om mensen buiten hun comfortzone te mengen? 'Sociale tektoniek', zo blijkt, wordt soms doorbroken door 'vulkanische singulariteiten'.

In Hoofdstuk 4 bepaalt contra-actualisatie vrij nauwgezet de narratieve vorm, van de ene casus naar de andere: gevonden sociale metingen bepalen het decor, waarna de-

mografische categorieën tegenover dagelijkse interactie tussen buren op straatniveau worden geplaatst en tenslotte worden gebeurtenissen onderzocht die deze habituele relaties ontrafelen. Op het niveau van sociale metingen verschillen Klarendal en Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus in hoe deze worden gemaakt en gebruikt. Terwijl de Nederlanders ze uitgebreid inzetten met een zwaar accent op etnische minderheden, uitkeringsgerechtigden en leefbaarheid (in plaats van bv. klasse) vermijden de Weense autoriteiten ze in het algemeen en moeten we bij vastgoedmarketeers zijn voor het gebruik van metingen. Parallel hieraan zijn de ideeën over waar 'sociale balans' is te vinden verschillend: in metingen of op straatniveau. Niettemin, in beide buurten wisselen momenten van tektonische wrijving en tolerant samenzijn zich af. In Klarendal is er volgens sommigen sprake van een onzichtbare muur tussen tegenover elkaar wonende huurders en woningeigenaren, maar ook van een onopvallende vertrouwdheid in de buurtspeeltuin. Ook de Weense buren, die al snel overheidsingrijpen eisen om publieke fricties op te lossen en te reguleren, verzekeren zich van hun eigen comfortzones van tolerantie in de openbare ruimte. Dat gezegd, laten beide casussen ook hun eigen singuliere gebeurtenissen van sociaal mixen zien die neerkomen op harmonieuze uitwissing van verschillen noch fenomenologische ontheemding. In Klarendal was het een community art project genaamd Ballroom Theater, volgens alle betrokkenen een onovertroffen succes. Als een laagdrempelige en veelzijdige reeks vaudeville avonden waarbij hoge en lage cultuur zorgvuldig werden gemixt, wist het evenement diep ingesleten gewoontes te doorbreken en identiteitskloven te overbruggen via kunst en culturele 'grensobjecten'. In Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus was de singulariteit in kwestie er een van minder explosieve tijdelijkheid: het pretentieloze en onhandig ingedeelde plein genaamd Schwendermarkt. De aangekondigde sloop ervan maakte een serie ruimteclaims los die het 'gemeente' (commons) karakter van de plek onthulde, als een weerbarstig obstakel voor zowel economisering (monoculturele verhipping) als politisering (multiculturele regulering). Zowel Ballroom Theater als Schwendermarkt slaagden er als zeldzame 'vulkanische' singulariteiten in om tijdelijk gewoontes te doorbreken, praktijken van socialisering te mixen en nieuwe gedeelde geschiedenis te schrijven.

Het hoofdstuk concludeert dat 'succesvol' sociaal mengen niet harmonieuze 'integratie' hoeft in te houden, laat staan sociale mobiliteit. Dus hoeft de afwezigheid van dit soort resultaten geen mislukking te betekenen. Minder ambitieuze doelen kunnen ook voldoende reden zijn om diversiteit te waarderen en gemixt wonen te plannen. Deze doelen kunnen echter, ten eerste, nauwelijks de verkoop of sloop van sociale woningen rechtvaardigen in een situatie van al grote tekorten (vgl. Gans, 1961: 183). Ten tweede hoeft het mengen zich niet af te spelen in alledaagse interacties, maar kan het vorm krijgen in unieke en betekenisvolle evenementen. Ten derde impliceert dit niet-zo-dagelijks soort sociaal mengen niet noodzakelijkerwijs een warm bad van sociaal comfort en dit zou oké moeten zijn in elke diverse, werkelijk stadse omgeving (Sennett, 1970). Tot slot gaat sociaal mixen in de praktijk niet per se om de spanning tussen segregatie en kosmopolitisch respect voor diversiteit, maar tussen een staat van multi- of monoculturele onverschilligheid enerzijds en een affirmatieve differentiatie van het buurtleven anderzijds door het cultiveren van singulariteiten. De afsluitende discussieparagraaf verbindt het voorgaande idee van singulariteit met de kwestie van wat in relationele zin bepalend is voor een 'plaats' (zoals ondervraagd door Massey,

1994, 2005). Gesuggereerd wordt dat het concept metastabiliteit afkomstig uit de dynamische systeemtheorie ons in de praktijk kan helpen zien en koesteren wat een plaats interessant, levendig en 'niet-gemiddeld' maakt (Jacobs, 1961).

Economiseringen die de rendementskloof min of meer waar maken

Door dieper in te gaan op de casus Klarendal, Arnhem, gaat Hoofdstuk 5 in op de variatie in praktijken en zogenaamde 'agencements' van economisering op het gebied van vastgoedontwikkeling. Sterk verwant aan Michel Callons economische antropologie (Çalışkan en Callon, 2009, 2010), combineert dit hoofdstuk inzichten uit de evolutionaire economie, praktijktheorieën van cognitie, bestuurlijkheidstheorie en disability studies om niet alleen een kritische beschouwing over de productie van gentrificatie te ontwikkelen, maar ook een 'klinisch' begrip ervan, in termen van zorgethiek (vgl. Gibson-Graham en Roelvink, 2009).

De meest prominente uitleg van gentrificatie vanuit de invalshoek van haar productie is de zogenoemde theorie van de rendementskloof (rent gap) (Smith, 1979a, 1996, Lees et al., 2008, Slater, 2017, Clark, 1988, 2017, Kallin, 2017, 2020). Als een Marxistische, historisch dialectische herinterpretatie van (neo)klassieke en stedelijk ecologische theorieën van landmarkten beweert de rent gap theorie dat in een zich geografisch ongelijk ontwikkelende kapitalistische economie gentrificatie zich het meest waarschijnlijk voordoet op een plaats waar het verschil voldoende groot is tussen het huidige rendement van het vastgoed en het potentiële rendement dat eruit zou kunnen worden verkregen bij het voorgestelde 'meest hoogwaardige en beste gebruik'. Omdat de theorie zowel het voorafgaande verval als de verdringing na herinvestering inherent aan het kapitalisme beschouwt, is zij de politieke mening toegedaan dat om een efficiëntere en rechtvaardigere toewijzing van land te bewerkstelligen het marktsysteem helemaal moet worden geëlimineerd en huisvesting gedecommodificeerd moet worden, waardoor zowel de (neo)klassieke landtheorie als de rendementskloof 'onwaar' gemaakt worden (Harvey, 1973, Lees et al., 2008, Slater, 2017, Clark, 2017, Kallin, 2020). Hoewel de rent gap theorie op een heel algemeen niveau erg overtuigend is en de revolutionaire recepten die eruit voortkomen aantrekkelijk, stelt Hoofdstuk 5 dat het slechts gedeeltelijk en nogal bot de productie van gentrificatie uitlegt en daarom niet in staat is precies de alternatieve praktijken van economisering te waarderen die de rendementskloof 'minder waar' maken. Er worden twee algemene bezwaren gemaakt tegen gangbare rent gap theorieën. Ten eerste dat ze door structuralistisch reductionisme praktijken van economisering trivialisieren die de rendementskloven daadwerkelijk moeten 'zien', of beter, construeren. Voorbij portemonneegroottes zijn technieken en affecten van bouw, waardebeoordeling en berekening echter verre van triviaal te noemen en leiden ze zo hun eigen leven. Ten tweede, wanneer praktijken eenmaal empirisch en comparatief in beeld komen, blijken ze slechts gedeeltelijk georiënteerd op rendementskloven en kun je zeggen dat ze ook andere 'kloven' najagen, kloven in prestige, nut en zorg. Kortom, de kloof wordt meervoudig.

Om dit aan te tonen neemt Hoofdstuk 5 een diepe duik in het scala van praktijken van vastgoedeconomisering die zich actualiseren in Klarendal. Het kijkt naar digitale da-

tabases, materiële esthetiek en zorgwerk en interviewt de producenten van huizen die zich met die praktijken inlaten: investeerders, renoveerders, makelaars en sociale woningcorporaties. Vier vastgoed agencements (operationele sets van praktijken) worden onderzocht, ieder een vehikel van verscheidene symbiotische, ambivalente en tegenstrijdige genealogieën (neigingen tot elitaire, populistische en autonome assemblage) en evolutionaire affecten (capaciteiten voor adaptatie, 'exaptatie' en innovatie). De eerste drie cases dienen om de ethische kaders te stellen waarbinnen de vierde kan worden geëvalueerd. De eerste agencement is een internationaal opererende investeerder die een stel nieuwe middenklasse woningen bouwt op een reeds vrijgemaakt stuk grond grenzend aan de eerder genoemde speeltuin van Klarendal. Zijn rationele en concurrerende manier van werken, gekarakteriseerd door een zeer geavanceerde en allesomvattende doorberekening van kosten en potentiële rendementen, maakt het een gentrificatie-machine bij uitstek. In scherp contrast daarmee staat de tweede agencement, welke is gefocust op de renovatie van monumenten en wordt belichaamd door een assertieve en door prestige gedreven ondernemer. In plaats van alles door te rekenen vertrouwt deze primair op zijn materieel-hermeneutische vaardigheid om de 'verborgen' allure van verwaarloosde panden te 'zien'. Weer heel anders is de derde casus, een doe-het-zelf bouwcollectief. In tegenstelling tot de eerste twee dienen de berekeningen, esthetiek en bouwpraktijken het gemeenschappelijke doel van materiële en sociale ontwikkeling en verbondenheid. Tenslotte is er de vierde agencement, de sociale woningcorporatie. Als een 'prothese' voor haar economisch geïnvaleerde huurders moet ze de calculatieve, esthetische en utilitaire functies vervullen zoals deze naar voren kwamen in de drie eerder genoemde cases, maar ook de bijkomende verleidingen van financiële speculatie en publiek prestige weerstaan. Op haar eigen wijze moet ze opboksen tegen dominante normen van winstbejag en kortetermijndenken, leren calculeren met andere socio-ecologische factoren en creatieve strategieën tegen stigmatisering verzinnen. Bij elkaar genomen, construeren en jagen alle vier de agencements hun eigen (combinatie van) kloven na, van rendement, prestige, nut en zorg.

Hoofdstuk 5 concludeert dat de vastgoedmarkt van Klarendal meer is dan één coherente structuur van rendementen, doch minder dan een losse veelheid van percelen en voorkeuren. De agencements die de markt maken brengen een meervoudigheid van symbiotische en tegenstrijdige praktijken samen die zowel theoretisch als praktisch niet te reduceren zijn tot één rendement zoekende kapitalistische norm. Daardoor vereist het minder waar maken van de rent gap theorie gedetailleerde aandacht voor de echt bestaande verscheidenheid aan economische praktijken. Oftewel, zoals gesteld wordt in de discussieparagraaf, ongelijkheid in wonen is meer dan een kwestie van mensenrechten en portemonneegrootte. Deze hoofdbestanddelen van de kritische blik op land en wonen moeten daarom worden aangevuld met een 'klinisch' perspectief (vgl. Deleuze, 1997). Dit zet ons aan een praktische zorgethiek te ontwikkelen, een die zich bekommert om economische invaliditeiten en 'anders-validen' erkent (vgl. Moser, 2000). Zoals we ook 'neurodiversiteit' leren waarderen (Ferguson, 2008) moeten we ook onze economische dyslexie en dyscalculie omarmen en weigeren te stigmatiseren en rekenen zoals dat van ons wordt verwacht.

De kwestie van gentrificatie gepolitiseerd

Blijft over, het rijk van de politiek en de praktijken van politisering die het actualiseren. In Hoofdstuk 6 worden theorieën van gentrificatiepolitiek en -planning kritisch onderworpen aan de eerder ontwikkelde actualisatiebenadering en het politiektheoretisch pragmatisme rond kwesties en hun publieken (Dewey, 1954, Latour, 2007). Twee gentrificerende buurten in Istanboel en Arnhem worden empirisch vergeleken: Beyoğlu-Cihangir en Klarendal.

Op het eerste gezicht zijn de Turkse en Nederlandse cases van gentrificatiepolitiek typische gevallen van, respectievelijk, 'klassenoorlog' (het best verstaan vanuit Marxistisch oogpunt, bv. Smith, 1996, Gürcan en Peker, 2014) en technocratisch bestuur (begrepen vanuit post-Marxistisch of Foucauldiaans perspectief, bv. Davidson, 2012, Uitermark et al., 2007, Uitermark, 2014). Hoewel deze brede karakteriseringën zeker enig hout snijden, zijn ze nogal essentialistisch en in empirische zin niet bij machte volledig recht te doen aan de variatie aan politieke praktijken waar plaatsen als Beyoğlu en Klarendal toe in staat zijn. De politieke ontologieën die ten grondslag liggen aan de standaard Marxistische en post-Marxistische/Foucauldiaanse interpretaties van stedelijke politiek zijn uiteindelijk nogal incompatibel (is macht gecentreerd en op klasse gebaseerd of gedecentraliseerd en discursief?) met het gevolg dat cases nogal onvergelijkbaar en geëssentialiseerd worden. Wat we daarom nodig hebben, in navolging van Latour (2005b, 2007), is een meer uitgebreid en verfijnd spectrum van praktijken waarlangs kwesties van gentrificatie opkomen en muteren, in plaats van de kwestie in één soort liberaal-parlementaire, antagonistische of technocratische mal te forceren. De empirische uitdaging van zo'n issue-gestuurd onderzoek is dan om het dynamische traject te traceren dat zorgen van gentrificatie min of meer succesvol doorlopen langs een continuüm van (respectievelijk) moleculaire, antagonistische, agonistische, consensus-georiënteerde, aggregatieve en bestuurlijke praktijken van politisering. Behalve een meer gedetailleerde analyse kan dit ook een meer gevarieerd scala van politieke tactieken en strategieën voorstellen.

In zowel de Turkse als Nederlandse casus waren de trajecten die de kwestie van gentrificatie doorliep geen rechtlijnige verhalen waarin ze simpelweg evolueerde van een onbeantwoorde zorg tot het onderdeel worden van officieel beleid. In vele gedaanten en vormen verschoof de politisering ervan van antagonistische opstanden naar deliberatief bestuur en weer terug. In dit opzicht blijkt de politisering van zorgen, of de obstructie ervan, niet af te hangen van alleen maar electorale meerderheden of de uitdrukking van (klasse) tegenstellingen, zoals vaak wordt geïmpliceerd in standaard verslagen van het politieke proces. In plaats daarvan kunnen gemarginaliseerde zorgen, min of meer waarschijnlijk, een plaats krijgen in overheidsplannen via rellen zoals in Klarendal in 1989; carnavaleske pleinbezettingen zoals in Beyoğlu's Gezi opstand in 2013; wettelijk geknutsel zoals geïmplementeerd door leden van de Turkse Kamer van Stedebouwkundigen; participatief budgetteren zoals in het Klarendalse wijkoverleg; of zelfs in pastorale activiteiten zoals die van de charismatische Klarendalse buurtpastor. Dit betekent echter ook dat op enig moment een bepaalde praktijk het adresseren van bepaalde zorgen kan overweldigen en blokkeren. In Istanboel, bijvoorbeeld, drukten antagonistische praktijken, gesterkt door de meerderheidspolitiek van de opkomende

AKP, steeds meer de zorgen over gentrificatie weg van een ontluikend maatschappelijk middenveld, ondermijnden mogelijkheden tot juridisch beroep en zouden uiteindelijk in 2013 een vreedzaam gentrificatieprotest in het Gezi Park gewelddadig neerslaan. In Arnhem werden pogingen om gentrificatie te politiseren via wetenschappelijke evaluatieprogramma's succesvol aangevochten door de 'methodepolitiek' van meer lokale actoren. Een andere technocratische praktijk, burgerbegroting, bleek succesvoller in het 'depolitiseren' van gentrificatiekwesities, of beter, het blokkeren van hun behandeling via andere middelen dan lokaal subsidiabele projecten.

Tenslotte, politieke verdringing kent vele gedaantes anders dan electoraal overwicht, directe uitsluiting van het politieke proces of het slinks tot medewerking worden gemanipuleerd door technocraten. Zorgen over gentrificatie worden op verschillende manieren, op verschillende tijden en in verschillende allianties politiek opgepakt of gemarginaliseerd. In het licht van deze dynamiek en parallel aan de voorgaande cultivering van singulariteiten en de ethiek van zorg wordt het cruciaal dat we een transversale praktijk van mesopolitiek gaan ontwikkelen (vgl. Stengers, 2008b). Deze verfijnde kunst van de alledaagse urbane diplomatie (vgl. Sennett, 2012) moet reflexief kunnen 'schakelen' en pivoteren tussen praktijken van politisering naar gelang de onderhavige kwestie. Door zich te wijden aan het trage en saaie 'binnenloodsen' van inclusieve belangen in het overheidsapparaat zou het zomaar de pragmatische uitwerking kunnen zijn van de 'eeuwige verloskunde' die, zo weten we nu, een levende democratie vereist (Taylor, 2019).

Ontologie in meervoud

Het laatste hoofdstuk vat de resultaten samen van voorgaande onderzoeken, maar gaat ook verder en behandelt de complexe interacties tussen praktijken van socialisatie, economisering en politisering. De praktijken, interpretaties en cijfers die de gebeurtenis van gentrificatie omvatten resoneren en vermenigvuldigen zich, elkaar katalyserend, in elkaar overlopend en elkaar overheersend. Dit is geen simpele optelsom van onderdelen maar een dynamische 'ontologische vermenigvuldiging'. Op het kwantitatieve vlak zijn er gebeurtenissen van 'kruislingse berekening' als, bijvoorbeeld, stijgende vastgoedprijzen onderdeel worden van positieve beleidsevaluaties of als demografische data opgepikt worden door vastgoedtaxatiemodellen, krediet-scores en systemen van sociale woningtoewijzing. Gaan we door naar het niveau van interpretaties, dan zijn er momenten dat de relatief autonome domeinen van sociale, economische en politieke communicatie elkaar 'interpenetren'. De economische herwaardering van een achtergesteld gebied kan, bijvoorbeeld, een demografische groep van een hogere klasse aantrekken met andere identiteiten en morele opvattingen die op hun beurt politieke eisen stellen om intensiever te surveilleren of de originele bevolking te verwijderen. Of andersom, pogingen om een meer 'inclusief' wijkbeleid te realiseren kunnen slechts middenklassers aantrekken die dat politieke ideaal onderschrijven, wat vervolgens het economische beleid voor de buurt in hun voordeel bepaalt. Hier houdt het vermenigvuldigen echter niet op en moeten we doorzetten en deze narratieven van interpenetratie gronden in de praktijken die ze in eerste instantie voortbrengen. Op praktijkniveau zijn er gebeurtenissen van 'in elkaar overlopen'

als één soort praktijk zich opdringt aan of bemoeit met een ander of een andere trigger (gebruik makend van interpretaties en metingen). Antagonistische of meerderheidspolitieke praktijken kunnen de productie en het gebruik van sociale statistieken volledig blokkeren of, andersom, sociaalwetenschappelijke en budgettaire praktijken kunnen een teleurstellende electorale politiek gaan vervangen. Maar er vindt ook overloop plaats tussen praktijken die niet of ondervertegenwoordigd zijn door de gebruikelijke en dominante narratieven. Sociale singulariteit, economische zorg en politieke bezorgdheid vloeien allemaal in elkaar over en nemen een vlucht in de meest breekbare maar significante praktijken van community art, zorgnetwerken en het spiritueel ‘aanwezig zijn’ bij de meest gemarginaliseerde zaken en zorgen.

Het zo middels een meerdimensionale ‘doorsnede’ gewonnen beeld van ontologische meervoudigheid beantwoordt niet langer aan gangbare oorzaak-gevolgmodellen en, daardoor, ook niet aan de daarmee geassocieerde positivistische of kritische opvattingen over de relatie tussen wetenschap en maatschappij. Als alternatief voor de logisch-empiristische, kritisch realistische of interpretatieve noties is ‘causatie’ opnieuw geconcipieerd als niet meer dan een contingent proces van actualisatie. ‘Effectuering’ duidt dan op de performatieve, contra-actualiserende uitwerkingen van dit proces. Als, bijvoorbeeld, een sociaal evenement zoals Ballroom of Schwendermarkt ingesloten interactiepatronen doorbreekt en de volkse geschiedenis van een buurt herschrijft; of als geduldige, anti-stigmatiserende investeringen door een woningcorporatie een nieuwe norm stellen die het speculatieve ‘flippen’ van vastgoed verbiedt. Gentrificatie beschrijft op deze wijze zowel veroorzaking als effectuering. Praktijken van socialisering, economisering en politisering (meestal, maar niet per se ‘stedelijk’, ‘van de middenklasse’ of ‘kapitalistisch’) overheersen andere dergelijke praktijken door de actualisatie van eigen interpretaties en cijfers. Maar tegelijkertijd overheersen ze andere praktijken door ze min of meer direct te contra-actualiseren, door het herschikken van hun capaciteiten om dingen anders te doen, te interpreteren en te meten. Wat betreft de positie van gentrificatie-onderzoek zelf is de performativiteit ervan afhankelijk van hoe het in de praktijk verbonden is met dit proces van herschikking. Koude feiten constateren of de oorlog verklaren zijn niet de enige wijzen waarop wetenschap voor de wereld kan zorgen en haar bezorgdheid kan uiten (Stengers, 2011). Net zoals we de kritische morele plicht hebben uitsluitende verhoudingen aan te vechten en anderen moeten helpen om dit te doen, horen we ons ook ethisch verplicht te voelen om actief op zoek te zijn naar onverwachte richtingen van verbinding en evolutie. Als producten van bedachtzame contra-actualisatie zijn de ‘diplomatieke’ concepten van vulkanische singulariteiten, economische dyslexie en urbane mesopolitiek die in dit proefschrift zijn ontwikkeld een poging om dit te doen.

Goede cijfers, betere interpretaties, best practices

Het proefschrift sluit af met enkele suggesties voor beleid en ‘best practices’ met verwijzing vooral naar de Nederlandse context. Wat betreft economische praktijk lijken de beleidswinden langzaam anders te gaan waaien. Onder druk van groeiende woningtekorten lijkt de nationale overheid in Nederland klaar om haar fixatie op het stimuleren van huizenbezit en het belasten van sociale woningbouwers achter zich te laten.

Met het verzwakken van neoliberalistische dogma's zou Nederland zich zo maar weer eens kunnen bewijzen als hét laboratorium voor progressieve huisvestingspraktijken. Onder dergelijke omstandigheden worden de beschouwingen en overdenkingen in dit proefschrift enkel relevanter. Een ambitieuze balans moet worden gevonden tussen eerlijker economiseren en zorgen voor onze stedelijke meent (commons), oftewel onze gedeelde huisvesting, zorg, onderwijs en gemeenschap. Naast publieke gelden vergt dit moedige daadkracht van woningcorporaties, van directie tot consultants op straatniveau. Aan de ene kant betekent 'dyscalculistisch' woningvoorraadbeheer dat we anders moeten gaan rekenen, door sociale en ecologische kwantiteiten direct mee te laten wegen bij investeringsbeslissingen. Dat zal een moeizaam stroomopwaarts 'knutselen' zijn, in een omgeving gedefinieerd door financialisering en huisjesmelkerij. Aan de andere kant moet dyscalculistisch leiderschap integriteit cultiveren, de verleiding van zakelijk prestige weerstaan en focussen op een voorzichtig bestrijden van territoriale stigma's. Verder dan en aan de basis van deze strategische doelen liggen echter de minder zichtbare maar absoluut cruciale praktijken van de dagelijkse materiële, lichamelijke en sociale zorg voor achtergestelde bewoners en hun buurten.

Tot voor kort is in politieke termen huisvesting weggedrukt van het nationale toneel door stuurloze consensuspolitiek en een cultureel antagonisme dat kwetsbare woonconsumenten tegen elkaar opzet. Hoewel het verleidelijk is om dit te bestrijden met een economisch, klassegedreven antagonisme, lijkt het voor Nederland nuttiger onze agonistische capaciteiten nieuw leven in te blazen (in dit opzicht is er veel te leren van Turkije). Op stadsniveau, vooral in middelgrote steden als Arnhem, kan een te dikke consensus en besluiteloosheid in de gemeenteraad politiek verstikkend werken. Vooral in combinatie een meer integraal, wijkgericht bestuur kan politiek gevangen raken in een statische bestuurlijkheid die niet langer open staat voor gemarginaliseerde zorgen en belangen. Omdat dit probleem niet zomaar kan worden doorgeschoven naar buurtniveau (als onderdeel van zulk wijkgericht werken) blijven er nieuwe oplossingen om te ontdekken. Tegelijkertijd zijn er op buurtniveau in het algemeen geen 'best practices'. Sommige kwesties zijn beter gediend bij plenair buurtoverleg, andere bij wijkraden of burgerbegroting. Het levend houden van een variëteit van relatief autonome platformen en praktijken kan ruimte maken voor behendige mesopolitiek, maar hiervoor is een hernieuwde civiele pedagogiek vereist.

In termen van sociaal mixen is het eerste advies aan beleidsmakers het verlaten van het sterke geloof in de 'concentratie hypothese' die stelt dat problemen van individuele huishoudens op de een of andere manier verergeren door de aanwezigheid van andere achtergestelde bewoners en dat, andersom, de aanwezigheid van meer welgestelde mensen op een of andere wijze hun omstandigheden zouden doen verbeteren via rolmodel- of netwerkeffecten. Aangezien hiervoor geen sterk bewijs is mag het nooit een reden zijn om bewoners uit huis en buurt te plaatsen. Daarom ook kunnen esthetische redenen voor gemengd wonen nooit voldoende reden zijn voor de sloop of verkoop van sociale woningen. Dat gezegd hebbende is er veel te verbeteren in de altijd dynamische moderne stad. Dus hoewel ambities ten aanzien van 'integratie' vaak te hoog liggen, moeten we ons niet neerleggen bij slechts een alledaagse 'tolerantie' in de openbare ruimte. Tenslotte dienen beleidsmakers, burgers inclusief, bewust gemaakt te worden van de kracht en contingentie van sociale wetenschap 'in het wild'. Statistiek en

rangschikking van burgers, buurten en steden zijn niet neutraal of natuurlijk zonder een praktijk die ze als zodanig presenteert. Als we de alomtegenwoordige etnische profielen en leefbaarheidscores van sociale wetenschappers contra-actualiseren zien we dat er keuzes worden gemaakt en vaak essentiële sociale kenmerken niet worden gekwantificeerd. Bewustzijn van de bias en uitwerking van sociale metingen moeten ons inspireren meer verantwoordelijkheid te nemen richting deze machtige abstracties.